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ABSTRACT 
Singapore is a highly controlled society. This thesis 
shows how the system of social control works as a whole. 
It does this by examining the details of social regulation 
in relation to political struggles, the phases of capital 
accumulation, and the alliance between the People's Action 
Party-state and foreign capital. 
A theoretical consideration of social control critically 
examines traditions which have related economic strategies 
to political resistance and to the role of the state. This 
chapter acts as a resource to identify and address issues 
which emerge in the subsequent detailed study of Singapore. 
The historical origins of current state repression are 
located in the British response to the anti-imperialist 
uprising in the post-war period. During the transition to 
political independence, the Lee Kuan Yew-faction of the 
People's Action Party built its alliance with foreign 
capital under the shelter of colonial-state violence. 
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A survey of theoretical approaches to Singapore's political 
economy favours an interpretation which sees local 
struggles as the driving force of change within the context 
of the latest phases of imperialism. 
The greater part of the thesis concentrates on the concrete 
ways that social control has worked in singapore since the 
PAP came to power. Major institutions are studied in 
depth: public housing, education, elections and parliament, 
and the law. Each highlights a major aspect of social 
control. 
The system of state welfare provision through public 
housing and education stratifies society, forces people 
into wage labour and induces political loyalty. 
Parliamentarism and the forms of liberal democracy help to 
convert submission into consent. If consent is not 
forthcoming, then the coercive powers of the law and the 
military are applied. 
The thesis concludes by showing how different political 
struggles were met by different forms of social control 
during the various stages of Singapore's economic 
development. The result is an overview of the way the 
whole system of social control works. 
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INTRODUCTION 
This thesis investigates the nature of social control in 
Singapore and develops a way of understanding it 
theoretically in relation to singapore's political economy. 
These tasks have not been attempted before in any 
comprehensive study either within or outside the country. 
This is partly because the dominant view of Singapore's 
political economy gives little indication that social 
control is an important aspect of social relations in the 
city state, which is seen as an economic miracle, a 
veritable haven of prosperity and contentment. The 
steadily rising standard of living is credited to the 
efficacy of People's Action Party (PAP) rule and often to 
the personal wisdom of Lee Kuan Yew. If noted at all, the 
authoritarianism of the government is seen as no more than 
the necessary imposition of discipline on a potentially 
fractious electorate for its own economic good. 
Yet the political atmosphere in Singapore is one of nagging 
fear born of decades of repression. People are constantly 
aware of the political limits on personal behaviour imposed 
by the state. Almost every action of each government 
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organ, no matter how superficially insignificant, is 
analysed for its political implications. When the full 
weight of PAP-state power is brought to bear on individuals 
through the internal security apparatus, collective anxiety 
blooms into widespread fear. 
The apparent contradiction between prosperity and fear 
stimulated this research. It did not take long to discover 
that this was no contradiction, that the price of the 
prosperity for the few is the fear of the many. 
The Need for Social Control 
Inequality is a major characteristic of Singapore society. 
The wealthiest ten per cent of households take about thirty 
per cent of total income, while the poorest ten per cent 
are left with two or three per cent of total income (Pugh 
1989: 842). Furthermore, this inequitable distribution of 
household income has been worsened by the PAP-state's low-
wage, high-technology policies for economic growth. 
Although official secrecy and PAP manipulation of 
statistics make reliable measurements very difficult, it 
has been estimated that "the population in poverty 
increased from some 25 per cent in the mid-1950s to some 35 
per cent in the mid-1970s u (Pugh 1989: 850). This trend 
was worsened by the increasing exploitation of the labour 
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force which accompanied the so-called Second Industrial 
Revolution from 1978 onwards (Salaff 1988: 261). Only a 
minority of skilled workers improved their incomes, thus 
increasing the disparity between themselves and unskilled 
workers. 
Between 1979 and 1983, income inequality widened 
between workers in different occupations and between 
workers with different educational qualifications. By 
1983 the average earnings of administrative and 
managerial personnel were five times more than those 
of production and service personnel (Bello and 
Rosenfeld 1990: 331). 
Inequality and poverty in Singapore are the results of 
economic development policies which have also affected its 
neighbours. Since colonial times, Singapore's economy has 
developed by means of raking off not only the surplus from 
its own productive sector, but also that of neighbouring 
countries. The country's strategic geographical location, 
both militarily and for the commodity trade, and the 
building of a highly developed infrastructure, enabled it 
to use Malaya and other Southeast Asian countries as its 
hinterland. Thus, the inequities of income distribution 
within singapore are mirrored by the disparity between the 
working classes of Singapore and those in Malaysia and 
Indonesia. 
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This exploitative economic system requires guarantees, both 
within Singapore and regionally, of the process of capital 
accumulation. There is therefore a very clear need for a 
domestic system of social control which is part of a 
regional strategy to sustain Singapore's economic role, in 
the interests of both the Singapore capitalist class and 
foreign capital. 
The Significance of Struggles 
Implicit in this analysis of the need for social control is 
the fact that exploitation invariably meets resistance. 
People fight back. Singapore is no exception. The 
powerful nationalist, anti-imperialist movement after 1945 
was a response to colonial plunder and rule and the 
movement could be subdued only by large-scale imperialist 
violence throughout Southeast Asia. Even then, Britain had 
to form an alliance with bour~eois nationalist leaders, 
hand state power to them and change its strategy for 
exploitation. 
The relationship between accumUlation, social control and 
political struggle is central to this thesis. The 
historical development of the alliance between the PAP-
state and imperialism, first Britain and then the US and 
Japan, does not simply reflect the developmental phases of 
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Singapore's political economy from colonial entrepot 
through import sUbstitution industrialisation to export-
oriented industrialisation and the concerted attempt to 
join the ranks of the industrially advanced countries. It 
is also a periodisation of struggles and the attempts to 
regulate them. 
Accumulation strategies have produced contradictions which 
have generated struggles, and social control has been 
directed at suppressing or displacing resistance. This 
thesis also holds that struggles in Singapore have 
exacerbated the contradictions, effected adjustments in 
accumulation and necessitated continual refinement and 
adaptation of social control. For example, both organised 
struggles such as opposition political parties or 
professional associations, and also uncoordinated struggles 
such as the response of working class Chinese in the 1980s 
to linguistic policies in education or middle class women's 
response to state breeding policies, have forced state 
polici~s to take account of the underlying contradictions 
of class, race and gender. Therefore, social control is 
seen in this study primarily as a response to struggles 
which also place limits on accumulation. In the 
relationship between accumulation, struggle and social 
control, struggle is seen as the driving force, the 
independent variable. Social control has not been simply a 
matter of imposing the social requirements of an 
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accumulation strategy on a quiescent population. Rather, 
both regulatory methods and strategies of accumulation have 
been forced to adjust to the upsurge of struggle. 
Why study Sooial Control? 
If struggle has such a primary role in Singapore, why study 
social control? By undertaking detailed research on 
structures of control and repression, have we not succumbed 
to what Cleaver regards as the blindness of critical 
Theorists who, "despite the originality and usefulness of 
their research into the mechanisms of capitalist 
domination ... remained blind to the ability of working-
class struggles to transform and threaten the very 
existence of capital" (Cleaver 1979: 42)? Cleaver's 
argument is that the structure of working class power and a 
strategic analysis of its development are the priorities 
for study if one wishes to comprehend how that power can be 
increased. 
without an understanding of one's own power, the ebb 
and flow of the battle lines can appear as an endless 
process driven only by the enemy's unilateral self-
activity. When the enemy regroups or restructures, as 
capital is doing in the present crisis, its actions 
must be grasped in terms of the defeat of prior 
tactics or strategies by our forces - not simply as 
another clever move. That an analysis of enemy 
strategy is necessary is obvious. The essential point 
is that an adequate understanding of that strategy can 
be obtained only by grasping it in relation to our own 
strengths and weaknesses (Cleaver 1979: 42). 
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The answer to this challenge is two-fold. First, the 
nature of social control in Singapore is not widely 
understood either within or outside the country. Analysing 
it is an important task in itself. 
Poverty and inequality are not everywhere obvious in 
Singapore. Neither is the comprehensive, pervasive system 
of social control. Nor is the fear which links them. 
Historically, violence has been the final guarantee of 
accumulation in Singapore and regionally. The PAP-state 
emerged from the military suppression of anti-colonial 
movements and has perpetuated its rule by a system of 
social control imbued with violence and the threat of its 
use, a system of fear. Thus, revealing the nature of 
social control also entails accounting for the effective 
camouflage of state violence and the social relation which 
is its political root: the alliance between the Singapore 
capitalist class, represented by the PAP-state, and 
imperialism, represented by foreign capital and military 
power, against those who sell their labour power. 
The second response to Cleaver's challenge is that studying 
social control is one way to understand the historical and 
potential power of struggles in Singapore. The PAP-state's 
grip on social organisation and information makes it almost 
impossible for anyone, Singaporean or foreigner, to study 
the structure of working class power directly and at close 
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range. However, the study of social control in Singapore 
yields a kind of political photographic negative of the 
dynamics of struggle. The development of regulatory 
institutions reveals the way people are organising to 
resist being pressured into activities required for their 
further exploitation. 
structure of Thesis 
A theoretical consideration of social control follows this 
introduction. It critically examines theoretical 
traditions which have related accumulation to social 
control and struggle, and it asks basic questions about 
what social control is, how it is mediated and the role of 
ideology. However, the chapter is not meant to be an 
exhaustive study of all theories of social control. Rather 
it is a resource to help identify and address the issues 
which emerge in the subsequent detailed study of Singapore. 
The following historical chapter deals with the post-war 
colonial period and the rise of the Lee Kuan Yew faction of 
the PAP. It reveals the colonial origins of the PAP-state, 
of the alliance with foreign capital and of the overall 
system of social control. 
10 
The various ways that Singapore's political economy has 
been analysed are examined in the next chapter. This is 
necessary because the way that we understand production and 
accumulation has implications for our understanding of 
their relationship to social control. 
These initial chapters place the question of social control 
in its proper theoretical and historical context. This 
ensures that the subsequent investigation acknowledges the 
theoretical questions at stake and the political 
implications of the alliance with foreign capital. 
otherwise, a study of the details of social control might 
produce the false impression of an omnipotent PAP-state 
with a cunning leadership impervious to the challenges of 
struggle. 
The subsequent chapters form the greater par~ of this study 
and concentrate on the concrete ways that social control 
has worked in Singapore since the PAP came to power until 
the end of 1990, although there are some references 
relating to the first half of 1991. These chapters focus 
on major institutions: public housing, education, elections 
and parliament, and the .law. Each is chosen in order to 
highlight a major aspect of social control. Both state and 
non-state (e.g. transnational corporations) institutions 
mediate social control. However, the dominance of state 
institutions and the largely successful suppression of 
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organised working class struggle in the workplace mean that 
struggles are mainly regulated by the state outside the 
workplace. Thus, state social control is the concern of 
this thesis; in particular, state control of the working. 
class. 
Public housing is examined first in order to understand how 
this major aspect of welfare cements state control and 
pressures people into wage labour. Education is studied 
next in order to show how Singaporeans are sorted, 
stratified and fragmented by this system. 
The practice of voting within the context of 
parliamentarism is the subject of the following chapter in 
order to see how it acts as a major mechanism for 
manufacturing consent and preventing dissent. 
The study of the law and related means of coercion is 
reserved for the final chapter because state repression and 
violence are the ultimate sanctions of social control. 
The conclusion draws together the insights and themes which 
have emerged. 
12 
CHAPTER 1 
THEORISING SOCIAL CONTROL 
The task of this chapter is to dev~lop a theory of social 
control in singapore, where the role of the state is 
central. The Singapore state is the country's largest 
employer; it sets wage levels, regulates labour supply and 
controls all unions. It holds about 75 per cent of the 
land and has the power to take the rest. It has been the 
exclusive or major provider of infrastructure (utilities, 
communications, media, industrial estates, port and airport 
services) and of social services (housing, health and 
education). The government is the major actor in the 
domestic capital market, and state enterprises have 
included Singap~re Airlines, a trading company and major 
joint ventures with foreign capital (Linda Lim 1983: 754-
756). It also, of course, controls the apparatus of state 
violence: the police and the internal security 
organisations, the courts and. the prisons, and a large 
military force. This reach of the state to every corner of 
singapore society makes its institutions the major 
mediators of social control. It is therefore vital to know 
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how and in whose interests the state exercises social 
control if we are to understand its significance. 
The PAP-state is often lauded for its success in enticing 
large amounts of foreign capital into Singapore. In fact, 
Singapore's productive sector is overwhelmingly dominated 
by transnational corporations (Mirza 1986), whose 
operations are controlled from abroad and which employ most 
of Singapore's workers. Therefore, social control by the 
state needs to be understood in the context of this 
relationship between the PAP-state and foreign capital. 
How does the maintenance of the PAP-state's political 
hegemony over the Singapore working class relate to the 
accumUlation strategies of foreign capital and to the mode 
of production in Singapore? Theorising social control in 
Singapore necessarily involves theorising this relationship 
and the way it functions as an alliance. 
We need a theory which will help us comprehend the role of 
the PAP-state in the context of this alliance. How is the 
maintenance of its political hegemony over an increasingly 
exploited working class within Singapore related to the 
perpetuation of its exploitative economic relations with 
its much larger, chiefly Malay, neighbours? How do changes 
in social control relate to shifts in the alliance, to 
changing accumulation strategies and to people's resistance 
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and struggles. Thus, the development of a theory entails a 
periodisation of imperialism and social control. 
In addition, a theory of social control must address the 
relationship between violence and legitimacy. For example, 
the PAP continually claims political legitimacy on the 
basis of its overwhelming victories in successive general 
elections, yet it administers an oppressive and violent 
system of criminal justice and internal security. How do 
we understand choice and consent in relation to state 
violence and other forms of repression? 
singaporeans are encouraged to believe that the PAP-state 
governs in the national interest regardless of race, class 
or gender. Yet the PAP-state represents a patriarchal, 
Chinese capitalist class which cooperates closely with 
foreign capital. How do we understand theoretically the 
ideological impact of social control? 
It is a major project to bring together these elements in a 
coherent theory of social control: the state, imperialism, 
accumulation, struggle, violence, choice, consent, class, 
race, gender and ideology. How are structures and 
mechanisms of social control to be identified and 
differentiated? What is their relationship to the mode of 
production and to struggles? How do they adapt to changes 
in the social relations in Singapore? In short, a theory 
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is needed which is able to focus on the complexities of 
social control while taking into account the whole 
political context of Singapore. 
Mainstream Marxist political theory provides a useful 
starting point with its observations on the accumulation 
and legitimation functions of the state. It theorises that 
the state gives legitimacy to the accumulation process it 
facilitates by means of social control. When there are 
contradictions between these functions owing to class 
struggle or capitalist crisis, then the state tends to use 
violence to coerce compliance (Meiksins-Wood 1981: 95). 
Only recently have Marxists addressed the task of examining 
how these legitimation functions actually work. Much of 
their writing is exploratory_ Nevertheless, there are some 
theoretical developments which provide useful analytical· 
categories for such a complex exercise. 
THE REPRODUCTION OF LABOUR POWER, STATE REPRESSION AND 
IDEOLOGY 
Althusserian structuralism is the precursor of much 
contemporary writing on social control in the mainstream of 
Marxist theory. Althusser was a major critic of the 
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empiricism which maintains that only what is observable is 
real and which denies the primacy of concepts in 
understanding reality. By focussing on the reproduction of 
labour power, Althusser tried to identify the unseen 
structures or pressures underlying the social reality of 
capitalism. The relevance of his abstractions to a theory 
of social control lies in the link between the wage 
relation and the repressive power of the state. 
"The ultimate condition of production is therefore the 
reproduction of the conditions of production," Althusser 
states in "Ideology and Ideological state Apparatuses" 
originally published in 1970 (Althusser 1984: 1). This 
refers to the reproduction of the productive forces (labour 
power and means of production) and the existing relations 
of production. 
In order to explain this reproduction, Althusser uses the 
Marxist categories of infrastructure and superstructure to 
build his rationalist theory of social control.. By 
infrastructure he means the economic base of a society. 
The superstructure is itself divided into two levels: 
politico-legal (law and the state) and the ideological 
(ideologies, religious, ethical, legal, political) 
(Althusser 1984: 8). 
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Thus, for example, labour power is reproduced by wages at 
the level of the economic base. Wages are lIonly that part 
of the value produced by the expenditure of labour power 
which is indispensable for its reproduction" (Althusser 
1984: 5). In other words, the worker is not compensated 
for the total labour time. The remaining surplus value is 
appropriated by the capitalist. The selling of labour 
power for a wage is thus a core mechanism of capitalism. 
What appears as a fair exchange of commodities, labour 
power for money, is in fact a social relation of 
exploitation of workers by capitalists. Not only are 
workers exploited by wage labour, but the wage is also the 
means by which they are recreated and controlled. 
Labour power is also reproduced through the superstructure 
by the education system and other institutions which 
influence skill-acquisition and social conformity. If I 
shall say that the reproduction of labour power requires 
not only a reproduction of its skills, but also, at the 
sam~ time, a reproduction of its submission to the ruling 
ideology for the workers, and a reproduction of the ability 
to manipulate the ruling ideology correctly for the agents 
of exploitation and repression." (Althusser 1984: 7). 
In dealing with the question of the reproduction of the 
relations of production, Althusser locates the state in his 
dual-level superstructure. He sees the state as the 
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repressive apparatus by which the ruling class dominates 
the working class, enabling the process of surplus value 
extraction. He distinguishes Ideological state Apparatuses 
(ISAs) which work mainly by ideology (education system, 
legal and political institutions, trade unions, media, 
cultural and religious organisations) from the Repressive 
state Apparatuses {RSAs} which function primarily by 
violence and repression (government administration, army, 
police, courts, prisons)~ 
Just as the reproduction of the skills of labour power are 
provided for "in the forms and under the forms of 
ideological subjection" (Althusser 1984: 7) so, too, is the 
reproduction of the relations of production "secured by the 
legal-political and ideological superstructure" (Althusser 
1984: 22). The RSAs ensure the political conditions for 
the operation of the ISAs "which largely secure the 
reproduction specifically of the relations of production" 
under the ideology of the ruling class (Althusser 1984:24). 
Therefore, according to this theory, social control occurs 
at the level of the superstructure through political, 
ideological and repressive institutions. The activities of 
these institutions are determined by the economic 
institutions and productive activities which occur at the 
level of the base. 
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critique and Alternative Method 
Methodological objections to Althusser's tendency to deduce 
reality from abstract theoretical conceptions have been 
prominent among criticisms of his work (e.g. Godelier 1978: 
88). Rather than helping to explain reality, his 
rationalist method has produced a kind of essentialism 
which is increasingly removed from concrete reality. For 
example, his splitting of society into separate 
compartments, as though politics and ideology take place in 
one part determined by economics in another, has brought 
problems of the nature of the inter-relationships between 
the parts. For example, it is never clear how political 
struggles at the level of the superstructure influence 
economic activity at the level of the base. His attempts 
to solve these problems by further elaboration of his 
rationalist theory include notions of the relative autonomy 
of the superstructure. from the base and the recognition of 
~he "reciprocal action" of the superstructure on the 
infrastructure. However, the "determination in the last 
instance" of the economic base is maintained (Althusser 
1984: 9). 
Thus, the two major problems of his theory remain. First, 
the methodology of deducing structures from the concepts of 
Capital prevents any critique of these concepts by concrete 
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reality. Secondly, the conclusion that structures serve 
the economic system, which is the independent variable 
determining all other activity including struggles, is 
biassed towards presumptions of equilibrium and the almost 
impossibility of change. It is therefore to be expected 
that a major criticism of Althusserian structuralism is its 
assumption that structures tend to self-perpetuating 
equilibrium regardless of struggles for social 
transformation (Jessop 1988: 149). 
An alternative methodology would need to refer constantly 
back and forth between the concrete activities or practices 
of institutions and the process of theoretical abstraction. 
Such a retroductive methodology (Sayer 1979) would enable 
the fit between the concrete and the abstract to be seen as 
provisional and always responsive to changing circumstances 
and new theoretical insights. 
Reviewing Althusser's theory by this method makes it 
pos~ible to gain much that is valuable. For example, we 
can see all institutions and concrete practices as part of 
the visible "superstructure". We can see the base as the 
unseen structural pressures, the relationships of power in 
a social organisation of productive activity, which we need 
to identify through theoretical abstraction (Meiksins-Wood 
1981: 78-79). Thus, unseen infrastructural pressures or 
mechanisms of social control present themselves through 
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concrete institutions. The functions of social control 
change according to the social formation and the conflicts 
within it. This is reflected in concrete institutions or 
practices emphasising different functions at different 
times or with regard to different social groups. 
The implications of these insights will be developed later 
in this chapter. It is sufficient here to note that, 
despite these criticisms, Althusser's contribution to 
developing a theory of social control has been influential 
in emphasising that there are structures to be identified, 
including structures which control people such as wage 
labour. While Althusser's methodology for identifying such 
structures might be flawed, this does not negate the 
possibility of their existence. Rather, it implies that a 
different method is required to identify them. 
Althusser highlighted state violence, ideology and the 
reproduction of the wage relation as major aspects of 
social control. He has thereby made the relationship 
between the mode of production and institutions of social 
control a central theoretical concern. Understanding 
their inter-relationship remains an imperative for current 
theories of social control. 
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ACCUMULATION, REGULATION AND THE STATE 
The pattern of Singapore's economic development suggests a 
correspondence between its accumulation strategy and its 
system of social control. The political alliance which has 
made Singapore's economy an adjunct of the capital 
accumulation processes of much larger economies (e.g. USA, 
Japan, EC) has apparently led to a remarkably stable 
political economy. In fact, the various phases of 
Singapore's development since 1965 have been refinements or 
differences in degree rather than qualitative 
transformations. 
This relationship between accumulation and social control 
has been taken up theoretically by the French regulation 
school from the 1970s (e.g. Aglietta 1979). While owing 
much to Althusserian structuralism, they focus on 
"regulation" rather than "reproduction". The main concepts 
of this school are "regime of accumulation" and "mode of 
regulation". 
An accumulation regime is a particular combination of 
production and consumption which can be reproduced 
over time despite conflictual tendencies; and a mode 
of regulation refers to an institutional ensemble and 
complex of norms which can secure capitalist 
reproduction pro tempore despite the conflictual and 
antagonistic character of capitalist social relations 
(Jessop 1988: 150). 
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Aglietta, a pioneer regulation theorist, states that the 
study of capitalist regulation 
is the study of the transformation of social relations 
as it creates new forms that are both economic and 
non-economic, that are organised in structures and 
themselves reproduce a determinant structure, the mode 
of production (Aglietta 1979: 16). 
That is, the whole system is the independent variable. The 
main theoretical contribution of the regulationists lies in 
their attempts to understand how the social relation 
between labour and capital is reproduced and regulated in 
different configurations over time so as to enable 
capitalism to overcome crisis. 
The wage relation is seen as the basic feature of the mode 
of regulation. In his major study of capitalist 
regulation in the United states, Aglietta develops "a 
theory of social regulation under the dominance of the 
basic relationship which defines capitalism: the wage 
relation" (Aglietta 1979: 380). People are regulated by 
being in wage labour because it provides their SUbsistence 
on the condition that they surrender surplus value and thus 
ensures their conformity and obedience. 
These regulatory functions of wage labour make it important 
that people remain in work, perhaps through a Keynesian 
state, even when it is not entirely profitable. Thus, like 
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Althusser, regulationists stress the role of the state in 
maintaining and extending the wage relation. Indeed, they 
emphasise its central role. 
This overall organisation of society within the state, 
by which modern capitalism attempts a solution at the 
political risk of universalising its social conflicts, 
evidently gives rise to a strong totalitarian tendency 
under the ideological cover of liberalism. The 
socialisation of the conditions of life can be a 
support for accumulation only if the leading fraction 
of the capitalist class succeeds in imposing an 
overall management of labour-power by binding the 
conditions of its reproduction in a tight network of 
social controls (Aglietta 1979: 386). 
Bonefield describes the role of the state as follows: 
It is within the state that the regulative forms are 
condensed, homogenised, and their operation achieved. 
It is the state that carries through appropriate forms 
of disorganisation of the activity of labour which 
assure the channelling of class struggle into 
"suitable" forms of capitalist reproduction (Bonefield 
1987: 100). 
But, as noted above, the main proposition of the 
regulationists is that the structures of regulation, such 
~s ~he wage relation, fit together with the structures of 
accumulation to form a system which minimises capitalist 
crises by forcing class struggle into institutionalised 
forms that do not threaten accumulation. This system may 
change internally according to shifting class alliances, 
the need for more or less coercion by state violence and 
the competitive pressures of capitalism. Nevertheless, the 
system is maintained over time by its internal flexibility 
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until it can no longer accommodate or contain the pressures 
generated by its contradictions. At this point the 
regulationists speak of a crisis of the whole accumulation 
regime and mode of regulation (Bonefield 1987: 104; Jessop 
1988: 151, 1990: 309). That is, a crisis in one part 
becomes a crisis of the whole, requiring the transition to 
a new hegemonic system. 
The restructuring of the regime of accumulation is posited 
as a qualitatively new phase of capital accumulation. This 
is particularly seen through the regulationist 
interpretation of the changing forms of the state, which 
they see as responses to qualitative changes in strategies 
of accumulation. They have conceptualised an historical 
transition from Fordist accumulation (mass production and 
mass consumption) and the Fordist state (corporatist, 
statist, welfarist) to post-Fordist accumulation (flexible 
labour practices and flexible all-purpose machinery 
producing a variety of products; economy of scope rather 
~han scale) and the post-Fordist state (privatisation of 
the regulation of social reproduction, with the state 
focussing on repressive means of regulation) (Bonefield 
1987) . 
26 
critique: Method and Class struqqle 
The major criticism of regulation theory is that, despite 
protestations to the contrary (Jessop 1988: 150), it fails 
to escape the main theoretical and methodological problems 
of Althusserian structural-functionalism. 
The whole capitalist system is seen as determinant. For 
example, Hirsch holds that, "within the framework of its 
general laws, capitalist development is determined rather 
by the actions of the acting subjects and classes, the 
resulting concrete conditions of crisis and their political 
consequences" (Hirsch 1978: 74-75; my emphasis). 
Holloway makes a similar point in relation to so-called 
"objective laws of capitalist development" and a deductive 
analytical method. 
To emphasise the objective laws of capitalist 
development in the early 1970s was to emphasise the 
inherently unstable nature of capitalism. In the late 
1980s, the appeal to [such laws] has become a 
. reformist argument for adaptation to the inevitable 
restructuring of capitalism. In a world in which it 
seems that the objective laws of capitalist 
development have crushed the subjective struggles of 
the working class, it seems the only option open to 
Marxists is to choose between lamenting the growth of 
capitalist violence and repression or to argue for 
accommodation to the new "realities" ...• Both of 
these variations on the theme of postfordism have the 
same implications: struggle against laws of capitalist 
development is hopeless. The world is closed, the 
future is determined (Holloway 1988: 99). 
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Clarke notes that 
the regulation approach has tended to adopt a 
structural-functionalist model of successive phases of 
structural integration and structural 
disintegration .... [Regulationists] recognise that 
economic relationships are socially regulated, but the 
regulation of social relationships is still 
subordinate to the functional requirements of the 
expanded reproduction of capital (Clarke 1988: 68, 
69) . 
Thus, according to Bonefield, regulationists hold that it 
is the "development of capital accumulation which 
determines the environment for class struggle", and this 
"reduces class struggle once more to a subordinate factor". 
The working class becomes merely the object and victim of 
history (Bonefield 1987: 105, 123-4). 
Reacting against the "lifeless determinism" of the 
regulation approach, Holloway states that it is not the 
objective laws of capitalist development implied by 
regulation theory but "the presence of the working class as 
an antagonistic force inside capital which is the key to 
understanding the development and instability of 
capitalism" (Holloway 1988: 101). Thus, the historical 
forms of domination reflect struggle; they are not the 
framework within which class struggle takes place. This 
means crisis does not develop apart from class struggle: 
"it is the crisis of the class relation, the crisis of the 
rule of capital over labour" (Holloway 1988: 102). 
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This critique has further implications for our 
understanding of the institutional forms which 
regulationists identify as comprising modes of regulation. 
The methodological problems of regulationists become most 
obvious in their understanding of the structures giving 
rise to the forms of social control. They deduce the 
significance of these changing forms on the basis of their 
rationalist assumptions about the over-riding importance of 
the whole system of accumUlation. A retroductive 
methodology would require checking abstractions against 
reality more systematically, rather than trying to fit 
reality to the abstractions. This weakness has led to 
considerable doubt concerning the real existence of the 
structures of Fordism and post-Fordism (Clarke 1988: 62) 
and the comparative and historical typologies elaborated 
around them. Many of the political tendencies associated 
with them may be real ones, but the reification of the 
postulated structures behind them must be rejected because 
the, tendencies are the result of struggle. 
Therefore, in reality, the institutional forms of social 
control are institutionalised forms of struggle, 
significant for the indications they provide of the 
historical particularity of struggle rather than marking a 
qualitatively new phase of capital accumulation, such as 
post-Fordism. 
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The institutional forms identified by the 
regulationists are of fundamental importance to an 
understanding of the historical development of the 
capitalist mode of production. However these forms 
are best understood as institutional forms of class 
relationships, through which the quantitative 
determination of relations of production and exchange 
is subordinate to the struggle over the reproduction 
of capitalist class relations. "Modes of regulation" 
are better understood as institutional forms of class 
struggle, which certainly define the historical 
character of accumulation, but which do not define 
qualitatively different regimes of accumulation 
(Clarke 1988: 69). 
Thus, class struggles, the expressions of conflict between 
parts of the social formation, are the independent 
variable. People's actions to resist or overcome 
exploitation can be seen as the motor of history. 
The state must be included in the institutional forms which 
have developed in response to and need to be understood in 
terms of historical class struggles. Regulation theory has 
been challenged for deriving the form of the state from the 
nature of capital (Holloway 1988: 94), from the needs of 
the system of accumulation. Rather, the society-wide 
social control functions of the state should be seen as the 
results of struggles and as the reason why "the struggle 
over the forms of capitalist domination necessarily becomes 
a struggle over the form of the state" (Clarke 1988: 85). 
Further, the emergence of a crisis leads to 
an intensification of the competitive and class 
struggles which develop in and against the existing 
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institutional forms of capitalist class domination, 
struggles which necessarily take on a political form 
and so impose themselves on the state. The state does 
not stand above these struggles, as the guarantor of 
the functional integration of the "regime of 
accumulation", for the state is an aspect of the 
institutional forms of capitalist class relations, and 
so is itself the object of struggle. Thus the state 
does not, and cannot, resolve the contradictions of 
capital, but reproduces them in a political form 
(Clarke 1988: 84-85). 
The restructuring of the institutional forms of the state 
as part of an offensive to fragment the working class can 
therefore be seen as characteristic of the last decade in 
most advanced capitalist countries. This interpretation 
stands in contrast to the regulationists' view that the 
restructuring of the regime of accumulation (through neo-
Fordist or post-Fordist forms of production) is the main 
development. The fragmentation has proceeded, according to 
Clarke, through 
the attempt to confine the aspirations of the working 
class within the limits of capital by confining wages 
and social expenditure within the limits of 
profitability .••• The political stability of 
monetarism, no less than that of Keynesianism, has 
depended on the sustained, if uneven, accumulation of 
capital on a world scale which has enabled the state 
to isolate and fragment working class resistance, 
while capital has been able to concede a steady rise 
in wages to sections of the working class (Clarke 
1988: 86). 
Two main points emerge from this critique of the regulation 
approach in relation to developing a theory of social 
control. First, it is the outcome of struggles, rather 
than regimes of accumulation or modes of regulation, which 
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will determine the forms in which crises unfold. Regimes 
of accumulation and modes of regulation are the outcomes of 
class struggles. 
Secondly, shorn of its Althusserian essentialism, 
regulationism does offer a way of seeing society as a whole 
system with class struggle as the determinant structural 
pressure. 
THEORISING IDEOLOGY AND SOCIAL CONTROL 
In the earlier critique of Althusser's base-superstructure 
distinction, it was mentioned that the base could better be 
understood as the unseen structural pressures and the 
superstructure as all visible institutions and concrete 
practices. An implication of this perspective is that 
~deology might be understood as being produced by practices 
rather than as a pre-packaged set of beliefs imposed by 
specialised institutions. If this is so, then many 
different practices, such as actions of resistance 
generated by class conflict, will produce different ways of 
thinking about reality. It is important that these 
differing notions of ideology be further explored here 
because the relationship between ideology and practices is 
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crucial to our understanding of the way social control 
works to contain or overcome class struggle. 
Notions of Ideology 
Ideology in Singapore is often viewed as a set of precepts 
imposed by the state. In fact, the PAP-state itself 
appears to have an essentially idealist understanding of 
ideology. Its current search for the elements of a state-
sponsored National Ideology (STW 13 october 1990) and the 
heavy-handed doctrine of Total Defence (GOS 1989a: 171) 
would seem to be predicated on the position that ideas 
cause action. 
Such a perspective has led to the identification of certain 
social institutions as primarily ideological. In the West, 
theorists have often categorised the education system, the 
media and the church as institutions primarily concerned 
with ideological indoctrination (e.g. Althusser's 
Ideological State Apparatuses). Similarly, writers on 
Singapore have seen the PAP-controlled education system as 
the major mechanism for imposing state ideology simply 
because of its pedagogical functions. It is "the most 
important item in the programme of thought control" (George 
1984: 136) and the instrument of "elite ideology and mass 
indoctrination" (Busch 1974: 32). 
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This way of seeing ideology and specialist ideological 
institutions leads to a focus on the characteristics of the 
imposed ideology. 
Political and social information and values are taught 
both in the relatively blatant forum of civics classes 
and in the more subtle context of such courses as 
history and literature. Such indoctrination is of 
great concern to the Singapore Government and, in 
particular, to the Ministry of Education, which 
develops textbooks and curricula designed to 
incorporate the official ideology in the educational 
process. Because the government is so intimately 
involved in the political aspects of schooling and 
because the values taught to pupils are the same as 
those impressed upon the general population, we must 
look at the ruling elite's ideology in order to 
understand the political consequences of education 
(Busch 1974: 32). 
That is to say, because an imposed ideology causes people 
to engage in particular social practices, the way to 
understand what is happening to them is to examine the 
ideology as it has been formalised by the rulers. It must 
be assumed that ideological imposition is necessary and 
successful because people do not otherwise perceive such 
practices to be in their interest. Thus, according to this 
idealist approach, ideology produces practices or organised 
behaviour. 
But this way of understanding the relationship between 
ideology and action does not fit singapore's historical 
development. Let us focus on Singapore's education system 
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since, from this perspective, it is regarded as a primarily 
ideological institution. However, our analysis could apply 
to other institutions equally well. 
The most striking characteristic of the PAP-state's 
education system is not the opposition to it but the 
extraordinary degree of cooperation and participation it 
achieved across the whole of society. This suggests that 
an increasing majority of people saw it as working in their 
interests. These factors cannot be adequately explained by 
the view that ideology was imposed and that people were 
pressured to behave in certain ways. Nor can the post-
modernist position be sustained that discourse or language 
provide the ideological categories which primarily 
determine perception and thus what people do. 
A rather more complex notion of ideology is called for. In 
developing it, we need to look at an alternative notion: 
that practices or activities produce ideology. This can be 
done by examining the example of wage labour, a central 
practice of social control. 
The Example of Wage Labour 
In singapore, a city-state with no rural hinterland for 
peasants to eke out an existence, there are few 
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alternatives to wage labour for the lower classes. 
Subsistence is only possible either through personally 
engaging in wage labour or through dependence on a wage-
earning family member. From the beginning of its rule, the 
PAP-state rapidly implemented policies of destroying the 
semi-rural subsistence economy of the parts of the island 
outside the main urban areas. strict controls on street 
vending, destruction of squatter areas and fishing villages 
ensured that, for the vast majority, wage labour quickly 
became the only means to survive. 
Wage labour is a practice which has specific and far-
reaching ideological effects. When workers engage in wage 
labour, through their total involvement in the practice and 
the way it works, they come to think that they are being 
paid for their total labour time. 
The payment of wages for the commodity labour-power 
creates the false appearance that the labourer's total 
labour time has been compensated. Here again it 
should be noted that this false appearance constitutes 
an ideological relation based on the material 
organisation of production (Fine 1980: 5). 
This ideological effect conceals the real unjust social 
relation: the subordination of those who provide labour 
power to those who buy it. 
A further ideological effect of wage labour is that workers 
think they have freely entered into the contract to sell 
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their labour by the action of exercising a choice between 
jobs. In reality, no matter which job a worker chooses, 
exploitation is present through the practice of wage 
labour. Ideologically therefore, the act of choosing 
becomes an act of consent to the relationship of 
exploitation. 
The only choice which would avoid exploitation through wage 
labour and avoid giving consent to it would be not to work 
for any capitalist. But we have noted that, in Singapore, 
unlike countries with a rural hinterland or a welfare 
state, this choice is not available. This almost total 
integration of the lower classes into wage labour means its 
ideological effects have an exceptional grip in Singapore. 
Exploitation and control of people appears as an exchange 
of equal things: labour power for money. Workers think 
they have freely chosen to offer their labour power in 
exchange for a fair wage. Hence the practice of wage 
labour also produces the ideological effect that workers 
think the practice is in their own interests. The 
ideological perception arising from their own actions 
legitimates the practice. Thus, they do not need to be 
individually forced into a practice that is necessary to 
maintain the social relations which exploit them. 
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Ideology and Choice 
From the example of wage labour, we can understand ideology 
primarily as the way people come to think about what they 
do, about the practices they are involved in. In this 
sense, practices produce ideology. Many practices 
perpetuate exploitative social relations while 
ideologically concealing and thus legitimating them. The 
most politically powerful practices in terms of 
legitimation are those which allow some degree of choice. 
This is because the ideological effect of an act of choice 
is consent. 
This is the main effect of the parliamentary electoral 
system which we will study in detail. The act of voting, 
of exercising a choice, produces the ideological effect in 
voters that they have voluntarily consented, not only to 
the electoral result, but to the political system as a 
whole. Similarly, choosing a school or a course of study 
is to consent to the political objectives of the education 
system. To choose to drop out is an act of blaming oneself 
for failure. 
Thus, practices which produce the most powerful ideological 
effect are those like wage labour, voting and education, 
which enable people to think they have voluntarily chosen 
to do what is necessary to uphold the hegemony of the 
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ruling class or to assist the development of capitalism. 
They do not have to be forced by ideas because they are 
pressured into practices which they see as in their own 
interests: a job means economic survival, education is the 
pathway to a good job, voting for stable government 
preserves this investment of effort. 
Therefore, in order to understand the politics of ideology, 
we need to examine the concrete practices which ensure that 
the appearance of what is happening differs from the 
reality, from the real social relations. In order to 
understand the political effects of ideology, we need to 
understand how what people think about what they do differs 
from what they really do. 
Practices and Institutions 
One of the tasks of this study is to uncover the 
ideological effects of practices which appear to organise 
or control things or commodities (e.g. labour power, votes, 
apartments) but which actually control people. 
Institutions will be seen as systematically organising 
these practices (preserving, mobilising l coordinating) and 
their ideological effects. The way people think about what 
they do as a result of doing it becomes ideological 
legitimation. Institutions formalise this ideological 
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legitimation. since the practice of wage labour is basic 
to the fundamental social relation of capitalism, many 
institutions organise this practice and systematise its 
ideological effects. In Singapore, the most important of 
these are the transnational corporations (which will not be 
studied in this thesis) and the PAP-state bureaucracy, 
especially the Ministry of Labour and the National 
Productivity Board of the Ministry of Trade and Industry. 
In the area of welfare, the institution of public housing 
organises practices which have the ideological effect of 
engendering loyalty while in reality fragmenting the 
working class and binding it more tightly to the practice 
of wage labour. The ideological effects of the practices 
of parliamentarism are systematised into an ideology of 
popular consent and constitutional legitimacy by the 
institutions of liberal democracy. In fact, these 
practices marginalise or eliminate real political 
alternatives. The ideological effects of the practices of 
the criminal law are systematised by legal institutions 
into an ideology of universal justice while criminalising 
the working class and terrorising it into submission. 
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A Feedback Model 
This discussion of notions of ideology and its relationship 
to concrete practices has favoured the perspective that 
practices produce ideology. This is because it appears to 
fit more closely with Singapore's development. Despite his 
early ambiguity on the matter (1985: 160), Clammer, a 
sociological specialist on the state and ideology in 
Singapore, also at times comes close to this position. For 
example, he states that "symbolic systems themselves 
reflect the practices which underlie and give rise to them" 
(1985: 165). 
This notion also seems to fit our understanding of the 
relationship between accumUlation, regulation and struggle. 
People are pressured to behave in certain ways which will 
advance capitalist accumUlation. Their involvement in such 
practices shapes their ideas about what they are doing and 
legitimates the process of exploitation. This is a form of 
regulation or control, as we have seen from the exampl~ of 
wage labour. However, when people resist pressures to act 
in conformity with the economic strategy, they are able to 
perceive social reality differently. That is, people are 
able to think differently when they are able to behave 
differently. This different behaviour is political 
struggle and may be highly organised or be the 
uncoordinated actions of many individuals. such resistance 
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arises from contradictions in capitalist social relations. 
Social control aims to prevent struggle by regulating the 
effects of such contradictions, through pressuring as many 
people as possible into practices which support capitalist 
accumulation. 
However, it would be wrong to say that the formalised 
ideologies of institutions have no effects on people's 
behaviour. Particular ideas, discourses and 
representations are among the many pressures which might 
lead people to engage in practices. We may therefore 
postulate a kind of feedback model of the relationship 
between ideology and practices. Thus, people's involvement 
in concrete practices may be seen as the primary 
determinant of how they come to understand society. In 
this sense, activities produce ideology. But the 
formalised ideas arising from the institutionalisation of 
such activities may also be seen as pressuring people to 
behave in accordance with them. 
THEORISING THE SINGAPORE STATE 
There are two main ways of theorising the state, each of 
which represents a broad theoretical tendency. Neo-Marxian 
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and bourgeois theory derive the form of the state from the 
nature of capital. Mainstream Marxist theory sees the 
state as reproducing the contradictions of capital in a 
particular political form. In the latter theory, struggle 
is therefore the driving force of political developments. 
But mainstream Marxist theory has, until recently, been 
largely preoccupied with the state in the advanced, 
imperialist countries. As a consequence, not much detailed 
work on the neo-colonial state has been done from the 
perspective of this tradition. Recent writers, therefore, 
often draw on neo-Marxian or non-Marxian categories, or a 
mixture of both, in theorising the Singapore state, because 
these traditions have focussed more on underdeveloped 
countries. 
Many writers have merely classified the Singapore state in 
accordance with their own economistic theories. This leads 
to some contradictory results. Milton Friedman, the free 
marketeer, has lauded the Singapore state as non-
interventionist and as an example of economic liberalism. 
He approved of the PAP-state's incentives to foreign 
investment and its lack of restrictions on repatriating the 
surplus generated in Singapore. Ironically, John Kenneth 
Galbraith, the Keynesian economist, has held singapore up 
as the ideal of the interventionist state (Linda Lim 1983: 
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754). The latter focussed on state domination and careful 
control of domestic capital accumulation. 
The value of the work of other writers has come from what 
they tell us about the PAP-state in their search for a 
suitable label. For example, Paul Lim, writing in the 
European structuralist tradition, labours at great length 
to place the Singapore state within a comparative typology. 
He settles on "bureaucratic-authoritarian" as the favoured 
description. But he appears to do so deductively before 
studying the concrete realities of Singapore, since his 
categories often do not arise from his data (Paul Lim 
1989). 
The Bureaucratic-Authoritarian and corporatist state. 
other writers have also categorised the state as 
"bureaucratic-authoritarian" and have argued over whether 
or not it is "co~poratist". Rodan (1989), writing in the 
Leninist tradition, and Mirza (1986), drawing on the neo-
Marxian tradition, both settled on the bureaucratic-
authoritarian classification. The term itself derives 
partly from Weber ian theory and partly from a neo-Marxism 
which sees bureaucratic-authoritarianism as a developmental 
stage of Third World industrialisation. Following on from 
the oligarchic state, which is associated with export of 
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raw materials, and the populist state of the national 
bourgeoisie which results from import sUbstitution 
industrialisation, there is a third stage of economic 
development which is characterised by the emergence of the 
bureaucratic-authoritarian state. 
This is reached where the opportunities for small-
scale investment in light industry have diminished. 
To solve this crisis of accumulation, large-scale 
investment in intermediate and capital goods is 
required. This "deepening" or vertical integration 
necessitates a relaxation of industry protection, the 
promotion of exports and the attraction of 
international capital .... Requirements of this 
production are beyond the capacity of most nationally-
based companies. Thus, not only is the national 
bourgeoisie edged out of the commanding heights of the 
economy, but a host of unpopular fiscal au.sterity and 
labour disciplinary measures are introduced to finance 
the new programme and attract capital. In these 
circumstances, the basis of political populism is 
undermined and a new alliance is formed between the 
military, civilian technocrats and the "upper 
bourgeoisie", a highly oligopolised and trans-
nationally oriented fraction of capital. All three 
are committed to carrying f·orward their increased 
integration of the economy with the international 
division of labour (Rodan 1989: 9). 
This analysis reflects real trends in Latin America and, to 
a lesser extent, in Singapore. But it is problematic. 
Rather than seeing the economic and the political as part 
of a whole social formation driven by class struggle, each 
particular state form is derived from a corresponding 
economic trend. Thus, the problem is not so much one of 
nomenclature but of method. The neo-Marxian tendency views 
the state as shaped by the developmental stages of the 
world economic system and thus loses sight of its role in 
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managing class relations and in being shaped by and 
responding to class struggle. 
The debate between Mirza and Rodan over whether or not the 
Singapore state is corporatist also raises this 
methodological issue. According to Rodan, lithe peculiar 
corporatist nature of the PAP is definitive of the 
Singapore model" (Rodan 1989: 29). Both Rodan and Mirza 
refer to Schmitter's definition of corporatism: 
[Corporatism is] a system of interest representation 
in which the constituent units are organized into a 
limited number of singular, compulsory, 
noncompetitive, hierarchically ordered and 
functionally differentiated categories, recognised or 
licensed (if not created) by the state and granted a 
deliberate representational monopoly within their 
respective categories in exchange for observing 
certain controls on their selection of leaders and 
articulation of demands and supports (Schmitter 1979: 
22) • 
However, they draw different conclusions from this 
definition. Mirza contends that the absence of the "nigh 
feudal exchange of rights and obligations inherent in 
corporatism" is absent in singapore, since the government 
has total control over organised labour and, at the other 
extreme, is itself subject to the demands of foreign 
corporations (Mirza 1986: 72). He further states that 
there is no need for a corporatist framework, as all social 
groups are already under control. 
46 
Rodan, on the other hand, points to Schmitter's distinction 
between "societal" and "state" corporatism, the former 
applying to "the post-liberal, advanced capitalist, 
organised democratic welfare state", while the latter 
relates to the "antiliberal, delayed capitalist, 
authoritarian, neo-mercantilist state" (Schmitter 1979: 
24). Under societal corporatism, the needs of capitalist 
production and accumulation are met by coopt ion and 
incorporation. state corporatism meets these needs by 
repression and political exclusion of the working class, 
usually in circumstances where the domestic bourgeoisie is 
too weak or divided to achieve them within a liberal 
polity. Rodan amplifies this approach with his own 
definition of corporatism, which he applies to singapore: 
[corporatism is] the establishment of structures of 
selective and exclusive political representation which 
afford the state an enhanced capacity to define 
social, political and economic goals. This 
arrangement is usually supported by the ideological 
notion that through the state's direction the 
interests of different groups and classes can be 
reconciled and, indeed, must be reconciled for the 
benefit of all (Rodan 1989: 30). 
Despite their different terminologies, there is broad 
agreement between the two writers. Both accept the vital 
role of the PAP-state in industrialisation and social 
control. Both see the need for a more exact description of 
it. Rodan adapts Schmitter's definition, while Mirza 
leaves the issue open after considering the PAP state's 
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role as comprador and also exploiter of the Southeast Asian 
region on behalf of western capital (Mirza 1986: 73). 
A major issue at stake in the above discussion is the 
nature of the relationship of the PAP-state to the 
singapore bourgeoisie and working class, and to 
imperialism. To what extent is the PAP-state comprador or 
nationalistic, and how has the development of social 
relations in Singapore brought these characteristics about? 
What implications do they have for the role of the state in 
social control? 
To examine these questions further and develop theoretical 
categories which more concisely relate the transformation 
of the Singapore state to class struggle, we need to take a 
step back from current writing on Singapore. 
The Absolutist state and the Internal Bourgeoisie 
Poulantzas' analysis of the transition from feudalism to 
capitalism in Europe (Poulantzas 1973a: 157ff) provides a 
useful categorisation of the transformation of the state 
resulting from the struggle between the nobility and 
bourgeoisie. He postulates the emergence of the absolutist 
state which had many of the characteristics of a capitalist 
state even though the bourgeois class was not yet the 
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dominant class (Poulantzas 1973a: 158). In this sense, 
there was a "non-correspondence between the political 
superstructure and the economic instance" (Poulantzas 
1973a: 157). 
The absolutist state is characterised by the fact that 
the holder of state power, normally a monarch, 
concentrates in his hands a power which is not 
controllable by the other institutions and whose 
exercise is not curbed by any limiting law •... The 
state makes its appearance as a centralised 
institution, as the source of all "political" power 
inside a territorial-national domain. It is in this 
way that the notion of state sovereignty gradually 
takes shape: it expresses the exclusive, unique, 
institutionalised and strictly public dominance over a 
territorial-national domain and the effective exercise 
of central power •... The fundamental characteristic of 
the absolutist state is that it represents the 
strictly political unity of a centralised power over a 
national ensemble •... Furthermore, it is the absolutist 
state's relative autonomy in its structures from the 
economic instance which allows the state apparatus to 
function in a way that is autonomous from, indeed 
contrary to, its class membership (Poulantzas 1973a: 
162, 165). 
The bureaucracy and the military were central to the state 
apparatus, their roles determined by the capitalist 
structures of the absolutist state (Poulantzas 1973a: 164-
5). The "non-correspondence" of economic structure and 
class relations is explained by Poulantzas in terms of the 
role of the state during the period of primitive capital 
accumulation. 
In fact, these functions of the state (expropriating 
small landowners, financing, supplying funds for 
starting industrialisation, attacking seigneurial 
power, breaking down commercial barriers within the 
national boundaries, etc.) can be performed only by a 
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state with a capitalist character, by a centralised 
public power of a strictly political character. These 
are precisely its "national/popular" institutions 
which, to a large extent, permit it to function 
against the interests of the nobility, at a time when 
it still cannot clearly rely on the bourgeoisie. This 
role of "force" of the state in favour of the 
"emergent bourgeoisie", as Marx describes it, can only 
be analysed as the intervention of the absolutist 
transition state. In other words, it is not any state 
which could have had this role of "force" in fixing 
the limits of a not-yet-given mode of production. The 
transition, which assigns these functions to the 
state, allows them to be performed only by a state 
with a capitalist character (Poulantzas 1973a: 166). 
In the transition from feudalism to capitalism, the 
underlying class struggle which shaped the absolutist state 
was that between the bourgeoisie and the nobility, as the 
former strove to become the dominant class politically and 
economically. The state ruled largely by force owing to 
its relative autonomy from the main conflicting classes. 
As it grew stronger, the bourgeoisie eventually came to 
govern through the bureaucracy and through the military. 
In the transition from colonialism to neo-colonialism in 
singapore, the class struggle which shaped the neo-colonial 
state was that between the anti-imperialist lower classes 
and the British bourgeois ruling class and its imperialist 
state. The struggle for political independence forced the 
British to hand over state power to a fraction of the local 
capitalist class, in cooperation with whom it could 
continue to rule. Here my distinction between "ruling" and 
"governing" is crucial. The PAP-state has governed but has 
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not, by itself, constituted a ruling class. It could not 
rule without an alliance with imperialism. The local 
capitalist class in singapore did not become, as we shall 
see in the following chapter, economically dominant. 
During the colonial period it was dependent on British 
trade and investment for its survival. The nationalist 
fraction of this class did not have sufficient economic and 
political power to advance its own interests in the 
transition to independence or subsequently and thus lost 
the opportunity for political leadership. 
The pro-imperialist, English-educated fraction of the local 
capitalist class, led by Lee Kuan Yew, was therefore able 
to consolidate an alliance with the British and acquire 
state power. In this process, its main opposition was the 
anti-imperialist mass movement of the lower classes with 
which it initially made an accommodation. Hence, when the 
Lee group came to power, it was relatively autonomous from 
the nationalist fraction of its own class but reliant on 
.imperialism as its main power base from which to defeat the 
mass movement and then to entrench itself in government. 
The economic policies of the PAP-state alliance with 
imperialism have kept local capital peripheral to the main 
productive sectors of the economy, even though some local 
capital accumulation has been encouraged. 
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The PAP-state has many of the characteristics of an 
absolutist state in its autonomy from local class forces; 
for example, its ability to expropriate land, to finance 
industrial infrastructure, to organise the working class 
and to override the interests of local capital. 
But the historical development of class struggle in 
Singapore and the shifting alliance with imperialism has 
changed the line up of class forces surrounding the state. 
The nature of the pro-imperialist capitalist class and the 
interest of other fractions of the class in its political 
hegemony have changed since the initial transition to 
independence. Indeed, this shift is what lies behind the 
different perceptions of the PAP-state as comprador or 
nationalist. Rather than settle for one term or the other, 
it would seem more useful to acknowledge that both 
tendencies are present in the singapore bourgeoisie, 
including the PAP. 
Poulantzas has described a class with both tendencies as an 
"internal bourgeoisie" in his analysis of secondary, 
advanced capitalist countries like France: 
This bourgeoisie, which exists alongside sectors that 
are genuinely comprador, no longer possesses the 
structural characteristics of a national bourgeoisie, 
though the extent of this of course differs from one 
imperialist formation to another. As a result of the 
reproduction of American capital actually within these 
formations, it is, firstly, implicated by multiple 
ties of dependence in the international division of 
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labour and in the international concentration of 
capital under the domination of American capital, and 
this can go so far as to take the form of a transfer 
of part of the surplus-value it produces to the 
latter. 
On the other hand, however, it is not a mere comprador 
bourgeoisie •••. the internal bourgeoisie maintains its 
own economic foundation and base of capital 
accumulation both within its own social formation, and 
abroad. Even at the political and ideological level 
it continues to exhibit its own specific 
features •••• Significant contradictions thus exist 
between the internal bourgeoisie and American capital. 
Even if these cannot lead it to adopt positions of 
effective autonomy or independence towards this 
capital, they still have their effects on the state 
apparatuses of these formations in their relations 
with the American state (Poulantzas 1974: 72-73). 
Szymanski has adapted this definition of an internal 
bourgeoisie to under-developed capitalist countries. II An 
internal bourgeoisie that both collaborates and manifests 
contradictions with the transnational corporations seems to 
be the dominant section of the bourgeoisie in most less-
developed capitalist countries" (Szymanski 1983: 415). 
Thus, we can understand the PAP-state as being a product of 
the struggle between the Singapore working class and the 
capitalist cla'sses of the imperialist countries, with the 
rule of the latter classes being mediated through the 
internal bourgeoisie's governance. Because other sections 
of the local capitalist class did not have sUbstantial 
vested interests in PAP governance, this rule has been 
marked by high levels of state violence and coercion. 
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Under classical imperialism, the local capitalist class had 
minimal responsibility for social control and was therefore 
able to be totally cooperative with imperialism. But under 
neo-colonialism when the local bourgeoisie had state power, 
this comprador character could not be sustained without 
undermining its social control. The neo-colonial state had 
to be more nationalistic in order to establish its 
legitimacy. 
In addition to the categories of absolutist state and 
internal bourgeoisie, it will also be useful to keep in 
mind the bureaucratic-authoritarian and corporatist 
categories as we study social control in Singapore. 
However, the main conclusion of this brief survey of 
approaches to the singapore state must be that there are 
some large theoretical gaps which arise from problems of 
methodology. If we wish to theorise the singapore state in 
the context of its alliance with imperialism, we need to 
understand how the various state and non-state forms of 
social control are related and how they change as the 
alliance changes. We need to understand the nature of the 
PAP-state as the product of the social forces and conflicts 
which produced this alliance in order to comprehend how 
social control works. To imply that the form of the state 
is mandated by a particular stage of economic development 
is to lapse into a determinism which ignores the primacy of 
social relations. Our examination in the following chapter 
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of post-war British imperialism in Malaysia and Singapore 
will enable these questions to be taken up more completely 
in the subsequent chapter on political economy. 
THEORISING SOCIAL CONTROL IN SINGAPORE 
The ways of theorising social control outlined so far are 
not intended to be exhaustive of the contributions of all 
theorists or theoretical schools. Rather, my aim here is 
to discover theoretical categories and methodological 
parameters which appear most promising for the task of 
understanding social control in Singapore~ 
The primacy of struggle in relation to accumulation and 
regulation is a major insight. It enables us to have a 
means of understanding the development of the forms and 
practices of social control. including the role of the PAP-
state. Additionally, by placing a periodisation of social 
control within the political context of the alliance 
between the PAP-state and foreign capital, we will be able 
to comprehend how strategies of accumulation and patterns 
of regulation adjust to struggle both within Singapore and 
regionally. 
55 
Mode of Production and Regulation 
More specifically, the debate between regulationists and 
their critics has yielded a rich supply of· theoretical 
categories and methodological insights. Most important has 
been the emphasis on the social formation in relation to 
regulation; that is, the implications for social control of 
a mode of production involving wage labour and thus the 
reproduction of social classes which tend to be in conflict 
because of the exploitation involved. 
We have seen that social control or regulation is vital for 
the reproduction of labour power and that the particular 
relation between capital and labour is reiated to the 
nature of the production process. Hence also the 
centrality of the wage relation to social control. The 
question of the correlation between Singapore's mode of 
production and its mechanisms of social control can now be 
taken up in this theoretical context, taking care to avoid 
the economic determinism for which the regulationists have 
been criticised. 
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Theory of crisis 
We have noted the regulationist tendency to see structures 
of accumulation and regulation as comprising a complete 
system which deals with crises by stabilising around 
specific forms of institutionalised class compromise. such 
a construct implies an equilibrium impervious to struggle, 
because the system as a whole is seen to be the determining 
force with class struggle as a dependent variable. 
However, the concept of such an interrelated system remains 
an important theoretical insight. It recognises that 
crises may occur at many points in the system and 
accumulate in many different ways. If one then sees class 
conflict as the independent variable, it follows that 
struggle in one part of the system may destabilise the 
whole and that, therefore, struggle may be effective at 
many points in the system. In fact, we will see later in 
this study that the PAP-state faces exactly this problem, 
as each struggle threatens to unravel the entire system of 
social control. 
state Forms and Forms of struggle 
The notion that class struggle determines institutional 
forms of regulation or social control is related to this 
view of crisis. Since class struggle permeates and shapes 
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all institutional forms of social control, crisis in one 
part may indicate a crisis of class relations as a whole. 
Our understanding of the PAP-state may be considerably 
enhanced by seeing the institutional forms of the state as 
shaped by struggle and as a site of struggle. The PAP-
state's central and extensive role in social control, 
especially in the fragmentation of the working class, can 
be seen as a response to struggle. Similarly, its alliance 
with imperialism can also been seen as the product of 
particular struggles. 
However, it must be noted that in Singapore there are forms 
of struggle related to race and gender as well as class. 
The existence of a predominantly Chinese state in a Malay 
archipelago has been secured by the alliance with 
imperialism. We shall see that the communal potential of 
Chinese dominance in singapore has been exploited 
regionally in order to divert attention from anti-
imperialist struggles. within Singapore, racial minorities 
(Malay, Indian and migrant workers) are the most exploited 
sections of the working class. Their struggles against 
exploitation are related to the structures of racism. 
Women are exploited for their breeding capacity and for 
their unpaid or cheap labour. Foreign investment has been 
attracted to places where the combination of reasonably 
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advanced technology, well-developed infrastructure and 
comparatively cheap labour enables high levels of surplus 
value to be generated. Women have supplied much of this 
cheap labour and are therefore subjected to the pressures 
of both patriarchal and capitalist social relations. 
We will see that contradictions have arisen between these 
structures of domination and exploitation, leading to 
various forms of struggle by women. Thus, in Singapore, 
struggles against patriarchy and racism are interwoven with 
class struggle. 
Ideology, Method and Social Control 
The relationships between choice and consent, between 
legitimacy and state violence, between practices and 
ideology can now be explored by means of the understanding 
of ideology outlined above. This feedback model postulates 
that determination is primarily in the direction of 
practices producing ideology with secondary determin~tion 
in the other direction. Thus, struggle produces 
ideological consequences which have to be addressed by 
institutions of social control. 
There are several methodological implications of this 
survey of some attempts to theorise social control. First, 
there is the regulationists' positive example of a 
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"research programme [which] shows a clear commitment to 
concrete analysis of concrete conjunctures through a rich 
and complex range of economic and political concepts 
directly related to the nature of the capitalist 
exploitation and domination" . (Jessop 1988:.162). That is, 
the detailed study of institutional forms of social control 
is essential to the development of theory. There is a need 
for systematic investigation of new mechanisms and the 
discovery of new linkages between them. There is still 
much work to be done in order to understand how systems of 
social control work. 
secondly, it is clear that any process of abstraction must 
include a retroductive method of constantly checking theory 
against reality and reality against theory. Otherwise we 
risk lapsing into obscure rationalist formalism or mere 
empiricism. 
Thirdly, the regulationists' periodisation of regimes of 
accumulation attempted to show that structures of 
accumulation and regulation fit together in different ways 
at different times. The developmental phases of 
Singapore's political economy noted in the introduction 
have been accompanied by changes in its systems of social 
control. since Singapore's political economy is 
characterised by the PAP-state's alliance with foreign 
capital, a periodisation of social control in this context 
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will necessarily be a periodisation of the phases of the 
movement of capital internationally and of the struggles 
against its effects. 
Although it will be theorised.in greater depth in the 
chapter on political economy, we must note here that the 
internationalisation of each circuit of capital (commodity 
capital through trade, productive capital through the 
operation of transnational corporations, and money capital 
through foreign direct investment) are political moves 
which express changes in social relations and represent 
stages of imperialism. The latest stage has involved the 
building of alliances between the capitalist classes of the 
imperialist countries and the capitalist classes of the 
neo-colonies. Imperialism creates new contradictions and 
political struggles. Thus, a periodisation of social 
control in relation to struggles will also reflect the 
historical development of imperialism. 
It is just such a periodisation which is the focus of the 
following chapter: Singapore's transition from colony to 
neo-colony in the face of anti-imperialist struggle. This 
study will provide the initial test for many of the above 
theoretical categories. 
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CHAPTER 2 
THE ROOTS OF TERROR: THE EMERGENCE OF THE ALLIANCE WITH 
IMPERIALISM AND THE RISE OF THE PAP-STATE 
This historical overview examines the way that British 
imperialism attempted to retain the colonial pattern of 
accumulation and rule by using military force against the 
anti-imperialist movement. Ultimately British interests 
could be preserved only by building a political alliance 
with bourgeois nationalist forces and surrendering state 
power to them, thus splitting and diverting the struggle 
against imperialism. The building of this alliance with 
the Lee faction of the PAP is the focus of the second part 
of this historical analysis. 
studying the emergence of the alliance will assist us to 
understand the PAP-state's contemporary social control in 
terms of the reciprocal obligations of this relationship; 
especially the PAP's role in creating the maximal 
conditions for the development of capitalism in Singapore 
and the region. The linkage of PAP-state social control 
with imperialist military power has provided the ultimate 
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guarantee of social control in singapore and, as we will 
see, has imbued all its mechanisms with the threat of 
violence. Unless contemporary social control is understood 
in this historical context, there might be a temptation to 
ascribe the present militarisation of the PAP-state and its 
continuing repression solely to PAP self-interest. 
Therefore this chapter throws light on the roots of 
contemporary social control in relation to accumulation and 
struggle. 
SUPPRESSING ALTERNATIVES TO COLONIAL RULE 1945-55 
The period 1945-55 marks a hiatus between the decline of 
British imperial pre-eminence through the loss of its 
colonies and the global assertion of us imperialism through 
its growing control over neo-colonies. The period's main 
feature was the British attempt to suppress strong anti-
colonial forces unleashed by the Second World War which 
opposed reversion to colonial rule. It concluded with the 
search for local allies to which state power could be 
entrusted in return for the protection of Western 
interests. That is, the strength of nationalism and the 
anti-colonial struggle eventually forced Britain to revise 
its plans simply to revert to colonial rule. This period 
63 
was therefore the prelude to the formation of the alliance 
between a fraction of the capitalist class of the emerging 
neo-colonial state and the capitalist class of the former 
colonial power. 
Immediately after the 1942 defeat of the British in 
Singapore and Malaya, the Colonial Office (CO) began 
planning for a "radical postwar re-organisation" of the 
territories to overcome the administrative disadvantages of 
the previous arrangement and to forestall demands by the US 
for the dismantling of its colonial rule in the area 
(Turnbull 1977: 220). By 1943, it had drawn up the Malayan 
Union proposals under which the Malay states and straits 
Settlements, with the exception of Singapore, were to be 
united under one colonial administration •. The CO decided 
Singapore should be kept separate "as a free port, an 
imperial defence base, and also because of the Malay 
states' long-standing fear of Singapore's domination" 
(Turnbull 1977: 220). In the short term it was thought 
Singapore would act as the main base for ten army divisions 
re-taking East Asia from the Japanese, remaining under 
military rule while Malaya reverted to (British) civilian 
control. In the longer term, it was envisaged that 
Singapore would be "a sort of District of columbia", an 
enlarged municipality if not a full colony, from where the 
British Governor-General for Southeast Asia would 
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coordinate policy in British colonies throughout the region 
(Turnbull 1977: 223). 
These colonial territories (Malay states, Straits 
settlements and Borneo territories) were considered as a 
package, not only in settling on a new configuration of 
British colonial power, but as a strategic bloc for Western 
interests in the region. However, the us saw the 
continuance of direct colonial rule in the face of 
nationalist aspirations as a possible complication in the 
securing of imperialism's interests. It was no longer 
necessary and, because of nationalist struggles, often no 
longer possible, to hold state power in order to exploit a 
,country's productive capacities. The us had discovered 
this much earlier than other imperialist powers and had 
long championed "open doorn policies (e.g. in China). The 
latest phase of imperialism therefore no longer involved 
exclusive exploitation by a single imperialist power. Thus 
post-war Britain had to face a world economy dominated by 
the US, which was also demanding access to the markets and 
resources of the British Empire. 
For a cash-strapped Whitehall, Malaya was by far the main 
dollar-earning colony, as Table 2.1 indicates. 
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Table 2.1: Net Surplus of Main Dollar Earners of 
British Colonies {1948} 
Colony Net Surplus ($ million) 
Malaya 172.0 
Gold Coast 47.5 
Gambia 24.5 
Ceylon 23.0 
Source: Hua 1983: 91. 
In 1951 Malaya's rubber exports to the US were valued at 
approximately US$405 million, while total exports from the 
UK itself to the US were less than US$400 million. Malaya 
was termed Britain's "dollar arsenal" {Li 1982: 169}. As 
an entrepot service centre for Malaya's exports and a 
strategic military base, Singapore's role 'was crucial. But 
this old imperialist model of holding state power in a 
colony in order to secure exclusive control of the surplus 
from natural resources could no longer be sustained because 
of nationalist str~ggle. 
The Malayan Communist Party (MCP) and its armed wing, the 
Malayan Peoples' Anti-Japanese Army (MPAJA), had cooperated 
with the British Military Command during the Japanese 
occupation. Immediately after the War, the newly-legalised 
MCP made proposals to the British Military Administration 
(BMA) , whose return it did not resist, for steps towards 
democratic self-government for a unified Singapore-Malaya. 
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However, it was obvious that after having made use of 
the guerilla forces during the Japanese Occupation, 
the British did not trust them once the Japanese were 
defeated. The British returned to reimpose their 
rule. They had no intention of handing power over to 
the communists, sharing power with them or even 
allowing them to play a complementary role. But they 
had to be treated cautiously ••.. After all, the MCP 
controlled an armed force of about 10,000 and its 
prestige and that of the MPAJA were high among the 
people. Faced with the problem of reestablishing the 
economy, the British could not very well afford to be 
confronted with an armed revolution (Khong 1984: 50). 
By October 1945, the MCP understood the British position. 
By this time the British had closed down two Chinese 
newspapers and jailed their editors. They had also 
responded with troops and police repression to MCP-
sponsored hunger marches and demonstrations for jobs, food 
and democratic rights, resulting in several deaths (Khong 
1984: 52). One estimate puts the number of MCP supporters 
in Singapore in the immediate post-war months at 70,000 
(Turnbull 1977: 228). The MCP-backed Singapore General 
Labour Union was established on 25 October 1945, and it 
quickly grew in strength with major strikes, beginning with 
a dockers' strike in November. The BMA's incompetence and 
corruption (it was termed the Black Market Administration) 
along with its repressive measures led to a general strike 
on 29 January 1946, and it was estimated that between 
150,000 and 173,000 took part in Singapore alone (Khong 
1984: 56; Turnbull 1977: 228). 
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The BMA exacerbated the situation by its political 
programme. First it brought forward the Malayan Union 
proposals, which simply reasserted colonial rule while 
keeping Singapore separate from Malaya. The MCP saw the 
separation of Singapore as "an attempt by the British to 
use Singapore's economic hold over the mainland to control 
the politics of the Malayan Union without having to bear 
the responsibility" (Hua 1983: 79). Despite vehement 
opposition from all quarters, the Malayan Union was created 
in April 1946 and singapore reverted to civil 
administration as a crown colony. The continuing storm of 
protest in Malaya from all races and classes, including the 
pre-colonial Malay rulers, led to the British making a deal 
with the latter. The Federation of Malaya, which 
guaranteed the old rulers' interests while maintaining 
British control, replaced the Malayan Union in February 
1948. But no other sectors of society were consulted. 
Anti-colonial protests built up. A nationwide shutdown and 
general strike on 20 October 1947 attracted widespread 
support in singapore and Malaya. 
Secondly, the British administration cooperated with 
employers, planters and agency houses to ensure that 
commodity production resumed to former levels and that 
workers were denied even modest improvements in wages and 
conditions. In response to both the constitutional 
proposals and the labour situation, the growth of unions 
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was phenomenal, with massive strikes and demonstrations in 
Malaya and Singapore from late 1945 (Hua 1983: 69-75). 
From 1 April 1946 to 31 March 1947, 1,173,000 work days 
were lost in singapore due to strikes (Khong 1984: 125). 
The British reacted by applying the restrictive 1940 
societies Ordinance, which required all unions to register 
and operate under highly restrictive conditions. 
The labour movement was much stronger in Singapore than 
Malaya and kept up pressure on the administration until the 
Singapore Federation of Trade Unions (along with the Pan-
Malayan FTU) was banned under the Trade Union Ordinance on 
31 May 1948. Throughout 1947 and into 1948, police 
repression of trade union activity was relentless, and 
workers were killed in several places in Malaya (Hua 1983: 
85-88). With the heavy restriction on political activity 
and union organising, the British left the anti-colonial 
forces with little choice but open revolt. 
Before outlining what I can only describe as the 
aggressively restrictive measures taken by the British 
to curb the MCP and its front organisations in 1947 
and early 1948, I should emphasise the fact that MCP 
policy between August 1945 and early 1948 was that of 
a Peaceful united Front with the object of achieving a 
more or less constitutional takeover of power. The 
policy was predicated upon British acceptance of open 
political, trade union and similar activities which 
would be considered legal in Britain itself. It was 
no doubt partly predicated upon the Mepfs retention of 
a significant administrative-cum-intimidatory power. 
I would argue that it was only when it became apparent 
that both major avenues of expression, political and 
trade union, administrative-cum-intimidatory, were 
almost completely to be denied to militant left-wing 
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groups that the MCP decided to reverse its previous 
policy (stenson 1971: 8). 
The colonial state pre-empted any final showdown on the 
streets when it dispatched Gurkha troops to Johor in early 
June 1948, and in mid-June the Governor-General declared 
states of emergency progressively throughout Malaya and 
singapore (Chin 1983: 9; Hua 1983: 88). The Emergency 
Regulations empowered the government to detain without 
trial, ban publications, take possession of any building or 
vehicle, control all movements on the road, disperse any 
meeting, impose curfews, arrest anybody without warrant, 
impose the death penalty for possession of arms, punish 
anyone the police considered to be disseminating false 
information, confiscate businesses suspected of aiding the 
MCP, detain any villagers suspected of aiding or consorting 
with the MCP, use all force necessary to arrest persons 
carrying firearms or suspected of consorting with people 
who do, and finally, evict persons occupying state land 
(i.e., squatters) (Khong 1984: 151-152). 
The MCP was proscribed along with other nationalist parties 
and organisations. Newspapers were closed and editors 
imprisoned. Thousands of political activists and trade 
unionists were imprisoned or deported. Banishment was 
legally possible because the citizenship status of many 
non-Malay residents was not yet finalised. Chinese and 
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Indian activists were thus deported to their respective 
countries of origin. Initially, this meant sending 
thousands of left-wing Chinese back to Kuomintang-ruled 
China. There had been more than 13,000 arrests and 
deportations by the end of 1948 and there was a net loss 
from Malaya to China of almost 29,000 persons between 
January and July 1949 (Hua 1983: 95). For the twelve years 
of the Emergency, one pro-British writer estimated the 
British "deported 90,000 communists and their supporters, 
and at one time detained 20,000 communists" in Malaya and 
Singapore (Josey 1980: 189). At a conservative estimate 
about twelve hundred Singaporeans were arrested and 
detained without trial between 1948 and 1953 (Turnbull 
1977: 248). Most were Chinese-educated activists. But 
English-educated "radicals" from such organisations as the 
Teachers' Union and the University Socialist Club were also 
taken in. 
Six months after the declaration of the Emergency, in 
December 1948, the MCP responded by l~unching its armed 
struggle. It had made the ideological commitment to armed 
struggle in March, but planned a longer preparatory period 
of industrial disruption than was possible once the British 
took the initiative in June (Khong 1984: 145, 148). Its 
armed wing, renamed the Malayan National Liberation Army 
(MNLA) I 
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••. comprised no more than 10,000 active regulars, 
against which, British imperialism ranged 40,000 
regular British and Commonwealth troops; 70,000 armed 
police personnel; 300,000 Malay Homeguards; including 
aircraft, artillery and naval support, " ..• perhaps the 
largest armed force in proportion to population ever 
used in a colonial war, testifying to the support the 
liberation movement gained and the degree of the 
suppressive effort ... The US gave full support to the 
British, and among other things supplied arms and 
helicopters. The [US] Griffin Mission of 1950 also 
recommended that immediate aid should be given for: 
radio and similar communication technology for the 
police; road building and earthmoving equipment; 
teacher training for Chinese primary schools and the 
revision of Chinese textbooks (Hua 1983: 97). 
According to another source, "that Britain was hard pressed 
in Malaya was evinced by the fact that by March 1950 there 
were nearly 100,000 troops and police (both British and 
local) who were having only limited success checking the 
3,000 or so guerillas" (Chin 1983: 11). In addition to 
anti-guerilla warfare, the methods used by the British 
included the extraction of information through torture, 
strafing villages and resettling thousands of Chinese 
squatters in guarded camps to prevent contact with the 
MNLA. These tactics were elaborated upon by the US a 
decade later in Vietnam. 
The ferocity of the military repression indicates the 
geopolitical importance Malaya and Singapore had for 
western imperialism in the face of anti-colonial struggles 
throughout Asia. This was also plainly stated in secret 
communications between British officials. 
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We should regard SE Asia as a whole and devise a 
coherent policy for dealing with it over the whole 
region •••• I feel that it is no exaggeration to say 
that this region has assumed a vast importance in the 
world-wide struggle between the democratic and 
communist causes, quite out of proportion to its 
industrial and political developments .••• We think - as 
we feel sure that you do - that a deliberate and 
planned effort must be made to hold the communist 
advance in Asia beyond the boundaries of pakistan, 
India, Tibet, Burma, IndoChina and the Philippines, 
and to keep it away from Siam, Malaya, Indonesia •... 
To do that we must have a constructive policy in which 
all the governments in these countries can operate as 
partners •••. We need Asian equivalents to the Marshall 
Plan and the Atlantic Pact that should offer the Asian 
Governments and peoples economic, political, and if 
necessary, military aid in their resistance to 
communism •.•• To devise such a policy, all the 
governments concerned in the region should be invited 
to cooperate. In addition, the governments of the 
USA, Australia, and New Zealand should participate. 
The USA are particularly important because probably no 
Plan adequate on the economic and military side is 
possible without a large measure of help from them 
(Top Secret: Malcolm MacDonald, Commissioner-General 
in SE Asia to Rt Hon Ernest Bevin, Fd Despatch No 16, 
23 March 1949, FO 371/1073 in Hua 1983: 91-92). 
Commonwealth military cooperation in support of the British 
was formalised under the ANZAM (Australia, New Zealand and 
the Malayan Area) consultative framework established in 
1948. Although the MNLA was largely defeated by 1955, the 
permanent stationing of Commonwealth troops in Malaya as 
part of a Commonwealth Strategic Reserve began in that year 
(Chin 1983: 8-22). This deployment was partly due to 
regional security concerns after the French defeat in 
vietnam as well as continuing operations against the MNLA. 
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Armed struggle was, of course, impossible in Singapore with 
its small land area and its large British military bases. 
The Emergency therefore affected the anti-colonial struggle 
in Singapore by confining it to the narrow limits of 
permissible trade union activity and legal political 
parties cut off from the main weight of the Malayan anti-
colonial movement. In mid-1948 the majority of the 
singapore communist leadership went to Malaya where various 
levels of struggle could be continued. Activists who 
remained in Singapore suffered the repressions of detention 
without trial, deportation and police harassment. 
The first side-effect of the Malayan emergency in 
Singapore was to cripple left-wing political movements 
and leave the stage to conservative politicians, who 
were willing to cooperate amicably with the colonial 
authorities in working for constitutional reform, 
modest social change and the retention of the colonial 
economy (Turnbull 1977: 238). 
Turnbull is only partly right. British strategy in 
Singapore was also circumscribed; the colonial state could 
not use the same degree of violence as in Malaya. The 
active use of the massive imperialist military power 
present on the island would destroy the investments and 
infrastructure crucial to British interests in both 
Singapore and Malaya. Also the killing of political 
opponents would take place in front of the whole population 
and the world media. In addition, it was clear that direct 
colonial control of the state was no longer acceptable to 
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any section of society. Even the English-educated 
bourgeoisie began to see routine acts of police violence as 
counter-productive, as propaganda gifts to the left. 
These limits on British rule provided some political space 
for the left. Hence the political irony of a resurgence of 
labour activism in singapore at the same time as 
imperialist forces were gaining a military victory over the 
MCP in Malaya. 
These tactical limitations also infused with urgency the 
British attempts to promote the bourgeois Progressive Party 
with its wealthy English-educated leadership_ This marked 
a decisive shift in the British policy of social control 
towards handing over state power to a bourgeois nationalist 
party. Such a party would need to exhibit an ability to 
control the population in the interests of British capital 
before an alliance could be cemented and the state handed 
over. In other words, the strategy entailed using 
bourgeois nationalists to crush the anti-imperiali~t 
movement. This repression would no longer be seen as a 
foreign colonial power oppressing a tiny colony but as a 
national government governing in the interests of its own 
people. 
The Progressive Party was encouraged to bring forward 
proposals for constitutional change. This came in the form 
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of the Rendel Commission, which proposed a partly elected 
legislative council without sovereign pow~rs. It quickly 
became clear to the British, however, that the Progressive 
Party was not a credible vehicle for its political 
objectives and that the Rendel Commission's reformist 
proposals would not be tolerated for long. 
The Chinese masses regarded them [the Progressive 
Party] as collaborators, supporting the colonial 
government's unpopular policies on education, 
language, immigration, citizenship, and national 
service .... To the Chinese-educated and a minority of 
English-educated radicals the activities of the 
legislative council were unreal and irrelevant, and 
the genuine political issues of the time took place 
outside of the council chamber (Turnbull 1977: 244). 
Unlike Malaya, Singapore did not have a local aristocracy 
to be transformed into a capitalist class.· There was no 
strong national bourgeoisie either. It was dependent on 
British commerce and was also split between the English-
educated and the Chinese-educated. The former, represented 
by such political parties as the progressives and later the 
Labour Front, were cultivated by the British as potential 
inheritors of state power. But they had no mass base and 
had such a genteel belief in liberal democracy that they 
were reluctant to use state violence for political ends. 
The Chinese-educated merchant class, on the other hand, 
were socially and politically marginalised by the British. 
They increasingly threw in their lot with the left-wing 
nationalist struggle. Perhaps they anticipated greater 
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influence and expanded business opportunities once British 
interests had been expropriated. There was, therefore, as 
yet no suitable bourgeois ally for the British in 
Singapore. 
But the struggle had pushed the British to the point where 
they had little choice but to follow US pressure and hand 
over state power. They needed an ally with apparently 
contradictory attributes: mass support in obtaining state 
power and a commitment to British interests once in power. 
At the same time, the left realised they could get state 
power in the short term only by means of an alliance with 
bourgeois political forces that would lend them a legal 
cover in the contest but have insufficient mass base to 
take permanent state leadership from the left once in 
power. Lee Kuan Yew and his small coterie of English-
educated bourgeois nationalists were able to exploit these 
political opportunities to their own advantage. 
THE TRANSITION TO NEO-COLONY: FINDING AN ALLY 
While studying in England in the late 1940s, Lee Kuan Yew 
realised that the mass-based, left-wing, anti-colonial 
movement continued to have popular support in singapore 
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despite the intensifying suppression of the MCP in Malaya 
by British military force. In January 1950, shortly before 
his return to Singapore. he addressed a student discussion 
group, the Malayan Forum. His speech revealed his 
understanding that the British would need to find a 
reliable ally to protect their interests after they 
relinquished state power. He also revealed a clear 
understanding of his class interest: making a deal with 
imperialism would be the only way to guarantee the 
longevity of bourgeois nationalist rule against the wishes 
of the "masses". 
We, the returned students, would be the type of 
leaders that the British would find relatively the 
more acceptable. For if the choice lies, as in fact 
it does, between a communist republic of Malaya and a 
Malaya within the British Commonwealth led by the 
people who, despite their opposition to imperialism, 
still share certain ideals in common with the 
Commonwealth, there is little doubt which alternative 
the British will find the lesser evil •.•• But if we do 
not give leadership, it will come from the other ranks 
of society, and if these leaders attain power, as they 
will with the support of the masses, we shall find 
that we, as a class, have merely changed masters ..•• 
But our trump card is that responsible British leaders 
realise that independence must and will come to Malaya 
and that therefore it will be better to hand Malaya to 
leaders sympathetic to the British mode of life, 
willing for Malaya to be a member of the British 
Commonwealth and, what is most important, willing to 
remain in the sterling area. For the alternative is 
military suppression, a policy which another 
imperialist power has found impossible in 
Indonesia .... 
If we fail to fulfil our duty, the change that still 
will come must be a violent one, for, whatever the 
rights and wrongs of communism, no one can deny its 
tremendous appeal to the masses •••. But if the majority 
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of us choose to believe that Malaya can be insulated 
from the nationalist revolts that have swept the 
European powers from Asia, then we may find that there 
is no place for us in the Malaya that is to be after 
the British have departed (Minchin 1986: 46-48). 
Reference to Malaya in this way so as to include Singapore 
was part of the creed of the nationalist struggle. Hence 
Lee was addressing Malayan as well as Singaporean 
colleagues. His advocacy of a class strategy to build an 
alliance with British imperialism was not new. The British 
deal with the Malay aristocracy two years earlier had shown 
their willingness to work through the local. traditional 
ruling class in the face of popular revolt. The 
aristocracy's interest in maintaining its class position by 
becoming a capitalist class had also been widely 
understood. 
What was significant in Lee's speech was his advocacy of 
the case for bourgeois Chinese nationalists to share state 
power with the Malay capitalist class in an independent 
Malaya. He was explicitly linking his own destiny as an 
English-educated, middle class Chinese to that of the Malay 
upper class and not to the anti-imperialist movement which 
had engaged the sympathies of most Chinese in Malaya. He 
was establishing a mutual interest in defeating the anti-
imperialist movement and in consolidating a relationship 
with the British. But the way his class would reach this 
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latter objective in Singapore would be very different from 
developments in Malaya. 
Building the Bourgeois Nationalist-Anti-Imperialist 
Alliance 
After returning to singapore in the early fifties, Lee and 
his student friends continued to meet. Regular discussions 
with Goh Keng Swee, Toh Chin Chye, S. Rajaratnam and others 
were held in Lee's basement dining room at 38 Oxley Road. 
Their main topic was how to obtain popular support in their 
bid for state power. In 1979, Lee recalled: 
Our primary concern was how to muster a mass 
following. How did a group of English-educated 
nationalists - graduates of British universities -
with no experience of either the hurly-burly of 
politics or the conspiracies of revolution, move 
people whose many languages they did not speak and 
whose problems and hardships they shared only 
intellectually? (Minchin 1986: 66) 
Lee and his faction of returned students did their 
political reconnaissance thoroughly. They knew the 
bourgeois parties were proving weak and incompetent and 
lacked wide political appeal. They also knew that the 
Malayan Communist Party and its open mass organisations 
were the most popular and highly organised political force 
in Singapore. A wide range of unions, educational 
institutions, vocational and cultural associations were 
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sympathetic to the left and, being predominantly Chinese, 
to political developments in China. The political 
aspirations of the majority of Singaporeans were, they 
knew, represented by the left. 
The Communists, although they had only a few hundred 
active cadres, could muster and rally thousands of 
people in the unions, cultural organisations and 
student societies. By working and manifestly 
appearing to work selflessly and ceaselessly, they won 
the confidence and regard of the people in the 
organisations. Having won the confidence and regard, 
they then got the people to support their stand (Lee, 
1961: 21). 
The Lee faction realised that it had to co-opt the popular 
legitimacy of the left in order to impress upon the British 
that it was capable of delivering mass support for a non-
communist, pro-British post-independence regime. Without 
the left, the bourgeois nationalists could never come to 
power (Bellows 1970: 20). 
At the same time, with their severely weakened central 
leadership after the onslaught of the Emergency in 1948 and 
the proscription of the MCP, the left needed a non-
communist, legal, electoral front to give it a role in the 
transition to independence. It realised the impossibility 
of an extra-legal bid for power in an island garrison, and 
it thus recognised the need to be represented in the 
political formalities of transition. 
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This high-risk political alliance between the left and a 
group of English-educated nationalists had, as the Lee 
faction knew, been tried before with inconclusive results. 
The Malayan Democratic Union, formed in 1945, had been 
unexpectedly successful in mobilising popular support 
against the colonial government. It collapsed in 1948 with 
the beginning of the Emergency. "within a few years, 
however, as aspiring politicians reviewed the MOU period, 
many perceived what they considered to be a winning 
strategy .... Four ministers in the present PAP government 
were MDU members" (Bellows 1970: 70). 
From the moment of his return, Lee had begun the process of 
showing how he could be useful to the left and thereby that 
he was a political leader to be taken account of by the 
British. He made contact with a variety of political 
movements and began to develop a public profile as a 
clever, aggressive young lawyer defending political cases 
in the colonial courts. His legal assistance to the Postal 
Workers' ~nion during their strike in May 1952 won him 
public recognition as an activist lawyer. He was 
eventually retained by over 100 unions and associations 
(Minchin 1986: 72; George 1984: 33). 
But Lee undoubtedly knew that he was not fully trusted by 
the left or the community organisations he legally 
represented (Bellows 1970: 132). He was known as a 
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bourgeois nationalist. When he met with left activists, 
Lee recalled in parliament on 23 February 1977, "They 
denigrated me. They said I had an air-conditioned office 
and I slept in an air-conditioned room. I was bourgeois". 
He lived in a large bungalow near the city centre, he owned 
a studebaker, bred German shepherd dogs and went on 
holidays to the Cameron Highlands. His contact with the 
dynamism of the mass movements unnerved him, and he could 
not cope. As a union adviser, he was often "out of his 
depth", sometimes begging activists to tone down their 
protests (Minchin 1985: 77). Not being able to speak 
Chinese himself, he sought advice from Chinese-speaking 
expatriates and expressed relief that he could attempt his 
united front ride to power protected by the presence of the 
colonial government (Minchin 1985: 71). 
The People's Action Party was formally established on 21 
November 1954 and included both the left and the Lee 
faction. 
The PAP was organised by fourteen persons meeting over 
a period of months in the recreation room of Lee Kuan 
Yew's home. In essence, what the English-educated, 
middle-class, non-Communist majority of this coterie 
did was to establish a working agreement with 
individuals who had proven organisational skills and 
symbol-wielding abilities and were evidencing these 
aptitudes in the 1954-56 riots and demonstrations •••• 
There was no way for the non-Communist PAP leadership 
to detach itself from the Communists if it wished to 
win the support of a majority of Singapore's 
electorate (Bellows 1970: 19-20). 
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The PAP's structure consisted of a network of local 
branches represented at an annual conference. The 
conference elected the governing body, the Central 
Executive Committee (CEC). The left had control of the 
branches of the Party and, by agreement in order to prevent 
proscription as a communist front, the Lee faction held the 
majority of seats on the CEC. The bourgeois nationalists 
had the head, the left had the body. 
From the beginning, it was a coalition of convenience for 
each faction, and both intended to use the PAP as the 
electoral vehicle to carry them through to being the first 
government of an independent Singapore and, eventually, 
after merger, of an independent Malaya. 
Building the Bourgeois Nationalist-Imperialist Alliance 
Having achieved the alliance with the left as a stepping 
stone to state power, the Lee faction had to pursue its 
main task of building an alliance with British imperialism. 
The first stage of establishing this relationship was 
proving that the PAP, led by the Lee faction, could be 
trusted with state power. Lee and his colleagues therefore 
had to deliver to the British a bourgeois nationalist 
leadership which demonstrated an ability to co-opt left-
wing mass support for its own political goals, to retain 
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control of the PAP, to operate competently in the 
legislature and to suppress unflinchingly the left's 
leadership and grassroots organisation. These attributes 
would get them covert British political endorsement, 
support from the colonial repressive apparatus and, 
finally, they hoped, state power. 
The Lee faction had certain advantages in this task of 
building their power base. From 1951 or 1952, Lee was in 
touch with British officers in the Special Branch who had 
already decided not to arrest him on his return but to see 
how he developed politically (Minchin 1985: 63). He 
eventually established a close working relationship with 
the Director of the Special Branch. In the early days of 
meeting the left leadership, Lee was receiving briefings on 
them from these security contacts. Alex Josey, formerly of 
MI6, became Lee's close friend and eventually his prolific 
biographer. 
Later, as the Labour Front administration weakened from PAP 
attacks and its own scandals and maladministration, Lee's 
ascendancy in the PAP made the Party increasingly 
acceptable to the British. Sir William Goode was made 
Governor of Singapore on December 11, 1957. As Singapore's 
Chief Secretary, he had controlled the Special Branch since 
1953 and was intimately acquainted with Singapore politics. 
Lee maintained close contact with Goode in the year leading 
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up to the 1959 elections and is said to have obtained 
information from him. Goode had responsibility for handing 
over to a non-communist, pro-British leadership and it 
seems that he favoured the Lee faction over the failing and 
unpopular Labour Front. Goode's information is said to 
have given Lee considerable political advantage over the 
Labour Front as well as over the left in the PAP (Bellows 
1970: 35; George 1984: 43). There is therefore every 
indication that, as the Lee faction increasingly 
demonstrated its political resolve and its capacity to 
deliver, the amount of British covert assistance increased. 
The ruthless duplicity and increasing success of Lee Kuan 
Yew's pursuit of his goals no doubt convinced the British 
that he was someone they could work with. By the time of 
the 1959 elections which brought the PAP to power, the 
alliance between the Lee faction and British imperialism 
had been forged. The British chose the Lee faction to 
inherit state power. 
The Alliance-Build~nq strategy 
Building an alliance with the British involved, as may be 
expected, a strategy of publicly supporting the left while 
undermining it in private. But it was more complex than 
this. For the Lee faction to retain control of the PAP at 
the executive level, the left had to be prevented from ever 
gaining a majority on the Central Executive Committee and 
thus taking over the party completely. 
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Secondly, in order to co-opt the mass movement to its 
political goals for as long as possible, the Lee faction 
needed to monopolise PAP representation in the legislative 
assembly. That is, the far more charismatic and popular 
left leaders of the PAP had to be prevented from using the 
officially sanctioned parliamentary institution as a 
political platform through which to establish national 
political leadership without the Lee faction's mediation. 
The Lee faction's monopoly would also have the important 
ideological consequence of enabling the rhetoric of 
bourgeois nationalism to dilute and divert the sharp edge 
of anti-imperialism. Lee and his colleagues could define 
their own political programme as socialist without fear of 
contradiction. 
Finally, the British were unlikely to want to hand over to 
a party which would be taken over by its left wing as soon 
as state power was achieved. The Lee faction therefore had 
to put in place the security guarantees that would enable 
it to survive the left's inevitable counter-attack. The 
British would no doubt assist with establishing the 
necessary regulations and structures. But, more than this, 
they also needed to be assured that the Lee faction could 
and would use the state terror that British rule bequeathed 
them. On all these counts, the Lee faction delivered. 
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This is not to suggest that the strategy was so clearly 
thought out from the beginning. It must also be remembered 
that the alliance-building process was a mutual one and not 
simply a sustained act of political cleverness by the Lee 
faction. The British were actively seeking to support the 
faction that would serve their interests best. There was 
almost no way that any faction could have made it 
successfully to the 1959 election victory without their 
support. 
The Lee faction performed the valuable function for the 
British of bringing the politics of the majority of 
Singaporeans into a parliamentary system which the British 
controlled in cooperation with a variety of factions of 
bourgeois nationalists. Before this, as a site for 
political struggle, the legislative assembly was largely 
irrelevant to the mass political movements. The 
parliamentary strategy of the Lee faction was to accept the 
mantle of the mass movement in the chamber while ensuring 
that the real left lea~ership never got a foothold there. 
To some extent this coincided with the political needs of 
the left, which needed the Lee faction to exhibit the 
acceptable face of bourgeois nationalism as a cover for 
them. 
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Collaboration and Betrayal 
Thus, Lee was able to denounce the government's repression 
of the left while maintaining ideological distance from 
them. He spoke eloquently and frequently in support of 
democratic freedoms in the Legislative Assembly to which 
three PAP candidates were elected in 1955. 
If it is not totalitarian to arrest a man and detain 
him when you cannot charge him with any offence 
against any written law - if that is not what we have 
always cried out against in fascist states - what is 
it? .. If we are to survive as a free democracy, then 
we must be prepared, in principle, to concede to our 
enemies - even those who do not subscribe to our views 
- as much constitutional right as you concede 
yourself .••. What he [Chief Minister Marshall] is 
seeking to do in the name of democracy is to curtail a 
fundamental liberty, and the most fundamental of them 
all - freedom from arrest and punishment without 
having violated a specific provision of the law and 
being convicted for it (Lee quoted in FEER 2 June 
1988) . 
This speech was delivered in September 1955 when the Labour 
Front government was proposing the Preservation of Public 
Security Bill, a milder version of Singapore's current 
Internal Security Act. 
At the same time, the Lee faction was using its executive 
power in the CEC and contacts with the British to undermine 
the left and have its leaders imprisoned. The pattern of 
arrests and the way Lee always seemed to have the right 
information at the right time has been termed "fortuitous" 
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for the "moderates" (Chan 1985: 150). There was more to it 
than this. 
On June 11, 1955, seven left-wing leaders were detained 
under security legislation before a general strike. While 
publicly requesting their release, the Lee faction 
privately expressed the view that the Labour Front 
government's actions were "feeble and lamentable in the 
extreme" because the Special Branch had recommended 300 
detentions (Bellows 1970: 22). The left wing of the PAP 
quickly became suspicious. There was a "growing pro-
communist conviction that the non-Communists were assisting 
the government in its periodic security sweeps against the 
pro-Communists" (Bellows 1970: 21-22). 
In order to avoid lending SUbstance to the charge that the 
PAP was a communist front, the left did not put up 
candidates for the PAP's Central Executive Committee (CEC) 
elections on 26 June 1955. For the same reason there was 
an understanding that, when the left did eventually enter 
the CEC, it should maintain a minority position and not 
take any offices. On 8 July 1956 at the second Party 
Conference, the left won four of the twelve CEC seats and 
proposed redrafting the constitution to enable branches to 
nominate CEC members. This revision would have enabled the 
left to take over the CEC and, whenever it wanted, to 
curtail the Lee faction's ability to forge an alliance with 
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the British using the PAP as a base. However, three left-
wing CEC members were soon arrested under the Preservation 
of Public security Ordnance (Chan 1985: 149). Lim Chin 
Siong, the most charismatic opposition leader, CEC member 
and PAP member of the Legislative Assembly, was arrested on 
the night of 26 October 1956. He remained incarcerated 
until after Lee came to power in 1959 (Clutterbuck 1973: 
130). Thus was the most powerful orator of the left 
excluded from the assembly as well as the CEC for the 
remainder of the decade. 
In August 1957, the left made a stronger bid to take over 
the CEC because, by this time, the need to clip the wings 
of the bourgeois nationalists was very clear to the left 
leadership. This move was also precipi tat'ed by the All 
Party Mission to London in April-May 1957 at which Lee, 
representing the PAP, accepted terms for independence 
through merger with Malaya and the establishment of an 
Internal security Council (ISC) , which were against party 
policy. The arrangement agreed to by Lee would enable a 
conservative government in Malaya, the Lee faction and the 
British to clamp down on the left throughout a merged 
Malaya and Singapore. 
To repudiate Lee's stance, the left needed to win the CEC 
elections. They won half the seats. Since they controlled 
the rest of the Party completely, this victory was 
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sufficient. Recognising this, the Lee faction initially 
refused to take up their seats. Ten days after the 
election, five of the left CEC members (and 30 non-CEC 
members) were detained under the Preservation of Public 
Security Ordinance (Pang 1971: 4). An embarrassed Lee 
denied the government statement that the arrests were to 
save the PAP from a communist takeover (Clutterbuck 1973: 
146; George 1984: 43). 
To ensure that Lee faction control of the CEC would never 
be under threat again and to obviate the need for any 
future purge, the party rules were amended to establish a 
cadre system. Cadres were chosen from among the party 
members by the CEC. Only cadre members could attend the 
party conference and vote for the CEC. The list of cadres 
was secret. The CEC could suspend, demote or expel any 
member. This reorganisation has been termed "the iron law 
of oligarchy" (Bellows 1970: 24). Lee himself put it well: 
uThe Pope chooses the cardinals and the cardinals elect the 
Pope" (George 1984: 45). There has only ever been one pope 
in the PAP. Lee Kuan Yew has been secretary-general since 
the beginning and remains so. 
In March 1958, with PAP electoral victory increasingly 
likely, the CEC decided to conduct a wholesale purge of the 
lower echelons of the party. It required all party members 
to re-register. By means of a Select Committee of six 
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persons from Lee's faction, a process was begun to weed out 
the left from the membership and to ensure that none rose 
to the higher levels of the Party. About 500 members were 
put on probation. While this action could not prevent 
left-wing control of the intermediate and lower levels of 
the Party, it did further secure the top level for Lee. To 
prevent future defections to the left, PAP candidates for 
the 1959 elections had to sign an undertaking they would 
resign from the assembly if they quit the PAP. Lee later 
introduced legislation into parliament which made it 
obligatory for all members of parliament to resign their 
seats if they left their party. 
The way Lee manipulated the administration to secure his 
faction's position in the PAP and eliminate the more 
popular left leadership was revealed by the Chief Minister 
shortly before the 1959 elections which brought Lee to 
power. 
The Labour Front administration was already severely 
weakened, and the opposition PAP was already certain to win 
the elections. The left leadership hoped to make a 
concerted bid to take over the PAP once and for all after 
Lee had won power. In the meantime they cooled their heels 
in prison. The exposure of Lee's role in putting them 
there came too late to affect the elections. 
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The Labour Front government (1955-59) under David Marshall 
and then Lim Yew Hock governed under the Rendel 
constitution: severely curtailed powers had to be exercised 
within the limits of continuing British colonial rule. 
While the Labour Front tried to negotiate full 
independence, the PAP, especially Lee himself, castigated 
it with great flair for being a tool of the British. At 
the same time, the Labour Front was acting under pressure 
from the British and Lee to detain left-wing PAP leaders 
and thus save Lee from imminent political eclipse. That 
this must have been particularly galling for Chief Minister 
Lim Yew Hock is clear from his 1959 outburst in the 
Assembly. More importantly, his impassioned statement 
reveals the extent to which Lee was secretly collaborating 
with the British against his left-wing PAP colleagues. 
The truth shall now be told. If one side can play 
dirty and begin to be dirty, I shall play the same 
game and do it too, and let the country and the world 
and God d.ecide. The subversive clause was put in as a 
result of the Honourable Member [Lee Kuan Yew] and I 
seeing the Secretary of state for Colonies. (Colony of 
Singapore 1955-59: 3, cols. 2164-65). 
Lim was pointing to Lee as one of the chief architects of 
the security provisions resulting from the constitutional 
talks in London, notably the clause that "persons known to 
have been engaged in subversive activity should not be 
eligible for election to the first Legislative Assembly of 
the new state of Singapore" (Clutterbuck 1973: 144). While 
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the singapore representatives publicly objected afterwards 
to the provision for the purpose of maintaining credibility 
back home, it has been generally claimed that they 
privately welcomed it. Lim's claim that Lee was one of its 
main proponents has been accepted by a number of writers 
(Bellows 1970: 138; George 1984: 44; Minchin 1985: 83-84). 
By this means Lee excluded the detained left leadership of 
his own party from future political office and, until Lim 
exposed him, was able to blame the move on the British and 
the Labour Front. 
The same talks confirmed that membership of the Internal 
security Council "would be drawn up in such a way that 
ultimate authority rested in the hands of the British and 
Federation officials and that the ISC would remain an 
effective instrument to detain or in some other manner 
prevent the pro-Communists from coming to power legally or 
illegally" (Bellows 1970: 34). Thus Lee could take power 
in Singapore with the full weight of British and Federation 
security authorities behind him to suppress the left. This 
is the main reason he accepted independence through merger 
on these terms, even though there remained a considerable 
risk that they would relegate singapore to a secondary role 
to Kuala Lumpur. 
Later in his speech, Lim continued, "I did so many things 
for the good of the country. I did so many things for the 
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good of the PAP after discussions with the PAP. Such is 
politics in Singapore today" (Colony of Singapore, 1955-59: 
3, col.2167). Of this statement, Bellows has observed, 
"In the passion of a moment [Lim] publicly stated that the 
non-Communists [in the PAP] informed the government on 
their pro-Communist associates" (1970: 133). 
Lee is often credited with surviving this period by a 
mixture of luck and his own political cleverness. This is 
partly true. But, more importantly, the Lee faction was 
cultivating British support through the squalid game of 
squealing on those whose political support was essential to 
its own popularity. Thus, the Lee faction exhibited an 
early, if indirect, ability to use state repression and 
terror against political rivals even before coming to 
power. In return for taking control of the state on terms 
which protected British interests, the Lee faction was 
already receiving their security guarantee. The ultimate 
sanction of imperialist military violence, first the 
British and then the US, has remained a fundamental pillar 
of social control in Singapore ever since. 
Consolidating the Alliance 
The PAP's accession to power was an important achievement 
for the Lee faction. They had positioned themselves well. 
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They were able to give vent to radical rhetoric while, to 
save the PAP from British wrath, proclaiming their 
ideological difference from the left. They were able to 
defend the left leaders in public while betraying them in 
private. They were at the head of a popular political 
movement which swept them to power in 1959 while the most 
charismatic leaders languished in detention. 
critics called it cheating, admirers called it 
flexibility, neutrals called it opportunism, but the 
fact is that it was a competent display of sustained 
dissimulation lasting nearly seven years. And it was 
successful (George 1984: 40). 
But it still remained to be decided finally whether the 
election was a victory for the bourgeois nationalists and 
imperialism or for the anti-imperialist movement and the 
left. The real struggle continued. The Lee faction was 
aware that the mass electoral support the PAP attracted 
was largely indirect or constituent, being channeled 
through, and derived from, the multiple, pro-
Communist-controlled secondary organisations. For the 
majority of the PAP electorate, secondary association 
leaders were political reality. Identification with 
the second-level leadership was the relevant and 
decisive affiliation (Bellows 1970: 26). 
That is, the Lee faction had to consolidate its own 
domestic power base if it was to consolidate its alliance 
with the British. It had to prove its ability to govern in 
the interests of foreign capital and to implement the lSI 
accumulation policy. This entailed two tasks. First, it 
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had to win over other sections of the local capitalist 
class and as many of the lower classes as possible. 
Secondly, it had to destroy the left leadership, the mass 
movements and bourgeois rivals so that there would be no 
political alternative to the Lee faction and thus no other 
party for the people to support or the British to deal 
with. 
Winning Over a Domestic Power Base 
While the support of imperialism was and still is the most 
important power base of the Lee faction, the practice of 
governance required the support of other sections of the 
local capitalist class. The PAP government had to be 
Singaporean. Otherwise direct colonial rule through 
military coercion might as well continue. For the Lee 
faction, winning over the more pro-imperialist sections of 
its own class was not a problem. The dependence of the 
local bourgeoisie on British capital and therefore their 
comparative weakness as a political force is discussed in 
the following chapter. If Britain supported the Lee 
faction, they could do nothing to stop it and supporting it 
was also in their interests. Although they may earlier 
have regarded the faction as radical activist interlopers, 
they were reassured by the steps it took on gaining power. 
It must have become increasingly obvious to them that the 
Lee faction and the British had an arrangement. Lee went 
out of his way to reassure them prior to the 1959 elections 
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by stating that the real battle would start after the 
elections: tiThe ultimate contestants would be the PAP and 
the MCP" (Lee 1961: 30). By the 1963 elections, this 
battle had been joined and much of the local capitalist 
class, although not the more nationalistic Chinese-educated 
elements, was right behind the Lee faction. 
In winning over the lower classes, the Lee faction also had 
several advantages in addition to its grip on the state 
security apparatus. First, for several years on the 
national stage, its members had articulated the ideology of 
bourgeois nationalism as a left-wing ideology. Even as it 
moved rapidly to ensure that the Singapore economy remained 
within the imperialist orbit, the Lee faction was able to 
characterise all its policies as truly socialist and in the 
interest of nation-building. 
Linked to this control of the PAP ideology was the Lee 
administration's control of the PAP's political programme. 
It quickly began to implement some of the most popular 
aspects of this programme: educational reform, public 
housing, better health system, community centres and other 
facilities. The left leaders were forced into the position 
of critics of a government which was carrying out their 
policies. At the same time, increasing numbers of the 
lower classes were moving to take advantage of the 
opportunities they saw the Lee administration offering 
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them. They had supported the PAP in 1959 and saw no 
inconsistency in supporting it again in 1963 when it was 
delivering on its promises. Arguments about the difference 
between bourgeois nationalism and national democracy would 
have been academic. 
The Lee leadership was also assisted by the fact that 
roughly twenty per cent of the labour force was employed by 
or dependent on the British military bases or related 
expenditure (Bellows 1970: 113; Krause 1989: 438). 
Furthermore, the alacrity with which the Lee administration 
used police-state tactics must have encouraged many to 
support it in 1963. 
Eliminating the Left 
To ensure that it could survive without popular support in 
the PAP, the Lee faction moved to consolidate its party 
executive powers with the full range of state power 
immediately upon election. More than that, it went on to 
the offensive to ensure that the left leaders were 
separated from their mass base once and for all. Then the 
state terror previously reserved for only the most 
implacable and powerful enemies of colonialism was slowly 
turned against the lower classes as a whole. 
In order to carry the popular legitimacy of the left into 
the elections, Lee had been forced to promise that the 
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release of detained left-wing leaders was a condition for 
the PAP taking up the reigns of government if it was 
elected. He therefore set about to release some of these 
leaders and then to destroy those who would not accept his 
leadership or the bourgeois nationalist betrayal of 
national independence. That is, on behalf of the British 
and in their own political interest, the Lee faction 
eliminated the charismatic and organisational leadership of 
the PAP and the independence movement which had succeeded 
in mobilising so many forms of struggle and in forcing the 
British to hand over state power. 
In the years after 1956, when he was lawyer for the 
detained left leaders, Lee had unusually free access to 
them and was able to gather extensive information for later 
use. 
I used to see them there [in prison], arguing their 
appeals, reading their captured documents and the 
Special Branch precis of the cases against them .••. I 
also saw the official version in reports on them (Lee 
1961:17). 
This previous legal work for the detainees and full access 
to security files after assuming the reigns of government 
was the basis of a revitalised anti-communist campaign. It 
was a comparatively simple matter to label a political 
rival on the left as a communist or pro-communist and thus 
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as an anti-national servant of another power, terms which 
might better have described members of the Lee faction. 
The characterisation of political rivals to the Lee faction 
as communist or pro-communist was a tactic of state terror. 
Lee himself has admitted that there were few actual MCP 
cadres in Singapore (Lee 1961: 21) and that he did not know 
who they were. But he also knew the political game that 
the British played before him and which now suited his 
purposes so well. As he said in the assembly while still 
in opposition; 
Whether a person is a communist or a communist agent, 
only he knows and God knows. Between his conscience 
and God of course lies the special Branch and it is up 
to them to show that these men whom they have arrested 
are Communists or Communist agents (Colony of 
Singapore 1955-59: 4, col.2598). 
In histories of singapore politics, especially those 
published in singapore, the opponents of the Lee faction 
are usually labelled "extremists", "communists" and "pro-
communists" as against Lee's "moderates" and "non-
communists" (Pang 1971; Chan 1985). These labels tacitly 
recognise that not all, nor even most, of those on the left 
who were active in the PAP and in community organisations 
were MCP members. The left were, in fact, a broad spectrum 
of groups committed to some form of socialism and to 
national independence. 
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The history of the PAP from 1959 to 1961 is one of 
increasingly desperate efforts of a still powerful left 
leadership to wrest the PAP leadership and thus state power 
from the Lee faction. On occasions during these three 
years, the Lee administration came close to falling but it 
had the support of the British and of much of the local 
capitalist class. It also had the instruments of state 
power which it used with increasing effect. On his first 
day in office, Lee conducted a two-hour inspection of 
security arrangements and had a conference with the police 
commissioner and the director of the Special Branch (George 
1984: 53). 
By 1961, the left was thoroughly disenchanted. All the 
detainees had not been released, a new amendment to the 
Citizenship Bill rendered some of the left leaders 
stateless, and restrictive policies were being implemented 
with regard to Chinese educational institutions and the 
trade unions (the main bases of left power). The left 
began to campaign on these issues. The Lee faction carried 
the battle to them with proposals for merger with Malaya on 
grounds unacceptable to the left (Pang 1971: 13). The left 
retaliated by withdrawing support for a PAP candidate in a 
by-election resulting in a PAP defeat. 
The final split came in 1961 after a vote of confidence in 
parliament forced by Lee on the merger proposals. The left 
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split from the PAP along with its mass base. Thirteen PAP 
Assembly members departed to set up the Barisan Sosialis 
[Socialist Front]. with them went more than 80 per cent of 
the PAP membership, all but two of the Party branches and 
nineteen of the twenty-three paid organising secretaries 
(Pang 1971: 15). According to other analysts, 60 to 70 per 
cent of the membership left and thirty of the paid staff 
(Bellows 1970: 28). Most cadres also left the Party (Chan 
1985: 153) but there is disagreement over just how many. 
All agree, however, that not even the skeleton of the Party 
remained. The Lee faction was now the PAP. 
One of the most important problems confronting the PAP 
in mid-1961 was that the party had lost most of its 
voter appeal .... Once these [left] organisations pulled 
away from the PAP, the remnants of the party were 
unable, save in a few instances, to arouse in the 
electorate those reifying, personally meaningful 
connotations and associations which a party slowly 
accrues over time (Bellows 1970: 46). 
Despite appearances, the situation was actually more 
serious for the Barisan than for the PAP remnant. Probably 
neither the Barisan nor the Lee faction recognised this, as 
the latter was surprised at the extent of the defections. 
But, by forcing a split with the left, the Lee faction had 
finally isolated its opponents so that the full weight of 
the security apparatus could be brought down upon them. By 
this action, the Lee faction was consolidating its power 
base with the British and the local capitalist class. 
Further, it was now possible to redouble government efforts 
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in education, housing and welfare in the certainty that 
these policies would win loyalty among the lower classes 
for the PAP and not the Barisan. 
The Barisan sosialis, for at least the next eighteen 
months, had the majority support of the singapore 
electorate (Bellows 1970: 75). But the systematic 
harassment of its leadership by the state security 
apparatus, the de-registration of its grassroots 
organisations, the PAP's hysterical anti-communism along 
with its calls to national loyalty and solidarity in the 
face of Indonesian confrontation, all took a severe toll. 
The Barisan Sosialis was put on the defensive and, now 
being in opposition, had no capacity to deliver concretely 
on its political programme. Furthermore, it could not 
match the parliamentary performance of the bourgeois 
nationalists, who had ensured that the parliament became a 
central symbol of independence and who had out-manoeuvred 
the left on the constitutional issue of merger with Malaya. 
The challenge for the PAP was to prove to the British and 
the Malay government in Kuala Lumpur that it could defeat 
the left and win an election. Only this achievement would 
give the PAP maximum political weight in the new federation 
of Malaysia. 
105 
With the departure of the mass organisations, the PAP had 
no way of reaching the local level with what remained of 
the party structure. It faced very strong Barisan sosialis 
organisation at this level. The PAP government therefore 
established networks of government community organisations 
to replace the party organs it had lost. These 
organisations delivered both welfare services and 
government propaganda at the local level. By the time of 
the 1962 referendum on merger and the 1963 elections, the 
PAP had much of its party-state apparatus in place. 
To ensure that its electoral chances were further enhanced, 
on 2 February, 1963, the PAP detained 111 opposition 
leaders without trial in Operation Coldstore, aptly named 
since some of them were kept for nearly twenty years. The 
charismatic Lim Chin Siong, who had been released after the 
1959 elections but not given citizenship papers or PAP 
cadre status, was arrested again. In solitary confinement 
he became suicidal from torture and maltreatment, was 
eventually broken after seven years, forced to confess and 
beg for mercy in public and then whisked directly to 
England from Changi Prison "reduced to a vegetable" (George 
1984: 69). His fate was similar to that of many others 
(Amnesty International 1980). More arrests followed later 
in 1963. 
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In addition, the PAP gerrymandered the elections and not 
merely by manipulating the state media: 
Former detainees were physically prevented from 
nominating in the one hour available for their 
personal presentation of papers. The election was 
called with minimum notice and the campaign period of 
nine days included the holidays and festivities 
associated with Malaysia/s inauguration. sites and 
permits for rallies were hard to come by. Printing 
facilities for opposition parties were almost 
unobtainable. Notice was given of the deregistration 
of seven leftist unions and SATU [Singapore 
Association of Trade Unions] funds were frozen at the 
eleventh hour to prevent their being spent for 
electoral purposes •..• [At PAP rallies] searchlights 
were used to show up dissenters in the crowd (Minchin 
1986: 130). 
The PAP won the election with 46.9 per cent of the total 
valid vote and the headless, persecuted Barisan Sosialis 
gained 33.3 per cent. 
This election formalised the exclusion of the genuine 
independence movement from state power. The left had 
failed to prevent the bourgeois nationalists from forming 
an alliance with imperialism. They had misjudged, thinking 
that they could simply take state power from the Lee 
faction after 1959. Too late they discovered that the 
alliance was solidly forged during the PAP's days in 
opposition when the left was under constant persecution. 
By 1963 the left had begun to lose its mass base and, 
without any bourgeois allies, came under direct attack from 
the combined British, Malayan and Singaporean internal 
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security apparatus. This ensured, as had been planned 
since 1958, that the left was unable to regroup and 
consolidate itself as a legal entity. 
New Phase of Imperialism 
The 1963 election result also indicated that the Lee 
faction, with the support of British imperialism, had 
established the basis of a long-term alliance. It had 
effectively transformed the PAP from an anti-imperialist 
party of the working class to the party of the pro-
imperialist section of the capitalist class, and had helped 
complete the transition from classical imperialism to 
modern neo-colonialism. It had brought Singaporean 
politics into a parliamentary institution it controlled. 
It had sufficiently co-opted or suppressed the lower 
classes to win an election. In the process it had 
demonstrated the will and the ability for state repression. 
De-registration, banning, withholding or revocation of 
citizenship, deportation, smear campaigns, fixed elections, 
widespread secret surveillance, police intimidation, 
detention without trial and torture had become part of the 
PAP political repertoire. In short, the Lee faction had 
finally proved itself worthy of taking over state power 
from the British. The alliance was consolidated. 
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However, the PAP's future depended on it continuing to 
govern in the interests of imperialism. Its future in 
Malaysia depended on the political accommodation it could 
reach with the Malay capitalist class. Within two years 
the PAP was decisively rejected as a potential partner in 
the governing coalition. Singapore was expelled in 1965. 
But, since imperialism could work through either a unitary 
neo-colonial state or two separate neo-colonial states, 
this separation did not at all threaten the PAP-state 
alliance with foreign capital. In fact, it enhanced 
Singapore's role as a regional base for direct foreign 
investment and gave further impetus to the development of 
an absolutist PAP-state. 
From 1965 the terms of the alliance were indicated by the 
conditions under which foreign investment entered 
Singapore. The strong incentives given suggest a highly 
cooperative internal bourgeoisie desperate for credit and 
technology and without the nationalistic leanings of its 
Malay or Indonesian neighbours. Not being accountable to a 
strong bourgeois class, the PAP-state was able to sacrifice 
not only workers but also local capitalists to the greater 
competitive power of foreign capital. That is, the PAP saw 
its interests as lying in the regulation of social 
conditions in Singapore to enhance the accumulation 
strategies of this alliance. The ways we might understand 
the political meaning of these strategies in relation to a 
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periodisation of political struggle and of imperialism are 
the concern of the following chapter. 
Periodisation and struggle 
The transition from colonialism to neo-colonialism in 
Singapore demonstrates how class struggle has been the main 
force in determining the local character of imperialism and 
the nature of the state. Such a periodisation reveals not 
only the concrete political forces at work in a specific 
social formation at a given moment but, more importantly, 
their development over time as a result of local political 
struggle. 
This periodisation of the twenty years from 1945 to 1955 
also sets the scene for the detailed study of the 
institutions of social control under the PAP-state since 
1965, which is the focus of this thesis. The development 
of each institution will be analysed within the framework 
of a periodisation of Singapore's political economy in 
order to trace the links between struggle, economic policy 
and social control within a changing social formation. 
The following chapter gives an overview of the ways 
Singapore's political economy may be understood 
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theoretically and outlines the periodisation of its 
development which informs the later chapters. 
111 
CHAPTER 3 
SINGAPORE'S POLITICAL ECONOMY 
The previous chapter dealt with the colonial origins of 
Singapore's political economy. An alliance between a 
bourgeois nationalist faction of the PAP and British 
imperialism emerged from a period of prolonged struggles. 
That is, Singapore's political economy was understood in 
terms of the relationship between economic strategies and 
Singapore's social formation. 
The earlier theoretical introduction noted the ways in 
which the dynamics of this relationship might be analysed. 
It focussed on the interaction between patterns of 
accumulation, systems of regulation and forms of struggle. 
It noted that the historical forms of domination reflect 
struggle. As they conflict or cooperate over economic 
policies, the relative strengths and weaknesses of social 
forces are institutionalised in the forms of social 
control. Therefore, an understanding of political economy, 
the relationship between accumulation strategies and the 
disposition of social forces, is essential to comprehending 
social control. 
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But it is not easy to find analyses of Singapore/s 
political economy which illuminate this relationship. This 
is because the dominant approach among writers on Singapore 
is the neo-classical tendency of current mainstream western 
economics. A minority of writers owe a theoretical debt to 
the neo-Marxian world systems approach or to the mainstream 
Marxist mode of production approach. Often these 
approaches are intertwined as analysts draw on more than 
one tradition in their writing. This chapter will 
distinguish between them in order to examine the 
theoretical themes and problems they raise in relation to 
singapore. The chapter will also argue in favour of the 
mainstream Marxist approach as being more able 
theoretically to explain Singapore/s political economy in 
terms of the relationship between accumulation strategies 
and the changing social formation in the context of 
political struggles. 
THE NEO-CLASSICAL APPROACH 
Most analysts of Singapore's political economy avoid even 
oblique references to theoretical questions in explaining 
its apparent success as a Newly Industrialised Country 
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(NIC). They content themselves with unequivocal assertions 
about the honesty, reliability and wisdom of the PAP 
government and its ability, through wise economic policy 
choices, to ma~e the most of the "givens" of geographical 
location, an expanding regional or global economy and a 
hard-working population. 
Typical of this literature is Milne and Mauzy's recent 
monograph on Singapore, which notes the PAP's success in 
making "quick and appropriate adjustments" to changing 
world conditions (1990: 132). It has been able to do this 
because singapore 
has leaders dedicated to the pursuit of excellence and 
the rewarding of merit, and Singapore has a 
hardworking labour force. Furthermore, the government 
encourages values that are essential "for the 
successful conduct of trade - honesty, integrity, 
trust, credibility, and incorruptibility (Milne & 
Mauzy 1990: 132). 
This explanation for singapore's economic development rests 
on the wisdom and virtuosity of the Lee faction of the PAP. 
This perspective is shared by many other writers. 
Chia siow Yue recently ascribed Singapore's "competitive 
edge" to geographical location and "political stability, 
quality of administration and economic management, and 
harmonious industrial relations" (Chia 1989: 271). She 
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previously emphasised "an enlightened leadership" as the 
main reason for export performance (Chia 1972: 33). 
Chen speaks of "an effective, honest government genuinely 
committed to economic development" which provides a model 
for all countries (Chen 1983: 7, 24). Lim Chong Yah, 
Professor of Economics at the National University of 
singapore, Chairman of the National Wages Council and 
father-in-law of Lee Kuan Yew's younger son, has referred 
to the "fundamental causes" of economic development in 
Singapore as "political stability and correct economic 
policy" (Lim C Y 1983: 100). More recently he elaborated 
on these basic causal factors: "Singapore adopted a free 
enterprise system with an outward-looking orientation 
supported by an able and honest government that gave the 
highest priority to economic efficiency and 
achievement •••• The leadership of the state was crucial, 
critical and indispensable in this rapid transformation 
process" (Lim C Y 1989: 206-7). 
Another writer accounts for Singapore's success by linking 
the economic wisdom of the PAP to the political discernment 
of the entire populace: 
Lacking a rural hinterland with the safety valve of a 
still functioning agrarian sUbsistence economy and [a] 
reserve of undeveloped natural resources, Singapore's 
people had nothing to fall back on but their own 
energy, adaptability, intelligence and realism. They 
had the good fortune to produce and the good sense to 
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support a group of young, vigorous, efficient, and 
dedicated leaders (Geiger 1973: 165). 
Similar emphases can be found in Lee Soo Ann (1973), Goh 
Keng Swee (1977), Drysdale (1984) and Vasil (1984). 
Fundamental Assumptions: Free and Rational Choice 
Although these studies purport to be purely descriptive, 
they share, perhaps unconscioUSly in many cases, the 
assumptions of the neo-classical approach to political 
economy. At the most fundamental level, this approach 
comprises a set of assumptions about human nature which are 
used as ultimate explanations for economic behaviour. 
Humans are seen as atomised beings who individually choose 
freely and rationally to act in certain ways in order to 
satisfy personal desires. What we are as individuals is 
not a product of our upbringing, our social environment or 
economic circumstances. We are the product of our genes 
and exist in society only to fulfil the individual needs we 
are born with. 
These assumptions have implications for the way most human 
activity is understood, from the reproduction of the 
species to the behaviour of the market. Since the PAP 
government also holds to these axioms, we will see how they 
influence its social control practices in the detailed 
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studies of some institutions later in this thesis. The 
main implications that we need to note in relation to 
writers on Singapore/s political economy are those relating 
to "rational choice" and "free choice", the nature of the 
market and the neo-classical theory of value. In short, we 
need to comprehend the neo-classical theory of capital.· 
Individuals make "rational ll choices in order to obtain 
their desired gratifications and they make these choices 
"freely". That is, every individual is assumed to have the 
same power to choose: equality is presupposed. If what 
people do arises from an equal opportunity to make rational 
(though sometimes mistaken) and free choices, then 
differences in human behaviour may be explained in terms of 
different individual values, preferences and tastes. Thus 
choices, not circumstances, explain behaviour. It is 
assumed that every individual is, or could if they wanted 
to be, in the same situation. 
At a very general level, neo-classical theory recognises 
that people's actions are related to their endowments, 
their circumstances. But these factors are regarded as 
"givens ll , exogenously determined from outside the field of 
economics and thus beyond its scope. No attempt is made to 
explain the reasons for different endowments and 
preferences. 
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Because of the emphasis on rational and free choice, this 
approach has sometimes been referred to as the neo-
classical/rational choice approach (Rodan 1989: 2). Its 
present dominance has also led to the simple name of 
"mainstream Western economics" (Szymanski 1983: 3). Its 
assumptions are easily detectable in the illustrations 
quoted above with their constant references to the correct 
policy choices made by the PAP-state and, always implied, 
by Lee Kuan Yew personally. No explanation is necessary 
for the Singapore "miracle" other than the observation that 
Lee' Kuan Yew and the PAP freely made the right, rational 
economic policy choices. 
Soon after 1959, the Singapore government made wise 
choices in directing industrial policy. It picked a 
high proportion of "winners" in deciding what sectors 
to emphasise (Milne & Mauzy 1990: 153). 
Marqinalist Theory of Value and the Free Market 
For neo-classical writers, the main correct policy choice 
of this able government was the commitment to free 
enterprise and the free market. This introduces another 
set of assumptions: the classical and neo-classical theory 
of value. The value of something is determined by natural 
scarcity and subjective preference or desire. When 
something is plentiful, our desire for it is weak. 
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However, if it is a scarce commodity, we have a strong 
preference for it. 
This notion of value is more commonly referred to as the 
theory of marginal utility. utility is the. satisfaction 
resulting from getting something. Disutility is the kind 
of negative feeling suffered from parting with something. 
The amount of utility or disutility is in direct 
correlation to the quantities of things involved and 
derives from its marginal units. Marginal utility refers 
to the value of a commodity at the margin, the pleasure or 
pain of getting one more or one less of a commodity than 
before. For this reason, the neo-classical approach is 
sometimes referred to as marginalist theory. This theory 
does not really distinguish between value and prices, thus 
both are determined by supply and demand or scarcity and 
desire. 
The price of a commodity is thus determined by the 
sUbjective preferences of both sellers (supply) and 
buyers (demand), a process involving continual 
negotiation and change, since what is demanded at the 
margin (one more) depends on the price at which the 
marginal unit is offered, and vice versa. When 
everyone has perfect knowledge and freedom to alter 
their preferences in response to changes in one 
another's preferences, equilibrium prices are formed. 
These express the sum of everyone's tastes under 
conditions of perfect competition and freedom (steven 
1991: 3). 
From these assumptions derive the notions of free 
enterprise and the free market. Marginalist theory sees 
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commodity exchange as a process that distributes "utility" 
to everyone provided they "freely" participate in it. The 
equilibrium price resulting from this kind of exchange is 
the optimum price, the right price: the price at which no 
one can get any more utility by making a different choice. 
Goods are exchanged until their relative marginal utilities 
correspond to their prices. This is termed allocative 
efficiency. 
In other words, the market is the solution to natural 
scarcity or different endowments. The market enables us to 
obtain the things we lack in exchange for the excess supply 
of what we already possess. Marginalist theory thus sees 
the market as a natural, politically neutral institution 
through which everyone can potentially benefit. 
The existence of a free market internationally through free 
trade leads, according to neo-classical and some world 
systems analysts (whom we will examine next), to countries 
specialising in industries or commodity production where 
they have a natural or comparative advantage. This is the 
hidden hand of the market ensuring allocative efficiency at 
the international level. Thus, correct economic policy 
choices ensure the development of production in "niches" 
where a country has a comparative advantage. The detection 
of such niches and the judgement on when it is time to move 
to another niche is seen as the stuff of economic wisdom. 
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A country such as singapore needs a niche - an area of 
concentration that is just right for its stage of 
industrial development and capabilities and in which 
competition from other countries is relatively weak. 
But .•. in the industrial context there are no permanent 
niches. Indeed, a newspaper headline summarised a 
B.G.Lee [Brigadier General Lee Hsien Loong, Deputy 
Prime Minister and elder son of Lee Kuan Yew] comment 
in the words, "Get out of our present niche or we're 
finished!" (Milne & Mauzy 1990: 153-4). 
Anything which interferes with the free market is seen as 
the enemy of free choice, of the right prices and of 
allocative efficiency. The free market or freely chosen 
exchange is seen as a moral end in itself. Hence the 
predisposition of neo-classical writers against state 
"intervention" in commodity exchange and against any other 
political force, such as a trade union, which organises 
individual choices into collective politidal power. 
All these assumptions lie behind the neo-classical 
approach, which sees the wise policy choices of the 
Singapore government to be trade liberalisation, letting 
market forces set prices, reform of exchange rates and the 
provision of export incentives (Rodan 1989: 2). 
The Contradiction of state Intervention 
However, while they herald Singapore as an outstanding 
example of a free market economy, these writers have 
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difficulty in justifying at the same time the extensive 
intervention of the state whose leaders made the "right" 
choices. How can this be a positive contribution to free 
enterprise? 
Lim Chong Yah deals with this contradiction through the 
simple expedient of embracing it. "Singapore has been able 
to grow so spectacularly in the economic field throughout 
the period because it has allowed a free enterprise system 
to flourish with government support and intervention where 
necessary" (Lim C Y 1984: 6). 
Gayle, an advocate of market I iberalisation , takes a 
similar route in his comparative study of Singapore, 
Jamaica and Costa Rica, but with a dash of cultural 
mystification added. Singapore is a nmarket socialist 
City staten which is "an economic success because accepted 
cultural traditions have permitted strong sociopolitical 
institutions to encourage entrepreneurial acumen and to 
attract foreign direct investmentn (Gayle 1986: 100). 
Lee Kuan Yew's prolific hagiographer, Alex Josey, notes the 
continuing support of "free enterprise" by "Singapore's 
pragmatic socialist government" (Josey 1980: 73). 
Ariff and Hill deal with the contradiction more 
imaginatively: 
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The crucial difference between Singapore and, to 
varying degrees, the other four ASEAN countries is 
that intervention in the former facilitates the 
efficient operation of market forces, whereas that in 
the other countries frequently produces the opposite 
result (Ariff & Hill 1985: 154). 
Somewhat tautologically, Singapore's economic success was 
achieved independently of government action which, owing to 
the efficacy of policy choices, merely assisted the 
operation of the market. Elsewhere in ASEAN, intervention 
has not led to positive results and therefore has distorted 
the market. As Rodan has pointed out, this is a no-lose 
position which makes impossible a serious analysis of the 
role of the state in Singapore's economy (Rodan 1989: 26). 
It only allows the conclusion that the actions of the 
Singapore state have facilitated rather than obstructed 
market forces which have, regardless, given the economy a 
position of comparative advantage. 
A variation on Ariff and Hill's theoretical side-step is 
provided by Krause in his study "Government as 
Entrepreneur". In his view, government interventions aimed 
at "correcting market imperfections" have "often done more 
harm than good" (Krause 1989: 436), but he then concludes 
"Singapore, however, is an exception". For theoretical 
support he borrows the categories of economic historian 
Douglas C. North and defines Singapore as an "optimal or 
neutral state ... which takes actions that would emerge with 
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perfect markets, which if accomplished by the private 
sector would require intense competition" (Krause 
1989:436). It is then only a short step to saying, as 
Krause does, that the Singapore market is too small for 
perfect competition in private markets and .the state is 
needed to protect against market failures. How has the 
state succeeded so effectively in Singapore especially in 
its economic intervention through SOEs (state-owned 
enterprises)? His answer: liThe honesty and integrity of 
the present political leaders have never been questioned, 
and this also is carried over to the SOEs" (Krause 1989: 
444). 
A related solution to the contradiction of government 
economic control is to acknowledge its importance 
domestically but note the overarching power of global 
market forces. This is the explanation offered by Sandhu 
and Wheatley. 
Singapore's economic success, despite the Republic's 
reputation as an exemplar of thriving free-market 
enterprise, has not been the result solely, or even 
primarily, of the operation of free market 
forces •... There can be no doubt that the cumulative 
outcome of the dirigiste measures, irrespective of 
differences of opinion about individual instances, has 
been to render Singapore especially attractive to 
multinational corporations and to enhance the island's 
comparative advantage in export manufacturing and 
servicing beyond that which it could have attained in 
a milieu of completely free market forces (Sandhu & 
Wheatley 1989: 1088-9). 
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The assumption of neo-classicism that comparative advantage 
is something which merely awaits realisation by the correct 
policy choices of the state remains, but in a diluted form. 
The role of the state in actually shaping comparative 
advantage is hinted at. Later, however, Sandhu and 
Wheatley ascribe Singapore's success to global market 
forces marginally assisted by a competent PAP state 
leadership. 
Surely the conclusion to be drawn must be that the 
economic success achieved by Singapore during the past 
quarter of a century has been the result 
principally of economic policies and practices 
imported from elsewhere and influenced only 
marginally, if at all, by indigenous cultural factors 
[such as the supposed Confucian work ethic]. Moreover, 
it is by no means certain that these policies would 
have proved effective had it not been for structural 
and situational forces prevailing in 'Southeast Asia 
and the world at large during the relevant decades, 
notably an expanding global economy, an increasingly 
open world trading system, and a relatively free 
transfer of technology between Asia and the West. 
within this context Singapore has benefited 
immeasurably from the shrewd and perspicacious 
responses of its political and bureaucratic 
mandarinate .... (Sandhu & Wheatley 1989: 1096~7). 
The inability of such scholars to resolve the contradiction 
of free market and state interventionism lies in the 
ideological assumptions of the neo-classical approach. 
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critique of the Neo-Classical Approach 
This chapter began with the imperative of understanding the 
relationship between Singapore's economic development and 
its social reality. In this endeavour, the neo-classical 
approach has severe limitations. This is because it is 
essentially an ideology which covers up the politics of 
social reality in the interests of justifying capitalist 
social relations. It provides a polemic rather than a 
scientific method. 
For example, the notion of free and rational choice focuses 
on one aspect of human behaviour, choice, in order to 
conceal the existence of inequality and the pressures which 
shape choice. Of course people do make choices, but these 
do not explain human behaviour. Rather, it is the 
circumstances within which choices are made which explain 
the reasons for them. People work for wages because they 
have no other means of survival, because the alternative is 
worse. People "choose" to be employers because they 
possess property. 
Similarly, the Lee faction of the PAP chose an export-
oriented industrialisation (EOI) policy after 1965 because 
of such circumstances as the persistence of political 
opposition in Singapore deriving from inequalities of 
class, race and linguistic tradition, the failure of the 
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PAP to conclude an alliance with the Malay capitalist class 
in· Kuala Lumpur, the nature of the PAP's alliance with 
British capital and the changing pattern of capitalist 
production internationally. 
Neo-classical writers would have us believe that PAP 
economic policy was merely a matter of the personal 
cleverness and uprightness of the leadership in making the 
correct choices. The political leadership is thus made the 
variable among the givens of economic reality. The 
personal abilities of PAP politicians and bureaucrats are 
made the basis of political legitimacy. While it is in the 
interests of the PAP-state to continue to generate such 
praise, the choices of one man or one party remain 
insufficient explanation for the development of Singapore's 
political economy. Rather, we need to understand such 
matters as the politics of struggles in Singapore or of the 
PAP alliance with imperialism in order to explain the 
actions of the PAP leadership. 
There is also no scientific way of determining whether 
choices are free. There is only the ideological assertion 
that any state or trade union involvement in commodity 
exchange limits freedom and therefore is bad. This 
indicates the political bias of the supposedly neutral and 
purely descriptive neo-classical approach: it is an 
ideology which justifies the exploitation of labour by 
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capital and which aims to break up any social organisation 
which interferes with this relationship. The ideology of 
choice supplies the assumption of equal power to act in 
accordance with individual tastes and preferences by 
abstracting economics from the inequalities of power that 
accompany social reality. This ideology suits those in 
power because it propagates the myth of equality. Equality 
of choice, of opportunity, implies that social and 
political differences are irrelevant and can be ignored. 
Relationships of power in a capitalist society are thereby 
declared to be normal, uncontroversial, a fact of nature, a 
matter of political necessity. The social realities of 
differing power owing to class, race or gender are hidden 
beneath such notions as marginal utility, allocative 
efficiency and the free market. 
comparison with Marxist Theory 
The deficiencies of marginalist theory as a scientific tool 
and its political partiality become apparent when 
contrasted with the Marxist theory of value, of the nature 
of production and of the role of the market. The 
categories of the marginalist notion of value are not 
scientifically testable. It is not possible to test 
whether something is chosen for the utility it provides, 
since the fact that it is chosen at a certain price is seen 
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as the evidence for the utility which was presumed to lie 
behind the choice. This is a tautological justification of 
all prices as the right prices on the basis that the 
purchasing agent was prepared to accept them. 
The neo-classical approach also subverts a scientific 
understanding of political economy by conflating capitalist 
production and consumption. It holds that consumer tastes, 
not the capitalists' need to make a profit, determine 
production. Production is seen merely as a response to 
consumer taste, a consumption of inputs to achieve utility 
in the future. By giving primacy to consumption, which 
appears at times to be a matter of choice or taste, over 
production, divisions of class and conflicting interests 
become non-existent. 
However, the Marxist approach to value takes into account 
the pressures of the social context, the circumstances 
which present the options from which choices are made. It 
seeks a scientific explanation of commodity exchange. At 
the centre of the circumstances of capitalist society is 
the capitalist production process based on wage labour and 
driven by competition among capitalists. The extraction of 
surplus value by capitalists through the exploitation of 
labour in the production process is a scientific way of 
understanding capital as a social relation. Consumption, 
the spending of workers' wages, can thus be seen in 
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political terms: the reproduction of labour power. The 
Marxist attempt to explain value and prices in terms of the 
socially necessary time for producing a commodity conforms 
to and reveals the reality of social experience rather than 
ascribing political realities solely to subjective feelings 
as neo-classical ideology does. 
Through the Marxist theory of value, the concepts of demand 
and supply can be understood in their political context. 
When external circumstances induce capitalists to move from 
one industry to another in search of higher profits, the 
equilibrium between value (socially necessary production 
time) and prices is temporarily disturbed. 
The most important political phenomenon of production is 
not this short-term influence of demand and supply on 
prices. It is the qualitative difference between capital 
and labour because their social situations are 
qualitatively different: one has power over the other, the 
wealth of one is acquired by means of exploiting the other. 
In terms of demand and supply, it is recognised that, on 
the demand side, workers produce surplus value which is 
appropriated by capitalists. On the supply side, Marxist 
political economy recognises that people without means of 
production enter wage labour out of necessity not after 
calculating the relative pain or pleasure of work or 
leisure as the marginalists would have us believe. 
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Capitalists make decisions about investment out of 
necessity to keep up with other capitalists or become 
bankrupt, not by weighing quantities of utility in the 
present against greater quantities in the future. 
Thus it can be seen that neo-classical theory takes the 
concepts of demand and supply out of their true political 
context where they explain relatively little about 
production and exchange, and elevates them to the level of 
ideological principles. This has the effect of obscuring 
the way capitalism functions. Labour and capital are 
treated not as qualitatively different social relations but 
as qualitatively similar factors in production and exchange 
which are sUbstitutable for one another at the margin. The 
conflicting interests of labour and capital are rendered 
invisible. 
Marxist Theory of the Market 
The Marxist critique of the neo-classical theory of the 
market reveals very sharply their opposing political 
positions. Marginalism sees the market as a kind of level 
playing field where everyone has equal power to act out 
their choices and tastes. It assumes the market functions 
for producers in the way it does for consumers. 
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Marxist theory sees the market as specific to capitalism 
and as serving its purposes. In particular, the market is 
where capitalists buy labour power. In order to survive, 
workers have to sell their labour power in a market 
dominated by capital. They have to give up their surplus 
product to capitalists. Far from being a terrain of 
equality, the market is the institutional mechanism through 
which the surplus is transferred from those who sell labour 
power to those who buy it. 
Secondly, the market is where the competition among 
capitalists, which constantly raises the exploitation of 
labour, is manifested. A free market is where there is 
equal opportunity for all capitalists to exploit workers. 
This is not a politically neutral institution but one which 
ensures the subordination of labour to capital. 
Capitalists who do not exploit workers effectively do not 
themselves survive. 
Thirdly, the market enables capitalists to translate goods 
into money, pure quantity which can be accumulated. 
Thus, the marginalist theory of political economy is that 
the driving force is consumer taste. Capitalism is a 
rationally contrived system to overcome scarcity and to 
satisfy needs. The neo-classical approach does not provide 
a scientific method for the study of political economy. 
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Rather, it provides ideological sanctification for 
capitalism. For most studies on Singapore, this means 
implicit justification for existing economic policies and 
explicit approval of the political leadership. 
On the other hand, Marxist theory sees the objective needs 
of production, constrained by the need to make a profit, as 
the driving force of capitalism. It seeks the politics 
behind economic forms, detecting a system of increasing 
exploitation. It sees capital as a social relation and 
therefore subject to the effects of political alliances and 
struggles. 
The Value of Neo-Classical writers 
This critique of the neo-classical approach is not made in 
order to dismiss the work of writers who locate themselves 
within this tradition. Rather, the aim is to find an 
approach to political economy which will assist our 
understanding of the relationship between economic 
strategies and social realities and thus enhance our 
comprehension of social control in Singapore. The dominant 
assumptions of scholarly writing on Singapore do not 
advance this aim, but such descriptive writing does have 
some value. At best, it provides information for 
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subsequent political analysis; at worst, the political bias 
of the writing renders data suspect and unusable. 
Also, in fairness it should be noted that Singaporean 
academics or foreigners resident in Singapore with a 
healthy concern for their own welfare would not find it in 
their interests to take a more critical approach to such a 
sensitive topic. Within these limits, some studies do 
provide helpful data and the occasional critical insight. 
For example, Sandhu and Wheatley note three important 
aspects of Singapore's political economy. First, the 
vulnerability of the economy resulting from the heavy 
dependence on international capital (1989: 1091, 1092). 
Second, that Singapore has constituted itself as "a global 
city in the sense that it has forged economic linkages 
across the whole world, and has thereby created for itself 
a hinterland immensely more extensive than its rulers could 
possibly have envisaged prior to 1965" (1989: 1088). 
Third, that the increasing importance of the service sector 
"represents a resurgence, in the modernized and expanded 
form of sophisticated business services, of Singapore's 
original entrepot function, possibly only temporarily 
eclipsed by manufacturing in the government's early efforts 
to combat unemployment" (1989: 1088). 
134 
These observations of the dependence of the economy, the 
role of Singapore as a regional node for international 
capital and the significance of the service sector are 
helpful insights. However, the writers are unable to give 
a clear indication of their political meaning because they 
do not see capital as a social relation: that the 
dependence on foreign capital is the expression of a 
political relationship between the PAP-state and 
imperialism. 
Koh Ai Tee raises the vulnerability of Singapore's "two 
tier" export profile: 79 per cent of exports are 
manufactured goods, a sector dominated by foreign 
companies, while the remaining 21 per cent are services 
dominated by local entrepreneurs (Koh 1989: 239). Chia 
Siow Yue also notes the dependence on foreign investment in 
the manufacturing sector: 
Wholly foreign-owned establishments alone accounted 
for more than half the output, value added, and direct 
exports of the manufacturing sector. The dominance of 
foreign investment becomes even more pronounced when 
joint ventures are included. Foreign firms (wholly 
foreign and majority foreign) accounted for the bulk 
of gross output (70.4% in 1985), value added (64.8%), 
and exports (82.2%) .... In 1985, among the top five 
industries in terms of value added, the foreign equity 
shares were 87 per cent in electronic products and 
components, 84 per cent in petroleum refineries and 
products, 55 per cent in non-electrical machinery, 43 
per cent in fabricated metal products, and 22 per cent 
in transport machinery (Chia 1989: 259-60). 
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But what is the political significance of this foreign 
investment? Does its dominance matter to Singapore? Chia 
implies foreign capital has its own interests at heart more 
than Singapore's, and thus attempts should be made at 
building an indigenous industrial base as well by promoting 
domestic entrepreneurship (Chia 1989: 276). Further, she 
states that the "government needs to continue its catalytic 
pioneering role in high-tech investments in order to 
provide a countervailing power to foreign MNCs in the 
absence of a strong and dynamic domestic private sector" 
(Chia 1989: 275). But at the same time she raises a 
critique of the government's emphasis on high-tech 
industries, saying that "it is not apparent that Singapore 
has a comparative advantage in high-tech industries" 
because it lacks "an abundance of scientific skills, large 
expenditure on R&D, and the availability of venture 
capital and dynamic entrepreneurship" (Chia 1989: 274). 
She concludes that Singapore's future might "lie more in 
high value-added services than in high-tech manufacturing", 
noting that "market forces" have traditionally. encouraged 
specialisation in services in Singapore (Chia 1989: 274). 
This debate about technology, the relationship between 
manufacturing and services, and the future specialisation 
of Singapore as a services centre and major exporter of 
services rather than manufactured goods emerges in an 
increasing number of neo-classical studies (Koh 1989: 240; 
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Lee Soo Ann 1989: 293). It is undoubtedly critical to 
understanding Singapore's political economy. However, most 
writers deal with the issues descriptively and 
prescriptively rather than analytically, and many as a 
response to the government's own reassessment of its 
economic strategy after the 1985 recession. There is a 
theoretical vacuum when it comes to understanding foreign 
investment in terms of maintaining a political alliance or 
relating shifts in the pattern of accumulation to changes 
in this alliance or to political struggles. It is 
therefore necessary to proceed to an examination of other 
theoretical approaches to the political economy of 
Singapore which might fill this vacuum. 
WORLD SYSTEMS/DEPENDENCY THEORY 
World systems theory or dependency theory is the second 
most common theoretical tradition among analysts of 
Singapore's political economy. The most influential and 
earliest world systems theorists, Amin (1974), Frank (1978) 
and Wallerstein (1979), came from the Marxist tradition. 
However, contemporary writers on singapore are more 
eclectic and are -influenced by neo-classical economics as 
well as by the neo-Marxism of the world systems "purists" 
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above. One of the most popular forms of dependency theory 
applied to singapore can be loosely classified as 
"developmentalism", a body of theory developed by liberals 
on the edges of both neo-classical and Marxist theory who 
sought a middle way between socialism and semicolonial 
status for developing countries (Szymanski ~983: 69). 
Some world systems writers tend more to the neo-classical 
tradition, while others advance arguments more within the 
Marxist tradition. The differences between them are often 
matters of emphasis. It is therefore a fairly complex 
exercise to determine the theoretical debt of individual 
writers. However, our purpose here is more to evaluate the 
general notions of world systems theory in relation to an 
adequate comprehension of singapore's political economy 
than to come to a judgement on individuals. Writers will 
therefore be referred to for the light they throw on the 
value of this tradition in understanding the relationship 
between patterns of accumulation and the social forces at 
work in Singapore. Our focus will be on the major 
tendencies and problems of dependency theory. 
The World System Determines 
The world systems approach acknowledges that the driving 
force of capitalism is the exploitation of workers by 
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capitalists and the competition among capitalists for 
increased profits. The distinctiveness of the approach is 
that it understands the way capitalism functions in any 
place in terms of the way it functions on a world level. 
Thus, the political economy of singapore may be understood 
in the context of the world system of capitalism. But the 
emphasis is even stronger than this; Singapore's political 
economy is seen as dependent on the world system. 
Singapore's political economy can be explained in terms of 
the effect of the whole system, the world, on its parts, 
countries. In this regard, it has much in common with 
regulation theory, theorised on an international level. 
The social formation constituted by the mode of production, 
classes and class conflict is the dependent variable. The 
international world system of capitalism is the independent 
variable. 
The world systems notion of dependence rests heavily on the 
theory of unequal exchange. Surpluses created by 
production in under-developed countries are distributed to 
the advanced countries through the way international 
trading prices function. This difference between value 
(the creation of surplus) and price (the distribution of 
surplus) is, in world systems theory, the main mechanism by 
which under-developed countries become poorer and advanced 
countries become richer. The major capitalist countries 
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are seen as the core of the capitalist world system and the 
under-developed countries as the dependent periphery. 
The Problem of the NICs 
singapore and the other newly industrialised countries 
(NICs) therefore pose a dilemma for dependency theory. In 
their case, it appears that the direction of the surplus 
flow is not solely from the periphery to the centre but 
that a sUbstantial proportion of the surplus is distributed 
within these countries. If this is to be explained in 
terms of a world system, then singapore's industrialisation 
must be seen as artificial or exceptional. Dependency 
theorists must deny that any capital accumulation has 
occurred within the NICs, which is very difficult, or they 
must argue that it has been externally induced in 
exceptional circumstances. 
However, even·· if it is accepted that the industrialisation 
of the NICs is due solely to external factors at the core 
of the world system (a "new" international division of 
labour, decomposition of production processes, 
technological development of communications and transport), 
lithe differentiation in response to the objective 
conditions of the international system continues to be a 
thorn in the side of dependency theory" (Rodan 1989: 18). 
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In other words, if the nature and political effect of class 
struggles at the "periphery" are very secondary to the 
requirements of capital at the "centre", the particular 
attraction of some developing economies and not others to 
foreign capital and the location of production facilities 
remains unexplained. 
Denial and Exceptionalism 
Deyo is a scholar from the dependency tradition whose 
writing on Singapore has spanned both responses to this 
problem. His 1981 Dependent Development and Industrial 
Order elaborated on the traditional dependency approach, 
which causally links domination by the core countries to 
the emergence of authoritarian states on the periphery. 
with this kind of deterministic approach, local political 
and social conditions are considered as secondary if at 
all. Deyo sees them as the PAP having facilitated the 
entry of foreign capital. 
Deyo sees both the pre-conditions and consequences of 
incorporation into the world capitalist system as trade 
union repression, wage controls and social atomism; in 
short, the institutionalised control and cooption of 
workers. Seeing the whole of Singapore asa "free 
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production zone" for export-oriented manufacturing (which 
he calls "world-market-oriented industrialisation"), Deyo 
notes the concomitant "generalisation of corporatist modes 
of political control from industrial enclaves to the larger 
political society", the expansion of national·income and 
employment (reducing inequality and raising standards of 
living), the diminution of the local political influence of 
foreign corporations and a trend to Ita popular-
authoritarian form of political corporatism" in response to 
the problem of economic and political demoralisation (Deyo 
1981: 11S-6). 
But Deyo's explication of the corporatist nature of the 
PAP-state and its relatively autonomous dealings with 
international capital is not an attempt to show how the 
social relations in Singapore were of primary importance in 
its economic development. Instead, he builds a case for 
the opposite conclusion: that repression is a norm of an 
imposed system of accumulation. It may be true that 
outside forces predominantly affect what happens within 
neo-colonies during certain periods. But Deyo regards this 
as the inevitable effect of a world system, rather than as 
the result of political struggles within each social 
formation (the imperialist power and the neo-colony). The 
purpose of his detailed study of Singapore politics is to 
show how this repression happened. 
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External Impositions Paramount 
Deyo sees the external impositions on Singapore's political 
economy as paramount in determining its shape and 
direction. He generally concludes that world-market-
oriented industrialisation results in "the creation of an 
increasingly ineffectual and dependent local bourgeoisie 
unable to effectively challenge rUling elites" (Deyo 1981: 
111). Specifically referring to Singapore, he states: 
[World-market-oriented industrialisation] has undercut 
the vitality and economic independence of local 
business classes which in other societies have tended 
to challenge authoritarian political rule, and it has 
disrupted local community structures which might have 
provided the leadership and social support for 
challenges to corporatist control of unions. Finally, 
it has led to the emergence of a highly atomistic 
industrial labour force that lacks the solidarity and 
commitment to organise against union and government 
domination (Deyo 1981: 93). 
This is another way of saying that real industrialisation 
has not taken place, that no local capitalist ruling class 
has developed and repressed the populace in an alliance 
with foreign capital. The political formation of the PAP-
state is ascribed largely to external forces. That is, 
political authoritarianism and systemic social control is 
put down to world-market-oriented industrialisation rather 
than to the internal resolution of social and political 
conflicts in the two decades following the Second World 
143 
War. Oeyo's analysis renders him subject to the general 
criticism of dependency theorists that "policies in the 
Third World to promote exports or attract international 
capital investment are interpreted as outcomes of the 
imposed 'needs' of capital at the centre, not outcomes of 
local class struggle" (Rodan 1989: 18). 
strategic capacity Model 
Subsequently, Oeyo has attempted to overcome the problem 
posed to dependency theory by the differentiated responses 
of developing states to these "imposed needs", especially 
the rapid growth of the Asian NICs. It would appear that 
his analysis of the NICs has forced him to recognise the 
weakness of world systems theory and he has made a move in 
the direction of the neo-classical tradition (Oeyo 1987: 
15). He has adapted the determinism of the world systems 
framework to the determinism of another framework which 
also has the mechanism of exchange, the market, as its 
focus. In doing this he moves further away from Marxist 
analysis to a synthesis of neo-classicism and dependency 
theory which he terms "development theory" and "a strategic 
capacity model of development" (Oeyo 1987: 11, 227). His 
analysis accordingly becomes more descriptive and less 
theoretically able to relate the development of Singapore's 
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economy to the development of domestic social and political 
forces. 
Explaining the NIC phenomenon, Deyo notes "the importance 
of a consistent, developmentalist, state-led strategy for 
economic growth and restructuring in South Korea, Taiwan, 
and singapore" (1987: 17). He then posits that the 
"strategic capacity" of these states to alter and 
ameliorate their dependence on the core is due to three 
factors: state coalitional autonomy, institutional 
consolidation, and the temporal sequence and nature of 
political and economic linkages to core societies (1987: 
20). This appears as an attempt to explain exceptions to 
the general rule of dependency theory rather than as a 
search for a new paradigm. Political developments within 
the NICs are seen in terms of deviance from the normative 
dependence of peripheral states. 
Singapore is seen as an exception within the exceptional 
Asian NIC category, both in terms of the destruction of a 
strong left movement prior to industrialisation and in 
terms of the continuing dominance of foreign capital in the 
manufacturing sector. This leads to further "exceptional" 
arguments: "Where labour movements were not already weak or 
controlled ••. labour-intensive manufacturing for world 
markets has indeed been associated with the imposition or 
intensification of repressive controls over labour" (Deyo 
145 
1987: 19). Thus, the emphasis in terms of the direction of 
causation has not changed, only the sophistication of the 
categories of dependency theory in order to accommodate the 
Singapore exception. 
Tecbnoloqyless Industrialisation 
A similar, though in some ways more acute, analysis of 
Singapore's political economy has been developed by a 
scholar who might best be seen as a dependency theorist of 
a liberal rather than Marxist formation. In his early 
writing, Yoshihara Kunio exhibited his neo-classical roots 
by noting "effective" and lIefficient" government as a major 
reason for the successful attraction of foreign investment 
into manufacturing (Yoshihara 1976: 17, 27). He concluded 
that it would be very difficult for Singapore to establish 
a viable indigenous export industry, but "not impossible" 
if its industries were integrated with the regional economy 
and dependence on foreign investment was reduced (Yoshihara 
1976: 165). 
Twelve years later, Yoshihara pronounced that Singapore had 
failed to industrialise and is, in fact, an example of 
"ersatz capitalism". As such, Singapore cannot even claim 
to be a genuine NIC. Instead, it is an example of 
"technologyless industrialisation" (Yoshihara 1988: Chapter 
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Five). He denies that Singapore's industrialisation is 
real. 
Yoshihara's justifications for these claims are applied 
more broadly to the ASEAN nations, among which Singapore 
was then an exception in having its manufacturing sector 
dominated by foreign capital. In brief, Yoshihara holds 
that the dependence of this sector (whether dominated by 
foreign capital or not) on foreign technology, the 
concentration of indigenous capital in the tertiary sector, 
the small size of the manufacturing sector, and the role of 
local capitalists as "rent-seekers" or compradors of 
foreign capitals all add up to a kind of ersatz capitalism 
(Yoshihara 1988: 3, 112). 
The building of a technological base which enables an 
economy to generate new exports one after another is 
regarded as essential to genuine industrialisation 
(Yoshihara 1988: 102). But, states Yoshihara, "Singapore 
can never build dynamic industrial capitalism of its own", 
because foreign companies with superior technology compete 
for skilled technicians with Singapore companies, because 
the service sector is highly developed and attracts most 
local skilled labour and because the small size of the 
manufacturing sector means there is insufficient research 
and development, insufficient industrial diversity and 
technological cross-fertilisation (Yoshihara 1988: 116). 
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But Singapore has registered more than two decades of high 
economic growth. Surely this points to the success of the 
EOI approach and the emergence of a local capitalist cl~ss? 
Apparently recognising where the surplus is created, 
Yoshihara notes the role of the manufacturing sector as the 
"engine of growth" of the economy (Yoshihara 1988: 100) 
which can drag the service sector up but not the reverse. 
However, he later makes an exception of Singapore which, he 
says, can make its service sector tradeable (Yoshihara 
1988: 116). Since 1973, he states, 
Singapore's growth depended greatly, if not entirely, 
on the prosperity of Malaysia and Indonesia, for which 
it acts as a service centre and an "oasis" ••.• Foreign 
capital, which has set up offshore production centres 
there, gives it some independence from these two 
countries, but that sort of industrialisation is 
dependent rather than autonomous, as it is in the more 
genuine NICs of East Asia (Yoshihara 1988: 118). 
Not denying the high growth achieved by Singapore, 
Yoshihara still claims that the Singapore economy has not 
been truly industrialised. Far from having the 
technological base required by genuine industrial 
capitalism, Yoshihara holds that Singapore's manufacturing 
export sector is sub-contracted out to foreign industrial 
capital. 
Singapore is often regarded as a model of capitalism 
in South-East Asia, but it is certainly not a model of 
industrial capitalism. Practically all industrial 
capitalist institutions which have export capability 
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there are foreign-owned. Although there are 
Singaporean industrial capitalists, they are mostly 
inward-looking, producing food and construction 
materials (such as steel products, cement etc.) for 
the domestic market •.. If there is anything 
"industrializing" about Singapore, it is because it 
serves as the offshore centre for foreign capital 
(Yoshihara 1988: 115-6). 
This last remark concerning Singapore's role as a centre 
for foreign capital (not just industrial capital) is 
crucial to understanding its political economy. Yoshihara 
does not elaborate however, nor does he place this insight 
within a theoretical framework which relates it to the 
political process of international alliance-building and 
the configuration of social forces in Singapore. The 
furthest he goes is the largely unsupported observation 
that social and political conditions are "largely 
responsible for having created the environment of the 
present situation of capitalism" (Yoshihara 1988: 4) 
followed by an historical outline of foreign investment in 
Southeast Asia. That is, despite his acute observations 
about the nature of foreign investment and the kind of 
industrialisation which has taken place, the ultimate 
emphasis of his argument parallels Deyo's. Deyo has been 
forced to recognise that Singapore has been industrialised 
and he moves towards the neo-classical position of 
development through the free market. Coming from the neo-
classical position, Yoshihara has confronted the dependent 
nature of Singapore's industrialisation and has moved 
towards a world systems theory of dependency. For differing 
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reasons, both he and Oeyo are constrained to understand 
Singapore's industrialisation as artificial or exceptional 
and that the global forces of capitalism have been the 
primary determinant of Singapore's political economy. 
Proof of Neo-Classieal Approach 
Some world systems writers, faced with Singapore's economic 
development, are willing to abandon dependency theory 
altogether. Barrett and Chin compare the Asian NICs within 
the "capitalist world system" and note a "pattern of 
moderate, sustained external economic reliance" accompanied 
by fast, high growth, successful structural transformation, 
high employment levels and growing economic power of the 
state, all indicating declining dependency (Barrett & Chin 
1987: 40). They conclude: 
..• these data generally run counter to dependencista 
predictions of long-term stagnation, growing 
inequality, deepening dependency, and a weakening of 
the state. To the extent that economic dynamism is 
seen as following from open economic development 
strategies centering on trade and linkage to foreign 
capital, these findings offer at least partial support 
for those working within a neo-classical perspective 
(Barrett & Chin 1987: 41). 
Thus the apparent convergence of the countries on the semi-
periphery with the core is seen as confirmation of the neo-
classical position of market-led growth. This must be seen 
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as a reasonable conclusion for those who emphasise the 
adaptation by the state in the third world to the changing 
external pressures of the world capitalist system, rather 
than the indigenous social and political factors which 
affect the nature of the state and shape the relationship 
between labour and capital. 
Trade and Investment 
Some of the problems of the world systems approach can be 
ascribed to the conceptual separation of trade from foreign 
investment. For example, in a rather contradictory 
analysis, Haggard and Cheng regard Singapore as a "hybrid 
case" and a "deviant case" (Haggard & Cheng 1987: 90, 93, 
94) which fails to conform to the general Asian NIC pattern 
in terms of the role of foreign multinational corporations 
in it, its dependence on foreign investment and its short-
lived lSI strategy. Eschewing foreign investment as the 
form of dependence, they conclude: 
More important have been the competitive pressures 
transmitted to the gang of four [Singapore, Hongkong, 
Taiwan, South Korea] through their extensive trade. 
Trade dependence has forced all four countries to 
adopt new industrial strategies that depend on 
technological capabilities (Haggard & Cheng 1987: 
129) . 
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But this amounts to saying that the market operating at the 
world level has forced the NICs to become dependent on 
foreign investment for production. These writers then also 
say that the same attention should be given to historical 
and political factors rather than treating them as residual 
(Haggard & cheng 1987: 84). But, in the light of their 
initial conclusion that external pressures mediated through 
unequal exchange are the main determinants of the political 
economy, it is difficult to see how this might be done. 
Haggard and Cheng do not do it themselves. 
With his "historical-structural" variation of dependency 
theory, Evans follows a similar path (Evans 1987: 221, 
223). He notes Singapore as an exception among the Asian 
NICs because of the heavy foreign investment in production. 
But he holds that trade and aid are the more important 
forms of dependency. 
For the East Asian NICs, reliance on trade has meant 
neither a stronger coalition of extractive foreign 
capital and agro-exporters nor the passive pursuit of 
comparative advantage based on natural endowments. 
Instead it has entailed a changing basis for 
comparative advantage engineered to a large degree by 
intervening states (Evans 1987: 211). 
Evans appears to say that the capitalist world system has 
not engendered a coalition of foreign mUltinational 
corporations and the landed national bourgeoisie in the 
NICs as it has elsewhere. Rather, "reliance on trade ll has 
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caused the growth of powerful states which have been able 
to shape production in accordance with their perceived 
comparative advantage in world trade. It is not clear how 
these states came about, what class interests they 
represent or why they are not also seen as partners in 
coalitions with outside forces. Later, Evans notes that: 
... despite the "relative autonomy" of authoritarian 
states and the similarities among them, such states 
must be analyzed in the context of class 
configurations in which they operate and in light of 
the broadly defined development strategies that have 
emerged from those configurations (Evans 1987: 219). 
Again it would appear that the primary direction of 
causation is in both directions. Evans' difficulties arise 
from trying to reconcile unequal exchange with foreign 
investment as a transfer of capital leading to genuine 
industrialisation and not just to further dependence. The 
world systems emphasis on global trade or accumulation on a 
world scale as the main determinant of political economy 
means the development of capitalism has to be explained 
mainly in terms of the spread of the world market through 
trade. Evans tries to keep this theory of causation in 
tension with the .contradictory Marxist emphasis on class 
struggle. 
writers of the world systems school frequently provide a 
sophisticated analysis of the movement of capital 
internationally. But they tend to ignore that it is the 
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development of the productive forces assisted by foreign 
investment which enables greater exploitation through 
technological advancement. Through their focus on the 
market, they seem to miss the significance of the fact that 
much of world trade is internal to the corporations which 
invest in the NICs. Unequal exchange is therefore 
intimately related to investment. Furthermore, the 
mechanism of exchange, the market, is only one mechanism 
through which international capital operates. 
The Fundamentals of Dependency Theory 
Szymanski sums up the fundamentals of dependency theory in 
this way: 
[Dependency theorists] all stress that the poorer 
countries have systematically been deprived of their 
wealth by the advanced countries with the consequence 
of the rich getting richer and the poor poorer. They 
all downplay a revolutionary role for the working 
class in either the less-developed or developed 
countries. They all claim a leading revolutionary 
role for the "most oppressed lt in the less-developed 
countries (the lumpen, the semiproletariat, and 
peasantry). They all maintain that what classical 
Marxism defined as interimperialist rivalry among the 
capitalist countries has largely been 
contained .... They are all pessimistic about an anti-
imperialist role for the national bourgeoisie in the 
less-developed countries .... Last, the Marxian-
dependency tradition differs from the Leninist 
mainstream in maintaining that imperialism is not 
driven by the need to export capital in order to 
continue the capital accumulation process (Szymanski 
1983: 92). 
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As we have seen, some world systems writers have tried to 
adapt these basic premises in order to take account of the 
NICs. But none of them has recognised that the export of 
capital is a stage of imperialism, an international shift 
in the social relation between capital and ,labour, shaped 
by political struggles between these classes in each 
country. The emphasis on a world system tends to 
depoliticise the analysis of capital into economistic 
descriptions of the "internationalisation" of capital or a 
"new international division of labour" between core and 
periphery countries. Not only is trade separated from 
investment, but the economic (multinational corporations) 
is separated from the political (the state). The latter 
distinction derives from the dependency emphasis on 
multinational corporations as the main facilitators of 
trade. "Multi"-national is used to connote joint ownership 
by many nations. This terminology loses the political 
dynamic that these corporations represent class alliances 
with the dominant member based in a particular social 
formation, an insight preserved by the Marxist formulation, 
"transnational" corporation. 
In comparison to the dominant role of the MNCs, the 
dependency approach relegates the state to a minor 
regulatory role. Hence, the strong states in Singapore, 
Taiwan and South Korea pose the same dilemma for world 
systems writers as they do for neo-classical writers. 
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Classes, class alliances and class conflict tend to 
disappear. writers try to postulate a new world system 
rather than seeing local struggles affecting the productive 
forces in each country and collectively or cumulatively 
forcing a new stage of imperialism. 
It is therefore very difficult for any writer with an 
intimate knowledge of political struggles in Singapore to 
find a theoretical "fit" in the dependency approach. Khoo 
Ee Hong is such a writer whose work is rich with 
descriptions of the various forms of social conflict in 
Singapore. But she is not well served by her theoretical 
approach. She states: 
In Singapore, economic growth and political repression 
by the ruling elites work hand-in-glove. The type'of 
economic strategies employed by the NICs necessitate 
authoritarian government within the context of [the] 
New International Division of Labour (Khoo 1990: 2). 
Later she adds: 
.•. the authoritarianism of a One-Party and One-Leader 
Rule developed independently of the economic model 
chosen. Authoritarianism laid its foundation during 
British colonisation and was further strengthened by 
the PAP when it became the government (Khoo 1990: 3). 
She then notes that economic miracles are a mix of 
"historical, political and economic conjunctures that 
cannot be generalised into laws" (Khoo 1990: 3). The 
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contradictions inherent in these statements do not 
undermine the value of her study of the forms and 
strategies of struggle in Singapore. But the inability to 
relate local social forces to patterns of accumulation, a 
characteristic she shares with other dependency writers, 
does limit the theoretical impact of her work. It is this 
weakness that we seek to overcome in a more detailed 
examination of the notion of imperialism in the mainstream 
Marxist tradition of political economy. By contrast, the 
deficiencies of world systems theory will be even clearer. 
THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF IMPERIALISM 
The mainstream Leninist theory of imperialism focuses on 
the links between the productive forces in any place and 
the political alliances made by capital internationally in 
order to increase the rate of profit. That is, the unit of 
analysis is the particular social formation and the mode of 
production in it which constitute classes. The motive 
force is class struggle, the exploitation of labour by 
capital, which produces varying reactions and activities 
locally and internationally depending on the historical 
circumstances. These reactions may range from wars to 
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foreign investment to comprehensive systems of domestic 
social control. 
In other words, because mainstream Marxism gives primary 
weight to the mode of production, the changing 
configuration of class forces in each context is seen as 
the main determinant, the independent variable, of the 
political economy. causation is from the local to the 
international. This is the opposite emphasis from 
dependency theory which holds that what happens in every 
country is the effect of the functioning of the whole world 
system. In addition, the units of analysis in world 
systems theory are the countries rather than their class 
relations. 
The mode of production theory of imperialism provides a 
wholistic framework for relating accumulation to 
regulation. By comparison, neo-classical theory regards 
social control as extraneous to political economy. with 
its tendency to external determinism, world systems theory, 
as we have seen, has considerable difficulty in accounting 
for local variations. 
There are now several major writers on Singapore whose 
analysis is based on the mainstream Marxist approach. They 
show how the particular social and political relationships 
in Singapore have shaped the economy. Hamilton follows 
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this approach in a comparative study of the four Asian NICs 
(South Korea, Taiwan, Hongkong and Singapore) identifying 
common patterns of growth but showing the uniqueness of 
historical factors in each case (Hamilton 1983). Rodan, in 
a more comprehensive study on Singapore's 
industrialisation, classifies his theoretical framework as 
the "indigenous classes and state autonomy approach" (Rodan 
1989: 19). Mirza, who focuses on multinationals and the 
growth of the singapore economy, also comes within this 
theoretical tradition (Mirza 1986). Robison, Higgott and 
Hewison make a comparative study of Southeast Asian 
economies focussing on the "interface of the international 
political economy and domestic political and economic 
interests" while noting "the inseparability of economic, 
political and social factors" (Robison, Higgott & Hewison 
1987: 1, 15). Bello and Rosenfeld point to the specific 
historical conditions in each of the Asian NICs together 
with their relations with the united states and Japan in 
accounting for their economic success and also the 
impending crisis of their economic .strategies (Bello and 
Rosenfeld 1990). 
These scholars clearly differ from the dependency approach 
and place Singapore's industrialisation in the context of 
the history of its social relations. But they do owe 
varying degrees of debt to dependency theory's analysis of 
the movement of international capital, often using world 
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systems terminology in a misleading way. It is therefore 
important to distinguish the main features of the Leninist 
theory of imperialism before proceeding to a concrete 
analysis of the stages of Singapore's industrialisation. 
However, dependency writers have concentrated on analysing 
developing countries for at least two decades and much of 
their writing can enrich the analysis produced by the 
mainstream Marxist approach. 
Leninist Theory of Imperialism 
We have already noted the unit of analysis of the 
mainstream Marxist theory of political economy and also 
what it sees as the driving force of capitalism. The 
associated Leninist theory of imperialism understands 
imperialism as a stage of capitalism when capital is 
exported in an international political move resulting from 
crisis and class struggle. Each part of this formulation 
requires a brief explanation. 
The breakdown of social relationships in imperialist 
countries and the inability of their capitalist classes to 
make money through increased exploitation in their own 
countries has led to the attempt to solve the problem of 
their own survival through some form of 
internationalisation. Hence not only the export of 
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commodities but the export of capital. More exactly, 
imperialism now involves the internationalisation of each 
circuit of capital within the circuit of the total social 
capital: commodity capital through trade, productive 
capital through direct foreign investment by transnational 
corporations and money capital through aid, lending and 
other operations of transnational banks. 
Imperialism is the monopoly stage of capitalism when 
capital becomes highly concentrated and centralised. Big 
corporations acquire the capacity to out-compete others 
because of their superior technology. This power is 
expressed in the forging of links between banking capital 
and industrial capital and thus the emergence of "finance 
capital". This merging of productive capacity and credit 
is concretely manifested in the relationships between 
transnational banks and transnational corporations and 
expressed in direct foreign investment. These 
relationships or alliances comprise one of the most 
important social forces behind the power of imperialism. 
Just as imperialism is engendered by crises in class 
relations, so is its operation conditioned by political 
struggles within colonies and neo-colonies. Social control 
may be mainly exerted by non-state organisations such as 
corporations or by politically independent states. That 
is, the forms of the political economies of developing 
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countries are determined by the interaction between local 
class struggles and struggles within the imperialist power. 
These struggles also produce alliances between capitalist 
classes across· international boundaries. In neo-colonies 
these alliances are often seen in institutional agreements 
between local capital, sometimes represented by the neo-
colonial state, and transnational corporations. 
Thus, the emphasis of Leninist theory is on seeing the 
internationalisation of capital politically and not just in 
terms of its economic appearance. For this reason I it 
continues to use the word lIimperialism" even after the 
formal political independence of developing countries 
because the fundamental political relationship remains 
although in a changed form. Hence also the use of the word 
"neo-colony" in preference to "under-developed ll country or 
"Third World" state. 
This focus on the changing social formation over time 
provides a helpful periodisation of the stages of 
imperialism. Rather than attempt a general outline of 
these stages, we will now turn to an examination of the 
historical development of Singapore's political economy. 
This will enable us to theorise the stages of imperialism 
on the basis of a concrete example and to note specific 
aspects of the relation between accumulation and regulation 
which require further theoretical development. 
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Pre-Industrial Singapore: Imperialist control of State 
Power 
The first phase of Singapore's political economy can be 
termed its pre-industrial stage before 1959 when Britain 
held state power. Borrowing from Buchanan (1972), Rodan 
notes that trade was largely through an intermediary class 
of local Chinese merchants involved in small scale 
collection, distribution and retailing, thus playing a 
complementary role to British-controlled primary production 
and trade. Singapore/s entrepot economy maintained a 
remarkably stable structure during the period 1900-1960: 
During this period between 70 per cent and 75 per cent 
of the workforce was employed in the tertiary sector, 
from which 80 per cent to 85 per cent of Singapore's 
income was generated. By contrast, the proportion of . 
the workforce employed in manufacturing during the 
same period ranged from ten per cent to fifteen per 
cent, with this sector's contribution to domestic 
income varying between five per cent and ten per cent 
(Rodan 1989: 41). 
There was heavy reliance on the Malayan commodity trade and 
entrepot services in the post-war period l but they were 
declining. Unemployment was rising sharply (Robison et ale 
1987: 3) and, in the mid-fifties, plans were drawn up for 
an import sUbstitution industrialisation (lSI) strategy 
(Mirza 1986: 29). The formation of a common domestic 
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market and political union with Malaya were central to this 
strategy, which eventually became a policy plank of the PAP 
in the 1959 elections. 
There were obstacles to immediate economicre-structuring 
in the late 1950s: mainly the mobilisation of the populace 
in mass political agitation for independence. Also the 
political impotence of the local capitalist class was 
reflected in their inability to command the loyalty of the 
mass of the population. An lSI policy would require far 
greater control over workers than before. Thus, the 
implications of the lack of a strong domestic bourgeoisie 
were that: 
Steps would have to be taken to nurture such a class 
and/or the state would be required to adopt policies 
to compensate for the lack of an industrial 
bourgeoisie. Certainly the state would in all 
likelihood have an important role to play in any 
strategy for industrialisation (Rodan 1989: 49). 
These observations demonstrate the particularity of 
domestic social relations in shaping Singapore/s political 
economy during this stage of imperialism. After the Second 
World War, the resurgence of nationalism in Malaya and 
singapore meant British imperialism could no longer acquire 
the rent from raw materials through the simple mechanism of 
holding direct state power. It had to build an alliance 
with a local capitalist class to whom state power could be 
transferred. Economic access would come through the power 
164 
of its direct investment and with the security guarantee 
for the local ruling class of massive imperialist military 
power. The united states was already ahead in doing this. 
Unlike Malaya, where the pre-capitalist Malay ruling class 
saw that it could maintain its position only by becoming a 
capitalist class in an alliance with imperialism, there was 
no existing class ally in Singapore with the social base to 
sustain a grip on state power. In fact, the nationalist 
movement in Singapore was so inspired by the revolution in 
China that it sought to prevent any such alliance being 
built, thus hoping for a nationalist and a socialist 
revolution simultaneously. This political movement was so 
powerful that it would need to be penetrated, co-opted and 
destroyed by any fraction of the local capitalist class 
which wished to govern. Only on the basis of this 
achievement could any alliance with the British be built. 
This was the route to power taken by the Lee faction which, 
on coming to power, had to consolidate its support in the 
local capitalist class and also its alliance with 
imperialism. The lack of a strong local capitalist class 
would be reflected in the eventual terms on which foreign 
capital, mainly from the united States, would enter 
Singapore after 1965. 
The pressure for industrialisation in the 1950s came from 
the need to deal with the deepening political struggle fed 
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by the decline of the commodity trade and thus growing 
unemployment. It also came from the need for British 
capital to raise its profitability in order to compete with 
US capital. This meant the post-war regeneration of 
productive forces in colonies as well as in the U.K. To 
secure Malaya/s wealth via Singapore, Singapore/s class 
struggle had to be dealt with. 
The war had, after all, been fundamentally over the 
competitive advantage supplied by the possession of 
colonies and the raw materials, markets and rUdimentary 
production base they provided. Those imperialist powers 
who wanted to increase their productive capacity and thus 
their political strength had to acquire more colonies by 
conquest, by taking them from other imperialist powers. 
Perhaps it is these political factors that Mirza has in 
mind in his discussion of Hongkong and Singapore as 
distribution centres within the global British empire when 
he states that "historical factors are probably the most 
important determinants of each country's development 
strategy" (Mirza 1986: 204). 
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Politioal Pre-Conditions for Industrialisation 
The second phase of singapore's political economy was the 
defeat of the anti-imperialist nationalist movement and the 
formal transfer of state power to the bourgeois nationalist 
faction of the PAP between 1959 and 1965. The acquisition 
of state authority and the merger with Malaya gave the Lee 
faction the power to eliminate the organisational 
structures of the mass movement and to defeat its electoral 
challenge. These political developments rendered the 
working class susceptible to greater control and 
exploitation. That is, this period saw the emergence of 
the immediate political preconditions to industrialisation. 
As we observed in the historical introduction, the Lee 
faction of the PAP exploited the political opening provided 
by the weakness of the pro-British local bourgeois 
political forces and their inability either to comprehend 
or to co-opt the anti-colonial feelings of the population 
at large. Thus Lee Kuan Yew and his group were able to 
ride to power on the strength of the left through an 
alliance of convenience before mobilising state power to 
smash the left. 
Executive power was subsequently employed by the PAP 
to extend its influence to all spheres of social 
activity, enabling it to establish control over all 
political groups. A virtual "state party" emerged 
which not only entrenched the PAP, but also 
conditioned economic and industrial policy... [By 
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1965] the political preconditions for an alternative 
economic strategy had been created. The supremacy of 
the PAP was the most important of these (Rodan 1989: 
50-51). 
The failure of merger with Malaya was the failure of the 
PAP to consolidate an alliance with the Malay capitalist 
class, which rejected the PAP's ultimate ambition to take 
state power in Malaysia as a whole (Minchin 1986: 115, 125-
6). Singapore's expulsion in 1965 was initially seen as a 
severe blow by the PAP leadership: without a sizeable 
internal market and a hinterland, the ISI policy could not 
work for Singapore. Its economy appeared to be back where 
it was prior to merger. However, the social formation had 
changed. The PAP was soon to discover the favourable 
configuration of class relations nationally and 
internationally for an export-oriented industrialisation 
(EOI) policy. 
By 1965 the PAP-state had largely defeated the left 
movement and was rapidly undermining the power of organised 
labour. It also had no debts to the weak and politically 
inept local capitalist class. The transitory nature of ISI 
in Singapore meant there was little chance to build up a 
strong local capitalist class ready to take advantage of 
the EOI strategy as in the other Asian NICs (Hamilton 1983: 
62-3). This was to the PAP's advantage in the new 
circumstances. "The PAP enjoyed a degree of political 
autonomy which made incorporation into the new 
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international division of labour a feasible political 
project" (Robison et al. 1987: 14). That is, the PAP-state 
had the capacity to regulate an industrial working class 
independent of pressures from workers or employers. The 
lack of a strong local capitalist class meant that the PAP 
was simply able to represent imperialism. 
Hamilton approaches the question of the political 
preconditions for industrialisation by asserting "the 
obvious structural fact that industrial capital dominates 
the production of surplus value. This raises the 
fundamental question of how this process of class 
transformation came about, for it is within this process 
that industrial growth occurs" (Hamilton 1983: 38). With 
reference to the four Asian NICs, he observes: 
The political condition which enabled industrial 
development was essentially that industrial capital 
exercised political control over both other segments 
of capital and the working population. This is not to 
argue that the state evolved as the direct political 
representative of industrial capital but that its 
social and historical functions were ultimately and 
overwhelmingly favourable to the accumulation of 
capital through industrial development (Hamilton 1983: 
67) • 
Both the form of the state in singapore and the mix between 
state and non-state forms of regulation were shaped by the 
previous struggles in Singapore and Malaya. The absence of 
a significant capitalist class in Singapore with a vested 
interest in local accumulation through an lSI policy, 
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continuing working class militancy and the lack of any 
bourgeois alternative to the PAP - all meant that any 
alliance with imperialism had to be through direct foreign 
investment agreed to by the PAP-state. Therefore, the form 
of industrialisation was fundamentally influenced by the 
social and political structures which had emerged from the 
struggles of the past two decades. 
The 1960s were also the years when imperialist powers began 
to export capital in increasingly large amounts in order to 
find production sites in favourable overseas locations. 
Under the neo-colonial system, the door was open to 
everyone and foreign investment was the only way to do it. 
It therefore became feasible for neo-colonies to attract 
both credit and technical expertise to establish 
manufacturing sectors. 
Hamilton emphasises that lithe state of the world economy in 
the key period of the '60s was decisive" for singapore, 
Taiwan, Hongkong and South Korea successfully to launch an 
Eor strategy (Hamilton 1983: 55). Mirza similarly states 
that the PAP-state's move into EOI "coincided with an 
embryonic restructuring of the world production and trading 
systems .... By creating the appropriate ambience Singapore 
has benefitted disproportionately from these trends" (Mirza 
1986: 5). The historical confluence is best summarised by 
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~obison, Higgott and Hewison's assessment of the PAP 
state's change of economic strategy after 1965: 
The assumption behind the state's high profile was 
that it could shape the factors of production, most 
notably through the enforcement of low wages, to give 
Singapore a comparative advantage in having labour-
intensive production. This was taking place, of 
course, at a convenient juncture in the development of 
international capital. The absence of politically 
powerful vested interests to defend the import-
sUbstitution strategy, so characteristic of many other 
countries in the region, also made for a swift 
transition (Robison et al. 1987: 7-8). 
Therefore the immediate post-1959 government reforms in 
housing, education, utilities and infrastructural 
development not only assisted the PAP to win electoral 
support and undermine working class loyalty to the left. 
There was also an emerging conjunction of these political 
needs of the PAP government with those of imperialism. The 
EOI strategy was the expression of this alliance of class 
interests. 
Export-'oriented Industrialisation: A Class strategy 
The third phase of Singapore's political economy was the 
implementation of the EOI policy from 1965 to 1978. This 
was a class strategy of consolidating an alliance between 
the capitalist classes of imperialist powers and the 
Singapore capitalist class represented by the PAP. 
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Rodan holds that, having developed the corporatist state as 
a "pre-emptive measure •.• to curtail its political 
opponents", the PAP now deployed this power "to foster a 
particular social and economic strategy" (Rodan 1989: 30). 
The process was a little more complex. The PAP used the 
blunt weapons of state suppression inherited from the 
colonial administration to crush its opponents, while it 
constructed corporatist structures to ensure they could not 
stand up again. By 1965 these structures were largely in 
place and required only further application and refinement. 
Thus, this period saw the birth of the one-party state and 
its ideology, repressive labour laws and the final 
destruction of autonomous unions, the manipulation of the 
electoral process, and the silencing of the press and 
educational institutions . 
... the PAP exploited its considerable relative 
political autonomy to secure a monopoly over 
legitimate political action through certain 
representative bodies, such as the NTUC [PAP-sponsored 
National Trades Union Congress]. In this way, the PAP 
cUltivated corporatist structures as a way of 
consolidating its relative autonomy rather than as a 
prerequisite for its political autonomy. It matters 
little that the NTUC, for example, is politically 
ineffective in representing a point of view to 
government; what matters is that the NTUC is the only 
legitimate channel through which labour is represented 
and that the objectives of the NTUC are effectively 
integrated with those of the PAP (Rodan 1989: 30). 
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Operation Coldstore in February 1963 (see Chapter Two) had 
rounded up more than one hundred trade union leaders and 
other opposition leaders. "Cold store's aftermath was a 90 
per cent decline in work stoppages between 1963 and 1964" 
(Bello and Rosenfeld 1990: 304). During merger with 
Malaysia, left-wing trade unions suffered wholesale, 
arbitrary de-registration and the pro-PAP NTUC was made the 
sole legal trade union confederation (Minchin 1986: 120). 
The NTUC acquiesced to the outlawing of strikes in 1967 
under the Criminal Law (Temporary Provisions) (Amendment) 
Act and subsequent legislation ensuring PAP-state control 
of the union movement (Vasil 1989: 154-6). The NTUC 
rapidly became a part of the PAP-state, with PAP leaders in 
its top positions. The position of Secretary-General of 
the NTUC eventually became a cabinet post. 
The 1968 Employment Act and Industrial Relations Act 
removed many worker rights and protections, giving 
management full discretionary power over most aspects of 
labour relations including dismissals, promotions and 
transfers (Bello & Rosenfeld 1990: 304). From this point, 
working class struggle could no longer effectively take the 
form of labour activism. This legislation heralded a low-
wage policy. The PAP-state's new control over workers and 
its offer of major tax incentives to foreign investors were 
successful in attracting foreign investment (Chia 1989: 
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266-70; Bello and Rosenfeld 1990: 292). By December 1978, 
foreign investment accounted for 78.5 per cent of total 
gross fixed assets in manufacturing. For the period 1976-
78, wholly-owned foreign companies produced over half of 
all manufactured exports; companies at least 51 per cent 
foreign-owned produced 87.4 per cent (Rodan 1989: 130). 
"By 1968, a range of comprehensive economic, social and 
political measures had been adopted to attract 
international capital to Singapore ... [and] dramatic results 
had been achieved in industrial growth and employment 
generation" (Robison et ale 1987: 7-8). 
In other words, after 1965, the PAP was in a position to 
build its alliance with imperialism without serious 
domestic opposition. Its possession of state power enabled 
it to suppress struggles and to re-shape Singapore's social 
institutions in conformity with its political goals. It 
had the power to conclude an alliance on terms unfavourable 
to the Singapore working class. 
In contrast to other Asian NICs, EOI was undertaken almost 
exclusively through the inflow of direct foreign 
investment. 
The expansion of Singapore's industry in the late '60s 
coincided with a large inflow of foreign direct 
investment and is almost wholly explained by this 
(Hamilton 1983: 57). 
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Foreign capital has so overwhelmed indigenous firms 
that the latter have played no role in most export 
industries and a small role in the rest (Hamilton 
1983: 63). 
That is, unlike other NICs where a local capitalist class 
had emerged with real political power to protect its 
interests, the PAP could ignore the demands of its local 
capitalist class as well as the working class. The PAP's 
base was foreign capital. 
This inflow of foreign investment reflects several other 
political developments. First, the British surrender of 
state power to a local ally opened Singapore to 
exploitation by other imperialist powers. All major 
industrialised powers could now compete to conclude a class 
alliance with the PAP. 
Secondly, the balance of class power in the relationship is 
revealed in the terms on which investment entered 
singapore. The incentives offered by the PAP-state to 
foreign capital show that ~t was desperate for such an 
alliance in order to ensure its political survival. In its 
class interests, the PAP therefore exposed the workers of 
Singapore to massive exploitation. The PAP may have 
resented the need to make such an alliance especially as 
their Anglophile leadership reluctantly had to move the 
weight of their alliance from British to US capital during 
this period. But it had few alternatives. 
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Thirdly, this foreign investment was an expression of 
finance capital, the fusing of technological power and 
credit into an enormous social force. singapore was an 
attractive proposition for investment in this stage of 
imperialism because it was a neo-colony which offered an 
unbeatable combination of infrastructure, disciplined 
labour and technical advancement. As a result of decades 
of development as an entrepot for the commodity trade, 
Singapore had a highly developed infrastructure. The 
defeat of the anti-imperialist movement and the imposition 
of a sys~em of social control by a strong neo-colonial 
state produced a disciplined, docile labour force, thus 
guaranteeing that the exploitation of workers could proceed 
undisturbed by political instability. 
The combination of infrastructure and disciplined, low-wage 
labour meant that, by bringing in advanced plant and 
equipment, foreign capital could achieve an absolute 
competitive advantage. That is, technical advancement in a 
neo-colony makes it possible to exploit more heavily than 
where technical backwardness continues. Foreign investment 
with its power of technology and credit takes place where 
exploitation can be the greatest. Hence the rapid 
development of the NICs because of their greater technical 
progress and higher productive forces. Low wages and 
advanced technology create an absolute advantage because of 
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the very high levels of surplus created. This analysis of 
the NICs based on their productive forces and the political 
alliances with foreign capital stands in contrast to the 
notion of comparative advantage with its emphasis on the 
market advantage of all countries in a global system of 
free trade. 
Fourthly, as a regional node for finance capital, singapore 
became a close-up platform for imperialist penetration of 
surrounding economies; an expansion of its previous role in 
the commodity trade. Thus, it must have been some 
compensation for the PAP that, although they could no 
longer aspire to state power in Malaysia, they could be a 
junior partner in a political alliance to rake off the 
surplus from its productive sectors. We will note a 
sUbstantial increase in this function after 1985. 
Fifthly, during this period, the imperialist military 
guarantee of this system of exploitation moved from Britain 
to the united states in accordance with the pre-eminence of 
us capital globally and in the region. 
The Limits of the Alliance: the Failure of a Revolution 
The PAP-state began to face the contradictions of success 
in low-wage EOI. The 1974-75 recession brought home the 
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vulnerability of its productive sector. Having solved its 
unemployment problem, Singapore suffered from a labour 
shortage by 1978. Facing increasing competition from other 
economies, a strong Singapore dollar and a high per capita 
income, the PAP-state changed strategy. It decided to move 
out of low-wage, labour-intensive manufacturing to capital-
intensive higher-value-added manufacturing. The state's 
institutionalisation of its power made this move possible. 
[By 1979J the PAP's systematic and pervasive influence 
over the industrialisation process was 
institutionalised tbrough firmly established 
corporatist structures. Moreover, the relative 
political autonomy of the PAP state, and the 
successful dissemination of an ideology supportive of 
technocratic elitism, provided sufficient space within 
which a new direction could be speedily and 
effectively charted by chief policy-makers (Rodan 
1989: 141). 
The fourth phase of Singapore's political economy from 1979 
to 1985 is thus the PAP-state's attempt to move away from 
reliance on labour expansion and from competition with 
other low-wage economies to a higher technological level of 
production. It recognised the importance of being on a 
higher level of technological development if its advantages 
in production were t~ be entrenched. 
This strategy was termed Singapore's Second Industrial 
Revolution. Despite the mandatory high wage increases, the 
incentives for high-technology industrial capital, the 
intensification of control over labour, the media, 
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education and the political process, the "revolution" 
failed. Although productivity improved and there was some 
shift to higher value-added production, international 
capital, particularly Japanese capital, did not invest in 
the qualitative upgrading of Singapore's technological base 
that the PAP had hoped for. Manufacturers continued to 
rely on migrant labour and the manufacturing sector fell 
behind the service sector, leading to a major PAP re-
assessment. Fortunately for the PAP, the economy remained 
a relatively low labour cost base for labour-intensive 
export-oriented production • 
.•. there are real limits to this [upgrading]. In the 
case of US-based capital, which has largely led the 
upgrading, the most sophisticated processes are still 
retained in the US or Europe, alongside pools of 
advanced R&D manpower and the markets for the 
finished products. In the case of Japan-based 
capital, there has been considerable reluctance to 
upgrade operations. The primary concern to ensure 
access to the markets of Europe and the US has 
conditioned the evaluation of Singapore's production 
costs by the Japanese (Robison et al. 1987: 8). 
What limited success the Second Industrial Revolution 
achieved (e.g. in the manufacture of computer hardware) 
"owes much to the speed and efficiency with which the 
Singapore state was able to mobilise resources in support 
of such investments. Such a capacity ..• derives from a 
broad set of social, administrative and political 
conditions, or structures, which have their origins in the 
historical circumstances of Singapore's earlier 
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industrialisation" (Rodan 1989: 187). It can now be added 
that the speed with which the PAP state overcame the 
negative results of this attempted shift can also be 
ascribed to the same factors. 
But the failure of this state-sponsored revolution should 
be understood in political terms. The PAP tried 
unilaterally to alter the terms of its alliance with 
imperialism and discovered it could not. It discovered how 
its divergence from its low-wage high-tech role was not 
purely a technical process but fundamentally a deeply 
political one which put its hegemony at risk. The 
electoral challenges to the PAP and other forms of struggle 
which emerged during this period showed the critical 
linkage between the accumulation strategy 'and class 
relations. The limits to the alliance were therefore 
primarily set by the resistance of Singapore's working 
class to increased exploitation after two decades of 
industrialisation. Secondly, the accumulation strategy was 
limited by the breakdown in social relations within the 
imperialist countries, especiallY the united states, where 
workers were objecting to losing jobs and conditions to 
overseas production. These connected political struggles 
must be central to the analysis of Singapore's contemporary 
political economy. 
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singapore's contemporary Political Economy 
To understand the latest phase of Singapore's political 
economy since 1985, we need to look more deeply at the 
limits to EOI growth and the reasons for the failure of the 
Second Industrial Revolution. We also need to comprehend, 
in political terms, the interaction between Singapore's 
political economy, especially its services sector, and 
transnational finance capital, one of the main forces 
through which imperialism operates. 
Andreff and Jenkins have each provided a helpful 
theoretical entree to these issues through their 
observations about the world economic crisis of the last 
two decades. Despite their references to 'the 
internationalisation of capital, the new international 
division of labour, and multinational rather than 
transnational corporations, they tend to see this crisis in 
political rather than economistic terms. Their theoretical 
contributions can therefore be understood as elaborations 
of the Marxist theory of imperialism. It is necessary, 
briefly, to outline their approaches before explicitly 
relating them to Singapore's recent development. 
Restoration of capitalist Order 
Andreff sees the crisis of world capitalism referred to by 
analysts since the early 1970s as "a restoration of 
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capitalist order, and a provisional resolution of its 
contradictions" (Andreff 1984: 58). The "new" order being 
created is much like the old except that it involves 
a higher degree of centralisation and 
internationalisation of capital, a deepening of the 
capitalist mechanism of unequal development, and the 
domination of transnational finance capital (TFC), 
based on ever-closer links between mUltinational 
corporations (MNCs) and transnational banks (TNBs) 
(Andreff 1984: 58). 
Andreff notes the Leninist roots of the theoretical 
hypothesis that imperialism is the epoch of finance capital 
and shows how transnational finance capital is being 
established as the core of capitalism by combining the 
TNBs' banking capital and the MNCs' industrial capital. 
The essence of our theoretical view is that with 
transnational finance capital, money capital and 
productive capital are organically linked in their 
internationalisation: international production and 
circulation are more and more controlled by MNCs and 
TNBs merged in the form of TFC (Andreff 1984:66). 
The effect of this process is indeed consistent with its 
aims: the maintenance of the profit rate of TFC. In 
addition, an international credit economy focuses on a few 
borrowers, and the crisis is transferred by TFC on to 
"other capitals, wage-earners and the Third World" (Andreff 
1984: 59). That is, imperialism remains in a new form. 
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Mechanisms for Increasing the Rate of Profit 
These insights are further built upon by Jenkins, who 
examines the relative significance of the mechanisms for 
maintaining or increasing the rate of profit • 
..• cr1s1s is not simply a consequence of a fall in the 
rate of profit but also a way in which capital is 
restructured in order to restore (for a time) the 
harmonious relationship between production, 
distribution and exchange, and to bring about an 
increase in the rate of profit. For Marx the most 
fundamental mechanism whereby this takes place is 
through the scrapping of old production techniques and 
the introduction of new ones. It is also achieved by 
bankruptcies ... It is these mechanisms for restoring 
productivity through increasing relative surplus value 
and depreciating constant capital, rather than attacks 
on the working class, which are central to the 
resolution of the crisis (Jenkins 1984: 41). 
Technological development through constantly introducing 
the most advanced means of production is critical to the 
competitive lead of the advanced countries. Jenkins also 
notes that the export of the means of production from the 
advanced capitalist countries to the neo-colonies is an 
essential part of this stage of capitalist exploitation. 
However, the attractiveness of cheap labour for production 
is stated to be of limited significance both in terms of 
the restricted type of industries involved and the short 
term nature of this attractiveness. That is, as we have 
noted, it is the combination of disciplined cheap labour, 
infrastructure and relatively advanced technology (although 
not the most advanced) in a neo-colony which is most able 
to create large surpluses. 
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Integration of capitals 
Like Andreff, Jenkins sees the integration of the various 
forms of capital in this stage of imperialism: 
The circuits of commodity capital, money capital and 
productive capital were for Marx three different 
aspects of the process of self-expansion of capital. 
In the context of the internationalisation of capital 
these three circuits have been identified with the 
growth of world trade, the growth of international 
capital movements, and the growth of the operations of 
the TNCs and the international circulation of products 
within such firms, respectively (Jenkins 1984: 41). 
This theory of the internationalisation of capital and the 
formation of transnational finance capital reinforces our 
understanding of Singapore's political economy in terms of 
class relations. Through TFC, alliances were built between 
the PAP fraction of the Singapore capitalist class and the 
imperialist capitalist classes, especially the US, to 
enable the successful launch of export-oriented 
industrialisation. 
The emergence of finance capital, the role of technology in 
maintaining capitalist competitiveness and the particular 
combination of productive forces in neo-colonies conducive 
to a successful EOI strategy - all help us comprehend the 
latest phase of Singapore's political economy. This phase 
can be understood in terms of the political limits to EOI 
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growth and Singapore's enhanced role as a regional base for 
imperialism. We will examine each of these in turn. 
The Limits to EOl Growth 
For almost two decades, Singapore's EOI strategy produced 
average annual growth rates of more than eight per cent 
(Chia 1989: 253). This success no doubt contributed to the 
PAP's sense of confidence in launching the Second 
Industrial Revolution. However, the failure of this 
initiative forced the PAP to recognise the political limits 
of the class alliance it had entered into. The PAP state 
had to realise that it could not be anything more than "a 
marginal component in the world system of production" 
(Robison et al. 1987: 11). These political limits are 
expressed in the limits to technological advancement which 
are interconnected with the limits to the attractiveness of 
a low-wage labour site. Further, there are the limits to 
the market penetration in the developed capitalist 
countries of the goods produced in the NICs. These 
obstacles forced the PAP and many writers to reassess the 
emphasis on the productive sector of the Singapore economy 
after 1985. 
The structural relationship between technological 
advancement, cheap labour and protectionism has been noted 
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by some scholars. Hamilton sees it primarily as a problem 
of declining NIC competitiveness. In the early 1980s, he 
recommended attempts at upgrading the economy through the 
investment by the NICs of huge amounts of indigenous 
capital in high technology industries in order to force 
dominant capitals to make space in the new international 
division of labour (Hamilton 1983: 68). This is a repeat 
of the Second Industrial Revolution except, in singapore's 
case, using state rather than foreign capital to do the 
job. Haggard and Cheng have suggested the development of 
an indigenous capacity for science and technology (Haggard 
& Cheng 1989: 127-8). Mirza has similarly opted for more 
self-reliance to lessen the economy's financial and 
technological dependence (Mirza 1986: 257, 263). These 
analyses fail on two counts. 
First, dependence on foreign capital was, as has been 
shown, a source of political strength for the PAP, giving 
it the independence from local class forces to launch the 
EOI strategy. 
Second and more important, these recommended solutions fail 
to take account of the deeper political realities behind 
Jenkins' analysis that technological innovation is the 
primary mechanism for restoring productivity and increasing 
the rate of profit (Jenkins 1984: 41). The enormous social 
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power of advanced capital cannot be matched by local 
capitalist classes in any of the NICs. 
The weakness of supposing that Singapore could achieve the 
high technological advancement of an advanced capitalist 
country through export-oriented industrialisation has 
already be observed in the limited attractiveness of cheap 
labour to foreign industrial capital and in the reluctance 
of this capital to export the most sophisticated means of 
production to Singapore. This capital invested in a very 
limited range of industries in singapore even before the 
attempt to upgrade to a high wage, high-tech economy. 
Furthermore, "the permanent threat posed by the possibility 
of re-importation of these labour processes to the centre 
as a result of technological innovation serves to increase 
doubts about the viability of this model of accumulation" 
(Jenkins 1984: 46). This trend was discernible in 
Singapore already by the mid-1980s with Fairchild returning 
integrated circuit assembly operations to Portland because 
new automated processes negated any advantage.of cheap 
labour (Rodan 1989: 197). Thus the relocation of 
production to cheap labour sites has been limited 
temporally as well as in the type and level of 
technological transfer. 
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In its reassessment of economic strategy after the 1985 
recession, the PAP itself publicly recognised this pattern 
in a statement by then Deputy Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong: 
New technology, the microchip revolution and 
robotic slaves that do not go on.strike for 
better pay and working conditions, have relieved 
the pressures on American, European and Japanese 
companies to seek sanctuaries outside their home 
(ST 27 February 1986). 
In other words, although Singapore workers are not 
permitted to go on strike (unlike workers in advanced 
capitalist economies), they can still cost more than 
robots. 
In addition, the PAP has faced the limits of protectionism. 
Singapore's export markets are not as diversified as the 
other Asian NICs with about one-third of its exports going 
to the USA (PEER 26 April 1990: 61). 
Thus, the political pressures exerted by advanced 
capitalist economies through the with-holding of the latest 
technology, protectionism and the consignment of cheap 
labour sites to a marginal role in world production have 
ensured that the period of neo-colonies expanding their 
share of world industrial output was short-lived and 
confined to an intermediate technological level (Jenkins 
1984: 47-8; Rodan 1989: 197). This does not necessarily 
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spell disaster for singapore's manufacturing sector, but 
rather indicates the limitations on the economy's further 
growth through export production and its market 
vulnerability to protectionism or a recession in the 
developed capitalist economies. It also means continuing 
intense competition among NICs to be on the leading and 
most profitable edge of this intermediate level of 
production. 
As has been noted, with the failure of the Second 
Industrial Revolution, the PAP recognised the vulnerability 
of the manufacturing sector in terms of technology and lack 
of skilled labour. The PAP state was unable to upgrade to 
significantly higher technology production and, after 1985, 
had to fall back to low-wage export production. It 
restored Singapore's international competitiveness through 
such measures as a wage freeze, reduction in employers' 
welfare contributions and corporate tax cuts (Rodan 1989: 
194). 
Since that initial rescue package to restore profitability 
and despite recent wage increases, Singapore has retained 
its competitiveness as a low-wage economy because it has 
·been careful to ensure that unit labour costs remain lower 
than those of other NICs where wage rises have been 
greater, such as Taiwan and South Korea. It is therefore 
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still able to attract foreign industrial capital (FEER 26 
April 1990: 61). 
The primacy of Political struggles 
But the tendency of the above analysis of the 
internationalisation of capital to minimise local political 
struggles must be resisted. otherwise it would appear that 
the limits to EOI growth were externally determined when, 
in fact, it was the groundswell of political dissent and 
resistance within singapore that was the major limitation. 
The Second Industrial Revolution required a sharp increase 
in social inequality that was politically unacceptable to 
the Singapore working class, who did not cooperate. The 
PAP-state faced a contradiction: its promises of prosperity 
in return for political loyalty could not be kept if 
singapore was to remain competitive. The failure of its 
"revolution" was the failure of its attempt to make it 
appear that prosperity was increasing for all classes while 
the income gap was suddenly widened. 
The PAP dealt with this crisis in its usual manner. The 
restructuring phase after 1985 was simply a reassertion of 
social control to suppress the political struggles which 
had emerged during this period of intensified exploitation. 
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Wage cuts and other attacks on the working class were 
political acts against political dissent. 
Some writers see this rise in political resistance as 
marking a general crisis in the NIC accumulation strategy. 
Not only were the NICs' working classes objecting but 
workers in imperialist countries were reacting against the 
loss of jobs, conditions and living standards. 
By the late 1980s, the NICs' external and internal 
environments had been radically transformed, and what 
had been key assets in the period of high-speed growth 
increasingly became liabilities. Protectionism was 
preventing export expansionism in the NICs' main 
markets, while the economic, environmental, and social 
costs of a strategy of industrialisation imposed from 
above by an authoritarian elite spawned increasingly 
powerful opposition movements that directly challenged 
the NIC model. Moreover, in South Korea, Taiwan and 
Singapore, the technocrats were forced to confront the 
same profound structural dilemma that was unravelling 
the NIC economy: rising wage costs were making the 
NICs unprofitable as sites for labour-intensive 
manufacturing at the same time that their continuing 
technological backwardness severely obstructed plans 
to create a more capital and skill-intensive, high-
tech manufacturing base (Bello and Rosenfeld 1990: 8). 
The PAP recognised explicitly some of the social 
implications of this crisis and moved to reshape domestic 
social relations: 
Singapore is not yet a developed country. A country's 
development cannot be measured only by its standard of 
living, or by its per capita GNP. These are only the 
manifestations of growth, not its driving force. The 
driving force lies in the factors such as the 
education level of the population, and the maturity of 
the structure of firms in the economy. In terms of 
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both these factors, Singapore has a long way to go 
(Economic committee 1986: para 40). 
Lee Kuan Yew noted again his country's lack of 
technological expertise and added that at least two-fifths 
of Singapore's key decision-making positions are occupied 
by non-Singaporeans (STW 5 May 1990). 
Another indication that the PAP understood the domestic 
social limits to EOI growth was its preparation to invest 
in production in the developed capitalist countries and in 
its emerging competitors. This can be taken from Deputy 
Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong's admonition that Singapore's 
next phase of expansion would be outside Singapore with 
Singapore-based companies "investing not just in 
neighbouring countries, but also in developed countries, 
Eastern Europe and China". By this means, the PAP aims to 
transform "a mere city state" into "a great international 
city staten; from "Singapore Inc." to "Singapore 
International" (STW 21 April 1990). 
An accompanying editorial to Goh's statement, reflecting 
the PAP position, stated that this investment strategy 
would be led by government-owned companies and would use 
expatriate Singaporeans now resident in these countries. 
The strategy would supposedly give access to technology and 
skilled labour while overcoming protectionism. 
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This trend by NICs to invest in advanced production has 
been described by Jenkins in terms of the "interpenetration 
of capitals" (Jenkins 1984: 46). It is another attempt by 
the PAP-state to alter the terms of its alliance with 
imperialism. By following this trend, the,PAP shows it has 
recognised the changes in the social and political 
conditions which made the EOI strategy initially 
successful. 
This direct investment in productive activities abroad 
should be distinguished from the Singapore government's 
long-term investment of state pension funds in the 
imperialist countries in order to gain a distributional 
share of the surplus. 
Regional Base for Imperialism 
Because of its geographical location and its development of 
both the commodity trade and services, Singapore has always 
been a regional base for imperialism. In the latest stage 
of imperialism and with the development of its 
manufacturing and services sectors under the EOI strategy, 
however, Singapore became able to function as a regional 
node for the integration of the circuits of commodity 
capital, money capital and productive capital. That is, it 
was in a position to assist the penetration of 
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transnational finance capital throughout the region. 
singapore's expanded and highly sophisticated service 
sector with its financial and banking infrastructure, 
transport and communications services facilitated the 
integration of the operations of transnational banks and 
transnational corporations. 
Lee Kuan Yew noted this role in a speech to the French 
National Employers' Federation in Paris: 
[Prime Minister Lee] said that Singapore was fortunate 
to have made the right economic choices, and by 
linking up with Europe, the US and Japan, had played a 
crucial ancillary role that had ensured its survival. 
It had made itself a desirable base from which 
multinationals could extend into other developing 
countries. The next key role was for Singapore to 
help accelerate the development of the region, for as 
its neighbours grew, it would grow too (STW 26 May 
1990) . 
It is now possible to comprehend more deeply the context of 
Yoshihara's statement that "if there is anything 
industrialising about Singapore, it is because it serves as 
th~ offshore centre for foreign capital" (Yoshihara 1988: 
115-6). Similarly brought into focus is Mirza's 
description of Singapore as an "internationalised" economy 
which plays the role of "peripheral intermediation" and 
exploiter of other ASEAN economies on behalf of Western 
capital (Mirza 1986: 1, 192, 73, 272). More exactly, 
through its alliance with international capital, 
Singapore's services sector has been able to collaborate in 
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penetrating the productive sectors of neighbouring 
economies and taking a share of the surplus distributed 
through Singapore to the imperialist countries. This is 
characteristic of a new phase of "multi-polaru imperialism 
when the NICs act as regional centres for finance capital. 
The degree of singapore's participation in this process is 
clear from its position as eleventh in the world for the 
hosting of both transnational corporations and 
transnational banks after the UK, USA, west Germany, 
France, switzerland, Belgium, Holland, Australia, Brazil 
and South Africa (Andreff 1984: 62). Singapore is the 
world's fourth largest foreign exchange market (STW 12 May 
1990). Furthermore, over 90 per cent of the overseas 
activities of TNCs and TNBs are concentrated in the 
advanced capitalist countries and the NICs, and most 
foreign direct investment takes place among these two 
groups of economies (Andreff 1984: 61). In the advanced 
capitalist countries most of this mutual investment is in 
the unproductive sectors to get a share of the surplus as 
it is distributed. Investment in the NICs is directed more 
to securing the surplus in the first place, both within 
these countries and, in the case of Singapore especially, 
in the region. 
Because of its entrepot role in commodity trading, 
Singapore's services sector held prominence in the economy 
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until the EOI strategy took hold and manufacturing became 
the engine of growth from the mid-1960s. Some writers have 
pointed out that services have always had the highest share 
of national output, with 76.1 per cent in 1961, falling to 
65.9 per cent in 1972 and then rising to just over 70 
percent in 1986. This compares with the secondary sector 
rising from 19.4 per cent in 1961 to a height of 32.1 per 
cent in 1981 before declining to around 29 per cent in 1986 
(Lee 500 Ann 1989: Table 13.1). The services sector 
increased by more than six times between 1961 and 1985 
(from 5$1,750 million to 5$11,250 million) despite little 
more than a doubling of the work force. 
In 1985 ... the tertiary sector accounted for about 64 
per cent of the employed labour force, which is lower 
than its 69 per cent share of the economy. The 
services sector, far from being diminished by the 
proposed industrialisation of Singapore, was highly 
productive despite [sic] employing a lower percentage 
of men than women ... (Lee 500 Ann 1989: 283). 
In 1984, the average value added per worker in the services 
sector was $23,958 as against $11,165 for the manufacturing 
sector (Lee 500 Ann 1989: Table 13.4). In these terms, the 
productivity of the services sector was twice that of the 
secondary sector. But this is to confuse surplus creation 
with surplus distribution. It is the manufacturing sector 
which creates the surplus and the services sector which 
distributes it. without the manufacturing sector, the 
singapore economy would have continued its decline of the 
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1950s and been unable to upgrade its infrastructure to take 
advantage of the penetration of the region by finance 
capital. 
Rather, behind the above figures is the restructuring of 
the services sector in response to the influx of foreign 
investment. Commerce, both entrepot and domestic trade, 
was the lifeblood of tpe services sector in 1960 with 44.2 
per cent of the sector's output. But this fell to 22.4 per 
cent by 1986. Transport and communications rose from 18.4 
per cent in 1960 to 24 per cent in 1986. The biggest rise 
was recorded by finance and business services, which 
increased its share from 15.3 per cent to 30.5 per cent 
over the same period, or from S$248 million to S$3,778 
million at 1968 factor cost (Lee Soo Ann 1989: Table 13.3). 
Despite the declining share of entrepot trade, it should be 
remembered that, in 1983, 85 per cent of intra-ASEAN trade 
was with Singapore (Mirza 1986: Table 5.9). Thus the main 
point to note is the enormous growth of financial and 
business services along with transport and communications, 
a growth which made these activities the backbone of the 
sector and gave it the capacity to facilitate the regional 
expansion of finance capital. 
According to Mirza, the PAP promoted Singapore as a centre 
for offshore banking, finance and other services from the 
early seventies (Mirza 1986:120-189), while others date the 
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drive to establish singapore as a financial centre from 
1968 (Haggard & Cheng 1989: 121-2). Whatever the exact 
timing, it is clear that the PAP state itself was not fully 
aware of the potential of its alliance with foreign capital 
to rake off the surplus from surrounding countries through 
the services sector. "For many years the services sector 
has been moored in the backwaters of economic theory and 
its potential contribution to the development process has 
been overlooked" (Mirza 1986: 177). This changed with the 
1985 recession and the failure of the Second Industrial 
Revolution which led to a reassessment of the productive 
sector in Singapore's development: 
... the manufacturing sector is no longer expected to 
fulfil the role originally envisaged under the "Second 
Industrial Revolution". Instead, services were 
earmarked as the most important growth sector of the 
economy, with a far greater emphasis on regional 
economic integration (Rodan 1989: 189). 
The PAP's economic committee, headed by the Prime 
Minister's son, Brig.Gen. Lee Hsien Loong, examined the 
re~sons for the economy's sharp decline and gave particular 
attention to finapce and business services and transport 
and communications which, together, made up about 40 per 
cent of the entire economy in 1985 (Lee Soo Ann 1989: 287). 
The Committee recommended that Singapore 
move beyond our being a production base, to being an 
international total business centre. We cannot depend 
only on companies coming to singapore solely to make 
or assemble products designed elsewhere. We need to 
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attract companies to Singapore to establish 
operational headquarters, which are responsible for 
subsidiaries throughout the region. In Singapore such 
headquarters should do product development work, 
manage their treasury activities, and provide 
administrative, technical and management services to 
their subsidiaries (Report of the Economic committee 
1986: 12). 
Therefore services would be made a primary attraction for 
foreign TNBs and TNCs to locate in Singapore. But, more 
than this, the Committee recommended a shift to becoming an 
exporter of services: 
Services account for an increasing share of our GDP, 
and our service exports have been growing as quickly 
as world trade services. Scope for growth is still 
huge. We need to promote not just Singapore-based 
activities like tourism and banking, but also 
offshore-based activities, like construction firms 
building hotels in China, and salvage firms operating 
in the Middle East •.. we have expertise in hotel 
management, air and sea port management, town and city 
planning. These skills should be systematically 
marketed •••• 
Our greatest potential for growth lies in this area: 
banking and finance, transport and communications, and 
international services. It has been growing rapidly, 
and given positive support, should continue to do so. 
The government must promote services actively, the 
same way it successfully promoted 
manufacturing .... (Report of the Economic Committee 
1986: para 63 Executive Summary). 
Usually, concentration on services depends on having strong 
local industrial capital. Singapore's location, however, 
compensates to a degree for the absence of "finance 
capital". Thus, the PAP state has been able to alter its 
economic strategy, not only to recognise the limitations of 
its EOI strategy, but also to maximise the benefits it can 
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gain from this new phase of imperialism. To do this it has 
had to recognise the dynamic of the integration of the 
circuits of capital in finance capital. In political 
terms, this means facilitating the exploitation of 
neighbouring economies by imperialist powers. 
Asked what Singapore could do to promote prosperity in 
the region, [Prime Minister Lee] said the Republic 
could work towards becoming a training and back-up 
centre for multinationals operating in countries 
around it. It could also strive to be a "spark plug 
to fire off developments in new areas in the region", 
thus accelerating the pace of development and change 
(STW 26 May 1990). 
Brig. Gen. Yeo, a PAP minister, has described singapore as 
"a major switching node of the world" for people, goods, 
capital, financial risks and information (STW 9 June 1990). 
One of the latest examples of facilitating the operation of 
TFC based in singapore or operating through Singapore is 
the large industrial zones being constructed immediately 
across singapore's borders in Indonesia's Batam Island 
(FEER 30 Nov 1989: 69-70) and Malaysia's Johor Bahru (FEER 
26 April 1990: 52-3). The PAP state has assisted with 
infrastructural investments and promoted the projects with 
the respective governments. Its role has been to open up 
the cheap land and labour of its immediate neighbours to 
foreign capital. Singapore will be used for its services 
ranging from financial services to communications and port 
facilities, both in the construction of these zones and in 
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the export of their production. Lee Kuan Yew sees the 
"triangle" as "offering a rare mix of a ready supply of 
labour and land, backed by sophisticated business 
infrastructure". He advised that if Singapore employers 
needed unskilled labour, they might do better to consider 
relocating to Batam, where workers are plentiful and wages 
low (STW 9 June 1990). 
In the case of Johor Bahru, singapore appears as the second 
largest investor in approved projects up to 1989 with M$335 
billion committed (second to Japan's M$408 billion). 
However, much of Singapore's figure is made up of the 
investments of Singapore-registered subsidiaries of foreign 
companies, especially us ones (PEER 26 April 1990: 52). It 
is unlikely that these projects will add significantly to 
the technological base of Singapore's manufacturing sector 
or result in significant economies of scale. They will, 
however, lead to considerable growth and healthy profits in 
Singapore's services sector. 
Therefore, this latest phase of Singapore's political 
economy has seen the PAP-state moving to overcome the 
limitations of its EOI strategy and to strengthen its 
alliance with imperialism through cooperating more strongly 
in the exploitation of the region. At the same time, 
Singapore has to remain competitive in its productive 
sector and still "depends on foreign money for 90 per cent 
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of its manufacturing investment" (FEER 23 May 1991: 55). 
There is therefore no shift away from the close arrangement 
with foreign capital and no sUbstantial growth of a local 
industrial capitalist class. 
Imperialism, struggles and social Control 
The aim of this chapter has been to discover a theoretical 
framework which establishes the connections between the 
changing strategies of capital accumulation in Singapore, 
particular political struggles against those strategies, 
and systems of social control which are adapted to suppress 
those struggles. 
We have examined three main theoretical approaches to 
Singapore's political economy: the neo-classical approach, 
world systems theory and the mainstream Marxist focus on 
imperialism. It is the position of this thesis that the 
latter theoretical tradition best explains Singapore's 
political economy by providing links between accumulation, 
social reality and regulation. 
It is now clear that neither "correct" policy choices by an 
enlightened leadership nor the external pressures exerted 
by a world system are sufficient explanations for 
Singapore/s industrialisation. They do not connect 
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economics with singapore's social reality. We have seen 
that the PAP-state could not have consolidated an alliance 
with imperialism and taken advantage of the global market 
environment without the particular social and political 
conditions which prevailed in Singapore. PAP political 
supremacy was itself an outcome of political struggles. 
These were not fought in anticipation of EOI or induced by 
international economic pressures for this purpose. But, 
having come to power, tithe PAP state played a critical role 
in fostering extra-economic conditions favourable for EOI" 
(Rodan 1989: 209-210). That is, it constructed a tight 
system of social control to suppress struggles which 
emerged in new forms to limit its accumulation strategy. 
Thus, the mainstream Marxist approach goes beneath economic 
forms to the politics of the social formation. It gives 
primacy to the configuration of social and political forces 
within Singapore while relating their historical 
development to the context of imperialism. The basis of 
social control can therefore be understood in terms of the 
historical movements in class relations resulting from 
political struggles and leading to the PAP-state's alliance 
with imperialist ruling classes. The Leninist tradition on 
imperialism provides the pointers for a periodisation of 
these changes in class relations, connecting the local and 
the international. From the ascendancy of the Lee faction 
to state leadership in 1959 until the present, we have 
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observed several distinct phases of Singapore's political 
economy. We have examined the transition from classical 
imperialism to neo-colonialism. The latest phase of 
Singapore's economic development reflects an attempt by the 
PAP-state to adapt its alliance to a shift in the pattern 
of imperialist exploitation. The sudden change from global 
rivalry between two super-powers to a multi-polar global 
economy has given greater political prominence to Japanese 
and European capital. Therefore, the PAP-state's alliance 
primarily with US capital has been moving towards a multi-
faceted alliance with transnational finance capital from 
Japan and the EC as well as the US. 
The relationships between this latest phase of the PAP's 
accumulation strategy and the social formation regionally 
and domestically are broadly clear. More regulation will 
be required, not less. 
Domestically, two decades of industrialisation and ever-
increasing exploitation of workers has fragmented the. 
working class, creating under-classes of migrant workers, 
female part-time labour and unskilled Malays. The main 
mechanisms for restoring productivity function to increase 
relative surplus value (e.g. technological innovation), to 
cheapen constant capital (e.g. increasing machinery running 
time through shift work) and to socialise the costs of 
production (through state subsidies paid for by workers' 
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taxes) (Jenkins 1984: 41, 44). All these mechanisms as 
well as more direct attacks on the working class, such as 
wage cuts and state-run unions, have increased alienation 
and dissent. New forms of political struggle continue to 
require a high degree of social control. 
For example, the growth of the services sector for the 
operation of transnational finance capital brings a new 
problem of regulation for the PAP-state. The domestic 
bourgeoisie are now concentrated in this sector and lithe 
fortunes of this class are now more central to Singapore's 
development strategy" (Rodan 1989: 191). This class has 
constantly to upgrade local companies in the services 
sector to make Singapore competitive with the other Asian 
NICs. Thus, the PAP has to give the appearance of 
accommodating the desire of this class for a more open and 
democratic polity without in fact creating one. Hence the 
present contortions of Singapore's political system as the 
PAP attempts to suppress the political aspirations of the 
middle-class. 
Despite the rapid development of Singapore's economy, the 
local capitalist class has remained relatively weak and 
subordinate to foreign capital. The rise of local capital 
has been carefully controlled by the PAP-state in order to 
prevent the growth of a more powerful and more 
nationalistic bourgeoisie which could threaten its alliance 
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with foreign capital. Singapore's political status as a 
neo-colony remains fundamentally unchanged. 
The PAP-state's alliance with imperialism can therefore be 
placed in the context of the need for economic growth to 
guarantee its continuing political hegemony. The extensive 
PAP control over domestic capital accumulation through its 
grip on state power has meant that no other prospective 
partner has yet emerged with whom foreign capital can build 
an effective alliance. One of the main purposes of 
domestic social control has been to ensure that this 
situation remains. To prevent the emergence of any 
alternative , the PAP has tried to maintain absolute 
supremacy, not merely dominance. Hence the pervasiveness 
of state social control. 
Regionally, the political implications of the increased 
regional cooperation with finance capital are apparent in 
the PAP-state's moves to guarantee its exploitative role. 
The "growth triangle" agreement with Malaysia and Indonesia 
seem designed to give the upper classes of these countries 
a long-term interest in Singapore's stability and economic 
growth. The initiative to minimise past political conflict 
with the Malaysian state leadership by collaborating in 
internal-security sweeps in 1987 (Committee Against 
Repression in the Pacific and Asia 1988) paralleled 
increasing military cooperation. For the first time since 
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independence, joint military exercises with the Malaysian 
and Indonesian armed forces were held (STW 27 May 1989). 
But the ultimate security guarantee was sought through the 
invitation to the united states for a direct us military 
presence on the island (STW 7 April 1990) and followed by a 
formal agreement (STW 17 November 1990). The future 
military role of Japan within the region was recognised in 
the public endorsement given to the US-Japan security 
relationship by Prime Minister Goh (STW 4 May 1991). 
In conclusion, the argument of this thesis is that shifts 
in singapore's political economy have reflected shifts in 
class relations and thus changes in its alliance with 
foreign capital. Political struggles have been the primary 
influence on the accumulation strategy as the alliance with 
imperialism has continually sharpened contradictions within 
the social formation. The PAP-state's attempts to regulate 
these conflicts are the subject of the following chapters. 
By studying the relationship between specific institutions 
of social control, forms of political struggle and patterns 
of accumulation, we will be able to see the whole system of 
social control within the whole political context of 
Singapore. 
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CHAPTER 4 
WELFARE AND POBLIC HOOSING: THE POLITICS OF THE WORKING 
CLASS BARRACKS 
The phases of Singapore's political economy have been 
characterised by particular struggles and particular 
mechanisms of social control which function to suppress 
them. So far, only the transitional period from 
colonialism to neo-colonialism has been examined in detail, 
and we have seen how violence was the main social control 
mechanism which functioned mainly through the institutions 
of the military and the police. Large-scale imperialist 
violence, police-state tactics and political sabotage were 
used to defeat the left-wing nationalist movement in 
singapore and Malaya and to bring the PAP's Lee faction to 
power. 
It is now time to look at the struggles which shaped the 
more recent phases of Singapore's political economy and the 
mechanisms ,of social control which emerged to combat them. 
In the post-independence period, welfare became the basis 
of social control, especially the institutions of public 
208 
housing, state pensions, education and health. In this 
chapter we will study the examples of public housing and, 
to the extent that it relates to housing, the state pension 
scheme. The following chapter focuses on the education 
system. But first it is necessary to set out the 
relationship of welfare to wage labour and the reproduction 
of labour power. 
WELFARE AND THE REPRODUCTION OF LABOUR 
In the first chapter, we noted that wage labour is the core 
mechanism of capitalism because it is the social relation 
of exploitation through which capital appropriates surplus 
value. We also noted that it is the fundamental mechanism 
by which labour power is recreated and controlled: 
regulationists see it as the basic feature of the mode of 
regulation. Here we must look deeper into the relationship 
between the reproduction of labour power and its regulation 
if we are to comprehend the links between social control 
and welfare. 
Both the level of the wage paid to workers and the method 
by which it is paid are crucial to the degree of control 
that can be exercised over them. In general, the wage must 
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not be so high as to threaten profitability or so low that 
workers cannot consume enough to be recreated or are pushed 
into rebellion. Thus, capital has an interest in keeping 
wages as low as possible to raise the level of 
profitability, but not so low that stable and efficient 
production is affected. The wage level is therefore 
dependent on the rate of accumulation. However, it may be 
higher than the rate of profitability allows at some times 
or with some workers, as when the PAP-state raised wage 
levels at the beginning of its Second Industrial Revolution 
in an attempt to phase out labour-intensive, low-technology 
industries. 
The way that conflicting tendencies between profitability 
and reproduction are managed through the mix between 
company and state regulation depends on the specific mode 
of production. In Singapore, the PAP-state's alliance with 
foreign capital involves the latter supplying the capital 
investment for production and the former guaranteeing 
cooperation with the accumulation process. The PAP-state 
therefore has to ensure a continuing supply of cheap, 
disciplined workers with appropriate skills. It must also 
support transnational corporations' management practices by 
means of state-controlled unions and repressive labour 
legislation. 
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The PAP-state's has an interest in maintaining its 
political hegemony by increasing wage levels. It therefore 
tries to increase profitability by constantly upgrading the 
technical level of production and it has also taken a 
direct role in regulating wage levels through the National 
Wages Council (NWC). The NWC has consisted of government 
representatives (Ministries of Finance and Labour, Economic 
Development Board and National Trades Union Congress) plus 
representatives from the American Business Council, the 
Japanese Chamber of Commerce and Industry, the German 
Business Group and the Singapore Federation of Chambers of 
Commerce and Industry (Lim 1989: 1264-5). The NWC is 
therefore one of the major institutions which regulates 
workers and which coordinates the alliance between the PAP-
state and foreign capital. 
However, capital also has an interest not only in the level 
of the wage, but how it is spent. 
There is, therefore, a potential conflict between the 
need to economise on outlays on variable capital in 
order to increase the rate of exploitation, and the 
need to control the labour force by strong economic 
ties of dependency. Only when the workers are totally 
dependent upon the capitalist for the maintenance of a 
reasonable standard of living can the capitalist fully 
claim the power to dominate labour in the workplace 
(Harvey 1982: 162). 
There are some goods that workers must have if they are to 
survive: housing, education, health, pensions and other 
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social services. Through the way these welfare items are 
provided and alternative means of sUbsistence to wage 
labour are eliminated, control of workers can be increased. 
The provision of essential wage goods through state welfare 
can be seen as the collectivisation of consumption in order 
to manage consumption in a manner consistent with 
accumulation (Harvey 1982: 91). That is, welfare is 
provided in such a way as to maximise profitability and 
also control of workers. 
Where welfare is provided largely through companies, 
workers are bound to them; where a great deal of welfare is 
obtained through the state, as in Singapore, political 
loyalty to the state is induced. Singaporeans are forced 
to purchase a large proportion of their sUbsistence 
requirements from the state. As we will see, this gives 
the PAP-state considerable power to ensure profitability on 
behalf of foreign capital, to manage crises by lowering or 
raising the level of welfare and to generate political 
loyalty. 
The consolidation of an effective system of welfare 
provision also renders less and less necessary the use of 
overt state violence to cement control. Furthermore, the 
way welfare is provided by the state has the ideological 
appearance of philanthropy from which the PAP has also 
gained legitimacy. That is, institutions such as housing 
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and education manage the provision of welfare so as to 
minimise the contradictions between the PAP-state's 
functions of guaranteeing accumulation and of social 
control, and to legitimise both its own role and the entire 
economic system. 
Regulation through the welfare system therefore parallels 
the effects of the wage system. The PAP-state's control of 
wages and welfare enables it to stabilise working class 
sUbsistence to ensure a level of material security that 
minimises political dissent. The PAP-state has facilitated 
the extension and reproduction of the wage relation in 
Singapore. As elsewhere, the extension of the wage 
relation has been "to the detriment of all other relations 
of production, and transforms the mode of life of the wage-
earning class by destroying all communal conduct. New 
social norms must be centrally instituted, and these take 
on a state form" (Aglietta 1979: 32). One of the main 
mechanisms for reshaping and regulating social relations is 
the centrally-instituted state welfare system. The working 
class is tied into this system which links the need for a 
livelihood to the necessity to engage in wage labour and to 
be loyal to the state. Thus welfare is a mechanism to 
suppress struggle. 
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Public Housing and Social Control 
The provision of public housing for approximately 86 per 
cent of singapore's population by the construction of half 
a million apartments (GOS 1989a: 158; Yeh 1989: 826) is 
generally agreed to be the outstanding achievement of the 
PAP-state. 
Indeed public housing in Singapore is the single most 
visible index of the government's outstanding 
performance; it is the de facto monument to the PAP 
government's success (Tay 1989: 860). 
In Singapore, housing is a symbol of pride, of 
nationhood, of the political achievement of the 
People's Action Party, and of government benevolence 
towards the public interest (Pugh 1989: 837). 
But what is not widely understood is the way public housing 
has functioned politically as a mechanism of social 
control. Yet, it is one of the main mechanisms by which 
the PAP-state has guaranteed labour power for its economic 
strategy and cemented its political supremacy. A 
periodisation of three broad and overlapping phases shows 
how the public housing system works as a regulatory 
mechanism and how different functions predominate at 
different times according to stages of political conflict. 
The first phase can be termed "Violence and Forced 
Resettlement". It is the period of transition from colony 
to neo-colony, when the PAP had to consolidate its power 
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base. This period was from 1959 to about 1966, when it was 
by no means certain that the Lee faction could defeat the 
anti-imperialist mass movement. It was a time of routine 
state violence and the regular use of secret police tactics 
against political opponents., Welfare institutions also 
mediated state violence. 
"Capital Formation and Proletarianisationn covers the 
period from 1966 to about 1978, from the end of the Barisan 
Sosialis as a political force to the beginning of the PAP's 
so-called Second Industrial Revolution. This is the phase 
when the PAP-state increasingly used the criminal law to 
suppress political dissent as it sought to stabilise 
working class sUbsistence and legitimate its rule. The 
defeat of left-wing political organisation had not 
completely suppressed the militancy of the labour force. 
State violence had to be turned against the working class 
as a whole and its punishments had to appear as the fault 
of those who transgressed neutral, universal laws and not 
as a defence of PAP political interests. The PAP was also 
trying to build up its support from local capital as an 
adjunct to its real power base, foreign capital. 
"The Second Industrial Revolution and Tightening the 
Welfare-Loyalty Noose ll is the third period covering from 
just before the election of J B Jeyaretnam to parliament in 
1981 until the present. The increased inequality resulting 
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from more than a decade of industrialisation had undermined 
the PAP's legitimacy. Thus, the emphasis of social control 
moved to welfare, especially housing and education, as the 
PAP-state sought the means both to camouflage social 
reality and to enforce political loyalty. 
VIOLENCE AND FORCED RESETTLEMENT 
The early 1960s is often characterised by the PAP as a time 
of leftist violence. However, the violence of the state 
was immeasurably greater than anything that occurred in 
street demonstrations. The Lee faction of the PAP had 
inherited state power from the British who had held on by 
means of large scale military violence against the 
independence movement in Malaya and severe police 
repression in Singapore. The Lee faction had cooperated 
with the colonial authorities in this repression and now 
inherited the repressive apparatus for its own use. 
This violent inheritance also included British housing 
policies of forced resettlement, especially the Master Plan 
(Yeung 1973: 14-15) to relocate a large part of the central 
city's population in a programme of "forced 
suburbanisation ll (Yeung 1973: 78). This was a civilian 
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version of the military tactic of establishing militarised 
"new villages" in Malaya. Both were aimed at disrupting as 
far as possible the social base of opposition political 
organisation (Hua 1983: 96). 
On coming to power, the Lee faction still faced a highly 
organised and popular anti-imperialist, nationalist 
movement on whose back it had ridden to power and which it 
had to destroy. The British Master Plan began to be 
implemented to destroy the sea in which the fish swam. It 
involved forcing resettlement of inhabitants from the two 
major Chinese quarters and the Indian quarter into 
satellite new towns beyond the city's green belt. The 
lush, rolling gardens and lawns of the British bungalow 
belt would have provided easier land for clearance and 
resettlement, but clearly neither the British nor the PAP 
had any intention of disturbing this preserve of the senior 
civil service and the rich (Gamer 1972: 169). 
Hence rural land had to be cleared. But most of the 
suitable areas were already settled or under cUltivation. 
This was not an obstacle but a positive benefit for the 
PAP, because these areas were also often opposition 
strongholds. In the 1960s the only major population 
centres outside the inner city were the British military 
bases (Wong and Ooi 1989: 794). But much of the work force 
which serviced them, and also the overflow from the 
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downtown area, lived in rural villages or squatter 
settlements. In fact, more than half the population lived 
in rural or semi-rural areas even though only about seven 
per cent derived their livelihoods mainly from agriculture 
or fishing (Chang 1976: 283, 287-8). This meant that farms 
and squatter settlements had to be forcibly demolished and 
the inhabitants rehoused in multi-storeyed concrete blocks. 
Resettlement involved the destruction of the homes and 
livelihoods of semi-rural people who actively resisted the 
process, and the suburbanisation of urban poor who were 
unaware of the social implications of public housing. 
The Lee faction's housing policy gained greater urgency 
from the departure of almost the entire PAP party structure 
and grassroots organisations in 1961 to set up the Barisan 
Sosialis. The PAP remnant had to undermine both the urban 
and rural bases of the left in order to survive 
politically. It quickly came to realise the value of 
forced resettlement in state-controlled housing in order 
physically to destroy traditional social organisation which 
/ it could never hope to control . 
..• compulsory urban resettlement provided the PAP with 
the opportunity of breaking up established and 
potential opposition electoral communities by dividing 
up old ethnic, working-class communities for 
resettlement in dispersed locations (Linda Lim 1989: 
183) . 
The HOB has been Lee's effective instrument in 
altering the political demography of singapore -
breaking up natural communities based on affinity of 
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race, clan, religion, language and dialect or on 
generations of friendly contact and shared work, and 
transferring the fragments into compact areas that are 
easy to monitor and easy to isolate should the need 
arise .... (Minchin 1986: 249). 
In 1962 and 1963 the PAP-state met the organised resistance 
to resettlement by farmers and rural dwellers with 
demolition teams accompanied by police riot squads. In the 
Kallang Basin and Toa Payoh, large crowds met the 
bulldozers. But public protests faded with the mass arrest 
of Barisan Sosialis leaders in 1963 and the dissolution by 
the PAP-state of the Singapore Rural Residents' 
Association, the Singapore Country People's Association and 
many hawkers' associations. The PAP labelled them all 
communist front organisations. A year later, the largely 
rural Malay population appeared to recognise that the 
destruction of their social and economic base was a special 
aim of the resettlement process. Race riots in July 1964 
broke out in a district targeted for demolition (Chan 1976: 
166-7). All Malay objections were ignored (George 1973: 
102). 
Any extended period of passive resistance to demolition and 
resettlement by a community invited another method of 
clearance. Serious fires broke out on several occasions. 
Coincidentally, few fire engines would be available, the 
water pressure would be low and the firefighters would have 
219 
defective equipment and engage in "rather odd target 
selection". During the 1960s, these incidents became known 
as "fires of convenience" (George 1973: 102; Pugh 1989: 
849). 
By 1965, the HDB had built more than 54,000 dwelling units 
which housed 23 per cent of the population (George 1973: 
101). This aggressive housing policy therefore became as 
much a strategy to eliminate social organisation outside 
PAP-state control as a means to provide for the public 
welfare. Traditional social organisation in both urban and 
rural settings were fundamentally threatened and the social 
base of political opposition was effectively undermined. 
Imposition of PAp-state Social Organisation 
To consolidate the political gains of the forced 
resettlement policy, the PAP-state instituted a parallel 
process of imposing state social organisation on the new 
settlements. This was an attempt to regain a mass base 
which prevented the regrowth of political opposition and 
eventually mobilised support for the PAP by replacing with 
government agencies the grassroots organisation that the 
Barisan had taken away. 
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In 1960 the People's Association was established as a 
statutory board to oversee the community Centres set up by 
the British. After the split with the left, the PAP-state 
used the PA, vastly expanding its network of Community 
Centres, to consolidate its power. Over 130 Community 
Centres were established in Barisan strongholds before the 
next elections in 1963. Besides the usual social and 
recreational functions of the Community Centres, the 
People's Association was charged with combatting communism 
and inducing loyalty to and identification with the 
government (Bellows 1970: 101-2). The Barisan community 
organisations were de-registered and similar services 
provided through the Community Centres. Each Community 
Centre had a television set and a radio, with large crowds 
gathering about the former since it was a new medium. The 
Community Centres became "institutionalized channels where 
the norms of the new political community envisaged by the 
PAP leaders would be fostered" (Seah 1985: 177). 
The PAP government was inconvenienced by the eleven month . 
strike by People's Association employees sympathetic to the 
Barisan after the split. But, after a purge, the 
government was able to expand the network and use the 
centres as a channel of political communication. The 
merger proposals with Malaya, military conscription and 
many other government initiatives were conveyed to the 
public via this network. It was of course a crucial means 
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of PAP campaigning for the 1963 elections, which the Lee 
faction desperately needed to win. 
After the elections and the incarceration of the left 
leadership, the PAP-state consolidated its social 
organisation in the community. Community Centres were now 
constructed within the new public housing estates. In 
1964, Management Committees were appointed to run the 
centres. Members were nominated by their PAP MPs, vetted 
by the security police (Seah 1985: 179) and appointed by 
the Prime Minister's Office. Many sub-committees were also 
established involving ordinary members of the community. 
Thus, by providing a limited response to basic community 
needs and involving the community in providing them, the 
government laid the foundation for an extensive network of 
communication and control which was more and more used for 
direct political indoctrination (Bellows 1970: 105). The 
People's Association and the Community Centres soon began 
to coordinate the "meet-the-people" sessions of PAP MPs, 
thus further blurring the distinction between party and 
state. The Community Centres were often also the site of 
the PAP branch headquarters. The PAP branches also set up 
kindergartens, youth activities and sports clubs (Linda Lim 
1989: 184). 
Citizens' Consultative Committees, or Constituency 
Committees, were set up on a constituency basis also as a 
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channel of political communication and control. By 1966 
they were established in all constituencies. They 
incorporated influential local figures into the PAP 
government machinery, gathered political intelligence and 
defused local problems before they became points of 
political mobilisation. Again nominations by PAP MPs were 
security vetted and then appointments were made by the 
Prime Minister's Office. There are now 81 Constituency 
Committees (one for each MP) and they coordinate all the 
other government "grassroots" organisations (GOS 1989a: 
215) • 
Needless to say, PAP members have become paramount in the 
leadership of these government organisations, although they 
do not necessarily publicise their affiliation • 
... the webs of relationship and interaction between 
the PAP party branch and these grassroots institutions 
are strong. This aspect also explains why during 
periods of political campaigning, these grassroots 
leaders are usually found actively working with the 
other party members (Seah 1985: 191). 
This imposition of state social organisation represents a 
takeover by the PAP-state of organisation and communication 
outside the workplace. That is, political organising 
normally takes place away from work and in the community 
through local autonomous organisations. The PAP-state's 
strategy of monopolising this space in its quest for a mass 
base, destroyed alternative organisation and precluded the 
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possibility of new autonomous non-state social 
organisation. We will see that this strategy had to be 
revitalised in the 1980s with the upsurge of political 
dissent. 
Before turning to the next period, we should note that 
there definitely was a need for substandard housing to be 
replaced and this enabled welfare to be provided in such a 
way as to induce political loyalty. Also, the PAP housing 
policy did have popular support when it came to power in 
1959. However, the way this policy was violently 
implemented quickly became unpopular (Minchin 1986: 128), 
and reflected the primary political goals it acquired: the 
political supremacy and legitimacy of the Lee faction. The 
strategy was also simple: opposition leaders were put in 
prison, their followers were put in government housing. 
CAPITAL FORMATION AND PROLETARIANISATION 
After 1966 and the split between the capitalist classes of 
Malaya and Singapore which resulted in separation, the PAP-
state had to strengthen its power base within Singapore and 
its relationship with foreign capital. The export-oriented 
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industrialisation (EOI) policy was the expression of this 
period of political consolidation. 
The PAP had destroyed the organisation of the left-wing 
opposition by 1966 but it still faced a militant labour 
force experienced in trade union struggles. In order to 
secure foreign investment and technology for production, 
the PAP-state had to guarantee a disciplined, obedient 
supply of wage labour. It had to tame the working class as 
a whole and it boosted the level of housing welfare as a 
means to achieve this. 
The PAP-state enlisted local capital in the provision of 
housing welfare in order to stabilise working class 
subsistence and reproduce labour power for the productive 
sector of the economy dominated by foreign capital. 
construction was an industry in which local capital could 
compete because importing houses is not usually an economic 
proposition. The contribution to GOP of the housing 
construction sector more than doubled to 5.4 per cent 
between 1960 and 1970. Investment in the sector 
constituted almost half the gross domestic capital 
formation (Hassan 1977: 15i Quah 1983: 204). 
Thus, large-scale public housing construction enabled the 
government to stimUlate and control domestic class forces 
even while embarking on an industrialisation policy which 
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relied on foreign capital. As the local capitalist class 
was organised, the working class was disorganised or 
fragmented in order to make it available for wage labour. 
The main political effect of the implementation of the 
housing policy has been the production of a working class 
dependent on the PAP-state for housing and dependent on 
wage labour to pay for it. The former was achieved, as we 
have seen, through the physical destruction of all other 
forms of cheap housing and through forced resettlement; the 
latter was achieved through the elimination or restriction 
of traditional means of sUbsistence and the imposition of a 
comparatively high HOB rental. It is therefore possible to 
understand the PAP-state's housing programme as a kind of 
forced proletarianisation by means of the extended denial 
of alternative sUbsistence and housing. 
It is also important to remember that in Singapore there 
was no large rural population ready to flood to the cities 
as in other Southeast. Asian countries. There was a finite 
population to re-house and one which, initially at least, 
expected improvement to their lives through the rapid 
changes proposed by the PAP (Hassan 1977: 11-14). These 
positive factors enabled the PAP-state to develop public 
housing in tandem with its expansion of Singapore's 
industrial infrastructure and achieve remarkable results 
(Lee Soo Ann 1973: 41, 117). 
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One of the main ways that public housing rendered the lower 
class available for wage labour was through the isolation 
of the nuclear family as the basic social unit. 
Isolating the Nuolear Family 
Forced resettlement in HOB flats not only split up 
communities but, as the flats were designed for nuclear 
families, also split up generations and ensured that the 
nuclear family became the basic social unit. Thus HOB 
residents were moved from an extended family context with 
an active community life of mutual support and a sense of 
local identity and security into seried ranks of self-
contained concrete boxes. nIt was argued that what the 
citizen gained in running water, electricity, and a better 
roof, he lost in mutual, neighbourhood, support groups and 
community spirit" (Austin 1989: 918-9). 
A detailed study of HOB residents in the 19705 revealed the 
extent of the isolation of the nuclear family and the loss 
of community. Hassan noted a sharp decline in relations 
with neighbours. He noted that less than ten per cent of 
children under ten years of age were allowed to play 
outside the flat and its immediate corridor. Around 60 per 
cent were not even allowed to play in the corridor but 
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remained indoors (Hassan 1977: 136). He recorded a 
prevailing sense of insecurity especially among the poorer 
families (Hassan 1977: 200) and the constriction of social 
life to the social confines of the nuclear family and the 
physical confines of the flat. 
The most meaningful activities take place within the 
confines of their "flat" which they perceive as 
"safe", and less meaningful and more artificial 
interaction "outside", that is, at the "neighbourhood" 
level which is perceived as impersonal if not hostile 
and constricting. Their perception of the "outside" 
environment is that of increasing constraints which 
are gradually narrowing the margins which they can 
manipulate in order to obtain a certain degree of 
freedom. As these margins become smaller and smaller 
as a result of increasing fixed expenditures and cost 
of living, it imposes upon them a cognition of the 
environment which is ever restricting and over which 
they have little control (Hassan 1977: 201). 
Hassan confronted a pervasive fear that his survey would 
somehow be communicated to the government (Hassan 1977: 
203, 206). Would the government find out that there were 
more people in the flat than officially approved and take 
it away? Would the fact that a son is in prison affect the 
family? Was the survey a way of identifying household 
consumer items which could be taxed? Was this a check to 
see if electricity was being used illegally? Most 
residents also expressed a sense of isolation and fear: 
they were afraid to seek help for their problems, they did 
not want others to look down on them by revealing their 
financial hardship, they did not know anyone to ask for 
help in an emergency. They felt powerlessness and that 
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they had to accept whatever the government offered (Hassan 
1977: 203). 
For those evicted from their former homes, there was 
no apparent resentment but merely resignation. To 
this and many other questions they put up the same 
front of acceptance of the inevitable~ It was 
pointless to ask them what they felt. Even if they 
had admitted that they preferred their former living 
quarters, when asked what they felt about their new 
residence and its facilities, they immediately assumed 
a puzzled air. Feel? What is there to feel? they 
asked (Hassan 1977: 205). 
Hassan also found high levels of anxiety and stress along 
with the health problems associated with these conditions: 
20 per cent of adults had frequent severe headaches, 40 per 
cent had trouble sleeping, 44 per cent had children who had 
trouble sleeping. The suicide figures in housing estates 
have become so politically sensitive that it is not 
possible to obtain accurate statistics. The isolation, 
fear, fatalism and sickness in HOB estates have been 
related to the social dislocation, the weakening of 
parental control (Pugh 1989: 851) and the sharp increase in 
crime (Austin 1989: 919). 
But these problems were primarily related to increasing 
inequality: resettlement in public housing did not decrease 
poverty. Resettlement not merely transferred poverty from 
urban slum or rural squatter settlement but increased it. 
A 1958 study noted 25 per cent of the population below the 
poverty line. Twenty years later, when about 60 per cent 
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of the population were in HOB housing (Chen 1983: 15), a 
similar study found poverty had increased to 35 per cent 
(Pugh 1989: 850). The evidence suggests that the very poor 
were the worst affected by forced resettlement (Austin 
1989: 919). 
The reasons for the increased poverty included the 
inability of HOB residents to continue to supplement 
incomes through raising pigs and chickens (Hassan 1977: 
203) or through planting their own gardens (Salaff 1988: 
30). New regulations forced them to pay for hawker 
licences and they were unable to undertake any occupation 
requiring a motor vehicle owing to their high cost (Austin 
1989: 924). An early comparative study of what were 
considered the "worst" slum area and the "best" HOB housing 
estate revealed that half the "slum" interviewees preferred 
to stay where they were and that many lived in adequate 
housing or better housing than they were being forced into. 
Of those already in the estate, a third said they could not 
afford the HOB rents (Gamer 1972: 167-8). Another study 
showed that the standard of housing in the estates depended 
on the ability to pay. Poor families, often the largest, 
were concentrated in one room flats. This pattern became 
associated with growing juvenile crime and low educational 
achievement (Hassan 1976: 253). Poorer families, the 
majority, found HOB flats more costly, transportation more 
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difficult and child rearing more problematic than the 
better-off families (Austin 1989: 924) . 
... some conditions worsened when the poor were 
rehoused from squatter dwellings and shophouses to HOB 
flats. They had lower room-occupancy rates in some 
pre-modern housing with 3.6 persons, but this 
increased to 5.0 persons when they were rehoused in 
HOB flats. The housing conditions in HOB housing and 
the poverty led to severe constraints on the chances 
of children, who prematurely left the education system 
to take low-paid jobs. The poverty also meant that 
for this section of the population, homeownership was 
not a realistic opportunity (Pugh 1989: 850-1). 
The increasing poverty and the social isolation of the 
nuclear family in public housing combined to produce a 
closed, self-protective, atomised community. 
For the poorer families the advantages and facilities 
available in the new housing environment are cancelled 
out by the increasing household expenses and ever 
increasing anxiety produced by this increase. The 
main solace for many of these families is that by 
living in flats among people they know little about, 
they can "hide" their poverty by keeping themselves 
aloof from their neighbours and the surrounding 
environment (Hassan 1977: 199). 
The welfare institution with the ostensible purpose of 
ameliorating the most miserable inner city housing 
conditions actually reduced the entire working class to a 
position of dependence on the PAP-state's system of 
centralised welfare thereby providing highly controlled 
wage labour for the EOl strategy. 
The transformation of a loosely structured labour 
force within an economy that turned on trading 
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activities to a regularised one employed in a 
diversified industrial economy is greatly assisted by 
the massive development of public housing. • •• one of 
its consequences was to keep workers in regular 
employment. Simply put, regular employment is 
necessary to meet the monthly rent required by the 
landlord, the HOB, or the mortgage payment for ninety-
nine year lease-ownership of the flat purchased also 
from the HOB (Chua 1989: 1011). 
Thus the move from kampung (village) life to housing estate 
made the nuclear family the basic social unit. By forcing 
this unit to bear alone all the economic burdens of this 
transformation, its continuing consumption of state welfare 
was assured. 
The way this proletarianisation functioned to fragment the 
working class on ethnic and gender lines and between 
citizen and migrant worker, creating a dual labour market, 
becomes very obvious in the following period. 
HDB: Focus of Political Dissent 
The government's political control was experienced most 
directly through the process of flat allocation by the HOB. 
The Singapore working class were forced to compete for 
housing with the centralisation of access to welfare in the 
hands of the state and the decline in self-reliant 
subsistence alternatives. Therefore, although much 
resettlement was forced in the early years, the cheaper 
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cost of HOB housing in comparison to private rental or 
purchase and the lack of any alternative led to long 
waiting lists for HDB flats. This gave the HOB enormous 
power through flat allocation (time of delivery, choice of 
neighbourhood, size and location of unit). 
The government was also able to integrate HOB allocations 
with its political goals in a highly explicit manner. In 
addition to breaking up ethnic and traditional social 
organisation, it was able to advance its family planning 
objectives. For example, large families had to wait longer 
for flats in the 1970s because of the policy of encouraging 
small families. But in the 1980s, three-generation 
families were given priority as the PAP-state sought to 
relieve itself of the responsibility of housing the elderly 
(Linda Lim 1989: 183). 
The changing regulations for flat allocation were highly 
sensitive political matters for the community at large. 
Public housing policy and the HDB itself became the focus 
of much political discontent during this period, and this 
was a major factor in the election of an opposition member 
to parliament in 1981. 
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Blockinq the Exits 
Having put people in their places physically, the 
government had to ensure that they stayed there and 
remained available for wage labour. This was done in at 
least two ways. 
First, the government made sure there were no alternatives 
to HOB housing for the working class. By means of the Land 
Acquisition Act 1966, the PAP-state gave itself the power 
to expropriate private rights in land titles. The PAP-state 
could acquire land not just for specific public purposes 
but "for any residential, commercial or industrial 
purposes" (Yeung 1973: 38). Together with other 
legislation (e.g. the Planning Act 1970 and HOB 
legislation), this Act has enabled the PAP-state to 
increase its ownership from 26.1 per cent of Singapore's 
land area in 1968~ to 67 per cent in 1980, and to 75 per 
cent in 1985 (Wong and Ooi 1989: 791; Linda Lim 1989: 185). 
Although this legislation may have been enacted initially 
to control land prices and facilitate the rapid development 
of industrial zones, housing estates and infrastructure, 
its application has also had the effect of ensuring that 
the working class have no access to cheap freehold land. 
In short, there is no prospect of returning to a semi-rural 
sUbsistence life-style. The only way out of the HOB estate 
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is to increase the family income exponentially in order to 
meet the very high cost of private housing. 
The second way that the PAP-state tied people to public 
housing was through the Central Provident Fund (CPF). This 
institution of forced saving linked domestic capital 
formation (through the construction industry), forced 
housing and the supply of labour power. 
Forced Saving, Forced Loyalty 
Mechanisms of social control collectively must ensure that 
workers acquire the skills they need in the accumUlation 
process, that they meet new demands for production and that 
they acquiesce to wage and job cuts. Control of their 
housing through welfare is one way to obtain workers' 
cooperation. But, if this is linked to their future 
SUbsistence when they are too old to work for a wage, then 
the power of capital's control over labour is further 
increased. 
The PAP-state has to guarantee the SUbsistence of retired 
workers if it is to get the cooperation of existing 
workers. There are, as we have noted, few alternative 
forms of SUbsistence to wage labour. Retirement pensions 
are therefore an essential part of the welfare costs of 
235 
reproducing labour power and of the process of stabilising 
working class subsistence. Labour militancy and other 
forms of struggle have been undermined by ensuring that 
non-cooperation threatens not only workers' present 
SUbsistence through being sacked, but also their housing 
and their SUbsistence in old age. 
The Central Provident Fund (CPF) is an institution to force 
worker co-operation through a scheme of forced savings. 
But, since these savings are deducted directly from 
workers' wages, it is more accurately described as a scheme 
for controlling workers by withholding their wages. The 
CPF forces them to pay in advance to support themselves 
when they are no longer productive. The political impact 
of the Central Provident Fund on the Singapore working 
class has been to tie workers and their families into wage 
labour and loyalty to the PAP-state. 
The CPF was established to receive compulsory contributions 
from workers and employers (Table 4.1). The worker-'s 
contribution to the CPF represents that part of the wages 
paid by capital for the reproduction of labour power in the 
present but diverted by the state for delayed payment. 
This is done in order to ensure that retired workers can 
continue to be consumers and not become a charge on future 
capital expenditure either by the state or the 
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Table 4.1: CONTRIBUTIONS TO CPF 
(percentage of wage) 
Worker Employer 
1955 5% 5% 
1970 8% 8% 
1980 18% 20.5% 
1984 25% 25% 
1986 25% 10% 
1988 24% 12% 
1990 23% 16.5% 
1991 23% 17.5% 
Source: Linda Lim 1989: 188; STW 12 May 1990, 20 April 
1991. 
corporations. Workers pay for their own future security 
by this means. 
In short, the CPF is the means by which the government 
ensures that the working population pays for its own 
retirement, health care, housing, filial 
responsibilities ... through its own forced savings and 
without charge to the government budget (Linda Lim 
1989: 189). 
The contribution by the employer may a~pear to be a 
generous gesture for the welfare of workers. In reality it 
is a state tax taken from the value generated by the 
workers themselves in production. The combined workers' 
and employers' contributions along with the remaining 
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portion of the wage comprise the total wage (immediate and 
delayed) necessary for the 'workers' SUbsistence. 
The CPF is a scheme by which you get what you earn. There 
is no inter-class or even intra-class transfer of welfare 
schemes which guarantee a minimum income to all retired 
persons. Thus, the CPF reproduces social inequalities and 
reinforces the divisions which weaken the working class. 
The control exerted by this forced saving mechanism is 
immense and works on several levels. First, as we have 
noted, the progressive elimination of traditional means of 
SUbsistence and housing has forced the working class to 
rely on wage labour just for survival. Singapore has no 
hinterland where workers can go and subsist when 
unemployed. This lack of alternative SUbsistence renders 
them susceptible to many forms of regulation mediated 
through the practice of wage labour, including compulsory 
membership of the CPF. 
Secondly, the CPF has become the only practical means for 
the working class to provide for their retirement. The 
options of reliance on government welfare or family support 
are far less attractive. The government welfare budget is 
very small and very hard to qualify for: 90 per cent of 
recipients are single, elderly, unmarried and without 
family. The other ten per cent are handicapped, widows, 
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orphans or abandoned wives or children. Welfare payments 
cover 50 per cent of minimum household requirements of a 
single person which, for most, means reliance on a 
charitable institution for survival. In 1985 the Ministry 
of Social Welfare was abolished and merged into the 
Ministry of community Development (Linda Lim 1989: 187). 
In addition, the traditional reliance on offspring during 
old age is severely restricted. For most of the PAP's 
rule, there have been strong disincentives to having more 
than two children. These disincentives largely remain in 
place for working class families, making elderly parents a 
burden on one or two low-waged young families. 
Thirdly, the PAP-state controls access to the forced 
savings. It possesses and administers each worker's 
withheld wages, the only major financial asset each worker 
has to guard against penury in the future. This gives the 
PAP-state enormous regulatory power. It has administered 
the system to ensure that workers conform with its 
political and economic objectives. 
The efficient administration of the CPF earns the PAP the 
support of workers who see the PAP-state as the guardian of 
their financial security. The legitimacy of the PAP-state 
is enhanced by workers having a financial investment in its 
stability and continuance. The PAP-state is not slow to 
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play on this electorally, pointing out the alleged danger 
to singapore's economy of voting an opposition into power. 
Fina~ly, the right to use CPF credits as down payments and 
to repay instalments on public housing was granted in 1968 
(Pugh 1989: 848). Less than a third of HOB flats were 
owner-occupied in 1970, but the proportion rose 
dramatically in the next period (Linda Lim 1989: 83). The 
way that home ownership through the CPF tightens the 
relationship between welfare and political loyalty will be 
examined at that stage. 
In contrast to the way the CPF has been used to fragment 
workers and to force their cooperation through dependence 
on the state, it has also been used to consolidate local 
capital behind the PAP. Workers' delayed wages have 
provided a huge amount of cheap capital to fund other 
living costs (such as public housing), infrastructural 
development and to invest in income-earning enterprises. 
That is, withheld wages have been used to assist domestic 
capital accumulation and thus to consolidate the power of 
local capital. 
In 1966 there were 417,000 contributors to the CPF, which 
stood at more than $440 million. By 1985, 1.89 million 
contributors had total forced savings of $26.8 billion (Ho 
1989:677) and by 1988, 2.06 million contributors had forced 
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savings of $32.5 billion (GOS 1989a:293). As government 
surpluses in the late 1970s became sufficient to finance 
public sector expenditure, CPF funds were increasingly used 
to boost singapore's huge foreign reserves (Linda Lim 1989: 
188). 
Thus, through the CPF welfare scheme, the PAP-state 
mobilised both workers and local capitalists to build the 
infrastructure and provide the labour power for foreign 
capital to generate huge surpluses from its singapore 
production sites. 
In summary, the period from 1966 to 1978 was a time when 
the PAP consolidated its political gains over the broad 
opposition movement it had confronted in the period of 
transition from colony to neo-colony. Political struggle 
during this period was manifested through institutions 
which the PAP now had the power base to be able to coopt or 
suppress one by one. It had consolidated the local 
capitalist class through the domestic construction 
industry. It had re-formed the lower classes into an urban 
proletariat physically located in government housing and 
available for employment in the nearby factories of the 
transnational corporations. 
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THE SECOND INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION AND TIGHTENING THE WELFARE 
-LOYALTY LINKAGE 
About 1978 the PAP launched its second industrial 
revolution aimed at a transition from a low wage economy to 
a high wage high-tech economy. It sought to develop an 
advanced industrial base and to phase out labour intensive 
industries with their increasing dependence on foreign 
labour. The government had to upgrade Singapore's 
infrastructure and labour skills which it hoped would 
attract the foreign investment to fund high-tech 
production. 
This revolution required a sudden rise in productivity and 
thus in the exploitation of workers. It created a new 
degree of social inequality. Its failure exacerbated the 
sharpened social contradictions of class, race and gender, 
which resulted. It was therefore a period which saw the 
emergence of new forms of political struggle and of 
increasing resistance to the PAP. Both the working class 
and elements of the middle class began to register their 
dissent electorally. Bourgeois women established their own 
organisations (e.g. Association of Women for Action and 
Research - AWARE, Singapore Association of Women Lawyers -
SAWL) and became active in others (e.g. the Singapore Law 
Society, Catholic community organisations). Minority-race 
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resistance became stronger as Malays managed to build 
residential communities in certain HDB estates. 
The PAP attempted to overcome this crisis of legitimacy by 
feigning equality. To this end, as we will see in later 
chapters, it gerrymandered the electoral system, marketed 
parliament as a forum of genuine political contest and 
boosted the meritocratic ideology of equal opportunity in 
education. In public housing, the PAP-state encouraged 
"home ownership" as a symbol of the way that its economic 
policies were supposedly benefiting every social sector. 
This period of intensified exploitation tended to 
strengthen the local capitalist class, to increase the 
regulatory power of the state and to weaken the political 
power of the working class. But these trends were by no 
means without their contradictions; contradictions 
exacerbated by the failure of the "revolution". The social 
control mediated through public housing during this period 
reflects these developments. 
strengthening Local capital 
Again the construction industry was used to boost domestic 
capital accumulation with the CPF as the main financial 
resource. The early 1980s saw a sharp rise in CPF 
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withdrawals for home-ownership, with 28 per cent of CPF 
contributions for 1983 being withdrawn for this purpose. 
In the 1974-85 period, housing absorbed from 4.8 to 15.9 
per cent of gross domestic product and some 11.6 to 34.1 
per cent of gross capital formation. Public housing 
amounted to 92 per cent of all residential construction by 
the mid-1980s (Pugh 1989: 842). 
The political meaning of this trend was again the 
consolidation of local capital behind the PAP-state's new 
economic strategy and a new level of control for the rest 
of the population. The CPF is clearly a powerful welfare 
mechanism of social control as a pension scheme. But its 
integration with public housing has made it even more 
central to the comprehensive system of social control. 
This is illustrated by the dynamics of HOB flat ownership. 
The Politics of HDB "ownership" 
By 1985, more than 85 per cent of Singapore's population 
lived in public housing and more than three-quarters of 
them were owner-occupiers (Yeh 1989: 826; Linda Lim 1989: 
183). This high incidence of home ownership has been 
touted internationally as symbolic of the PAP-state's 
success (Quah 1985: 248). In Singapore, the PAP-state has 
promoted home ownership as a sign of a migrant community 
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showing a sense of permanence and of commitment to the 
nation by investing in a home (Ong 1989: 937). 
There are two main reasons why HOB home ownership increases 
the social control exerted over the owners. First, they 
are not owners in the sense of a private freehold sale. 
Rather they purchase equity in the flat in the form of a 
ninety-nine year lease which reverts to the HOB upon 
expiry. Owners are little more than tenants. But the 
HOB's hold over them is greater than over tenants because 
of the size of the investment that "purchase" involves and 
which owners do not wish to jeopardise. There are many 
rules and regulations which owners must follow. 
For example, the HOB imposes limitations on the number 
and family status of people who can live in the units, 
has to approve their renovation, rental and resale, 
forbids the conduct of business in the units, and has 
the right to evict residents found guilty of morally 
inappropriate behaviour, not necessarily with 
compensation for their equity in the unit (Linda Lim 
1989: 183). 
Therefore, owners are not only subject to the same petty 
regulations as tenants in terms of restrictions on the 
colour they can paint their front door, the type of pets 
allowed and noise curfews. They are similarly liable to 
eviction (and imprisonment) for offences such as dropping 
dangerous litter over their balconies or for offending 
against the morality of the state. But, in addition to 
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sharing these regulatory burdens with tenants, owners may 
or may not be compensated for their investment. 
Secondly, although the increasing availability of CPF funds 
for housing has latterly enabled poorer families to follow 
the better-off in purchasing flats, this has also had the 
effect of easing the majority of the working class into a 
long-term financial commitment requiring long-term fulltime 
wage labour. 
Since poor couples and those of modest means find it 
hard to save, CPF enables them to buy a home without 
having to stint on necessities. The low proportion of 
their take-home pay spent for housing frees them to 
spend more on consumer goods. This painless road to 
property ownership ties a family into debt [to the 
state] and credit relations that require them to work 
steadily for years to come. But if they should lose 
their jobs, they will risk losing their payments and 
losing their homes (Salaff 1988: 242-3). 
Thus HOB tlownership" puts many in long-term debt to the 
state and ensures a disciplined labour force at home as 
well as in the factory. Even those who payoff their debt 
do not have exclusive rights over their equity and may be 
deprived of it at the discretion of the PAP-state. That 
is, the fear of losing one's own home, which is usually 
also one's major asset, remains a fact of life for most 
Singaporeans. Under this constant threat, most 
Singaporeans are constrained to behave in their own homes 
as if everything is forbidden except what is expressly 
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allowed. This fear and the mechanisms which tie people 
into it have become one of the central pillars of the PAP-
state's social control. 
Furthermore, the PAP-state's launching of its "Second 
Industrial Revolution" in the late 1970s could not have 
been contemplated without already having about 80 per cent 
of the population within the grip of the HDB welfare system 
to ensure compliance with the process of capital 
accumulation. 
Increasing Inequality: Fragmenting the working Class 
Although the Second Industrial Revolution largely failed to 
launch Singapore to the technologically advanced level 
hoped for, it did achieve significant social results. It 
stabilised working class sUbsistence and further fragmented 
the working class. 
Poverty was hidden but it existed. According to one 
estimate, it was probable that over 30 per cent of 
Singapore's households were below the poverty line, 
thanks to HDB policies that had unwittingly promoted 
"shelter poverty", that is, poverty brought about when 
households had to deprive themselves of nonshelter 
basic necessities in order to meet the high costs of 
housing (Bello and Rosenfeld 1990: 331). 
Salaff (1988) studied poor and "secure" families before and 
after the initiation of the move from labour intensive to 
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capital intensive industrialisation, or what she calls the 
"early development" stage and the lIadvanced development" or 
second stage. These stages largely correspond to the 
second and third periods that I have distinguished. 
Salaff's observations show that the PAP failed 
significantly to upgrade the skills of the labour force 
while deepening the social alienation of the majority of 
workers and their families. 
Many families she met in public housing estates during 
1974-76 "exhibited the profile of Third World poverty" 
(Salaff 1988: 3) as well as many of the characteristics 
also noted by Hassan. By the mid-1980s, Salaff noted that 
the poor had been drawn more deeply into the wage economy 
and that "the income gap by social-class group remains 
virtually unchanged. Despite the uplift of some of the 
poorest, poor men still average about half the wages of 
secure men" (Salaff 1988: 226). Further, she notes that 
the increase in wages during this second stage has had the 
effect of increa~ing control over the nuclear family and of 
reproducing the class structure while differentiating the 
working class into a minority of better paid workers in 
core industries and a majority of poorer workers. 
The new second-stage programmes root families ever 
more deeply in the capitalist mode of production, 
which opens them to control by the market and 
restructures them along new class lines. That the 
second-stage economic programmes bring workers more 
deeply into the market economy has been seen first by 
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the spread of wage work and the rise in basic wages 
earned. The proletarianisation of the men and women 
in my sample enables policies that promote certain 
types of industries and occupations to reach 
increasing numbers of workers. The policies then 
force the restructuring of the labour process. within 
each of the social class groups, the earnings of 
workers whose skills are favoured (men and women in 
the core-sector industries and in technically skilled 
occupations) have improved the most. Such a 
realignment of opportunities occurs throughout the 
class spectrum. Thus the programmes of job creation, 
job finding, and retraining carry forward the major 
class divisions and inequalities (Salaff 1988: 262). 
This study noted an increased consumption of welfare (e.g. 
housing and education) by all families. Most families had 
risen above the poverty line and, although still poor, were 
now consumers. However, while the outward appearance of 
family life has become more uniform, Salaff found that the 
divide between rich and poor has not narrowed and the class 
structure is maintained (Salaff 1988: 249, 261-2). That 
is, through the system of with-holding wages, working class 
SUbsistence was stabilised. 
These conclusions have been verified by .other scholars who 
have noted the persistence of poverty in housing estates 
despite the improving standard of flats and the growth in 
average incomes. This poverty remains concealed, mainly in 
one room HDB flats. The poorest ten per cent of the 
population still receive only two to three per cent of 
total income (Pugh 1989: 849-50). 
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The increase in poverty in the "early developmental stage" 
and its persistence to the present indicates that the 
reproduction of the class structure and the destruction of 
traditional working class organisation are not incidental 
but integral to the operation of housing welfare. That is, 
the increased consumption of welfare is necessary to shape 
the social conditions for the extension of wage labour. 
The isolation of the nuclear family and thus of the working 
class as a whole from its existing social and political 
organisation in the first stage was developed into further 
integration into the market economy and wage labour in the 
second. This integration involved further differentiation 
among the working class as already noted with regard to 
workers in industries targeted for up-grading. However, 
the HDB welfare system also enabled differentiation of 
other fractions of the working class throughout the two 
periods. 
Women and Housing: Patriarchy and Industrialisation 
The added burdens of nuclear family life in HDB flats have 
already been noted. However, it has not been pointed out 
that these strains primarily devolved upon women as part-
time wage labourers and housekeeper-child-rearers who were 
now isolated at home without other adult company. Further, 
the physical design of HOB flats was not related to women's 
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needs in these roles nor to their values. Low-rise, high 
density housing would have been more appropriate to the 
tasks now loaded almost exclusively on to women (Pugh 1989: 
840-841, 853). 
However, the increasing pressures from the involvement of 
families in the money economy meant more and more women 
were compelled to work to buy consumer goods or furnishings 
and to help meet the increasing family financial 
obligations (Linda Lim 1989: 186; Salaff 1988: 233). The 
location of small manufacturing plants in flatted factories 
in housing estates encouraged women into part-time, low-
paid wage labour. 
In the 1980s, Salaff found that the increasing involvement 
of women in wage labour during the "advanced development 
stage" had brought the whole family under the social 
control of welfare mechanisms in a way that the wage labour 
of male workers had not yet achieved. 
Whether new or old workers, through their market 
commitment women help bring their families more deeply 
into the new structures of the second-stage economy. 
The state social services, such as housing 
developments in areas where factories locate and birth 
control services, enable women to work. [sic] In turn, 
their wage labour increases their families' 
participation in the new state social services (Salaff 
1988: 263). 
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While the politics of family planning will be pursued in 
greater detail later, it is important to recognise that 
women workers became a differentiated, low-paid sector of 
the workforce. The acquisition of skills in Singapore is 
linked to class so most working class women remain doomed 
to low wages. A full-time woman employee earns three-
fifths of the comparative male wage (Salaff 1988: 236). 
More than this, women are increasingly employed in even 
lower paid part-time jobs. 
Those women not already employed when the second stage was 
launched were further marginalised. Home-making became 
even more the sole work of the wife and mother and child-
rearing became even more time consuming (Salaff 1988: 269). 
The PAP-state has begun to show concern about this burden 
on women, not because this labour is completely unpaid, but 
because, with the shortage of singaporean labour, it wants 
to force more women into part-time employment. 
Furthermore, the PAP-state can thereby extract more labour 
out of the nuclear family unit without an increase in the 
reproduction costs of that labour. A speech by Lee Kuan 
Yew further showed that the PAP-state wanted to push more 
women into wage labour without raising the level of 
welfare. He called on men to "change their cultural 
attitudes" and help out in the home. "Wives have jobs, 
wives have social lives of their own, wives cannot alone 
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carry the burdens of managing the home and bringing up the 
children," he said. However, he stated it was "too 
difficult for the state or private enterprise to help 
lighten the load by providing domestic help or good child-
care services" (STW 7 July 1990). Soon after, the 
government said only 33,000, or three per cent of the 
workforce, are part-timers and that it wished to increase 
this to ten per cent (STW 18 August 1990). It had 
previously noted that 540,000 women were "not working" (STW 
9 September 1989). 
Thus the forced restructuring of social organisation 
through the HDB and related welfare systems has 
differentiated working class women into either poorly paid 
wage workers or unpaid workers at home, while increasing 
the burden of family responsibilities. The patriarchal 
relations of the nuclear family have been reinforced by the 
capitalist relations of wage labour. 
Workers without Housing: Creating a Dual Labour Market 
The absorption of labour into the public housing 
construction programme and in industrial production from 
the mid-1960s enabled Singapore's unemployment problem to 
be solved by the early 1970s. However, the rapid growth of 
the economy then required more workers, skilled and 
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unskilled, than Singapore could supply itself. Hence the 
approximately 150,000 unskilled and semi-skilled foreign 
workers from neighbouring countries allowed into Singapore 
as of early March 1990 and the intention to allow more (STW 
3 March 1990). 
Most of these workers are denied public housing and other 
forms of welfare available to Singapore citizens and 
permanent residents. It is difficult to get statistical 
information on their housing conditions because this is a 
sensitive political subject. This sensitivity is attested 
to by the detention without trial of community workers in 
1987 whose community work had begun to expose the misery of 
foreign workers. 
However, simple observation of construction sites around 
singapore reveals that most construction workers live in 
barrack-style temporary plywood sheds on site with a 
minimum of facilities. These workers are not members of 
the CPF and do not have the same labour rights under law qS 
singaporeans. Their poor living conditions came to the 
surface with the health problems of the 20,000 Thai 
construction workers. Since 1982 at least 220 of these 
workers have died suddenly in their sleep possibly due to 
their habit of cooking rice in PVC pipes lying around the 
building site (Singapore's official explanation) or due to 
the bad living conditions, stress and exhaustion (The 
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Economist 15 September 1990). The official explanation 
seeks to blame the workers but it in fact also indicates 
the poor living conditions they suffer. 
The visible existence of a class of workers on very low 
wages and deprived of the benefits of the HDB housing 
welfare system has made it clear to the Singapore working 
class that the only thing worse than being in an HDB flat 
is not being in an HDB flat. 
In short, the PAP-state, like its colonial predecessor, has 
found it useful to have a labour source it can turn on and 
off like a tap without any domestic political consequences. 
Thus, when unemployment rose from 2.8 per cent in December 
1984 to 6.1 per cent in March 1986, the PAP-state reacted 
to the recession by repatriating foreign workers (Lim Chong 
Yah 1989: 213). There were no repercussions for the 
housing market (already in oversupply by 1985) because 
these workers were largely housed in company-built and 
government-~pproved squatter camps on or near building 
sites. 
Furthermore, neither the PAP-state nor foreign investors 
bear any cost for the generational reproduction of this 
cheapest source of labour. Poverty and unemployment in 
neighbouring countries ensure a ready supply, and there is 
no need to invest in these workers' welfare either to 
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reproduce their labour or to control them. If they get 
sick or die, there are more where they came from. If they 
are foolish enough to agitate for better conditions, they 
can be expelled immediately. We will examine this under-
class of the dual labour market in more detail in the 
following chapter. 
Housing and voting: contradictions Emerge 
Soon after the launch of the Second Industrial Revolution, 
the PAP faced the contradictions of its success in housing 
more than 85 per cent of the population in HOB flats by the 
mid-1980s. The entire working class (estimated at 80.2 per 
cent of the total population in 1976) (Chan 1976: 34) and 
much of the middle class was dependent on the PAP-state for 
its housing. Having stabilised the living conditions of 
the work force, the PAP-state moved to cut the costs of 
housing. That is, the move to upgrade the economy required 
greater productivity and less social expenditure. This was 
a further development of the trend resulting from the move 
from the lSI policy of the early 1960s to the EOI policy. 
Ideologically, this trend was mirrored in the PAP's switch 
from social justice rhetoric to the ideology of 
inegalitarian meritocracy. 
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The PAP-state cut its funding to the HOB. The state grant 
to the HOB in 1977-78 was $Q8.5 million. In 1979-80, it 
was $32.9 million (Pugh 1989: 849). At the same time there 
was building sector inflation, with price increases 
reaching 38 per cent in 1981 (Pugh 1989: 849). The HOB 
continued its high-handed treatment of its tenants, notably 
by evicting some residents from their flats in the Anson 
area to make way for a container port. Evicted residents 
were given no priority on the HOB waiting list. In 
addition, the government also continued the destruction of 
adequate non-HOB working class housing (Pugh 1989: 846), 
adding more disgruntled citizens to the waiting list. 
There were still 76,509 families on this list and they were 
now faced with sharply higher prices for HOB flats (Quah 
1985: 248, 254). 
The many grievances surrounding HOB policy and the lowering 
of state support for welfare led to a degree of political 
dissent the PAP had not anticipated. This was expressed 
most obviously through the by-election victory in 1981 of 
opposition leader J. B. Jeyaretnam, who broke the PAP's 
parliamentary monopoly. Working class voters sent a 
message of protest which shocked the government out of its 
complacency. It quickly increased HOB funding (Pugh 1989: 
855) • 
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However, the sudden release of CPF funds for private 
housing and the increase in HOB construction then led to 
oversupply and a decline in home values. This was also 
unpopular "in a nation where more than three-quarters of 
the population consists of 'home owners' whose homes 
constitute the bulk of their savings" (Linda Lim 1989: 
186). This displeasure, along with other grievances, was 
reflected in a continuing trend against the PAP in the 1984 
general election results and the election of another 
opposition member. 
The PAP-state learned that, to ensure the optimal level of 
social control through state social organisation, a 
sufficient level of welfare needs to be available from the 
state. Without an adequate material incentive to balance 
the PAP's political threats, it is very difficult to use 
the electoral process to convert submission into consent. 
The PAP-state severely misjudged the level of welfare 
required when it launched its "Second Industrial 
Revolution" in the late 1970s. 
If housing problems are not solved, those affected 
might demonstrate their dissatisfaction by not voting 
for the ruling party. This was demonstrated in the 31 
October 1981 Anson by-election. Accordingly, the PAP 
government must continue to ensure that Singaporeans 
will be satisfied with public housing otherwise its 
legitimacy might be further eroded in the future (Quah 
1985: 254). 
258 
The government also realised that voters felt they had 
nothing to lose by casting a protest vote. But the one 
political action the PAP-state cannot make illegal if it is 
to derive legitimacy from the forms of liberal democracy is 
casting a vote for the opposition. At the .same time, to 
maintain its absolute political hegemony, the PAP requires 
a high level of electoral consent. It faced the 
contradiction of having made HDB flat "ownership" such a 
central part of its social control mechanisms: the working 
class was unable to build its own political organisation, 
but it could exercise with impunity its prerogative to 
withhold electoral consent. closing off this form of 
struggle became a priority. The PAP linked housing values 
to political loyalty. 
Restoring Legitimacy: Tightening the Welfare-Loyalty Link 
The growing vote against the PAP in the elections of the 
1980s indicated the resurgence of political struggle as the 
PAP's accumulation strategy intensified exploitation and 
repression. The PAP was no longer able to take the outward 
conformity of the working class to social control practices 
as an indication of political support. 
Prime Minister Lee, at a 1988 election rally, put the issue 
in this way: 
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We are now facing a new problem. with every election, 
a growing realisation spreads across the population 
that, yes, we need a PAP government which is good, but 
there is also that itch to say let's put in a few 
sticks of chili and we will get a quicker response 
from the government ..•• If you vote for the wrong man 
then I wish you well. You will soon find out 
(Asiaweek 2 September 1988: 34). 
Since the government could not outlaw casting a vote for 
the opposition, it responded with administrative measures 
to tie the property values and standard of living of HOB 
residents to PAP electoral success. An early indication of 
this tightening of the welfare-loyalty link came during the 
1984 election campaign when Lee Kuan Yew threatened that 
constituencies which returned an opposition member may lose 
some government services. He was responding to 
Jeyaretnam's election and to the groundswell of dissent 
against raising the age for withdrawal from the CPF, 
against the HOB's flat allocation policies and against 
family planning schemes which discriminated against the 
poor. After the election, in which two opposition members 
were elected I he said lithe government would not be 
blackmailed" by the people and that, lito make sure the 
excesses [votes against the PAP] were not carried too 
far •.. it is necessary to put some safeguards into the way 
in which people use their votes to bargain, to coerce, to 
push, to jostle and get what they want without running the 
risk of losing the services of the government" (Asia 
Yearbook 1986: 226). 
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In March 1985, the National Development Minister announced 
that the Housing and Development Board would give priority 
to PAP constituencies in providing maintenance for lifts, 
water pipes, drains, roofs etc. He stated in parliament, 
"This is a very practical political decision .••• I make no 
apologies for it. As a PAP government we must look after 
PAP constituencies first because the majority of people 
supported us" (PEER 11 April 1985). The PAP-state moved to 
institutionalise this threat against dissenting voters and 
create an additional obstacle to future opposition 
victories by instituting a new level of local government. 
Town councils 
Legislation to form Town Councils in housing estates was 
introduced on 25 May 1988 and passed the next month. The 
idea had developed in tandem with the Group Representation 
Constituencies (GRCs) or "Team MPs" proposal after the 1984 
election (see Chapter Six). It was proposed that the three 
elected MPs in a GRC would automatically form the Town 
council, one of them as chairman. In the end, despite the 
hurried separation of the rationales for these schemes, the 
final legislation followed this initial proposal. 
The power of the HDB to administer and maintain the estates 
was devolved to the Town Councils (TCs) which would be 
formed according to the parliamentary boundaries. There 
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would thus be TCs formed on a Single Member Constituency 
(SMC) basis as well as the GRCs. TCs would be formed in 
all GRCs and SMCs by February 1991. Each TC would be 
allocated a budget (SMCs $3 million and GRCs $9 million) 
and have the right to set maintenance fees, make 
investments, decide on new amenities and raise rates. The 
government would not subsidise deficits. 
In parliament the PAP pushed the TC proposal as giving 
residents more say in the running of their estates, an 
example of grassroots democracy. However, the three trial 
TCs, begun in September 1986 and covering nine 
constituencies in the Ang Mo Kio area, were hardly 
democratic in their membership. Each had a PAP MP as 
chairman with the other two PAP MPs from the GRC as 
members. It would appear that the fact that MPs are elected 
to parliament gives sufficient licence to the PAP-state to 
claim that their appointment to other bodies is a 
democratic procedure. The other 18-21 councillors were 
selected by the MPs and were mostly from the government-
appointed Residents' committees or citizens' Consultative 
Committees, the strongholds of PAP members and sympathisers 
(ST 14 September 1986). 
Deputy Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong explained the TC 
legislation in terms of the government's two main concerns 
after the 1984 election: encouraging Singaporeans to 
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participate in "building an even better singapore" and 
providing "stabilisers to our democratic political system" 
(Quah 1989b: 7). More bluntly he earlier stated this 
latter objective as forcing Singaporeans "to think a little 
more carefully before they cast their votes". This would 
neutralise the threat of "protest votes" being registered 
as in 1984 (Asia Yearbook 1988: 223). 
Thus HOB residents were left in no doubt about the 
implications for their welfare of voting in an opposition 
member of parliament. The enormous task of administering 
the estates includes maintenance, renovation, regular 
repainting of the blocks, collecting rubbish, looking after 
the environment within the estate including parks, car 
parks and roads and formulating the rules and regulations 
about what one can and cannot do "not only in the estate 
but also within the inside of one's own flat" (SCMP 5 
September 1988). The majority of TCs, being PAP-
dominated, will have the back-up of the state 
administrative apparatus. The extent to which any 
opposition-controlled TC has this support will depend on 
whether the government wants it to succeed or fail in the 
eyes of its constituents. It is clear that the PAP-state 
has established the TCs as winner-takes-all bodies rather 
than ensuring a balance of political representation in 
order to be able to show the contrast between PAP and 
opposition TCs. 
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A well-run estate can flourish, while negligence and 
poor service will result in run-down flats, poor 
facilities, not to mention the dangers of corruption. 
Property values of such estates will rise or fall 
depending on how well or how badly they are run, the 
Government explains ..•. opposition parties which are 
financially weak and lacking in human expertise view 
it as a serious threat to their political 
aspirations .... Politics will be an entirely new ball 
game in Singapore (SCMP 5 September 1988). 
The sole elected opposition MP after 1988, Chiam See Tong 
of the Singapore Democratic Party (SDP), may well succeed 
in running the TC in his SMC. The resources of his party 
can be focussed on the single constituency. The PAP-state 
regards him as an acceptable, tame opposition and it would 
benefit from allowing his Town council to develop as an 
opposition show-case in order to authenticate its good 
faith in establishing the scheme. It would also benefit 
because the SDP would spend most of its energy doing this 
rather than mobilising citizens nationally on national 
concerns. But it is unlikely that the PAP-state would 
permit any future Workers' Party MP to be as successful 
because of the broader appeal of that party to the working 
class. 
The Town Council scheme therefore introduces a new level of 
threat against HDB residents. The PAP-state, faced with 
individual actions which cumulatively could threaten its 
electoral legitimacy, has responded with a scheme which 
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ties continuing welfare (in this case the value of flats 
and adequate servicing of them) to political loyalty. If 
residents lose out, they only have themselves to blame. 
The PAP-state has introduced the strategy of the military 
reprisal into its welfare mechanisms: if the enemy is 
assisted, the whole village is punished. 
In addition to this initiative, the PAP-state continues to 
reassure HOB residents that it will deliver improved 
property values to those who support it. In his last 
National Oay Rally address as prime minister, Lee Kuan Yew 
promised singaporeans that "the Government could double the 
value of their assets in 20 years provided they treated 
life like a marathon and stayed the course" (STW 1 
September 1990). He was referring to the <HOB's renovation 
and upgrading programme for existing flats which could 
eventually double their value. 
Housing and Racism: Removing Demographic Threats 
Having split up and resettled traditional communities in 
HOB estates, the level of emerging political struggle in 
the early 1980s induced the PAP-state to take new 
initiatives to ensure that no autonomous communities arose 
within them. That is, the PAP-state had to ensure the 
continuing disorganisation of the working class. In 
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addition to its Town council scheme, it took steps to 
increase its political control over the working class in 
the estates and to undermine any growing sense of 
neighbourhood identity and security arising from minority 
ethnic affiliation which might be translated into an 
opposition bloc vote. It achieved these aims by imposing 
racial quotas, by extending state community organisations 
and by further militarising the housing estates. 
Although a dispossessed and discriminated against racial 
minority, the Singapore Malay community nevertheless has 
had to be handled carefully owing to the geopolitical 
location of Singapore between two much larger Malay states. 
Malay resentment of their political and economic 
marginalisation and their cynicism about PAP Malay leaders 
(STW 6 October 1990) has been reflected in a consistent 
anti-PAP Malay vote. This dissent began to concern the 
PAP-state when easing the rules governing allocation of 
flats and their resale resulted in Malays gradually moving 
back to their favourite districts, thus concentrating the 
anti-PAP vote. 
This problem was addressed by introducing HDB sale and 
resale regulations which discriminate on grounds of race in 
order to prevent or break up what the PAP-state calls 
"racial enclaves". This has been justified as a move to 
prevent racial conflict. According to the Minister of 
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community Development, liTo allow the races to regroup now 
would be to go back to the pre-1965 period when there were 
racial enclaves and racial riots" (STW 18 February 1989). 
The HDB's post-1982 prototype new town is 625 hectares with 
40,000 dwelling units (du) divided into neighbourhoods of 
6,000 to 7,000 du which are further divided into precincts 
of 400 to 800 du (Yeh 1989: 826). The precincts generally 
consist of a number of high-rise blocks. In 1989, the PAP-
state set racial limits for HDB estates. 
Table 4.2: HDB RACIAL LIMITS 
(maximum percentages) 
RACE HDB NEIGHBOURHOODS HDB BLOCKS 
Chinese 84% 87% 
Malay 22% 25% 
Indians/others 13% 13% 
Source: STW 18 February 1989. 
The above limits are described by the PAP-state as non-
discriminatory and as "a balanced racial mix" (STW 18 
February 1989). By this logic a block which has 87 per 
cent Chinese residents is not a racial enclave, but a block 
which has 26 per cent Malay residents is a racial enclave. 
Or, to put it another way, it takes more than three times 
as many Chinese as Malays to make a race riot. Clearly the 
purpose of the limits is to prevent the growth of strong 
Malay community organisation, even at an informal level, 
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which would adversely affect the PAP-state's electoral 
legitimacy. Also a bloc Malay vote against the PAP would 
expose the institutional racism of the bourgeois Chinese 
state. 
It should also be noted that the growing (mainly Chinese) 
middle-class has not been quite as susceptible to the 
threats of dispossession and criminalisation aimed at the 
Chinese working-class. The HDB's attempt to bring the 
middle-class within its social control mechanisms has been 
quite successful (Linda Lim 1989: 191). However, its 
initial elitist policy of building executive class flats 
together had the effect of concentrating professionals 
willing to vote against the PAP in particular blocks or 
estates. 
with the move to providing more middle- and upper-
income units, the HDB first segregated these units in 
like clusters, but more recently preferred dispersal -
some believe in part to allow for the possibility that 
members of a like-income group (educated 
professionals, for example) might vote in a like 
manner, resulting in housing patterns biassing voting 
results (Linda Lim 1989: 183). 
Thus the demography of housing remains thoroughly 
politicised despite the early forced resettlement 
dispersals of the 1960s and the imposition of exclusive 
PAP-state social organisation. 
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strengthening Political Control of the Labour Camp 
From the late 1970s another level of PAP-state social 
organisation was added to suppress struggle and induce 
workers to cooperate with the new accumulation strategy. 
Residents' committees were launched in 1978-79 by the now 
familiar process of appointment through the Prime 
Minister's Office. By 1988, 359 Residents' committees had 
been set up involving more than 5,600 residents, usually 
the "better educated among the population" (GOS 1989a: 
216). Each Residents' Committee covers one zone of 
apartment blocks varying from 500 to 2,500 flats. 
Residents' Committees are officially categorised as part of 
"Social Defence and Community Relations" (GOS 1989a: 215). 
As Singapore's population was increasingly relocated 
in HDB estates, the need to create new communities and 
monitor and resolve the problems of this large 
constituency of voters became paramount. By 1985, 
when 84 per cent of Singapore's population were living 
in HDB flats, housing problems had every possibility 
of developing into major political issues. Thus in 
addition to the citizens' Consultative Committees 
(CCCs), the Community Centre Management Committees 
(CCMCs), and the PAP party branches, 261 RCs were set 
up in constituencies with HDB populations. Each RC 
has responsibility for a zone of 500 - 2,500 housing 
units. Without this sensory system of the body 
politic, it is unlikely that the PAP could have 
provided effective and stable government for over two 
decades (Chan 1989: 81). 
The value of imposing this social organisation on the HDB 
estates was attested to by Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew: 
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Look at our new towns with community centres, parks 
and stadiums. Think of their channels of 
communication for the constituents to reach the HDB, 
PUB, TAS, the government ministries, and the 
administrators who manage them. They have their MPs, 
RCs, MCs, CCCs, who act like the network of nerves and 
sensors which monitors signals and feedbacks [sic] and 
sends out messages in return. It is these invisible 
ties that make for the sense of belonging, a sense of 
security of life in singapore (ST 20 August 1984). 
[PUB: Public utilities Board; TAS: Telecommunications 
Authority of Singapore; MCs: Management Committees.] 
Housing estate political control was reinforced in the 
1980s by integrating pOlicing with the activities of 
Residents' Committees. From 1983, Neighbourhood Police 
Posts (NPPs) were introduced to housing estates, with a 
total of 91 NPPs expected to be in operation by the end of 
1989 (GOS 1989a: 178). Modelled on the Japanese koban 
system, NPPs have generally been sited on.the ground floors 
of public housing blocks and staffed with 25 or more police 
officers. Constables are required to make personal contact 
with every family in an NPP's area and to join the 
activities of local community organisations (Austin 1989: 
920) . 
The NPPs have close cooperation with the Residents' 
Committees which, as noted already, are appointed through 
the Prime Minister's Office. The Residents' Committee 
office is often located near or next to the NPP. Working 
with the NPPs, the Residents' committees had established 
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71,974 Neighbourhood Watch Groups involving 288,217 
households by October 1988 (GOS 1989a: 178; Ong 1989: 943). 
This integration of policing and PAP-state political 
organisation within estates represents a tighter linkage 
between the provision of housing welfare, political loyalty 
and the apparatus of state violence. It was accompanied by 
increased surveillance of the working class in their homes 
and by further militarisation of the estates. 
Total surveillance: Nowhere to Hide 
Capital produces and reproduces not only its social 
environment but also its physical environment (Harvey 1982: 
403), an observation attested to by the architectural style 
and physical lay-out of HDB estates. The position and 
design of public housing renders workers vulnerable to 
surveillance and control, as well as making their labour 
power conveniently available. Often sited near the 
factories of transnational corporations, housing blocks are 
arranged in ordered rows on open land. There are long 
empty corridors with one door for each flat. This barrack-
style design enables two or three police in the groundfloor 
lift lobby and stairwell of a twenty-storey block to seal 
off several hundred people. This may be a major reason why 
the PAP-state resisted low-rise, high-density housing long 
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after it had been shown to be cheaper, use space more 
efficiently and be more conducive to a sense of community 
(Pugh 1989: 852). 
Placing a major segment of the population in barrack-
style blocks provided the police with an opportunity 
to scrutinize citizen activity more efficiently from a 
distance (Austin 1989: 919). 
Residence in an HOB flat renders a worker vulnerable to 
surveillance. Details of who is living in which flat are 
centrally computerised. citizens must report a change of 
address to the authorities within two weeks or be subject 
to a $5,000 fine or up to five years imprisonment or both 
(Austin 1989: 916). This monitoring is backed up by 
electronic surveillance. 
For example, all citizens on reaching the age of twelve 
years are finger-printed. This print is centrally recorded 
and is also placed, along with a personal photograph and 
signature, on an identity card (IC) bearing a personal 
number. Any citizen must be able to produce their IC when 
officially requested. Its number is used in all dealings 
with the PAP-state (CPF, HOB, utilities, telephone, 
educational authorities, hospitals, income tax, driving 
licence, passport). During 1990 new Ies began to be issued 
to coincide with the introduction of a computerised, 
automatic fingerprint-identification system. Thus, all 
citizens will have their prints in this computer which is 
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accessible to the police and security authorities (STW 18 
August 1990; GaS 1989a: 178; SAWL 1989: 36). 
Physical surveillance was also upgraded when, in 1988, the 
Criminal Investigation Department (CID) acquired "a 
sophisticated video system ... for better and more extensive 
crowd surveillance" (GaS 1989a: 178). In addition to the 
various types of police surveillance, other state agencies 
also help regulate the estates. For example, in 1989 there 
were 24 anti-litter squads, each of four officers, 
patrolling the estates watching for residents who drop 
litter from their flats (STW 20 May 1989). 
Furthermore, the PAP-state occasionally admits (GOS 1986: 
B154) its bugging of private meetings and telephones, 
interception of mail, reviewing of personal records, use of 
a very large network of informers, shadowing of citizens 
and the harsh incognito interrogation of suspects by its 
secret police, the Internal Security Department. This 
much-feared force is merely. one of the internal security 
and intelligence organs of the PAP-state. Their 
organisation and operations are kept largely secret except 
on such occasions that a mass arrest is conducted to 
suppress political threats (GaS 1989a: 177). 
with the induction of all males into military service and 
the encouragement of paramilitary organisations in 
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secondary schools and the community, the estates are also 
highly militarised through the inclusion of the working 
class itself in the repressive state apparatus. 
Consequently, it is highly unlikely that many 
residential blocks are without a number of police-
orientated citizens nearby (for example, retired 
officers, reserve officers, voluntary constables, or 
prospective recruits) to aid citizens or the regular 
police in time of need (Austin 1989: 922). 
In 1968, approximately 15 per cent of Singapore's land area 
was taken for defence and security, much of this occupied 
by the British (Wong and Ooi 1989: 791). Today, the 
development of the barrack-style HDB estates and their 
militarisation means that they can also be regarded as 
military bases. Public housing estates are places where 
worker-soldiers live under discipline. One result of the 
PAP-state's alliance with foreign capital has been to make 
the perimeter of militarised areas congruent with the 
boundaries of the country. 
PUTTING PEOPLE IN THEIR PLACES 
The development of public housing was essentially a process 
of physically putting people in their places. The early 
period saw opposition leaders put in prison while the lower 
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classes were forced into public housing both to improve 
their standard of housing and to isolate them from 
political mobilisation. In the second period, these 
housing estates were rapidly expanded and transformed into 
labour camps for transnational corporations. The focus of 
social control became keeping workers in their flats 
through the CPF and blocking all alternative forms of 
sUbsistence. Neutralising the political struggles arising 
from intensified exploitation was the main task in the 
latest period. The restoration of PAP legitimacy required 
a new degree of regulation. 
This exposition of public housing as a social control 
mechanism is not meant to imply the conception and 
implementation of a master political strategy by the PAP-
state. Rather, as it struggled for political hegemony and 
then to build a successful alliance with foreign capital, 
the PAP-state used the welfare mechanisms at its disposal 
to advance these goals. It seized the opportunities as 
they presented themselves. As we have seen, policies had 
unforeseen consequences: the PAP misjudged the level of 
dissent in the early 1980s, it cut welfare expenditure at 
the time most likely to undermine its own support, and it 
did not comprehend the politics of Malay resettlement 
patterns early enough to avoid explicitly racist counter-
measures. That is, the PAP-state did not always comprehend 
the dynamics of its own systems of social control. 
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Nevertheless, public housing has undoubtedly been a 
powerful regulatory mechanism: 
••. social welfare provisions have, as the government 
itself admits, been used as political instruments to 
ensure social stability and greater political support 
for, and less effective opposition to, the governing 
party. Housing is a prime example .••• (Linda Lim 1989: 
191). 
More specifically, we have noted that the institution of 
public housing has facilitated the following: 
the consolidation of local capital behind the PAP; 
the forced disorganisation of the working class by 
physical isolation and creating dependence on wage 
labour for welfare access, thus guaranteeing the 
reproduction of obedient labour power; 
the differentiation of the working class into 
grades according to race, gender and national 
origin with varying access to welfare and wages, in 
order to raise the level of exploitation without 
raising the level of welfare; 
the suppression of immediate political struggles by 
tying housing to loyalty to the PAP-state; 
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the long-term control of the working class outside 
the factory by imposing state social organisation 
and linking it more closely to the apparatus of 
state violence. 
These will be controversial conclusions for Singaporean 
scholars who have disputed the findings of Buchanan (1972), 
Gamer (1972) and Hassan (1976, 1977), which relate to the 
problems experienced by HDB residents. Chan Heng Chee 
(1976) refers to a government survey in order to prove how 
happy residents are with the HDB and to refute Buchanan. 
Quah (1983, 1985), in two similar articles, uses an HDB-
university survey of 1968 and a 1973 survey by two 
Singapore academics to rebut Buchanan, Gamer and Hassan. 
While there may be room for improvement of research methods 
or refinement of conclusions, these criticisms appear as 
apologetics for the PAP-state. 
For example, Quah claims the benefits of resettlement 
include ethnic integration, equating forced dispersal of 
minorities among the overwhelmingly dominant Chinese 
population with a move towards national unity (Quah 1983: 
206). However, the beneficial effects of this process for 
the Malays or Indians (as opposed to the greater control 
accruing to the state) have been widely questioned (e.g. 
Willmott 1989: 589). Also, the persistence of Malay 
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resistance to PAP rule admitted by the regime itself would 
place this in question. 
Furthermore, some Singapore scholars have attempted to 
minimise the social effects of high-rise living (Quah 1985: 
250-2) or to enhance the political legitimacy of the 
housing policy and the PAP-state by pointing to the 
correspondence between the high levels of satisfaction 
expressed to HOB survey teams and the general election 
results (Stephen Yeh and Pang Eng Fong 1973). 
However, our conclusions do not require us to deny that the 
HOB has supplied a comparatively high physical standard of 
housing to the working class. Rather, our analysis enables 
us to place approval or disapproval ratings gathered in 
official surveys in their proper political context: the 
alliance between the PAP-state and foreign capital. That 
is, when Yeh and Pang quote 70 per cent approval for HOB 
housing and for the PAP-state, this figure can be seen to 
sustain the central argument of. this study: public housing 
has enhanced the PAP-state's powers of social control for 
the purposes of political hegemony and the development of 
capitalism in Singapore. By tying welfare to political 
loyalty, the PAP-state has been able to convert the forced 
submission of the working class into a high degree of 
formal consent. This has been a major ideological effect 
of public housing. When consent has not been forthcoming, 
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housing welfare has also been linked to the coercive 
apparatus of state violence. 
But new social contradictions have emerged in this process. 
New struggles have emerged resisting state racism, 
resisting the reinforcement of patriarchy by capitalism and 
opposing the intensifying exploitation of the lower 
classes. These struggles permeate other regulatory 
institutions, such as education, which also have powerful 
ideological effects. An understanding of social control in 
singapore comes not from examining one institution, but 
from seeing the links between institutions and how they 
function together as a whole. 
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CHAPTER 5 
EDUCATING FOR SUBMISSION 
Just as housing is the main social control mechanism for 
putting people in their places physically, the education 
system is the premier institution for putting them in their 
social places. Unlike public housing, education deals with 
all classes. It therefore has to regulate the 
contradictions of class, race, language, religion and 
gender across the whole of society. This means it has to 
repress, divert or co-opt many forms of struggle. We will 
see that it does this by reinforcing divisions of class and 
race as well as by strengthening patriarchal relations. 
Furthermore, we will see that the goals of the education 
system are determined by the alliance between the PAP-state 
and foreign capital. This chapter will investigate the 
development of educational practices by placing them in the 
context of the historical shifts in this relationship 
influenced by domestic resistance. 
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In studies of Singapore's education system, it has becom~ 
common to observe that changes in the PAP-state's education 
policy have been determined by the requirements of the 
economy. Linda Lim has said that the PAP-state followed 
the "human capital" theory that investment·in the 
improvement of the quality of labour is investment in 
future high growth rates (Linda Lim 1989: 172). Tham has 
noted that the post-1965 educational policies allowed "the 
full play of economic forces in determining educational 
outcomes" (Tham 1989: 480) and Gopinathan has stated that 
educational objectives have been tied to industrialisation 
(Gopinathan 1976: 74). 
True as far as they go, these observations fall short 
because they fail to identify the fundamental social 
relations which are being maintained by the practices of 
the education system. It is changes in these social 
relations (i.e. struggles) which necessitate changes in 
social control mechanisms. 
The PAP-state has facilitated the rise of a patriarchal, 
Chinese capitalist class (with token representation of 
other races), which has flourished by building an alliance 
with foreign capital and by jointly exploiting a mainly 
Chinese working class. The practices of the education 
system have played a crucial part in reproducing this race, 
class and gender structure. Struggles in Singapore and the 
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movement of international capital have caused changes in 
education policy. That is, as the development of political 
hegemony and capital accumulation has been conditioned by 
local social forces, so have educational practices changed. 
This is the proposition which this chapter aims to explore 
in some detail. 
THE FUNCTION OF EDUCATION 
In the introductory discussion of practices, institutions 
and ideology, it was noted that the predominant function of 
the state-controlled education system is not to impose a 
pre-packaged ideology. Its crucial institutional function 
is its role in the reproduction of labour power by 
coordinating the "people-sorting" mechanisms or practices 
which put people into the jobs which provide their welfare. 
Therefore, these practices are necessary to shape a social 
structure favourable to the development of capitalism in 
Singapore and the maintenance of PAP hegemony. Education 
sorts people into upper class, middle class and working 
class. That is, it sorts class agents, people, into class 
positions, jobs. within the working class, people are 
sorted into either the core (employed), or the reserve army 
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of labour (unemployed) (Hill 1979: 7-8; steven 1983: 178-
9) • 
In Singapore, the core of the working class is increasingly 
comprised of Singapore citizens who are skilled and 
predominantly male. The reserve army is in turn further 
differentiated into floating and latent labour. The 
floating reserve of labour results from the periodic 
adjustments to the number of workers needed by particular 
industries or companies which are related to short-term 
fluctuations in the rate of profit. Workers in the 
floating reserve can generally move from adjusting or 
failing industries to expanding firms. They therefore 
usually experience only short-term unemployment, unless 
there is a general economic decline. If they cannot find 
another job, they may enter the latent reserve. 
Latent workers are those who are unemployed and are always 
ready for work but who are able to survive in the meantime. 
singapore/s latent reserve reflects the existence of a dual 
labour market. One part of it is comprised mainly of women 
whose sUbsistence is usually guaranteed by means of another 
family member (e.g. a spouse, a parent) being engaged in 
wage labour. The other part of the latent reserve is the 
lower classes of surrounding countries who are unable to 
get employment at home but who can survive by sUbsistence 
agriculture or other non-capitalist forms of production 
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which are possible in Asian countries with a rural 
hinterland. There is no real reserve of stagnant workers 
in Singapore who, in other countries, are those unemployed 
workers lacking alternative means of sUbsistence. 
The education system therefore sorts people into opposing 
classes, fragmenting the working class in the process. We 
have observed the social consequences of this 
classification process within the HOB estates, especially 
during the Second Industrial Revolution. Women and foreign 
workers have become favoured for their cheap labour power 
because welfare costs for the reproduction of their labour 
are minimal and they are deprived of job security. 
In Singapore, race and gender are additional categories by 
which the education system also sorts class agents into 
class positions. For example, the Chinese patriarchy has 
to be reproduced while ensuring that no other possible 
capitalist class fraction emerges as an alternative to the 
PAP to build an alliance with foreign capital. The. labour 
power of the Chinese working class has to be reproduced, 
while the geopolitically sensitive Malay underclass has to 
be excluded not only from the capitalist class but from the 
core of the working class as well. 
Educational practices therefore have the task of sorting 
people according to their class, race and gender into their 
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positions on either side of the social relation of 
exploiter or exploited. It is not, as Clammer (1985: 165) 
suggests, ideology which sorts or classifies people, but 
rather it is concrete practices organised within 
institutions such as the education system which do it. 
Furthermore, because the education system is the main 
people-sorting institution in the reproduction of labour 
power, other mechanisms of social control with the same 
primary function interact with it. These include the 
population planning mechanisms for sorting out those who 
should be born and those who should not, and for sorting 
out from among those born outside Singapore, those who will 
be permitted to be exploited by singapore-based employers 
and those who will be kept in the reserve army of latent 
workers outside its borders. In short, these mechanisms 
include the practices of state family planning and the 
employment of migrant labour. By these means, people are 
also put in their social places or excluded from having any 
place at all. 
Ideological Effect 
People are happy to be involved in the education system 
because they recognise it is the only pathway to jobs and 
economic survival, the only means to obtain welfare. This 
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ideological effect of educational practices is achieved by 
the necessity of having to acquire an education to get 
jobs, the appearance of equality of opportunity and social 
advancement on the basis of merit. The PAP-state's 
absolute control of the national education system enables 
it to define the ostensibly neutral criteria of merit. 
Therefore, not surprisingly, the most meritorious people in 
Singapore are English-speaking (and, secondarily but 
increasingly important, Mandarin-speaking as well), Chinese 
and male whose parents are already in the upper class. The 
least meritorious are monolingual Malay women and migrant 
workers. 
It is structurally impossible for all Singaporeans to 
attain a high level of scholastic success because the 
education system is designed to achieve different ends. 
The political goals of class stratification stand in 
contradiction to the educational aspirations of the 
majority of the population. 
ThUS, the education system produces the ideological effect 
of enabling people to think that they are advancing their 
own interests, while in fact they are doing what is 
necessary to uphold the hegemony of the capitalist class 
and assist the development of capitalism. The way this 
ideological effect has been produced is examined in detail 
in this chapter along with an examination of the ideology 
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of equal opportunity and merit. A fuller comprehension of 
the ideological effects of educational practices will be 
obtained by studying the ways in which the education system 
changed in relation to the effect of struggles in Singapore 
and to shifts in the PAP-state's alliance with foreign 
capital. 
THE FORMS OF STRUGGLE 
A notable characteristic of the Singapore education system' 
is the frequency with which it has undergone sUbstantial 
change. It was undoubtedly a difficult task for the PAP-
state to bring a racially and linguistically complex 
society under centralised state control in order to 
guarantee the provision of a cheap, disciplined labour 
force and be able to respond to the changing needs of the 
alliance. 
The rigorous control required to achieve such a result 
should not be under-estimated. Singapore's population of 
2.65 million (June 1988) consists of 2.01 million Chinese 
(76 per cent), 401,200 Malays (15.1 per cent), 171,800 
Indians (6.5 per cent) and 62,800 others (2.4 per cent) 
(GOS 1989a: 25). Traditionally, the Chinese population has 
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been socially differentiated according to language groups: 
mainly Hokkien, Teochew, Cantonese, Hakka, Hainanese, 
Foochow, Malay (Straits Chinese) and English. Although 
there are regional variations among the Malay community, 
the mother- tongue of Malays can be taken as Malay. The 
Indian population includes a large Tamil-speaking community 
and also smaller communities speaking Malayalam, Punjabi, 
Telegu, Hindi, Bengali or English as their mother-tongue. 
It seems the task of social control in such a complex 
society took precedence over a higher increase in 
educational attainment, because Singapore has been unable 
to achieve the increase in educational levels reached by 
Hongkong and South Korea. 
TABLE 5.1: COMPARATIVE EDUCATIONAL LEVELS 
Literacy 
Secondary school 
enrolment 
Tertiary 
1978 
1965 
1983 
(20-24 year-olds in 
tertiary education) 1965 
1983 
Singapore 
75% 
45% 
69% 
10% 
12% 
Source: Linda Lim 1989: 179. 
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Hongkong S Korea 
90% 93% 
29% 35% 
68% 89% 
5% 6% 
12% 24% 
Education has been required to regulate so many forms of 
struggle in Singapore that it has achieved a less than 
impressive increase in educational levels. The British 
colonial state faced a wide array of anti-imperialist 
forces: a mass-based left party, unions, community 
organisations, ethnic-linguistic associations, Chinese 
schools, left intellectuals from both Chinese and English-
educated backgrounds and bourgeois nationalists. After the 
pro-imperialist faction of the PAP won the contest for 
state power and suppressed its former allies, the forces 
that these other forms of struggle represented have not 
necessarily gone away and new forces have emerged. Thus, 
as we examine the historical development of the education 
system, we will note new forms of struggle. 
For example, the growth of an English-educated middle class 
has produced a generation who expect parliamentarism to 
guarantee liberal democracy. Hence the emergence of a new 
phase of liberal democratic dissent through opposition 
parties, professional and Christian organisations. Middle 
class women have also become more organised and vocal, 
particularly dissenting from government-imposed breeding 
programmes. 
These struggles have been accompanied by the emigration of 
skilled workers and professionals. "People just get tired 
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of living in the sixth form the whole of their lives," said 
one emigrant (Elegant 1989: 18). This new form of struggle 
is to get out of the whole system: people feel they have no 
real choice any more, that there is no place in Singapore 
that they want to be put and so they leave if their skills 
are marketable in an advanced country. This is a social 
breakdown of serious proportions, because of the 
significant numbers involved (The Economist 10 March 1990: 
37), thereby undermining the PAP's growth strategy of 
skills upgrading. It also signifies a crisis in the 
ideological influence of the government if prospective 
members of the bourgeoisie no longer believe they can 
realistically expect to join it or have lost interest in 
doing so. 
The Malay minority's struggle against exploitation by the 
PAP-state-foreign capital alliance has taken the form of 
refusal to support the PAP electorally, with-holding 
community support for Malay leaders chosen by the PAP and 
attempting to retain the integrity of their ethnic 
community by means of geographical concentration in public 
housing estates. 
Chinese working class struggle has generally been unable to 
take the form of labour activism since the union movement 
was made part of the PAP-state. The main indication of 
working class dissent is the growing opposition vote which 
290 
reached 37 per cent in the 1984 general elections. Despite 
a comprehensive gerrymander of the electoral system and PAP 
threats against opposition voters, this dissenting vote 
rose to 38 per cent in 1988 (GOS 1989a: 232). 
But the main form of working class struggle has been the 
attempt to rise out of the working class. This form has 
become dominant because the ideological effect of the 
education system has made it appear as a real possibility 
for everyone. The crucial significance of the education 
system for social control is that it places people in their 
class positions while giving them some hope of bettering 
this position. Like a lottery, enough people "win" their 
way to the middle class to convince the majority that their 
efforts at upward mobility are not in vain. The real 
social relations between a tiny capitalist class and a mass 
of exploited workers not only remain unchanged, but are 
reinforced by the aspiration to get out of one's class. 
This form of struggle is therefore politically encouraged 
by the PAP. 
In order to understand the relationship between struggles 
and the education system, it is necessary to study them 
both in the context of the historical phases of the PAP-
state alliance with imperialism. As with our analysis of 
public housing, these periods will be used as a general 
indication of the changes in social relations in Singapore. 
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First is the phase of transition to a neo-colony, when the 
PAP-state established its political hegemony (1959-1965). 
This is followed by the implementation of the EOI policy 
(1966-1977) and the consolidation of the alliance with US 
imperialism. The third phase is the Second Industrial 
Revolution (1978-1985), which in turn overlaps with the 
current period of adapting to the new phase of multipolar 
imperialism. But, initially, it is necessary to outline 
the legacy of the colonial period inherited by the PAP-
state. 
THE COLONIAL LEGACY: THE EMERGING NEED FOR AN ALLIANCE 
Before 1939, the British colonial government had no 
political need to establish a structure of universal 
education to secure social control. The Chinese capitalist 
class was largely dependent on the British-controlled 
commodity trade. Unskilled, migrant workers were adequate 
for commerce and services. Most of the Chinese were not 
British subjects and could be disposed of through 
deportation when not required. In short, the absence of an 
independent national bourgeoisie or ruling class in 
Singapore and the plentiful supply of migrant labour meant 
the British did not need to rule in alliance with local 
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political forces. The colonial government simply imposed 
its will. 
The system of elite schools established by Christian 
missionaries provided an English education "largely to 
supply clerks for Western commercial houses and the 
government" (Busch 1974: 28). The Chinese education system 
set up by language groups or clan associations along 
traditional lines emphasised cultural identity and Chinese 
nationalism. After the Chinese Revolution of 1911 these 
schools became increasingly nationalistic and anti-
colonial. The emphasis on Mandarin as the unifying 
language of Chinese nationalism dates from this period 
(Shotam 1989: 507). In the 1930s the schools were 
ideologically influenced by the rise of the Communist Party 
in China. The schools in Singapore were self-governing, 
self-funding and provided their own textbooks and teachers 
(Busch 1974: 29). The British colonial government had very 
little control over them and had no apparent desire for it 
unti~, on its return in 1945, it faced a highly organised 
independence movement. The rUdimentary educational 
infrastructure which had developed during the first decades 
of the century then became the site of serious conflict 
during the post-war anti-colonial struggle. 
293 
Education and Communalism 
The pre-War communalist strategy of building links with the 
Malay aristocracy in Malaya and largely ignoring the 
welfare of Chinese migrant labour in Singapore had to 
change when confronted with the popular surge towa~ds self-
government. British educational policy in Singapore after 
the war must be seen in the context of its broader strategy 
to defeat the left throughout Malaya and Singapore by 
manipulating communal factors of race,language and 
religion to prevent the further development of unity among 
the lower classes. 
The British in Malaya had to solve the problem of how 
to hand over political power and simultaneously keep 
its economic interests intact. But as we have seen, 
the only credible and consistent force leading the 
nationalist movement was that rooted in a militant 
left-wing working class .... Consequently, it was 
essential for British imperialism to find an 
alternative to these class forces. The Constitutional 
talks after the war represented the limit of the 
colonial state's communalist strategy; namely, the 
'institutionalisation' of communalism in the country 
(Hua 1983: 76). 
The separation of Singapore from its Malayan hinterland and 
emphasising its special character as a predominantly 
Chinese city-state was an important part of the British 
strategy to keep Singapore as a separate strategic colony. 
Tham has euphemistically described the post-war colonial 
education policy as aimed at obviating "the threat of 
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social and political divisiveness" (Tham 1989: 495). On 
the contrary, the British administration aimed to maximise 
communal divisions so that the strong left movement in 
Singapore would have minimum impact on the peninsula and 
the singapore Chinese working class could be isolated and 
suppressed. within Singapore itself, this strategy meant 
maximising the divisions within the Chinese community and 
between Chinese and other races. 
Tham is correct, however, in that the British worked to 
consolidate pro-British forces and to minimise the 
contradictions between them, so that the suppression could 
be effected over the long term after the end of direct 
imperialist rule. 
Thus, in education, the colonial state had two aims. 
First, it wished to take control of the Chinese education 
system, in order to remove a major institutional base for 
Chinese ideological formation and anti-colonial 
mobilisation. Related to this objective were the plans 
emerging during the 1950s for an Import-substitution 
Industrialisation (lSI) policy. The post-independence 
Chinese working class would gain citizenship and the 
franchise and thus change from a migrant labour force to a 
stable, permanent majority of the population. A state 
system of education would be required to regulate this 
class for wage labour. 
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Secondly, the colonial government aimed to improve the 
system of English education to consolidate a local 
capitalist class sympathetic to British commercial 
interests (Wilson 1978: 240). As the colonial 
administration began to accept the inevitability of passing 
state power into local hands, it began to test out local 
political forces and to attempt to shape them. 
This communalist strategy meant deepening the already wide 
gulf between the English-educated upper-class and the 
Chinese-educated upper-class, and eventually destroying the 
social base of the latter. It was obvious after the war 
that the English-educated upper-class had a monopoly on 
good jobs and that an EngliSh education gave access to and 
the support of the British administration (Shotam 1989: 
507). Government favouritism towards English-medium 
schools and their graduates added to the grievances of the 
majority Chinese-educated community. Discrimination 
against Chinese education and culture became a major 
political issue for both the Chinese-educated upper-class 
and the Chinese lower- class (Wilson 1978: 114-178). 
The government advanced its aims by such administrative 
devices as the application of the Registration of Schools 
Ordinance, which empowered the Department of Education to 
close any school used for "unlawful purposes" (Wilson 1978: 
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159). In addition, Chinese schools became eligible for 
government grants if they also accepted government control. 
However, aided Chinese schools on average were given 30 per 
cent of the amount per pupil received by English schools· 
(Wilson 1978: 210). These tactics were bitterly resented 
by the Chinese community. 
In 1954, however, when this conflict was at its height, the 
number of enrolments in English-medium schools overtook 
those in Chinese-medium schools (Shotam 1989: 510). This 
reflects the new education strategy to consolidate an 
English-educated industrial working class in Singapore and 
to widen the social distinction from Malaya. 
The vernacular-educated (Chinese, Malay and Tamil) were 
being systematically directed to technical and vocational 
training and were unable to break into higher status and 
higher paid jobs. But this method of sorting people into 
two opposing classes by means of language medium was now 
being progressively replaced. The fact that English-medium 
schools had a majority of enrolments meant that, not only 
was an English-educated upper-class being formed, but also 
that the English-medium state education system would 
increasingly put all classes of singaporeans in their 
respective class positions. The criteria would remain the 
same: linguistic facility in English would still determine 
class position. The difference would be that the process 
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would be completely in the state's control through a 
centralised, English-medium education system. 
But the Chinese education system still had considerable 
political power to mobilise the lower classes. Therefore 
this policy could not be made explicit in the face of a 
highly organised left movement espousing a Malayan 
nationalism. 
The Pretence of Accommodation 
In 1955, the partially-elected Legislative Assembly 
appointed the All Party Committee to review education 
policy and recommend an appropriate policy for an 
independent Singapore. The origins of the PAP-state's 
education policy lie in the report of this committee. Lee 
Kuan Yew was a member of it. In 1956 the Committee 
recommended: 
- the equal treatment of the four main language 
streams (English, Chinese, Malay, Tamil); 
- the introduction of bilingual education (for most, 
mother-tongue and Malay) in primary school and 
trilingual (plus English) in secondary school; 
- the use of Singapore/Malaya oriented textbooks 
and syllabuses; 
- the designation of Malay as the national 
language; 
priority be given to science and mathematics as the 
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basis for an industrial society (Tham 1989: 478). 
The government agreed to much of the report which, in 
effect, was recommending two common languages, Malay and 
English. But, in line with its policy of keeping the 
politics of Singapore separate from that of Malaya and 
maximising the chances of the English-educated, the 
colonial government in practice declined to give higher 
status to Malay, to implement the suggested bilingual and 
trilingual ,policy in full or to open up better jobs for the 
vernacular-educated. While pretending otherwise, it stuck 
firmly to English as the priority language. That is, it 
yielded to the appeal for equal treatment for all language 
streams only in order to lower the political temperature 
and enable it to acquire more complete control of the 
Chinese education system. This was achieved by a new 
funding policy: Chinese schools had to accept full 
government funding (and thus complete control) or none at 
all (Wilson 1978: 220). This policy was successful in 
bringing almost the entire Chinese education system under 
the Education Department within a few years. Malay and 
Tamil-medium education remained virtually ignored. There 
were no Malay or Tamil-medium secondary or tertiary 
institutions. 
Thus, the colonial administration used the ideological 
cover of a multi-lingual education policy to move towards 
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its goal of a centralised, state-controlled education 
system which would be most likely to produce a cooperative 
English-educated capitalist class (mainly Chinese but 
including a few Indians and fewer Malays). 
The Appearance of Choice 
This centralisation process would help the state to put the 
Chinese working class in its place. By emasculating 
vernacular education systems (Gwee 1975: 89-91) and 
excluding their graduates from social advancement, the vast 
majority of the population could be transformed into wage 
labourers, an industrial working class. 
But it did not appear this way. Parents were told they had 
the right to choose an English, Chinese, Malay or Tamil 
education (Wilson 1978: 218). If their choice was not 
possible, it was because they were not rich enough to 
afford the fees, or their children were academically or 
linguistically deficient, or their community had not been 
sufficiently far-sighted in providing the schools, or the 
Education Department had not yet caught up with the demand. 
As it became clearer that the job market increasingly 
favoured the English-educated, resistance to education 
policies became increasingly vociferous. But the 
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government refused to take steps to provide better 
opportunities for the Chinese-educated, saying that 
employers had the right to choose whom they wanted to 
employ, and their preference happened to be those who were 
English-educated. The government ignored the fact that it 
was the largest employer on the island and therefore was 
able to establish the main linguistic criteria for 
employment. On the contrary, it encouraged schools "to 
abandon curricula and syllabuses which are politically and 
pedagogically outmoded ll (Wilson 1978: 220). As the 
increasing enrolment in English-medium schools showed, more 
and more people were moving towards the state education 
system in a pragmatic assessment of the better chances they 
perceived it offered for their children. Thus the ground 
was already moving from under the Chinese educational lobby 
as it fought to survive. 
wilson states that educational policies of this period were 
"a determined and partially successful attempt to remove 
the cause of considerable social injustice" (Wilson 1978: 
231). The official education policy may have given this 
impression, but the actual effect of the practices of the 
restructured educational system was in the direction of 
greater social control and the undermining of existing 
social organisation based on ethnic affiliation and working 
class solidarity. It was obvious that social advancement 
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was open only to the pro-British, English-educated who 
previously formed a tiny minority. 
contradictions of the Contest for Power 
Although the PAP was led by an English-educated faction, 
there was a contradiction between the PAP policy of the 
time and that of the government. The PAP, which then also 
included the legal left, was pushing for singapore's 
independence as part of Malaya and therefore emphasised 
Malay as a future common language. This was a logical 
policy for a party committed to a programme of import 
sUbstitution industrialisation in a region where Malay was 
the lingua franca and in which the predominantly Chinese 
PAP had aspirations to be a major political force in a 
federal Malaysian polity. 
The British, however, were still planning to keep Singapore 
as a separat~ strategic colony; hence the policy of making 
English the primary language. As we have noted, the 
colonial government largely ignored the All Party Committee 
proposals on bilingual and trilingual education which 
amounted to recommending two common languages, Malay and 
English. 
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However, on coming to power the PAP pursued this policy 
with its emphasis on Malay in order to establish its 
Malayan nationalist credentials. After its expulsion from 
Malaysia, there was no political gain to be had from the 
policy. Its primary interest in its alliance with 
international capital was an English-educated work force. 
It thus reverted to the British colonial communalist 
strategy: official recognition of all four languages as 
mediums of instruction but practical provision for only 
English as people "chose" this "option". 
Lee Kuan Yew himself indicated he understood the logic of 
the British position if Singapore was kept a separate state 
from Malaya, when he said in the Assembly in 1956: 
If we had to solve the language problem in Singapore 
alone, I think the solution [would] be somewhat 
different from that which would be arrived at if [we] 
solved it on a Pan-Malayan basis. And I still wish to 
talk on a Pan-Malayan basis because the other 
alternative is uncomfortable (Legislative Assembly 
Debate 1955/56 col. 1900-1909, 12 April 1956). 
That is, the communalist education policy of the British 
colonial state was determined by its interest in 
maintaining it as a strategic colony_ It failed to achieve 
this. The PAP's policies were determined by the political 
alliances it hoped to make: first with the Malayan ruling 
class and subsequently solely with British capital. It 
failed with the first and succeeded with the second. 
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Colonial educational practices, with their manipulation of 
language and race for political control, therefore formed 
the legacy which the PAP-state refined to suit the 
contingencies of its political ambitions and its alliance 
with foreign capital. The ascendancy of particular 
practices and their ideological effects varied according to 
the phases of this alliance and the strength of resistance 
against them. 
DESTROYiNG CHiNESE EDUCATiON: THE PAP'S COMMUNALiST TACTiCS 
1959-65 
While the colonial state had to control Chinese education, 
the PAP-state had to destroy it. Initially, the PAP 
government had the advantage of not being seen as an alien 
regime in the way the British were. But the 1961 split and 
the formation of the Barisan Sosialis left the PAP 
bourgeois nationalists exposed culturally as well as 
politically. The English-educated Lee faction faced the 
problem of not appearing authentically Chinese in 
comparison to the Barisan leadership which had emerged from 
the Chinese community's own institutions. Also, with 
internal security still in the hands of the British, the 
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PAP risked appearing as their puppets when it cracked down 
on the left. 
The Lee faction therefore pursued a two-pronged strategy to 
consolidate its political hegemony and ensure the survival 
of its class. First, it used the criminal law and police-
state tactics in a concerted attempt to destroy the 
movement comprising an alliance between elements of the 
Chinese upper-class, the Chinese working class and the 
intellectual left. Secondly, to deny this movement one of 
its major institutional bases and to prevent continuing 
doubts about the PAP's cultural legitimacy, the Lee group 
set about destroying not only the autonomy but also the 
cultural integrity of Chinese education. This was done by 
replacing the traditional elements of Chinese education 
with the standardised state-approved syllabus. The PAP-
state was still able to claim that the option of a Chinese-
medium education remained; a claim which obscured the rapid 
destruction of Chinese education. 
We will examine in some detail the steps taken to achieve 
these goals during this period. However, it should be 
noted that this policy proceeded as part of broader 
educational initiative to ensure that the state education 
system became a primary sorting mechanism across the whole 
society. That is, primary education had to be made 
universal. The increased access to education began as part 
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of the socialist welfare programme of the PAP and 
proceeded, after 1961, as a means to wean the lower classes 
away from the Barisan. 
Thus, the PAP-state largely continued the educational 
policies of the colonial administration. This is hardly 
surprising, since, with the departure of its mass base, the 
Lee faction relied more on its alliance with British 
imperialism. The PAP's political survival rested on the 
success of the broader British communal strategy with 
regard to the formation of Malaysia. PAP-state educational 
policies were therefore framed within the parameters of 
this communalist policy. 
The 'merger' solution in 19.63 was a realisation of 
imperialist strategy which completely ignored the 
democratic demands of the masses in the respective 
nations. Once again communalism was employed by 
British imperialism in the application of this neo-
colonial solution to incorporate Singapore and the 
North Bornean states. 
The inclusion of singapore by itself would, in 
numerical terms, have tilted the communal equation in 
favour of the Chinese, but this was unacceptable to 
the Malay rulers. Now, with the new possibilities for 
gerrymandering by the inclusion of Sarawak and Sabah, 
the time was ripe for merging Singapore with the 
Federation. It was the ideal solution to enable 
British imperialism to maintain its hold on the rich 
resources of the North Bornean states (oil, timber, 
pepper, tobacco, gas) and at the same time deal with 
the left-wing threat in Singapore (Hua 1983:135). 
Thus the Lee faction's attack on Chinese education mediated 
the racism of imperialism in an even sharper form than the 
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colonial administration. The transition to neo-colonial 
status exacerbated communalism. 
Discrimination through Integration 
To destroy the Chinese education system, the PAP-state 
continued the British policy of funding only schools which 
accepted its complete control and of arresting the main 
anti-government leaders. But it had to go much further. 
In 1959, the programme began of integrating two or more 
language streams within a single school, ostensibly to aid 
the inter-mingling of races (Gopinathan 1976: 72). But the 
main achievement of integrated schools waS to open all 
language streams to standardisation and centralisation. In 
response to the First state Development Plan 1960-64, there 
was an immediate emphasis on mathematics, science and 
technical subjects, and bursaries were made available to 
those willing to take subjects, in the words of the 
Education Minister, "considered desirable by the 
Government" (Wilson 1978: 234). The need for vocational 
and technical streams was officially recognised, and it was 
recommended that only twenty per cent of primary school 
graduates be channelled into the academic stream 
(Gopinathan 1976: 74; Seah & Seah 1983: 242). The academic 
stream consisted overwhelmingly of the English-educated. 
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Control through standardisation 
In 1960, the PAP-state introduced the Primary School 
Leaving Examination (PSLE). It was a standard examination 
for all four language streams and therefore assisted in the 
enforcement of a standard syllabus. It was also an 
educational hurdle controlled by the government which all 
students, regardless of language medium, had to cross in 
order to continue their studies. 
In 1961, Chinese schools were instructed to follow the 
English-medium school pattern of primary, secondary and 
tertiary education. Examination boycotts by Chinese-medium 
students followed, but failed (Arumugam 1975: 63). By 1963 
there was a standard system of education to which all 
language streams had to conform: six years primary, four 
years secondary and two years pre-university. 
In addition, the government undertook a crash 
programme to build public, Chinese-language schools so 
that no longer would parents desiring this type of 
education have to send their children to radical 
schools. Rules of accreditation were also arranged so 
that schools defying government control could not 
provide the same benefits to students of more 
compliant Chinese-medium institutions. More (though 
still not enough) job opportunities were provided to 
Chinese-medium graduates so that potential opposition 
leaders were increasingly drained away from communist-
affiliated organisations. Finally, the structures 
surrounding the school system were also attended to. 
School committees that had provided funds for Chinese 
education and had managed the schools had also 
afforded a means whereby local elites could have their 
status recognised and where they could exercise 
leadership. Similar committees were organised by the 
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government to perform these functions - but under 
government control ...• The point emerging from all 
these developments is that the government breached the 
structural integrity of the Chinese community, 
undercut its radical leadership, and established a 
far-reaching organisational basis for its support 
(Busch 1974: 128-9). 
The cruellest blow to Chinese education was the frontal 
attack on its premier institution, Nanyang University. 
Established in 1956 as a Mandarin-medium university for 
southeast Asian Chinese, Nanyang became a vibrant centre of 
classical Chinese learning and left politics. Funded by 
wealthy Chinese entrepreneurs, the Hokkien clan association 
and even by taxi and trishaw drivers who contributed a 
day's earnings to its foundation, it was the symbol of 
Chinese educational achievement (Turnbull 1977: 247; Chew 
1982: 65). 
students and faculty were arrested, expelled or deported 
for their political activities. The imposed curriculum re-
organisation of Nanyang in 1964 led to widespread protest 
which was summarily suppressed. The citizenship of its 
prime benefactor and millionaire founder, Tan Lark sye, was 
revoked because, said the government, "out of extreme 
racialist sentiment he knowingly allowed himself to be used 
by his associates to advocate the communist cause in 
Malaya". In fact, Tan helped to finance some Barisan 
sosialis candidates in the 1963 elections (George 1984: 
131, 138). Ngee Ann College, another Chinese tertiary 
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institution founded by the Teochew association in 1963, was 
quickly brought into line with similar imposed changes in 
1966 (Arumugam 1975: 63). 
Multi-Racialism and Equal opportunity 
Apart from its emphasis on Malay, the PAP-state pursued the 
destruction of Chinese education and the extension and 
centralisation of educational practices under an official 
education policy very similar to the previous government's. 
It had four aims: 
equal treatment of the four streams, namely, Malay, 
Chinese, Tamil and Englishi 
establishment of four official languages with Malay 
as the national language of the new nation in an 
attempt to unify the multi-racial community; 
emphasis on the study of mathematics, science and 
technical subjects designed to equip youth with 
requisite skills, aptitudes and attitudes for 
employment in the industrial sector; and 
building of loyalty to the nation (Seah & Seah 
1983: 241). 
Under these policy priorities the PAP-state claimed to be 
building a just, multi-racial society. But, as one 
observer puts it, "it was form rather than substance that 
dominated the educational scene during this period" (Tham 
1989: 478). The policy of equal treatment for all language 
streams appeared fair and thus came to be accepted by the 
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public. But it was in fact an ideological cover for an all-
out attack on Chinese education and for the reproduction of 
a Chinese-, Malay- and Tamil-speaking industrial working 
class and an English-speaking capitalist class. 
Since there was already an efficient Chinese education 
system, equal treatment for all streams could well have 
meant increased state funding to set up autonomous 
education systems for Malay and Tamil streams. But the 
political interest of the PAP-state was to undermine the 
autonomy of Chinese education and, as a side product, to 
win Malay support by portraying itself as genuinely 
multiracial. Chinese educationists therefore were 
lambasted as communalist chauvinists and as antagonistic to 
the interests of a multi-racial society (George 1984: 138). 
There was equal treatment of all language streams in that 
all were brought under a standardised, centralised PAP-
state education system. This was the actual effect of 
educational practices designed to exploit the 
contradictions of communalism for political purposes. 
In addition, the apparently non-communal policy commitment 
to Malay as the national language and to bilingual and 
trilingual education disguised the fact that English would 
continue to be the language of business in Singapore (Tham 
1989: 478). To those being sorted by these practices, it 
seemed fair to be learning two or three languages and that 
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all language streams received standard treatment. This 
provided the ideological legitimation the PAP-state needed. 
What was not yet obvious to the ordinary citizen was that a 
deeply discriminatory, meritocratic education system was 
being set up to serve the interests of thePAP-state's 
alliance with British capital. 
Political objectives of Extending Welfare 
During this period, the PAP-state built up the state school 
system to provide universal primary education, improving 
facilities, classroom resources and teacher training 
(Wilson 1978: 235). As a demonstration of its sincerity in 
aspiring to be part of a Malayan nation, the PAP-state 
introduced Malay as a second language throughout the 
English and Chinese streams. In 1960 it announced a scheme 
to provide free education for Malays up to university level 
(Gopinathan 1976: 72). It also began to provide secondary 
education for the Malay and Tamil streams. In 1960, 
education took 23.5 per cent of total government 
expenditure, the largest item. By 1963-64 education 
expenditure reached its peak of 32 per cent of government 
expenditure, a level it has never again attained (Linda Lim 
1989: 178). The PAP-state had to deliver on its election 
promises to provide higher levels of welfare, especially in 
housing and education, to attract popular support to itself 
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and away from the Barisan Sosialis. Real improvements had 
to be made if the PAP ambition to be a major force in the 
politics and industrialisation programme of a federal 
Malaysia was to be realised. 
Failure of Communalist Tactics 
In federal Malaysian politics, the PAP was using the same 
strategy of heightening communalism for political ends 
under the guise of preaching the merits of multi-racialism. 
But, instead of threatening Chinese educationalists for 
their alleged chauvinism as in Singapore, in Malaya the PAP 
played to Chinese chauvinism in its attempt to supplant the 
Malayan Chinese Association (MCA). The MeA was the Chinese 
bourgeois party which had built an alliance with the Malay 
capitalist class to form a governing federal coalition 
which itself ruled in cooperation with British capital. In 
the federal parliament, the PAP was in opposition but aimed 
to replace the MCA in the governing coalition. It 
therefore sought to attract Malayan Chinese to its support 
by increasingly communalist appeals. 
It was quite evident that the PAP's challenge of 
'Malay Special Rights' was basically an appeal to the 
communalist sentiments of the non-Malays in its 
attempt to extend its interests in the 
mainland ...• [T]hroughout 1963-65, Lee and the PAP 
created a highly-charged atmosphere of communalism 
within Malaysia (Hua 1983: 142-3). 
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Lee was hardly advancing the cause of multiracialism when 
he threatened the Malay leadership in Kuala Lumpur: 
"supposing we real, virile Chinese unite, there would be 
trouble in five or ten years, because there are five 
million chinese, forty-two per cent of the population" 
(George 1984: 78). 
But the PAP miscalculated by raising the political 
temperature in Malaya to the point that the Malay ruling 
party, the united Malay National Organisation (UMNO) , 
expelled Singapore from the Federation. The Lee faction's 
racist policy failed on the federal level. 
Thus, the PAP's extension of social control through a 
system of universal education had aimed to produce both 
political supremacy and labour power for import-
substitution industrialisation in a federal Malayan polity. 
But the contradictions of the PAP's communalist policies 
led to its failure to build an alliance with the Malayan 
capitalist class. 
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FROM RACISM TO MERITOCRACY 1966-77 
singapore's expulsion from Malaysia did not mean the end of 
racist or communalist education policies. Rather it led to 
their incorporation into a more sophisticated meritocratic 
sorting process. 
The PAP-state's forced independence marked the conclusive 
failure of its attempt to consolidate an alliance with 
British capital through an alliance with the Malay 
capitalist class. The Lee group therefore sought to build 
an alliance directly with foreign capital. The form of the 
alliance was the export-oriented industrialisation policy. 
The terms of the alliance included the provision of a 
cheap, disciplined labour force by the PAP-state in return 
for foreign technology and credit. Education played a 
major role in restructuring political relationships in the 
island-state in accordance with the requirements of this 
alliance. 
English: The Language of Merit 
Immediately, this direct alliance between the English-
educated, mainly Chinese, PAP fraction of the capitalist 
class and foreign capital (increasingly from the united 
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states rather than Britain) began to reinforce the 
importance of English literacy, of being Chinese and of 
loyalty to the PAP, all attributes that had begun to 
acquire a certain relativity in a Malaysian polity. 
without the large Malay and Indian populations of the 
Federation, the PAP had a simplified task in sorting its 
majority Chinese population. 
In education, the PAP-state jettisoned one of the major 
political objectives it was previously required to meet as 
a Malaysian state. That is, the emphasis on Malay as the 
national lingua franca and the upgrading of Malay-medium 
education could be dropped in practice, although regional 
geopolitical sensitivities required continuing lip service 
to it. 
The shaping of the education system for centralised control 
and people-sorting according to the needs of international 
capital and PAP-state hegemony could thus proceed with 
simplified criteria of merit. English, the language of 
foreign capital, would be the indisputable and sole 
language of merit. Facility in English (or the lack of it) 
would be the ostensibly neutral criterion for placing 
Singaporeans in their social places. But since English was 
the language of the Chinese and Indian bourgeoisie, an 
educational system which favoured English would continue to 
reinforce the connections between class, language and race. 
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English would cement the upper class across ethnic divides 
while excluding the working class of all races. In this 
way, the "neutral" criterion would ensure the reproduction 
of the capitalist class and the consolidation of an 
industrial proletariat. 
This re-assertion of meritocratic educational practices 
also involved the intensification of control over the newly 
centralised, standardised education system and the mopping 
up of the remnants of the Chinese education system. By 
1965, much of the groundwork had been done. The period of 
merger with Malaysia had achieved one of the PAP's 
objectives: the final rout of the left and the destruction 
of its political organisation. It remained for the PAP-
state to institutionalise its political gains by refining 
the mechanisms of meritocracy and systematising their 
ideological effects. 
Bilingual policy: strategy for English Dominance 
with the complications of Malaysian political life behind 
it, the PAP-state was able essentially to revert to the 
1956 colonial educational prescriptions: the reproduction 
of an English-educated capitalist class and the formation 
of a technically skilled working class with sufficient 
facility in English to perform the labour required of them. 
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The promotion of bilingualism and technical education put 
the mechanisms of social control in place to bring this 
policy to fruition. 
The post-Malaysian period formed the watershed in the 
history of education as the emphasis on both bilingual 
and technical education was stressed with political 
independence and the resulting need to restructure the 
economy so that Singapore could become economically 
viable as an island state (Seah and Seah 1983: 242). 
The bilingual policy meant that one of the languages learnt 
by every student would be English, which would then be the 
common language. The speed with which English gained 
ascendancy as the de facto lingua franca was justified by 
the PAP-state on the grounds that it was an international 
language and the language of modernity (i.e. science and 
technology). Apparently no longer the hated language of 
colonialism, it was, according to the English-educated PAP 
leadership, a neutral language for use by all racial 
groups. In this way, the PAP strove to characterise its 
policy as inter-communal and internationalist rather than 
as favouring the international language of imperialism. 
However, the PAP did also explicitly justify English on the 
basis that it was the language of investing industrialists, 
and that its continued use would mean continuity in 
records, administration and law in Singapore (Gopinathan 
1976: 76; Wilson 1978: 236). 
Singapore thus appears unique, in Southeast Asia, in 
encouraging the use of the language of its former 
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colonial rulers, and it is tempting to suppose that, 
although nowhere clearly stated as a matter of policy, 
this has been the aim of the Government. By 1970, 
enrolment in English-medium schools was considerably 
in excess of that in all other schools combined 
(wilson 1978: 237). 
Mathematics, science and technical subjects were emphasised 
by the PAP-state as the basis of education for nation-
building and industrialisation. In 1966, mathematics and 
science were required to be taught in English in the first-
year classes of non-English-medium primary schools (Seah 
and Seah 1983: 242). By 1969, all pupils were streamed 
into academic, technical or vocational schools after their 
primary education, essentially on the basis of their 
aptitude in English. 
Therefore, the emphasis on English and science effectively 
downgraded both a vernacular-medium education and a Western 
liberal arts education. Not only might these latter social 
formations render students susceptible to political 
mobilisation against the PAP-state, but they also excluded 
the core "language" of imperialism: science and technology. 
English was the way to this deeper "language". 
The First Language of Bilingualism 
The bilingual policy ensured that English would eventually 
gain almost complete supremacy as the first language of the 
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education system and the national language of inter-
communal communication. In 1966, all first-year secondary 
pupils were required to learn a second language. From 1969 
all students had to offer a second language in the school 
certificate examinations. By that time, over one quarter 
of primary and three quarters of secondary schools were of 
the integrated type which combined language streams within 
one school. These schools failed in their stated aim of 
fostering better inter-racial contact and of ensuring 
students became effectively bilingual. Non-integrated 
English-medium schools were seen to maintain higher 
academic standards (Arumugam 1975: 64-65). In fact, the 
bilingual policy encouraged parents to send their children 
to English-medium schools because they could be assured of 
a higher standard of English learning and thus better job 
prospects, while still being taught their mother tongue as 
a second language. 
By 1968, 57 per cent of Chinese students were in the 
English-medium stream and 43 per cent in the Chinese-medium 
stream. By 1975 all schools, regardless of language 
medium, were required to teach mathematics and science in 
English at all levels while other subjects such as history, 
civics and geography could be taught in the second language 
(Arumugam 1975: 66-67). 
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Thus, by the early 1970s, the "four-stream educational 
system [English, Chinese, Malay and Tamil] ·was converging 
towards a single stream" (Tham 1989: 481). The political 
economy of Singapore had made the alliance with imperialism 
the ladder to personal success. The subjects of merit were 
mathematics and science. The language of merit was 
indisputably English; English was the language of the 
politics of Singapore's economy. 
Mandarin, The Second Language 
The bilingual policy meant that the PAP-state could avoid a 
community's last-ditch resistance to the loss of their 
vernacular by promising that it would always be available 
as a second language in the education system. This was a 
comparatively simple matter with the minority Malay and 
Indian communities who spoke mainly Malay and Tamil and 
could be forced to fall in line with state policy. 
But the bilingual policy raised some contradictions for the 
majority Chinese community with its entrenched dialect 
affiliations (Hokkien, Hakka, Teochew, Cantonese, 
Hainanese, Foochow and Malay). These were the mother-
tongues of the Chinese working class and they exerted a 
powerful political force in terms of kinship and other 
primary social relationships. To disorganise the Chinese 
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working class in order to render it more susceptible to 
direct political control, these linguistic communities had 
to be dissolved. The bilingual policy achieved this by 
unilaterally laying down that the mother-tongue of every . 
Chinese was Mandarin. 
Yet less than one per cent of Singapore Chinese had 
Mandarin as their mother-tongue (Chew 1982: 66). The PAP 
was manipulating the symbolic importance of Mandarin. 
Mandarin had been the symbolic language for uniting Chinese 
linguistic communities around the political agenda of the 
left. As we have seen, the cultural integrity of the 
Chinese education system which nurtured this tradition had 
been destroyed by the PAP. But the language itself 
remained in a few prestigious Chinese-medium institutions 
which were potential bases for a cultural resurgence. The 
bilingual policy provided both the rationale for finally 
dismantling the institutional remnant of Chinese education 
and the means of coopting Mandarin to the PAP-state's 
political use. 
From 1969, the bilingual policy made it possible for the 
PAP-state to appease Chinese public opinion with the 
encouragement of Mandarin as a second language to English 
while, at the same time, completing the demolition of the 
Chinese education system. 
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For example, the government stated that students of Nanyang 
university must be effectively bilingual in English and 
Chinese (Mandarin). Under this justification, all first-
year classes were conducted in English from 1975. In 1978 
first-year classes were combined with the English-medium 
University of Singapore. The same year the real agenda was 
stated by a PAP minister: "The medium of instruction at all 
tertiary institutions is and will be English" (Chew 1982: 
65). By 1979, only Chinese language and literature were 
taught in Mandarin. In 1980 Nanyang was forced to merge 
with the University of Singapore to form the National 
University of Singapore. As final ignominy, Nanyang's 
prestigious campus was made into a technical institute as 
had that of Ngee Ann College before it. By this time 
Nanyang had already been starved of the highest calibre of 
faculty and students, and its financial base had been 
eroded. 
The previous destruction of the left and this systematic 
dismantling of the Chinese education system now made 
Mandarin available for the political agenda of the PAP-
state. Some observers have seen the second language policy 
of Mandarin as having the objective of building up ethnic 
solidarity and pride among Chinese. By making all Chinese 
equally proficient in Mandarin, the PAP-state may have 
hoped to ensure their loyalty and negate the entrenched 
Malay resistance to PAP rule (Busch 1974: 112). There may 
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be some truth in this observation that,.once again, the PAP 
was engaging in communal tactics to ensure its own 
political longevity. 
But a more important reason may have been the PAP's 
determination to open Chinese communities to the use of 
English by denying them their own mother-languages at any 
point in the education system. The mandatory Mandarin 
bilingual policy immediately restricted actual Chinese 
mother-tongues to domestic use within each community and 
these languages are now being progressively eliminated as 
children are schooled in English and Mandarin, languages 
unknown to their parents and grand-parents (FEER 20 June 
1991: 17). In addition, the Mandarin policy gave the PAP-
state added power to put Chinese in their social place. 
Instead of using Mandarin as a unifying language, the PAP 
has used it as a weapon to break down Chinese social 
structure and to reconstitute the community as an atomised 
working class. This has led to the historical irony of the 
English-educated PAP section of the capitalist class now 
wielding the cultural authority of Mandarin and, in its own 
political interests, imposing the language as the sole 
language of intra-community communication. 
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contradictions of Promoting English 
Following the linguistic agenda of foreign capital also 
brought contradictions, especially in administration and 
political control. 
The administrative complexity of promoting English, while 
pretending otherwise, in such a linguistically diverse 
society inevitably brought contradictions and shows forms 
of struggle. In the early years of its rule, the PAP state 
found that some of the changes it imposed on the education 
system failed to achieve the expected results and had to be 
changed. sometimes changes were obstructed. Often those 
most involved in the process of education, such as 
principals and teachers, were not consulted and 
subsequently disagreed with or did not understand the point 
of the changes. 
The PAP-state therefore formalised the channels of 
"consultation" under its control through which educational 
advice would be acceptable, thus rendering other responses 
ad hoc, unacceptable and politically hostile. For example, 
the Advisory committee on curriculum Development was set up 
in 1970 for the "harmonising of subject objectives with 
overall objectives" (Wilson 1978: 238). But such actions 
merely contained dissent. The contradictory effects of 
policies which aimed to reconstitute the whole linguistic 
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configuration of the population demanded frequent changes 
to educational practices. This instability, as we observed 
at the beginning of the chapter, undermined the overall 
increase in educational levels. 
More worrying for the PAP was the fact that English is an 
international language which increasingly opened the local 
community to outside influences as more people learned it. 
This introduced a major problem of political control. 
The PAP leadership knew that English gave access to liberal 
democratic values, having themselves been introduced to 
parliamentary politics by this route. The ferment of 
student and worker uprisings in Europe and the anti-Vietnam 
war movement in the USA at the end of the decade, as well 
as the counter-cultural movements, no doubt added to their 
fears that these social and political traditions would 
become more widely accessible within Singapore as English 
usage spread. 
The authorities see industrialisation and 
modernisation of the island and the consequent spread 
of English as having brought in its train unacceptable 
values and practices which, if left unchecked, would 
undermine the work ethic and the values of 
achievement, social and personal discipline, 
endurance, etc., which they had sought to promote 
(Gopinathan 1976: 77). 
This concern was focused on Chinese stUdents more than 
Malays, and the PAP framed the problem in terms of losing 
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Asian culture and values. In these terms, Malays were less 
likely to lose their culture because of their residence 
within the geographical area of their cultural heritage. 
But, in reality, the PAP had already consigned the Malays 
to a vernacular-speaking under-class who had little access 
to Western political traditions anyway_ Also, having 
demolished the Chinese education system, the PAP-state's 
real concern cannot have been the preservation of Chinese 
culture. Rather, its project was the consolidation of a 
larger English-speaking Chinese bourgeoisie while 
restricting its politicisation to the PAP programme. 
To achieve this end, the government suppressed the local 
media, restricted the foreign media, controlled local non-
government organisations and prevented international NGOs 
(such as Oxfam) from locating regional headquarters in 
Singapore (Asia Watch 1989). In education, it attempted to 
use the mother-tongue strategy to portray outside political 
influence as alien and un-Asian and to prevent the 
development of international links. 
As early as December 1966, the Ministry of Education began 
to plan a comprehensive programme for moral education and 
social discipline (Chan Heng Chee 1971: 52). From 1972, 
the learning of the mother-tongue was promoted as 
reinforcing traditional Asian values. The latter appeared 
to be the PAP-state's answer to questions of morals and 
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discipline. While English was necessary for economic 
success, the mother tongue, according to Lee Kuan Yew, was 
necessary for lithe ethics, values of work and discipline in 
an orderly societyll (The Mirror 20 November 1972). Thus, 
the mother-tongue emphasis was fundamentally aimed at 
providing a political prophylactic. 
In 1974, as the English-educated students at the University 
of singapore were launching their doomed demonstrations in 
support of retrenched workers from TNC factories, the PAP-
state launched its Education for Living (EFL) and civics 
courses into primary and secondary schools respectively 
(Chiew 1983: 257). These courses aimed to instil Asian 
moral values of thrift, filial duty, obedience to authority 
and loyalty to the government. 
These traditional values, supposedly absorbed through the 
device of language lessons in the mother-tongue, have been 
termed "cultural ballast" by the PAP-state (Gopinathan 
1976: 77), a revealing term that it has continued to use 
(GOS 1989a: 187). Ballast, while assisting the navigation 
of a steady course, is also, by definition, dispensable and 
unimportant in itself. This reinforces the analysis that 
English, mathematics and science were the core of 
education, while the "mother tongue" (relegated to the 
position of "second language") and Asian values were merely 
dispensable weightage for controlling the course set by the 
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priorities of the alliance with foreign capital. Thus, 
from the early 1970s, schools were enjoined to supply an 
English education geared to serving export-oriented 
industrialisation while simultaneously being required to 
build into the minds of students the supposed means of 
psychological control and thus political legitimation. 
The outbreak of political dissent in the 1980s would appear 
to mark the partial failure of this initiative. 
Controlling Three Forces 
In suppressing dissent within educational institutions, the 
PAP-state was aiming to control three forms of struggle 
which were often related: socialism, communal self-
determination and liberal democratic humanitarianism. As 
we have seen, it had crushed the left movement, demolished 
educational institutions nourishing communal independence 
and coopted linguistic and cultural traditions. But the 
existence of strong, English-medium, liberal democratic 
institutions like the parliament and the university raised 
the possibility of all forms of struggle using such 
institutions as avenues for a resurgence. 
During this period of 1966-77, the PAP-state therefore 
tightened its grip on such institutions. It mainly used the 
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criminal law in combination with administrative 
restructuring, personal threats, police action and 
violence. 
These direct methods of control were also required during 
the decade in order to ensure that the refinements of the 
meritocratic mechanisms were set in place and loyally 
administered. To prevent obstruction by unsympathetic 
professional educationalists and to ensure that a different 
political strategy or an alternative political leadership 
did not emerge through the newly-centralised education 
system, the PAP-state established direct political control 
of all educational institutions during this period. 
On one level, the benefits of conformity to the criteria of 
merit were explicitly connected to political loyalty 
through the introduction in 1966 of a flag-raising 
ceremony, recitation of an oath of loyalty and the singing 
of the national anthem every day at every school. The 
expansion of uniformed cadet units at schools followed in 
the late 1960s (Gopinathan 1976: 74) along with the 
introduction of military education for all males in the 
form of National Service, which began in 1969 (Chew 1982: 
196). These innovations not only assisted the PAP-state to 
generate a sense of crisis concerning the survival of the 
nation; in focussing on loyalty to the PAP-state, they also 
obfuscated the reality of the subordinate relationship of 
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the PAP-state to foreign capital, the alliance which 
necessitated imposition of the meritocratic criteria. 
On another level, the PAP-state went to considerable 
lengths to ensure that the education system could never 
again become the base for political opposition. Entrance 
to university was made conditional on the issuance of a 
political suitability certificate issued by the internal 
security police. Individual dossiers were maintained on 
all students by the security authorities which were 
referred to- at the time of employment (George 1984: 137; 
Wilson 1978: 238-239). In 1970, Lee Kuan Yew told students 
not to take political science, philosophy and sociology but 
to take more useful subjects (such as science, medicine and 
law). The following year the Public Service commission 
stopped all bursaries for students taking these subjects. 
Since that time the arts and social science subjects have 
attracted those who could not get in to the more 
prestigious, officially-approved subjects (Clammer 1985: 
160) • 
PAP operatives and infrastructure were inserted at all 
levels of the system. PAP members were introduced into the 
university administration, faculty and student 
organisations. Expatriate faculty were marginalised: some 
were expelled, and all were forbidden to be involved in 
local issues. The university of Singapore vice-Chancellor 
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resigned over state interference in the university. In 
1968 he was replaced by Dr Toh Chin Chye, Deputy Prime 
Minister and Chairman of the PAP, who continued to hold his 
government posts concurrently. The departments of history 
and political science were combined and headed by another 
cabinet minister (George 1984: 137-138). 
University students were severely warned about the 
inadvisability of opposition to the PAP-state. 
[Prime Minister] Lee personally saw to it that 
students were left in no doubt that they were sticking 
their necks out if they took an interest in what did 
not directly concern them. Whenever he addressed a 
student meeting his tone was intimidating. If a 
question rose from the floor, he would first insist on 
knowing the student's name, citizenship and subject of 
study. If a questioner said he was Malaysian, Lee 
would say he had no right to ask questions. If the 
questioner said he was studying chemistry, Lee would 
chastise him for asking questions on politics. It did 
not take students long to realise that silence was 
golden (George 1984: 141). 
When Lee received an unfriendly reception during an address 
at the university in 1969, he ordered a subsequent meeting 
of first-year students to be held. At this meeting he 
warned the students against their seniors and their 
teachers and said that the government knew everything that 
happened inside and outside the classroom. He said he 
would not allow dissent on the fundamental issues of 
national security, National Service, multiracialism, 
economic survival and the political system. Lee met the 
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executive of the students' union beforehand and threatened 
that any student who stepped out of line during the 
following meeting would be called up for two years' 
National Service immediately (George 1984: 199). 
By means of its senior and Junior Pyramid clubs on campus, 
the PAP-state monitored faculty and students in discussion 
programmes and recreational activities, using these clubs 
as recruiting grounds for the PAP and government service. 
Alternative political societies were suppressed, especially 
the long-established Socialist Club, which came under 
attack from the PAP-state as early as 1963, when its 
journal was banned. In 1964 the Democratic Socialist Club, 
patronised by cabinet members, was established as an 
officially-approved counter-organisation. In 1971 the 
socialist Club was finally suppressed through 
deregistration. 
The internal security police kept the universities under 
clo~e surveillance to the extent of recording lectures and 
watching the extra-curricular activities of lecturers and 
students (George 1984: 139; Wilson 1978: 239). Some 
student activism was still possible through the students' 
association, as evidenced by the student protests over 
retrenchment of workers by foreign companies in 1974. This 
linkage between the English-educated middle class and 
workers was clearly too much for the government. It 
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resulted ina stage-managed trial of student leaders on 
fabricated charges, imprisonment and deportation (Tan Wah 
piow 1984, 1987a, 1987b). Legislative changes then removed 
the last vestiges of autonomy from the students' 
association. 
The significance of these events lies very much in the 
fact that they represented a direct attack on 
essentially middle-class institutions, and a firm 
recognition of the extent of middle-class 
disenchantment and potential for political opposition. 
The government was attacking not only the radical 
left, but also the liberalism of English-stream 
students, and the assertion of Chinese culture among 
Chinese-stream students .... To repress the left wing, 
and minimise its influence among the lower classes, 
the government has extended tight control over areas 
of life which are middle class in character. In doing 
so, it has alienated important sectors of the 
intermediate middle-class - for whom repression of the 
radical left wing is perfectly legitimate, but 
repression of liberalism is quite another matter, and 
so too is repression of culture (Buchanan 1972: 215). 
Busch notes the tendency of English-educated students to 
regard the process of politics to be as important as the 
benefits it provides. The alienation of this elite from 
the PAP, he observes, "may be a serious problem for 
singapore" (Busch 1974: 90-91). The leadership of liberal 
democratic dissent in the mid-1980s by these same students 
and also their emigration in large numbers has proven him 
correct. 
It remains for us to examine the ideological effects of the· 
educational practices of this period from 1966 to 1977. 
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How did students and their parents come to understand the 
educational process? How was this understanding 
systematised into a formal ideology of the PAP-state? But 
to comprehend the difference between ideological effect and 
actual political results of educational practices, it is 
necessary first to note these political results in general 
terms. In other words, we must see what people were 
constrained to do before we look at what they thought about 
their actions. 
Political Effects of Meritocratic Educational Practices 
By the end of this period from 1966 to 1977, the PAP-state 
had used its centralised control of the educational system 
to restructure social relations according to the criteria 
of merit most congenial to its own political hegemony and 
the needs of its alliance with foreign capital. The 
capitalist class being consolidated was to remain English-
speaking and pro-western. The working class was left in no 
doubt that learning English and a technical education were 
necessary qualifications for access to the material 
benefits of industrialisation. 
To these ends, the education system deprived all but the 
capitalist class a formal education in their own cultural 
and linguistic traditions. Communal factors of race and 
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language were systematically correlated with class position 
through the bilingual policy and the emphasis on science 
and technology. 
That the Government of Singapore makes deliberate use 
of the education system for purposes of social 
engineering can hardly be doubted •••• The shape of 
society which is beginning to emerge seems not so very 
unlike Plato's perception of the ideal city-state in 
which lithe wise shall lead and rule, and the ignorant 
shall follow". Certainly, the school system is 
rigorously competitive and selective, with a series of 
examinations resulting in the channelling of the 
overwhelming majority into one or other of the 
technical/vocational streams (Wilson 1978: 238-239). 
The schooling selection process of universal examinations 
ensured that the working class were denied significant 
opportunities for upward mobility, thus remaining available 
for training for wage labour. Only 71 per cent of pupils 
passed the Primary School Leaving Examination according to 
a 1978 Ministry of Education report. Of these, only 35 per 
cent completed secondary school, while the remaining 36 per 
cent failed or dropped out. That is, 65 per cent of 
primary school entrants did not successfully complete a 
secondary education. , From the 35 per cent who completed, 
only 14 per cent gained entrance to pre-university level 
and only nine per cent then went on to tertiary study (four 
per cent to university, five per cent to polytechnic or 
teachers' college) (Seah and Seah 1983: 246-247; Gopinathan 
1976: 75). 
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Thus, the education system was fulfilling its political 
function of extending access to education in order to 
ensure that all citizens were subject to the sorting 
process and that the working class and ethnic minorities 
acquired only the minimal level of education necessary for 
the reproduction of labour power. The task of the 
education system was then to fail this majority in order to 
make their labour power available to capital. 
This political function is a widely recognised task of 
meritocratic education in industrialised countries: 
The main reason why schools do not seriously attempt 
to undermine the process [of discriminatory education] 
is that the upward and downward cycles of brightness 
training and dullness training actually facilitate the 
schools' task of reproducing society's class 
structure •... Their task is to produce in each age 
cohort a differentiated body of graduates who can be 
fit [ted] into existing occupational roles and statuses 
with a minimum of friction. In this way, the basic 
structure of social classes is recreated even though 
particular families may rise or fall in the hierarchy 
from one generation to the next (Blum 1978: 176). 
In Singapore the education system was successfully 
recruiting failures. 
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The Ideological Effects of Meritocratic Educational 
Practices 
The draconian labour legislation of 1968, the drop in 
average wages in 1967-69, the loss of 75,000 jobs and more 
than thirteen per cent of GDP with the departure of the 
British military at the end of the decade (Buchanan 1972: 
83, 87) would not seem the ideal time to intensify 
educational practices which fail the majority of students. 
The reason this process assisted the PAP-state's social 
control rather than undermined it lies in the ideological 
effects of the practices. The education system ensured 
that people blamed themselves for not being in the 
capitalist class. 
The experience of being processed by the mechanisms of 
educational social control produced ideological effects 
that students and their parents internalised as 
explanations for what was happening. That is, it appeared 
that the criteria of merit were neutral objectives 
available for all to satisfy by means of their own efforts. 
Students who were literate in English and did well in 
academic examinations in mathematics and science were the 
most meritorious and deserved the success they so quickly 
attained in terms of status and jobs. Those who did not 
succeed could only blame themselves. Even the realisation 
that the English-educated Chinese upper classes were 
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overwhelmingly the most meritorious did not lead to 
questioning of the basis of the definition of merit. 
Rather, it encouraged the trend towards English-medium 
education. 
English is regarded by all ethnic groups as providing 
the best job opportunities, a belief justified by the 
socio-economic disparities that continue to exist 
between the English and the non-English-educated and 
which has led to reduced enrolments in the non-English 
streams (Gopinathan 1976: 76). 
The PAP-state's policy of maintaining the pretence of four 
equal language streams, its promotion of second languages 
and its imposition of streaming and universal examinations 
fostered the belief that there was real choice and real 
opportunity: that the success of a student was up to the 
parents' judgement and their child's personal intelligence 
and application. This perception has been shared by 
academics who have also failed to see that the practice of 
providing choices conceals the real selection functions of 
education. 
The wisdom of governmental non-interference with the 
existing educational provisions was never more 
dramatically revealed than when more and more parents 
voluntarily chose to have their children educated in 
English-medium schools (Tham 1989: 481; my emphasis). 
Seah and Seah are more circumspect in their observation, 
indicating that choice is constrained by political 
considerations. 
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The flow of command in the overall education system is 
thus unidirectional from the political leadership down 
to the Ministry of Education, to the principals and 
teachers and finally to the parents of the 
schoolchildren. Ironically, democracy is still 
practised at the tail-end of this chain of command in 
that parents supposedly can decide or choose 
ultimately between the options available in the 
education and school system (Seah and Seah 1983: 257). 
As part of making parents and students feel personally 
responsible for their educational success or failure and 
thus their social position, the experience of educational 
practices actively shapes students' perceptions of 
themselves. 
[Schools] attempt to align students' self-conceptions 
with their eventual job prospects so those in lower-
class occupations will feel they are capable of 
nothing better and will not feel cheated. All this 
can be achieved more easily if students are quickly 
stratified into ability levels and trained in such a 
way that those in the higher levels learn more than 
those in the lower ones. An interactive process which 
has this effect may diminish the learning capacities 
of many students, but nevertheless be functional for 
reproducing the class structure .... Since schools are 
expected to display no favoritism toward any 
particular group, they tend to recruit their failures 
from among the children who are initially hardest to 
teach; these being the ones who lack familiarity with 
middle class lifestyles and speech patterns (Blum 
1978: 176-7). 
In Singapore, those selected to fail and then ideologically 
conditioned to accept this are the working class and racial 
minorities. Salaff noted that the poor lIaccept the 
authorities' evaluation of their children's abilities .•.. 
By accepting the power of the school system to determine 
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their children's occupational future, the working-class 
becomes further involved in the new industrial order" 
(Salaff 1988: 246). That is, their ideological formation 
assists their proletarianisation. 
This derivation of self-worth and vocational prospects from 
educational practices also produced an insidious 
internalisation of racism by its victims. In his study of 
legitimacy and ethnicity in Singapore, Busch concluded that 
ethnic self-denigration among the Malays was severe, many 
of them regarding themselves as inferior to Chinese. 
Malays tended to see the reason for educational failure in 
culturally-acquired laziness rather than in educational 
practices which discriminated against them or in the 
worthlessness of Malay-medium education within the PAP-
state's economic plan (Busch 1974: 85-86). 
Thus, the experience of meritocratic educational sorting 
processes produced the ideological effect in students that 
they were being sorted correct~y according to their own 
abilities. The ideology produced by these practices has 
been systematised or formalised by Singapore's institutions 
and political leaders. Politicians, technocrats, teachers 
and the media constantly provided students with the 
ideological categories which appeared to accord with what 
they were experiencing. 
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Meritocracy: The Formalisation of Ideology 
The systematisation of the ideological effects of 
Singapore's education system had its own characteristics 
but was by no means unique. Similar practices have 
produced similar effects elsewhere which have been 
formalised into meritocratic ideologies. In addition, Lee 
Kuan Yew and many of his peers in the PAP leadership were 
ideologically formed by their experience of the colonial 
and elitist educational practices of Britain. They 
naturally interpreted the practices they introduced in the 
same ideological terms. 
Equal opportunity and Merit 
A crucial ideological principle 'was that of equality of 
opportunity regardless of race, religion, class or 
linguistic heritage. The ideological perception of choice 
legitimated the PAP-state's role as apparent neutral 
guarantor of meritocratic advancement. This became 
ideologically formalised in the rhetoric of equality of 
opportunity. What an individual did with this opportunity 
was dependent on personal merit. 
There was constant emphasis on merit as the criterion 
for upward mobility and privilege. It was asserted 
that Singapore had to be achievement-oriented and that 
the island could neither afford nor tolerate shirkers 
in its quest for progress - "from each his economic 
best, to each his economic worth" (Gopinathan 1976: 
75) • 
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Equality of opportunity logically leads to social 
inequality, since individual abilities differ. The 
recognition of individual merit leads to a just society. A 
just society is an unequal one. 
[M]ore and more the young are showing that they want 
to be equal in order that they can strive to be 
unequal. What they want is not to be equal throughout 
life but to have equal opportunities, so that those 
whose ability and whose application are better than 
the average can become more equal than the 
others .•.• Our immediate task is to build up a society 
in which man [sic] will be rewarded, not according to 
the amount of property he owns, but according to his 
active contribution to society in physical or mental 
labour. From each according to his ability. To each 
according to his worth and contribution to society. 
This is the first step to a more equal and just 
society (Lee Kuan Yew in an address to the Socialist 
International, quoted in Josey 1980: 68-69). 
Thus, because there was no legal bar preventing the working 
class and ethnic minorities from entering elite 
institutions, Lee and other PAP leaders claimed that equal 
opportunity existed for all classes and races. They 
clearly felt their role as arbiters of a person's worth and 
contribution to society according to such criteria as their 
facility in English, their loyalty to the PAP and to 
capitalism, to be a neutral one. Failure to take advantage 
of lIequal ll opportunities could therefore, in their view, be 
due only to the weaknesses of those who failed in the 
attempt. 
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As noted before, this ideology is not new. 
The general notion of meritocracy uses two related 
arguments to depict the class structure of western 
capitalist societies as natural and socially 
desirable. First, it pictures society as providing 
opportunity for all to rise in the occupational 
hierarchy. Inequalities of wealth, power, and status 
exist because people differ in how intelligent and 
industrious they are. Such differences are the cause 
of inequality, and since they themselves are the 
product of nature, the inequalities which exist must 
also be natural. 
Secondly, it contends that society benefits by 
recruiting the most capable individuals into the most 
responsible jobs. These jobs must offer much greater 
prestige and salary than others as a way of attracting 
capable persons. Hence, the existing inequalities 
perform the necessary function of conserving scarce 
talent and directing it where it is most needed. 
Individuals employed in upper class occupations 
deserve their wealth and privilege because their 
contribution to society is especially valuable. 
Conversely, the poor are poor because they are lazy 
and unintelligent. They merit nothing better than 
bare sUbsistence living because they contribute little 
to society, and it is in society's interest not to 
improve their position substantially (Blum 1978: 162; 
my emphasis). 
The ideology of natural differences determining merit and 
causing inequality sanctifies the concentration of wealth 
and power in the hands of a few on the basis that they 
individually merit it. The blame for being poor and 
powerless correspondingly is laid squarely on those who 
are. This ideology dissolves the issue of class. 
However, the PAP came to power with a socialist programme, 
and the Lee faction faced the problem of switching from a 
public commitment to egalitarianism to outright capitalist 
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meritocracy. It also confronted the need to consolidate a 
technocratic capitalist class around the PAP-state, since 
the Lee faction had no mass support and did not represent a 
strong bourgeoisie. Lee was equal to the task. He stated 
that the socialist aim of "putting the economic power of 
the state into the hands of the people as a whole" could be 
achieved by an elite providing "the direction, planning and 
control of this power in the people's interest" (Josey 
1980: 69). Lee then set about consolidating this elite. 
Class Ideology of Meritocratic Leadership 
Between 1966 and 1977 it became obvious that Lee Kuan Yew's 
understanding of his own educational formation accorded 
with the kind of people-sorting mechanisms that the PAP-
state was introducing into the education system. Lee has 
never been especially modest about his own abilities. It 
seems he concluded from his experience at the elite local 
Raffles College and then at Cambridge University in the 
1940s, that such institutions for reproducing the rUling 
class act as neutral sorting mechanisms for advancing to 
their proper level in society the most intelligent and 
those most gifted with leadership qualities. Since many of 
those with whom he studied later became the political 
leaders or the senior bureaucrats of Malaysia and 
singapore, such a belief is perhaps understandable. 
However, by 1967, Lee had generalised this ideological 
perception to a belief that, in any society, there is an 
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elite of "no more than five per cent" who are "more than 
ordinarily endowed physically and mentally". 
It is on this group that we must expend our limited 
and slender resources in order that they will provide 
that yeast, that ferment, that catalyst in our society 
which alone will ensure that Singapore shall maintain 
its pre-eminent place in the societies that exist in 
South East Asia - and the social organisation which 
enables us, with almost no natural resources, to 
provide the second highest standard of living in Asia 
(Lee Kuan Yew quoted in Eastern Sun 26 June 1967). 
The year before, in a speech to school principals, Lee 
indicated that he expected the education system to unite 
Singaporeans in support of the state regardless of their 
race, language, religion or culture. Yet, at the same 
time, it functioned to divide them according to class, 
race, language, religion and culture. Th~t is, he required 
the education system to perform its customary role of both 
reproducing social relations and legitimising the process. 
But his emphasis was on the formation of a paternalistic 
ruling class. 
Our community lacks in-built reflexes - loyalty, 
patriotism, history or tradition .... [O]ur society and 
its education system was never designed to produce a 
people capable of cohesive action, identifying their 
collective interests and then acting in furtherance of 
them ...• The reflexes of group thinking must be built 
to ensure the survival of the community, not the 
survival of the individual, this means a re-
orientation of emphasis and a reshuffling of 
values .... We must have qualities of leadership at the 
top, and qualities of cohesion on the ground ..•• The 
ideal product is the student, the university graduate 
who is strong, robust, rugged, with tremendous 
qualities of stamina, endurance and at the same time 
with great intellectual discipline and most important 
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of all, humility and love for his community (Lee Kuan 
Yew 1967 in George 1984: 136). 
A decade later, Lee observed that all the top people in 
Singapore could be accommodated in one jumbo jet and that, 
if it crashed, that would be the end of singapore (caldwell 
1979: 14). In his last National Day speech as prime 
minister, Lee Kuan Yew returned to the theme, saying that 
only the top three per cent of Singapore are capable of 
political leadership. 
It's a small place, no more than a total of those 
within the ages thirty to forty-five, at the most 800 
people. We can put them all into one little lap-top 
computer, all the basic data (STW 1 September 1990). 
Of the current PAP leadership, he stated: 
Our .right to govern is based on merit. We have to 
show that we are manifestly qualified to govern by our 
abilities, our training, our character, our ability to 
deliver the goods, and that we exercise power for the 
common good (STW 8 September 1990). 
These statements are but echoes of an early address by Lee 
given at Chatham House in London in 1962. 
At a time when you want harder work with less return 
and more capital investment, one man one vote produces 
just the opposite .... [In Asia this system] has been 
superceded by systems which give power effectively to 
one man or group of men for an indefinite period. 
Government to be effective must at least give the 
impression of enduring, and a government which is open 
to the vagaries of the ballot box when the people who 
put their crosses in the ballot box are not illiterate 
but semi-literate, which is worse, is a government 
which is already weakened before it starts to 
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govern •••• If I were in authority in singapore 
indefinitely without having to ask those who are being 
governed whether they like what is being done, then I 
have not the slightest doubt that I could govern much 
more effectively in their own interests. That is a 
fact which the educated understand (George 1984: 114). 
It is therefore hardly surprising that the PAP-state's 
educational initiatives produced meritocratic ideology. 
Lee's 1965 proposal for lithe establishment of an Eton-style 
boarding school in which Singapore's brightest students 
would be groomed for future command" (Buchanan 1972: 290) 
is an early example. This proposal met with considerable 
opposition (ST 4 May 1965) but eventually came forward in 
1969 in the modified form of four elite pre-university 
colleges. 
It was stressed that such schools were not for 
children of the wealthy and privileged in society -
bright children would qualify, so long as they 
satisfied certain requirements, regardless of what 
stratum of society they came from (Buchanan 1972: 
291) • 
The "certain requirements" were, of course, the criteria 
set by the PAP-state's definition of merit. These elite 
establishments accordingly filled up with the children of 
the wealthy, the English-educated, the capitalist class and 
the emerging middle-class (George 1984: 186). 
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The Ideology of Class Hatred 
If equal opportunity enables individuals to achieve the 
level they merit, then it is a short step to claiming that 
people actually do reach the level of their ability. 
Therefore, once meritocratic sorting practices are spread 
across the whole of society, it is only a matter of time 
before the whole of society is sorted according to their 
natural ability. Thus, some proponents of meritocratic 
education, including Lee Kuan Yew, claim moral 
justification for it on the grounds that it overcomes 
hereditary class divisions and leads to divisions based on 
actual ability. 
Singapore is a society based on effort and merit, not 
wealth and privilege depending on birth. There is 
nothing in the life-style of the employer which is not 
open to the worker (Lee Kuan Yew STW 14 October 1989). 
The viciousness of this ideological position can be seen 
when the implicit connection between intelligence, 
biological heredity and race or class is made explicit. 
Herrnstein, an American scholar, has given academic comfort 
to those who argue that social inequality is a necessary 
consequence of hereditary meritocracy. 
The privileged classes of the past, based on religion, 
title, property, race, even physiognomy, were probably 
not much superior biologically to the downtrodden, 
which is why revolutions had a fair chance of success. 
By removing artificial barriers between classes, 
society has encouraged the creation of biological 
barriers. When people can take their natural level in 
society, the upper classes will by definition, have 
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greater capacity than the lower (Herrnstein 1971: 201-
2) • 
This ideology has been soundly criticised as nothing more 
than "a bare assertion that the ideology of capitalist 
society accurately expresses universal traits of human 
nature, and that certain related, implicit assumptions of 
behaviourist psychology are correct" (Chomsky 1972: 29)~ 
In Singapore, it soon became clear that the lower classes 
and minority races failed overwhelmingly in the education 
system. The PAP leadership concluded that they are 
therefore naturally lacking in ability. Lee revealed his 
view of working class Singaporeans in his frequent public 
references to them as "digits" (George 1984: 132). He made 
his view of education for the poor brutally clear in a 1967 
address to a community centre meeting: 
We will be to blame if youngsters ten years from now 
become hooligans, ruffians and sluts. They can be 
trained to be otherwise. Even dogs can be trained as 
proved by the Police Training School where dogs, at a 
whistle, jump through a hoop, sit down or attack those 
who need to be attacked (George 1984: 194). 
Dressed up with the pseudoscientific principles of 
intelligence levels (I.Q.) and eugenics (Chee and Chan 
1984), this ideology has legitimated class hatred and 
racism in Singapore. 
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The Ideology of Eugenics 
From our earlier study of the fUndamental assumptions of 
neo-classical theory, we know that this capitalist class 
ideology of political economy holds that we are the product 
of our genes, not of our social circumstances. We can now 
see how the ideology of eugenics arises from a meritocratic 
system which legitimises capitalist social relations. 
Many of the practices most closely related to Lee's 
eugenics ideology are more prominent in the next phase of 
education, where they will be dealt with in detail. It is 
sufficient to note at this stage that, once society is 
properly sorted, and if intelligence (or the lack of it) is 
hereditary, then it makes no sense to let the lower classes 
and minorities increase the proportion of meritocratic 
failures in the population by irresponsible breeding. 
Hence, when the PAP-state wanted to maximise its human 
resources in the late 1960s in order to launch the export-
oriented industrialisation policy, it introduced abortion 
and voluntary sterilisation laws aimed at the poor and 
ethnic minorities. In Lee's words: 
Free education and subsidised housing lead to a 
situation where the less economically productive 
people in the community are reproducing themselves at 
rates higher than the rest. This will increase the 
total population of less productive people. 
Our problem is how to devise a system of 
disincentives, so that the irresponsible, the social 
delinquents, do not believe that all they have to do 
is to produce their children and the government then 
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owes them and their children sufficient food, 
medicine, housing, education and jobs .... Until such 
time when moral inhibitions disappear and legislative 
or administrative measures can be taken to regulate 
the size of families, we must try to induce people to 
limit their families •••• 
One of the crucial yardsticks by which we shall have 
to judge the results of the new abortion law combined 
with the voluntary sterilisation law will be whether 
it tends to raise or lower the total quality of our 
population. We must encourage those who earn less 
than two hundred dollars per month and cannot afford 
to nurture and educate many children never to have 
more than two. We will regret the time lost if we do 
not now take the first tentative steps towards 
correcting a trend which can leave our society with a 
large number of the physically, intellectually, and 
culturally anaemic (Abortion Bill, Third Reading, 29 
December 1969, Select committee Report: 321-3). 
The possibility that the social control mechanisms of the 
education system, together with socio-economic conditions, 
actively discriminated against the educational achievement 
of the working class, women and minority races, had been 
ideologically concealed. Meritocracy was the formalised 
ideology for the institutionalisation of class hatred and 
racism. Lee Kuan Yew's ideological position has a 
disturbing affinity to that of a previous political leader: 
Since the inferior always outnumber the superior, the 
former would always increase more rapidly if they 
possessed the same capacities for survival and for the 
procreation of their kindi and the final consequence 
would be that the best in quality would be forced to 
recede into the background. Therefore a corrective 
measure in favour of the better quality must intervene 
(Adolf Hitler 1942: 161-2). 
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Racial Hatred and the Ideology of Kultiracialism 
The formalisation of the application of eugenics to Malays 
was done explicitly by a Malay politician, Mahathir bin 
Mohamad, now the prime minister of Malaysia, in a book 
entitled The Malay Dilemma (1970). He "proved" that 
inbreeding has made Malays intellectually inferior to 
Chinese. For this reason, he concluded, Chinese control 
the economy_ His book was essentially an apologetic aimed 
to explaining the economic subjugation of Malays and at 
motivating them to do something about it. 
But, in Singapore where Dr Mahathir studied and where 
racist educational and other practices continue, their 
ideological effect is to legitimate Chinese dominance and 
enshrine racism against Malays as a scientific principle of 
genetic inferiority. As Busch states, "Repeatedly, I heard 
this theme from Malays in Singapore, even from secondary 
school pupils who had never heard of Dr Mahathir and his 
book" (Busch 1974: 59; see also Nasir and Chee 1984). 
Lee Kuan Yew has also never attempted to hide his racism, 
since he also regarded it as scientific reasoning. He has 
accounted for the superiority of East Asians (over Malays) 
in terms of "innate ethnic qualities" (The Mirror 21 
October 1968). He has isolated other factors as well: 
Climate and diet may have given East Asians a cultural 
edge over Southeast Asians in coping with modern 
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economic development. They may account in part for 
the intense, thrifty, and largely secular societies of 
China, Japan, Korea and Vietnam (Lecture at Columbia 
University, New York reported in Eastern Sun 23 
December 1968). 
Lee frequently made reference to his 4,000 years of 
cultural history in comparison to equatorial races who 
would go to sleep in the afternoon (George 1984: 168). 
But the predictable failure of Malays in a racist 
educational system established for highly competitive, 
individualistic, English-educated Chinese has needed and 
acquired more sophisticated ideological legitimacy than 
thinly disguised racial hatred. 
The legitimation of the results of educational sorting by 
meritocratic ideology has been complemented by an ideology 
of multiracialism which portrays Malay failure as being for 
the common good. It might be expected that the principles 
of a multiracial policy would emphasise the right of all 
racial communities to order their own affairs in culturally 
appropriate ways. However, the PAP-state advanced 
principles of multiracialism which emphasised the reasons 
why minority racial communities may not have this right. 
The official PAP policy after independence was to recognise 
Malay rights as equal to those of other races and to note 
that their educational needs were greater. But the PAP-
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state no longer had to accommodate the Malay politics of 
the peninsula. It merely had to contain the politics of 
its own Malay minority. Therefore, despite specific 
constitutional guarantees to the Malays, it stood by the 
principle that "there can be no distinction between 
majority rights and minority rights" (Parliamentary 
Debates, cited in Betts 1975: 136) and that the greatest 
danger to minorities is "not tyranny by the majority, but 
pursuit of minority rights" (Straits Budget cited in Betts 
1975: 137). Furthermore, the PAP held that if the Malays 
objected to the principle of equal rights, the Chinese 
majority was automatically released from adherence to this 
principle (Chew 1982: 206). Just as the policy of 
multiracialismhad been used against the Chinese education 
system, it was now turned against the Malays as an 
ideological weapon which would label objections to the high 
rate of Malay educational failure communal and subversive 
of multiracialism. 
However, because 0f the glaring racial inequities of 
meritocratic education in Singapore, academic apologists 
have had to claim that racial injustice is fair and that 
doing anything about it would be unfair. In justifying the 
ideology of meritocracy as tla denial of the norm of equity 
in favour of the norm of efficiency", Tham proceeds to 
state: 
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First, it ensured that critical areas of the economy 
would have men and women of proven ability and 
performance; and secondly, it suggested to the public 
at large fairness and justice irrespective of ethnic 
differences. Seen in this context the underlying 
logic of meritocracy seems unassailable. There was, of 
course, the question as to whether certain groups such 
as the Malays should merit special government 
intervention to ensure their effective participation 
in the economy. Such a step, if proposed at all, 
would have militated against the government's thinking 
concerning how best to improve the Malays' economic 
status. Any multiracial party in power would have 
been loath to employ group-focused economic-
development policies since it would most certainly 
have been unpopular with the majority. In any case, 
there was also the belief that Malays would be better 
able to compete in future if they developed the 
qualities of hard work and self-reliance (Tham 1989: 
481) . 
This ideological rationalisation assists greatly in 
connecting the ideology of meritocracy with the PAP-state's 
ideology of multiracialism and of welfare. In fact, of 
course, "group-focused economic-development policies" 
exactly describes meritocratic practices which ensure that, 
in Lee Kuan Yew's words, "we must expend our limited and 
slender resources" on the "no more than five per cent" of 
the population who happen to be overwhelmingly Chinese and 
members of the capitalist class. Tham is justifying the 
PAP-state policy of not wasting money on those who are 
genetically unable to improve their intellectual level, the 
same justification used by Lee for restricting physical 
reproduction by the poor. 
This position accords with the PAP-state's actual fiscal 
priorities which saw the education budget progressively 
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decline from its peak of 32 per cent of total government 
expenditure in 1964 to less than nine per cent in 1980 
(Linda Lim 1989: 178). Having achieved political hegemony 
and begun to sort the Chinese working class, the PAP-state 
did not waste its money on those other races quickly 
identified as total meritocratic failures. Thus, in 
singapore, the ideology of meritocracy incorporates 
ideologies of multiracialism and welfare which legitimate 
Chinese domination and a racist state. 
Broader Ideological context 
The ideology of meritocracy was systematised in the broader 
ideological context of a PAP-generated crisis of national 
survival after expulsion from Malaysia (Chan Heng Chee 
1971: 53). There was a call to unity for the sake of 
survival. This call contained at least four elements: 
fostering a multiracial democratic ideal; building a 
rugged, tightly organised and modern society; developing a 
sense of Singapore identity; and having a commitment to 
change. with the diplomacy which made her Singapore's 
Permanent Representative at the united Nations, Chan notes 
that: 
There is little doubt that the ideology has been 
consciously formed and articulated to achieve 
particular ends but it cannot be asserted with similar 
certainty that the primary intent of PAP ideology is 
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to ensure the survival of the party, although 
admittedly, an ideology stressing unity would tend to 
maximise the ruling party's power (Chan Heng Chee 
1971: 53). 
The implications of this ideology have been noted more 
emphatically by Rodan. 
This 'ideology of survival' ••• insisted on the 
inseparability of economic and political survival and 
the necessary subservience of all other 
considerations. Above all else, survival demanded the 
internalisation of an entirely new set of social 
attitudes and beliefs which embodied self-sacrifice 
for the 'national interest'. An important aspect of 
the new ideology was the acceptance of the PAP's sole 
right to determine this interest and the belief that 
the PAP's own political survival was paramount to 
singapore's survival (Rodan 1989: 88). 
In short, the PAP exploited the public insecurity resulting 
from its expulsion from Malaysia and the later British 
military withdrawal to systematise an ideological climate 
favourable to its political survival and the objectives of 
its alliance with foreign capital. Great emphasis was 
placed on raising skills, on social discipline and on 
foregoing short-term benefits for long-term gain. The 
'rugged society' was the regime's shorthand for this .• 
By this is meant the exercise of self-discipline and 
social responsibility by individuals so that the needs 
of society can, when necessary, take precedence over 
individual desires •... Out of such industrious 
cooperation is supposed to emerge a 'rugged society' 
able to cope with a different international 
environment because it has mobilised its human 
resources - the only resources Singapore has (Busch 
1974: 33-4). 
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In this ideological context it was possible to suppress 
claims for the redress of grievances or attempts at anti-
PAP political mobilisation with contemptuous caricature. 
When we are trying to survive in a tight situation 
there is very little place for harmful or even 
meaningless activities. At best they are irrelevant 
eccentricities; at worst they lead the young into a 
world of fantasy and make them unfit for the strenuous 
exertions that may lie ahead (Goh Keng Swee in The 
Mirror 17 April 1967: 5). 
Furthermore, the withdrawal of British forces gave the PAP-
state the opportunity to launch a massive militarisation 
programme with the assistance of Israeli advisers. The 
decision of the PAP leadership publicly to proclaim that 
they were building a garrison state on the Israeli model 
seemed calculated to maintain communal tension in the Malay 
archipelago and thus deflect anti-imperialist movements. 
The aggressively anti-Islamic implications of explicitly 
imitating Israeli militarism heightened anti-Chinese 
feeling in Malaysia and Indonesia, providing a distraction 
from class politics most convenient for foreign capital and 
local capitalist classes. The PAP-state thus took over the 
role of the British in advancing a communal strategy on a 
regional scale to fragment class solidarity. 
This militarisation also ensured domestic stability for the 
attraction of foreign investment (Buchanan 1972: 261, 267; 
George 1984: 192). In 1969, defence expenditure surpassed 
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education expenditure as a proportion of total government 
spending (Linda Lim 1989: 178). Lee Kuan Yew made it clear 
that he regarded Singapore as the "linch-pin ff for Western 
interests in Southeast Asia and for the future prosperity 
of Malaysia and Indonesia (Josey 1968: 427-428). 
Furthermore, he made it plain that part of the educational 
commitment to science and technology was related to 
military priorities: 
We intend to fight for our stake in this part of the 
world, and [to] anybody who thinks they can push us 
around, I say: over my dead body ••.. I don't care if 
there are 100 million Indonesians of whom 400,000 are 
armed. So what? What is important, I know in ten, 
fifteen years I can breed a generation that can man 
missiles .... We know that some of our neighbours can 
get this equipment. But can they work it as quickly 
as we can work it CST 10 November 1965)? 
Later Lee stated: 
We opted for the Israeli fashion, for in our situation 
we think it might be necessary not only to train every 
boy but also every girl to be a disciplined and 
effective digit in defence of their own country 
(Eastern Sun 21 October 1967). 
Thus the ideology of meritocracy was formalised within a 
highly repressive atmosphere to legitimise not only 
educational practices but also the entire political 
programme of exploitation and repression developed in 
alliance with Western imperialism. The PAP-state was able 
to proceed with its undermining of local working class 
organisation and conditions with justifications of 
360 
pragmatism and necessity. Its control of educational 
institutions and the media enabled it to produce and 
formalise a congenial ideological consensus for the 
legitimation of its political objectives. As Buchanan 
noted during this period, IIthis has been the most decisive 
effect of the Government's 'social development' policy -
not greater social welfare, but greater social control, and 
the creation of a cheap, disciplined labour force" 
(Buchanan 1972: 69). 
The consolidation of the meritocratic practices of 
education between 1966 and 1977 had effectively 
proletarianised the lower classes and minorities for 
export-oriented industrialisation. The formalisation of 
meritocratic ideology had legitimised the practices which 
produced it. But, by 1977, some of the contradictions of 
these practices had become obvious as the PAP-state's 
economic ambitions responded to intense international 
competition. 
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THE GREAT LEAP FORWARD 1978-85: A NEW EDUCATION SYSTEM 
The Second Industrial Revolution to upgrade the singapore 
economy to higher value-added production was predicated on 
the PAP-state's grip on the mechanisms of social control. 
It had used education radically to restructure Singapore/s 
population during the previous two decades. Not only had 
it sorted class agents into their class positions but it 
was changing their linguistic and cultural heritage to suit 
the industrialisation policy. Educational practices had 
transformed people's perceptions of their social place and 
altered their social aspirations. 
But, if political struggles were not to emerge in new and 
more threatening forms within Singapore, the PAP had to 
continue to deliver continuous economic growth which both 
justified and required increasing control. 
In the late 1970s, it seems that the PAP felt it was able 
to improve its position in the alliance with foreign 
capital to that of most senior junior-partner among other 
Asian states, if not that of an equal. If previously the 
PAP-state had responded to the perceived needs of foreign 
capital in education, now it sought unilaterally to move up 
the scale of industrialisation away from the increasing 
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competition from its Southeast Asian neighbours in labour-
intensive, low value-added industries. 
Such an initiative required a qualitative change in the 
Singapore labour force through a sudden intensification of 
the social control practices it had consolidated during the 
previous phase. To equip its workers for the great leap 
forward, the PAP-state launched educational initiatives to 
take its labour force to a higher level of skill and, 
through that, exercise a greater degree of control. This 
sudden shift meant more rigorous categorisation of people 
and more concise targeting of educational resources. It 
also entailed re-organisation of the reserve army of 
labour. 
However, the most remarkable strategy for ensuring a highly 
skilled and largely self-reliant labour force was the 
linking of sexual reproduction to educational sorting 
mechanisms. The government implemented a eugenics policy 
through an official breeding programme of incentives and 
disincentives. That is, the PAP-state decided to introduce 
a selection process even before the education system by 
deciding who would be permitted to be born and who would 
not. 
However, the PAP was confronted with a resurgence of 
political struggles as it sought to implement these 
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measures and was therefore severely limited in what it 
could achieve. We examine each of the above initiatives 
and their political and ideological implications. 
A Failing system 
By 1978 there was general recognition that the education 
system had become clogged up by the simultaneous stress on 
bilingualism, technical education and English proficiency 
unmatched by enough highly qualified teachers and adequate 
facilities (Seah and Seah 1983: 243). It had also suffered 
from frequent changes to the method of implementing the 
bilingual policy, changes which were handed down from the 
top political leadership, often the Prime Minister himself, 
to an increasingly demoralised Ministry of Education and 
thence to schools which obediently put into practice 
directives they knew to be ineffective or contradictory 
(Seah and Seah 1983: 255). But even Lee appeared to 
recognise that the sorting mechanisms of education were 
working too well: an English-educated technocratic elite 
was being created but everyone else was dropping out 
without achieving even the minimal standard of education 
required. "Only the bright rise above all the overload and 
break through, and the average give up," he noted (Asia 
Yearbook 1979: 289). 
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The results were seen in drop-out and attrition (drop-outs 
plus failures) rates far h~gher than those of Taiwan (Tham 
1989: 488), in low literacy levels and in ineffective 
bilingualism. At one stage the army had to issue badges to 
national servicemen indicating which languages they 
understood in order to assist communication (Seah and Seah 
1983: 250). It could not be assumed that completion of a 
bilingual education had rendered the students effectively 
bilingual. 
In 1979, an Educational study Team chaired by Deputy Prime 
Minister Goh Keng Swee presented a report on the education 
system along with recommendations for change. Whilenoting 
many of the problems outlined above, the Goh Report's main 
concern was expressed in terms of "educational wastage": 
failure to achieve expected standards and premature school-
leaving (Tham 1989: 488). That is, the Team was not 
concerned that the people-sorting mechanisms of the 
education system were structured in favour of reproducing 
the capitalist class by assisting the educationally-
advantaged to reach their proper station in life. Nor was 
it concerned that these mechanisms reproduced the working 
class by discriminating against the Chinese-educated and 
ethnic minorities. After all, the education system was 
designed to achieve these objectives and was achieving them 
successfully. 
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Maximising a Scarce Resource 
Rather, the Goh Report focused on the system's failure to 
extract lithe maximum potential from a scarce resource" and 
on the need "to fill up the education gap in manpower 
requirements before Singapore can successfully join the 
ranks of brain and technology-intensive nations" (Seah and 
Seah 1983:248-9). In other words, the problem was not that 
members of the working class were being ejected from the 
education system as failures. The problem was that when 
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the academic-stream students graduated they had not 
achieved a sufficiently high educational standard. 
Similarly, when the working class students were ejected 
from the academic stream into vocational and technical 
education and thence into the labour force, they were still 
insufficiently skilled, linguistically (in English) and 
technically, to sustain the great leap forward into high-
tech industrialisation. In the process of launching the 
Second Industrial Revolution, the PAP-state realised that 
approximately 600,000 workers of its one million strong 
labour force had not reached Primary six level, the final 
year of primary education (Chiew 1983: 253). In the eyes 
of the PAP leadership I Singapore was not maximising the use 
of its major resource, people. 
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But the PAP-state was facing a form of struggle. Both 
working class and middle class students were reacting 
against the alienating educational selection process by not 
learning. Singaporeans were demonstrating their reluctance 
to learn both languages required by imperialism: the 
English language and the language of science and 
technology. The working class was not inclined to learn a 
foreign language so that foreign bosses would find it 
easier to order them around. They had to be further 
pressured to learn the above subjects so that the alliance 
with foreign capital could be sustained. 
Goh's Education Study Team consisted mainly of systems 
engineers aged in their thirties or younger, not 
professional educationalists. It is therefore perhaps 
understandable that they decided not to continue wasting 
government expenditure on giving all children the same 
quality of primary education up to the Primary School 
Leaving Examination (PSLE) in Primary six. Instead they 
decided on intelligence tests to grade children after the 
third year of primary education, at the age of eight or 
nine years. The government then put in place graded 
streams of education designed to give each group an 
education suitable to its expected station in life. In 
this way the government tailored educational practices to 
tithe needs of private companies engaged in, or moving 
towards, higher value-added production" (Rodan 1989: 149). 
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That is, I.Q. tests, which generally work against working 
class children, racial minorities and girls, were used to 
sort out the future adult members of the working and 
capitalist classes at this stage. 
This system of early sorting ensured that education.became 
even more elitist: a Gifted Education Programme was 
introduced for the most talented eight per cent, and the 
best educational resources were directed to them and the 
next 30 per cent. At the same time, more funds were 
immediately directed to tertiary education. Total 
enrolments in universities and colleges rose by 49.4 per 
cent and in technical and vocational institutes by 7.5 per 
cent from 1979 to 1983. Over the same period, engineering 
course enrolments rose by 2,104 at the National University 
of Singapore and by 10,232 at Singapore Polytechnic (Rodan 
1989: 149). 
The lower streams were given a year or two longer to pick 
up basic English skills (Seah and Seah 1983: 258-260). 
This aimed to ensure that more skilled labour could be 
extracted from the largest part of the "scarce resource" 
before it was finally ejected from the system. Between 
1979 and 1984, the proportion of those entering the labour 
force with only primary level qualifications or less 
declined from 43 per cent to 26 per cent (FEER 25 August 
1988: 59). 
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Government expenditure on education rose from $32.75 
million in 1978-79 to $374.68 million in 1982-83, a 1,044 
per cent increase (Rodan 1989: 149), or from less than nine 
per cent of total government expenditure in 1980 to 14 per 
cent in 1985 (Linda Lim 1989: 178; STW 18 March, 25 March 
1989). This should not be seen as a reversal of the PAP-
state's welfare ideology. Much·of the expenditure was 
targeted at the tertiary and technical levels, not at 
programmes to assist working class primary students to get 
into the academic stream. It was also a temporary infusion 
of state funds to kick-start the economic upgrading 
process. Towards the end of the 1980s, the government 
introduced policies to reduce the level of educational 
funding. 
Endinq the Myth of Equal Treatment 
The PAP-state~s rigorous campaign to upgrade the education 
system ended the myth that the four language streams were 
receiving equal treatment. This period saw the official 
assertion of the major educational requirement of the 
alliance with foreign capital: the supremacy of the English 
language as the educational language for all Singaporeans. 
The PAP-state increased the pressure to learn English and 
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science as it sought to overcome people's reluctance to do 
so. 
In December 1983, the PAP-state announced the "National 
stream" of education. That is, English-medium education 
would officially overwhelmingly predominate, even for 
ethnic minorities such as the Malays. All workers were 
forced to learn some English. Also, instead of some Malays 
failing through their own vernacular-medium education, they 
would all henceforth drop out of an English-medium system, 
thus saving the government the cost of Malay-medium 
schools. 
By 1985, the round figures for student enrolment in the 
various language medium streams were 97 per cent in 
English-medium and 3 per cent in Chinese-medium. Barely 
recordable were the 0.04 per cent enrolled in Malay-medium 
and 0.01 per cent in Tamil-medium (Shotam 1989: 510). 
The new system of education appears in total 
consonance with the economic requirements in terms of 
manpower provision. With the emphasis in English 
which will become the first language of 80 per cent of 
the primary I cohort and the remaining 20 per cent 
grounded in at least oral English, the harnessing on 
to science, technology and international business 
communication will satisfy the economic needs of the 
global economy. (Seah and Seah 1983: 262) 
At the same time, the government had to clear the path of 
bilingualism for English speakers whose second language was 
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not up to standard. Some were faltering on the thresholds 
of secondary school and university because they were 
failing their second language. The requirements for the 
second language at PSLE (primary School Leaving 
Examination) level and for entrance to university were 
therefore watered down in 1985 (ST 14 July 1985: 1). The 
government continued to be adamant that it was pursuing a 
bilingual policy (Tham 1989: 490). The dilution of the 
bilingual policy was also necessary for a patriarchal state 
because girls were achieving much higher linguistic 
standards than boys and thus gaining entrance to the 
university in greater numbers. 
As well as intensifying the meritocratic practices of the 
education system, the government also tried to extract more 
from the rejects of the education system. It put 
considerable effort into improving the skills of those who 
had already been rejected: the 60 per cent of the overall 
labour force without primary-level education. In 1979 the 
Skills Development Fund was set up.by imposing a levy on 
employers for each employee (Rodan 1989: 144). Other 
schemes were also started such as the Basic Education for 
Skill Training (BEST) programme. This began in July 1982 
with an initial intake of 500 workers who were taught 
English and mathematics up to Primary Six level by means of 
two sixty-hour courses (Chiew 1983: 253). 
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The Reserve Army of Labour 
As already noted, these educational initiatives were part 
of an attempt quickly to upgrade the quality, in 
meritocratic terms, of the total population. This process 
could not ignore the large numbers of migrant workers who 
had come to Singapore since the early 1970s. They were 
treated as a latent reserve being admitted for short 
periods and regularly rotated. They were not permitted to 
bring their families with them or to have offspring in 
singapore to be sorted by Singapore's education system. 
Migrant workers had been permitted to come to fill job 
vacancies created by rapid economic growth, and wages were 
~ 
kept low in labour-intensive, low value-added industries~.· 
These workers were concentrated in construction and the 
dirtier, more dangerous or more monotonous jobs. 
Officially, there were 40,000 foreign workers holding "work 
permits" in Singapore in 1978, but there may actually have 
been more than double that number (Asia Yearbook 1979: 
292). One estimate of Malaysians working in Singapore was 
as high as 120,000 (Rodan 1989: 138), but some of these may 
have been salaried "employment pass" holders, a category 
for business people, technicians and professionals not 
subject to nearly as severe discriminatory regulations as 
work- permit holders. Between 1970 and 1980 the proportion 
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of non-citizen, non-permanent residents went up from 2.9 to 
5.5 per cent of the total population (Yap 1989: 466). 
Regulations were already in place to prevent migrant 
workers from having access to PAP-state welfare and thus 
from acquiring a degree of permanence. Any work permit 
holder wishing to marry a singaporean had to gain 
government permission. This was rarely granted. If 
permission was granted and the worker had been in Singapore 
less than five years, then both husband and wife had to 
agree to be sterilised after their second child (Yap 1989: 
466) to prevent them disproportionately lowering the 
quality of the popula'i:ion. 
In 1978 there was still a labour shortage, with 
approximately 40,000 jobs being created each year and only 
about 30,000 Singapore workers entering the work force 
(Rodan 1989: 137). Nevertheless, the PAP-state's high-wage 
policy from 1978 was aimed at phasing out low-value-added 
industries, and it saw this as an opportunity to. cut its 
reliance on foreign labour. 
It especially wanted to cut out non-Chinese migrant workers 
altogether during this industrial restructuring. The 
government's euphemism to cover its racism was "non-
traditional sources". The traditional source was Malaysian 
Chinese, to whom many Singapore Chinese are related. The 
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PAP-state aimed to use the upgrading process to lessen its 
dependence on non-Chinese workers from other neighbouring 
countries. 
But by 1982 it was clear that the attempt to curtail 
foreign labour was undermining the PAP-state's support 
within the local capitalist class. The construction 
industry needed these workers (Asia Yearbook 1982: 232-3). 
The PAP-state relented but began to introduce ever more 
stringent measures to control migrant workers and to ensure 
they did not get a permanent toe-hold in Singapore. 
Thus from 1978, the PAP-state took major initiatives to 
improve the level of each educational stream, especially 
the academic and technical tertiary stream. It also took 
steps to raise the skill level of those who had already 
been sorted and failed. Furthermore, it tried to minimise 
the possibility of low-skilled Chinese foreigners 
contributing disproportionately to lowering the quality of 
the permanent population through their offspring. It tried 
to eliminate this possibility altogether for low-skilled 
non-Chinese foreigners. 
But two sections of the population that the PAP-state 
decided to target specifically in its intensification of 
meritocratic practices were women and the generation yet 
unborn. This policy was the most remarkable feature of the 
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PAP leadership's social engineering initiatives which 
accompanied the great leap forward. 
Ante-Natal streaming 
In his 1983 National Day address, Lee Kuan Yew expressed 
alarm that the well-educated in the population were 
reproducing at a slower rate that the less-educated. Women 
university graduates were averaging 1.65 children while 
uneducated women were averaging 3.5 children. If this 
continued, he declared, "levels of competence will decline. 
Our economy will suffer and the society will decline" (ST 
15 August 1983). 
Lee elaborated: 
We gave universal education to the first generation in 
the early 1960s. In the 1960s and 1970s, we reaped a 
big crop of able boys and girls. They came from 
bright parents, many of whom were never educated. In 
their parents' generation, the able and not-so-able 
both had large families. This is a once-ever bumper 
crop which is not likely to be repeated. 
For once, this generation of children from uneducated 
parents have received their education in the late 
1960s and 1970s and as the bright ones make it to the 
top, to tertiary levels, they will have less than two 
children per ever-married woman. They will not have 
large families like their parents (Lee Kuan Yew 1983: 
5) • 
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He was expressing a view consistent with meritocratic 
ideology elsewhere that "after several generations of 
meritocratic selection, those left at the bottom are, 
biologically speaking, the dregs" (Blum 1978: 178). Lee 
clearly believed that more than two decades of PAP sorting 
had seen the able and intelligent rise to positions of 
wealth and power in singapore society, while the rest had 
found their true level beneath. That is, the divisions 
between upper class, middle-class and working class now 
corresponded exactly with levels of intelligence. 
Furthermore, since he regarded intelligence as hereditary, 
the failure of those in the upper classes to breed in 
sufficient numbers to reproduce themselves was a threat to 
the PAP's ambition to build a developed industrialised 
country. The educational sorting mechanisms needed more 
high quality raw material. 
As we have seen before, such observations have an 
unavoidably racist implication. Those breeding too much 
were not. only working class, but ethnically were also 
mainly Malays and Indians. Lee must have noted that, while 
the early family planning policies aimed at the poor in the 
1960s and early 1970s had a devastating effect on the birth 
rates of Malays and Indians, their rates were moving back 
up to replacement level (Yap 1989: 462) which they reached 
in 1985. Meanwhile the Chinese rate continued to decline 
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and had been insufficient for replacement since 1975 (Yap 
1989: 457). 
A system of incentives and disincentives had been in place 
since the 1960s to prevent the working class from breeding 
too much. 
The disincentives were: an increase in delivery 
charges in government hospitals for each additional 
child beyond the second; no paid leave for working 
women expecting their third or subsequent child; no 
income tax relief for the fourth and subsequent 
children; large families not to be given priority in 
public housing and not to be allowed to sublet rooms 
in their HDB flats; and higher antenatal care fees for 
those women with two or more children. The incentives 
were benefits accruing to those who had undergone 
sterilisation, namely higher priority in the choice of 
primary school; waiver of delivery fees; paid medical 
leave, and unrecorded, full paid leave (Quah and Quah 
1989: 112-3). 
We have already noted in the earlier observations on 
eugenics, Lee's justifications for the later introduction 
of abortion and voluntary sterilisation in 1970. Abortion 
on demand was allowed from 1974. By 1983, the production 
of parents' sterilisation certificates at the start of 
primary school was a fact of life (Wilson 1978: 239). 
But Lee concluded these measures were not enough. The 
government needed to encourage educated Singaporeans to 
breed more, thus expanding "the talent poolll (ST 15 August 
1983). That is, he wanted the Chinese capitalist class to 
reach replacement level. In January 1984, the government 
377 
announced that graduate mothers with three or more children 
would receive top priority in registering their children in 
the best primary schools. In March, "working mothers" with 
a degree (i.e. not working class mothers) and a third child 
were given 30 per cent tax relief (Quah and Quah 1989: 
114). 
But working class women were not forgotten. In June the 
government stated it would pay $10,000 into the Central 
Provident Fund of any mother under thirty years of age with 
little or no education who was willing to be sterilised or 
ligated after their first or second child. Both parents 
had to be Singapore citizens or permanent residents with a 
combined income of under $1,500 per month. The money could 
be used towards the purchase of an HOB flat. There were 
311 enquiries on the first day this policy came into effect 
(Asiaweek 7 September 1984: 44; Quah and Quah 1989: 114). 
This income limit avoided a pitfall of the previous 
incentives to be sterilis~d: better educated women, that 
is, middle and upper class women, had disproportionately 
been willing to get sterilised and make use of the primary 
school priority registration. Non-graduate mothers 
(working class women) had not been so keen, so that by 1983 
there were 37,000 non-graduate mothers with four or more 
children and low incomes (Quah and Quah 1989: 114). The 
new policy of paying poor women to be sterilised was aimed 
378 
at reversing this situation and would, at the same time, 
tie the working class more tightly into public housing. 
This system of incentives and disincentives to breed was a 
sorting practice which amounted to a kind of ante-natal 
streaming. Working class parents were encouraged to choose 
to have only one or two children so as not to pollute the 
talent pool too much. Third and subsequent children were 
streamed out and not permitted to be born, by 
sterilisation, extra taxes and deposits on HDB flats. 
To ensure the availability of working class women for wage 
labour once they had bred up to the government limit, the 
suggestion of full-day schools for their offspring began to 
be raised from the early 1980s (Seah and Seah 1983: 249, 
262). until then, most schools ran two sessions daily. 
With children away all day instead of half a day, working 
class women would be able to go out to work without any 
child-care costs accruing to the state. Middle and upper 
class women employed foreign women, domestics, the lowest 
paid workers in Singapore to care for their children. 
Therefore the change in schooling pattern was primarily 
designed to obtain the labour power of working class women 
in the work place as well as in the home and to achieve 
this objective without increasing the costs of education 
and other welfare expenditure. In facti it was a way to 
cut the overall costs of reproducing the working class. 
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The government wanted to spend its resources on high 
quality children and therefore encouraged middle and upper 
class women to produce more of them. These children 
received preferential treatment from before birth and 
throughout their school careers. Before birth, they were 
placed in the academic stream. 
From Mother-Tongue to Father-Faith 
The PAP-state realised that the intensification of 
meritocratic practices from 1978, and their extension into 
the most personal aspects of people's lives, required a new 
degree of ideological legitimation in the face of 
continuing forms of non-cooperation in the education system 
and in the labour force. This realisation surfaced in the 
1978 Goh Report which concluded that the teaching of 
Education for Living and civics in the mother-tongue was, 
by itself, insufficient to instil traditional values in the 
young. The more intensive exploitation of their labour 
involved in upgrading the economy required an ideological 
basis for forcing people to stay in their social places and 
not seek escape. The PAP-state searched for a collective 
ethic to use against those who gave priority to their 
personal interest in avoiding increased exploitation and 
exercised their political rights to do so. 
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This initiative may have been related to a corresponding 
move in labour relations during the same period when Lee 
Kuan Yew called for greater "team spirit" among workers CST 
1 May 1981) and urged that the Japanese system of 
industrial relations be followed. Since there was a labour 
shortage in Singapore, workers regularly changed jobs in 
response to marginal incentives offered by rival employers. 
Foreign companies complained about job-hopping. Thus, an 
"East Asian" ethic of company loyalty was encouraged along 
with Japanese methods of raising productivity through 
increasing the exploitation of workers by means of more 
"collective" work methods such as quality control circles. 
Therefore, behind these government moves lay a new form of 
political struggle. In a situation of full employment, 
workers who could not escape their class position were 
nevertheless able to find the least exploitative job 
conditions available by choosing between employers. "Job-
hopping" forced foreign companies to compete with each 
other for workers by offering marginally better conditions. 
Since the PAP could not legislate to force workers to stay 
in their jobs without undermining the whole ideology of its 
wage labour system, it hoped to instil a higher degree of 
selfless obedience in the next generation of workers 
through its ideological formation of school students. The 
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PAP sought their long-term cooperation in their own 
exploitation. 
The Goh Report stressed "moral education" in addition to 
mother-tongue learning while also indicating that something 
more was needed in the area of cultural education. 
A society unguided by moral values can hardly be 
expected to remain cohesive under stress. It is a 
commitment to a common set of values that will 
determine the degree to which people of recent migrant 
origin will be willing and able to defend their 
collective interest. They will not be able to do this 
unless individuals belonging to the group are able to 
discern that an enlightened view of their long-term 
self-interest often conflicts with their desire for 
immediate gain. 
[W]hile moral education would help to give school 
children a set of values which could guide them in 
their adult life, this may not be sufficient to 
provide the cultural ballast to withstand the stresses 
of living in a fast changing society exposed to 
influences, good and bad, of an open society such as 
ours. With the large scale movement to education in 
English, the risk of deculturization cannot be 
ignored. One way to overcoming the danger of 
deculturization is to teach children the historical 
origins of their culture (Report of the Ministry of 
Education 1978). 
In 1979 a moral education programme was launched which had 
been developed by a Catholic priest. It dealt with an 
individual's awareness of self and of her or his relation 
to society. It encouraged young people to identify the 
values underlying the choices facing them, to make the 
choice they wanted and to accept the consequences. But 
some of their parents chose to vote for the opposition in 
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the 1981 Anson by-election, and the PAP-state decided this 
choice should not be encouraged. It stopped the programme. 
While the young people were being taught 
responsibility in decision-making, they were also 
being initiated in the concept of rights, individual 
and social. This was really too dangerous. In 1982 
the programme which had already been developed for 
secondaries one and two was stopped (Voices from 
Singapore December 1990: 3). 
The PAP-state then appeared to conclude that a moral and 
cultural grounding which would minimise the assertion of 
individual political rights could be supplied by the formal 
teaching of religion from an academic perspective. 
This unsentimental, pragmatic view of religion as a means 
of social control potentially at the disposal of the state 
was not disguised. The PAP-state's lack of sentiment for 
religious tradition had recently been well proven by the 
demolition of a 120-year old Chinese temple by the Housing 
and Development Board for a swimming complex. In 1977 the 
central Sikh temple had been destroyed for another HDB 
complex. Both acts had been strongly opposed by the 
respective religious communities (Asia Yearbook 1979: 289). 
In 1982, Education Minister Goh Keng Swee introduced 
compulsory religious education as an examination subject in 
secondary schools from 1984. Every student had to study at 
least one subject from a list which included Confucianism, 
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Islam, Hinduism, Buddhism and Christianity. At the same 
time the general population was subjected to an extended 
government campaign on Confucian ethics, relating the topic 
to the use of Mandarin and to Chinese identity. This was 
the government's ideological conditioning of Chinese 
singaporeans for the 1984 general elections: an attempt to 
stem the electoral tide towards the opposition which the 
Second Industrial Revolution had accelerated. It was a 
response to political struggle and the message was that 
parliamentary opposition was not merely un-Asian but anti-
Asian. 
In the third quarter of 1982, eight Confucian scholars 
were invited by the Ministry of Education to help 
draft guidelines for the subject of Confucian Ethics. 
They gave public talks on the subject in English and 
Mandarin, and held discussions with relevant bodies 
such as the Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences of the 
National University of Singapore. The Chinese dailies 
published, almost every day for months, articles and 
comments on the subject .... [S]ome of these Confucian 
scholars (from the United States) expressed their 
impressions obtained from ethnic Chinese pupils in the 
secondary schools they visited that most Chinese would 
choose to study Confucian ethics (Chiew 1983: 257; my 
emphasis). 
In other words, the PAP-state succeeded in letting Chinese 
students know that another subject of merit was Confucian 
Ethics and that there was no doubt at all that this was 
their cultural heritage. Since it was expected that 
students would take the subject most relevant to their own 
cultural heritage, the majority of Chinese were thereby 
induced to take courses in Confucian ethics, which stressed 
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the moral rectitude of loyalty to the patriarchal state 
even at the expense of one's personal well-being. 
Confucius, according to Goh Keng Swee, "believed that 
unless the government is in the hands of upright men, 
disaster will befall the country. By the way, in this 
respect, the PAP also believes the same thing" (ST 4 
February 1982). The implication was that if a government 
is in the hands of "upright men" like the PAP, then it 
should not be questioned but respected and obeyed (Rodan 
1989: 172-3). Announcing the scheme, Goh Keng Swee 
threatened that any parents who did not want their children 
to study any religion or system of ethics would be 
personally interviewed by him (FEER 19 October 1989). 
This use of religion also had a deeper purpose beyond that 
of undermining immediate parliamentary dissent or inducing 
conformity in the young. Confucianism and the major 
religious traditions all sanctify hierarchical, patriarchal 
familial relations. Thus, this ideological reinforcement 
of male power was also aimed at the increasing opposition 
of women who were refusing to breed and work at the new 
intensity required by the PAP. 
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Political Achievements of Meritocratic Intensification 
The more rigorous and targeted sorting practices of the new 
education system achieved some useful results for the PAP-
state. Educational levels improved. 
TABLE 5.2: EDUCATIONAL LEVELS 
(% total labour force) 
less than primary secondary post-secondary tertiary 
1974 40.3 19.7 6.2 2.4 
1985 22.8 29.3 11.0 5.2 
Source: Linda Lim 1989: 178. 
However, these levels remained markedly behind those of 
singapore's competitors. South Korea and Taiwan remained 
far ahead in tertiary education (FEER 25 August 1988: 59; 
Linda Lim 1989: 179). Those educated to university level 
in Singapore constitute 12 to 13 per cent of the 
population, compared to 32 per cent in South Korea and 20 
per cent in Thailand (Elegant 1989: 18). 
The political effects of this sharp intensification of 
exploitation and social control were also very clear in 
terms of the social structure and of suppressing struggle. 
Salaff's study of Singapore families before and after the 
launching of the "second stage" economy showed three major 
effects: the reinforcement of the class structure, the 
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increased use by the poor of welfare mechanisms, including 
the education system, and further fragmentation of the 
working class. 
She discovered that poor parents used the school system 
more than previously, but that their children remained at 
the bottom of it. She noted their disadvantages in 
planning their childrens' education, in employing tutors 
for private tuition and in choosing schools (Salaff 1988: 
249). 
Salaff's examination of the new skills training programmes 
showed that the poor !lare least likely to upgrade their 
jobs through training programmes" and that men without 
diplomas could not compete for the better jobs (Salaff 
1988: 230, 263). She found that few firms hired women 
graduates of training programmes and that working class 
women were generally doomed to low wage labour (Salaff 
1988: 234). 
A family's ability to buy a home in the public sector 
and the extent of its use of educational and family 
planning programmes turn on income, education and 
property •... Thus the Singapore development strategy 
has changed outward appearances of family life-style 
more than internal relations .... families retain their 
distinct positions in the class structure and in wage 
labour (Salaff 1988: 262). 
with the attempt to upgrade skills, the opportunities for 
upward social mobility were taken by some better-off 
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elements of the working class and of the lower middle 
class. According to Salaff, this only worsened the 
fragmentation of the working class. 
[N]ow that sections of the formerly poor are 
advancing, and with the meritocracy as the overarching 
ideology, the community of the poor is not cohesive. 
Families that have bettered themselves contract their 
ties to a small circle .... [V]ery poor families have 
lost their supportive community (Salaff 1988: 268). 
other writers have also noted the sudden increase in 
poverty and inequality. 
Between 1979 and 1983, income inequality widened 
between workers in different occupations and between 
workers with different educational qualifications. By 
1983 the average earnings of administrative and 
managerial personnel were five times more than those 
of production and service personnel (Bello and 
Rosenfeld 1990: 331). 
Therefore, in terms of the PAP's political agenda, there 
were positive developments. Educational and skill levels 
were improved, though not enough. At the same time the 
working class was tied more firmly into the educational 
sorting mechanisms, and its capacity for class solidarity 
was further undermined by increased inequality. 
It would appear from early trends that initiatives for 
ante-natal streaming of the working class were also having 
the desired effect. But the associated attempt to raise 
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the fertility of capitalist class (educated) women failed 
(Yap 1989: 470). 
The imposition of Confucian ethics achieved some degree of 
legitimation of the PAP-state's welfare objectives. The 
sudden concern to re-assert patriarchal relations through 
emphasis on the extended family and filial piety, which the 
PAP-state had previously been instrumental in breaking 
down, included the pedestrian aim of relieving the 
government of the increasing cost of welfare expenditure on 
the elderly (Linda Lim 1989: 180). This came at a time 
when it wanted to increase its funding of infrastructural 
developments. 
The government's promotion of filial piety was 
certainly to some extent motivated by the expected 
shortfall in land available for public housing. It 
also provided justification for government attempts to 
curtail welfare spending which would enable increased 
expenditure on economic development (Rodan 1989: 173). 
This enlargement of the nuclear family by tacking on 
elderly parents, was an attempt to lower the overall cost 
of welfare by loading more costs on to the primary social 
unit. This objective was eloquently expressed by Senior 
Minister Rajaratnam: 
We want to teach people the government is not a rich 
uncle. You get what you pay for. We are moving in 
the direction of making people pay for 
everything .... We want to disabuse people of the notion 
that in a good society the rich must pay for the poor 
(Vasil 1984: 168). 
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This was not a genuine attempt to recreate the extended 
family, since that would entail the recreation of 
autonomous communities with their web of kinship 
relationships. Not only would such a development be 
against the social control interests of the PAP, but it 
would also be impossible without major changes to 
Singapore's capitalist social relations. 
However, Confucian ethics and religious instruction in 
schools was primarily concerned with legitimating the new 
level of exploitation by engendering obedience and loyalty 
and reinforcing patriarchal relations against the interests 
of women. The success of this primary aim was doubtful. 
By 1985 it was clear that PAP-state's rigorous control of 
the centralised education system had indeed enabled it to 
initiate rapid change to meet the labour requirements of a 
high technology economy. 
The new educational programmes overtly support the 
high technology economy_ ~hey not only train the next 
generation of workers and structure their goals for 
the future but also bring parents at each class level 
into the social order in support of the second stage 
economy (Salaff 1988: 264). 
But it was also clear that Singapore had fallen short of 
the Objective and new contradictions had arisen. 
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A crisis of Legitimacy 
By late 1985, the contradictions of the PAP's policies had 
produced political effects which amounted to a crisis of 
legitimacy. The struggles which had arisen resulted from 
contradictions between the strategies for reproducing the 
class structure, for reinforcing the subordination of women 
and for racial domination. Aspects of all these strategies 
had been implemented within the education system in a way 
which sharpened conflicts of interest and undermined the 
ideological legitimacy of the process of social sorting. 
with the recession in 1985, the PAP could no longer 
disguise the fact that the crisis in social relations had 
undermined its accumulation strategy. The PAP-state faced 
a crisis of considerable proportions. We will now examine 
the contradictions behind the struggles which emerged, 
before looking at how the PAP-state has sought to restore 
its legitimacy. 
Education and Class 
The ideological power of meritocratic sorting comes, as we 
have seen, from its appearance as a natural social ordering 
'process and from its appearance of being in the interests 
of all individuals. The Second Industrial Revolution's 
sudden shift of policy, necessary to forestall the dissent 
arising from fifteen years of the EOI policy, meant it was 
not possible to portray these objectives as always in the 
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interests of the groups singled out. The sharp, ruthless 
and explicit targeting of different sectors of society for 
different treatment revealed the PAP's real political 
objectives. Neither was it possible for these developments 
to seem a natural progression of existing practice. Far 
from negating rising opposition, the Second Industrial 
Revolution further stimulated it. 
For example, the ideological impact of early streaming was 
to heighten the sense of competition at all levels of 
education and to increase the fear of failure as well as, 
for the working class Chinese and Malays, the certainty of 
failure. This certainty began to undermine the ideological 
assumption of equal opportunity. The priority scheme for 
children of graduate mothers alienated both educated women 
(i.e. of the upper and middle classes) who felt classified 
as mere breeding machines, and working class women who felt 
deeply discriminated against. 
The most visible manifestations of the struggles which 
created this crisis included electoral opposition, with the 
loss of the 1981 by-election and a twelve per cent swing 
against the PAP in the 1984 general election. In addition, 
by the mid-1980s, about 2,000 families per year were 
emigrating to western countries. After 1985 the outflow 
increased considerably, and the government estimate of 
around 10,000 families between 1986 and 1989 is probably a 
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very conservative figure (STW 21 January, 26 August, 16 
December 1989). In 1989 itself, an estimated 4,700 
families (16,000 people) emigrated (Elegant 1989: 18), a 
figure proportionately not far below the exodus of the 
middle and upper classes from Hongkong, who faced an 
uncertain future with China (The Economist 10 March 1990: 
37) • 
This loss of educated Singaporeans represented a serious 
blow to the PAP's industrialisation policy of upgrading the 
educational level of the population. Lee Kuan Yew spent 
much of his 1989 National Day address on this issue, making 
a very emotional appeal for loyalty. The straits Times 
headline read: "PM, close to tears, tells nation: 
singaporeans must have conviction that this is their 
country and their life". Directly addressing emigrants, 
Lee declared: "You are a washout." The foreign media 
noted, "leaving is perhaps the cruelest of opposition 
gestures" (The Economist 11 November 1989: 41). 
Escape as a form of struggle reflects the realisation of 
the middle class that their or their children's chances of 
joining the capitalist class are minimal. Mass emigration 
indicates a breakdown in the educational ideology of 
meritocracy as well as a conflict between the political 
needs of capitalism in a neo-colony and the ideology of 
bourgeois liberal democracy. People realised that no 
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matter how often they voted against it, the PAP would not 
relinquish control. While it relies on the forms of 
liberal democracy for its legitimacy, it cannot loosen 
political control if its accumulation strategy, its 
alliance with imperialism and its political hegemony are to 
be guaranteed. 
patriarchy and capitalism 
By 1985 the PAP-state also faced struggles arising from the 
failure of its linkage of population policy to educational 
practices in order to reproduce the class structure. The 
results of ante-natal streaming showed that, while the 
government could to some degree discourage poor Chinese 
women from breeding, it had less effect on racial 
minorities, especially Malay women. Also, its attempts to 
raise fertility among the better educated had largely 
failed (Yap 1989: 470). 
Over the long-term, the Population Planning unit of the 
Ministry of Health estimated, on the basis.of the birth 
rate, a 25 per cent decline in the 15-29 age group from 
816,000 in 1985 to 619,000 by the year 2000. In 1986, 60 
per cent of clerical workers, 40 per cent of production 
workers and 30 per cent of all service workers were under 
30 years of age. Hence the manufacturing, financial and 
services sectors would be hard hit by this decline (FEER 25 
August 1988). Combined with the slow rise in educational 
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levels, this trend made the government's short-term aim of 
having 20 per cent of the labour force in professional or 
technical jobs by 1995, compared to less than 14 per cent 
in 1980, look increasingly unrealistic (The Economist 15 
August 1987: 22). The total population was forecast to 
peak in 2010 at 2.9 million and then decline by the end of 
the century to half its present size (Asia Yearbook 1988: 
223) • 
In short, the PAP-state faced a crisis not only of its 
attempt to improve the skills of the existing labour force 
but of maintaining the class and race structure of that 
force over the long term. The reproduction and 
strengthening of a highly educated Chinese meritocratic 
capitalist class was threatened by the exodus of Chinese 
professionals and the refusal of the remaining educated 
Chinese women to reproduce their race and class at 
replacement rate. A declining proportion of Chinese in the 
population would undermine the legitimacy of a Chinese 
capitalist class in a Malay region. 
But the political objectives of the ante-natal streaming 
policy need to be placed primarily in the context of the 
PAP-state's aim of extracting the maximum potential labour 
power from women. Put bluntly, it wanted more labour from 
working class women and fewer of their babies, and it 
wanted both more labour and more babies from middle and 
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upper class women. That iS I the government had identified 
women who were not presently in wage labour as a 
significant labour source as well as being crucial to its 
eugenics strategy for reproducing workers. Working class 
women with fewer babies would pollute the talent pool less 
and be more available for wage labour, much of it part-time 
and low paid with below average welfare costs, thus 
generating greater surplus value. 
The refusal of middle and upper class Chinese women to 
reproduce was the main form of struggle behind the failure 
of this PAP policy. They refused in a number of ways: by 
not getting married at alII by marrying late and having few 
children, if any, or by escaping the PAP-state's breeding 
controls altogether. The latter option included 
emigration, marriage to a foreigner, or both. The social 
and political sanctions against unmarried women having 
children have rendered the single parent family without 
patriarchal dominance almost impossible. 
The openly discriminatory nature of the graduate mother 
scheme, arising from its explicit connection between class 
and educational privilege l was a major stimulus of this 
struggle. But the conflict between patriarchy and 
capitalism went deeper than this one policy. 
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It is first necessary to understand the priority of the 
patriarchal system of social relations as control of 
women's breeding. 
Patriarchy's dynamic power is centred in the controls 
which are developed to limit women's options in 
relation to motherhood and mothering (Eisenstein 
1980:46). 
The first appropriation of private property [in human 
history] consists of the appropriation of the labour 
of women as reproducers (Lerner 1986: 52; her 
emphasis). 
In contrast, the priorities of capitalist social relations 
are the exploitation of labour power in the work place and 
of unpaid labour in the home. Thus, women in Singapore are 
required for their reproductive labour, their wage labour 
and their unpaid domestic labour. Working class women are 
under pressure to deliver all these forms of labour. 
Middle and upper class women are under pressure to deliver 
more babies than working class women as well as to engage 
in paid work. However, often they employ foreign women as 
domestic workers and are thereby increasingly freed from 
such unpaid work themselVes. Through the levy paid to the 
government I which is in addition to the maids' wages, the 
PAP-state has ensured that educated women reimburse the 
cost of reproducing this labour. 
Thus, Singapore women are subject to two systems of power 
organising in relation to each other. Eisenstein points 
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out how conflicts between patriarchy and capitalism are 
proof of the autonomy that each system must have from the 
other in order for each to act in the interests of both. 
otherwise they tend to undermine each other (Eisenstein 
1980: 52). 
Referring to the United states, she examines particular 
conflicts 
as representative of the tensions between the 
capitalist economy (and its supportive liberal values 
of equal opportunity and rugged individualism) and the 
patriarchal relations of the hierarchically-organised 
sexual division of labour and its related protective 
values. The state's objective is to try and create 
cohesion between these systems as they need to 
function as one, with one set of 
priorities ... protecting the capitalist patriarchal 
order. But at present the cohesion is disrupted by 
conflicts between the relations of patriarchy and the 
ideology of liberalism, i.e., the lack of opportunity 
for women in patriarchy vs. the ideology of equal 
opportunity; the relations of capitalism and the 
ideology of patriarchy, i.e., the need for women wage 
workers vs. the ideology of woman in the home; and 
between the ideology of patriarchy and the ideology of 
liberalism, i.e., the ideology of women's inequality 
vs. the image of equal opportunity (Eisenstein 1980: 
53) • 
These tensions exist in Singapore. As women have 
internalised the capitalist ideology of meritocracy with 
its individualistic values through their involvement in 
education, they have come into conflict with hierarchical 
male dominance both at home and in the work place. The 
pressure to work has emphasised the similarity between 
husband and employer in terms of subordination. The 
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pressure to breed has exacerbated the contradiction between 
personal achievement through paid labour and the 
patriarchal state's appropriation of their reproductive 
labour. These conflicts have undermined patriarchal 
relations just when the development of capitalism to a new 
stage needed them. 
The government's promotion of patriarchal ethics and 
religion also back-fired by sharpening the contradictions 
between patriarchy and capitalism. The social ethics of 
Confucianism and major religious traditions, with the 
exception of forms of Christianity deeply influenced by 
capitalism, are generally based on the pre-capitalist self-
sufficient home where the patriarchal family was an 
integral part of the system of production. However, "the 
capitalist patriarchal family is based on the distinction 
between domestic and wage labour, and hence is represented 
ideologically as separate and apart from the world of work 
(wage labour)" (Eisenstein 1980: 50). 
Religious education undermined the ideological separation 
of home and work, as did the explicit PAP demands to 
produce more children for the work force. There was a 
widespread feeling among women that the state had intruded 
too far into personal matters (Quah and Quah 1989: 114). 
Thus, many middle class Chinese women were prepared 
publicly to oppose Confucian ethics as anachronistic, 
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oppressive and alien. Some Chinese Christian women were 
drawn to liberation theology and Christian feminism as an 
ideological critique of PAP policy. Since the PAP-state 
had officially encouraged religious education within the 
state education system, it could not immediately suppress 
this dissent which the contradictions of its own policies 
had stimulated. 
Middle and upper class women were able to vent their 
opposition to the linkage between breeding, education and 
religion because they faced less risk of censure and could 
do so without directly attacking the PAP's accumulation 
strategy. Probably, their greater investment in 
meritocratic education made them more aware of the 
contradictions than working class women, who were not only 
more exploited but also subject to greater social control. 
Thus, bourgeois women did not connect their dissent to 
class and race in a fundamental critique of PAP economic 
policy. For example, the alternative policy of expanding 
welfare provisions to ensure greater educational 
opportunities for the disadvantaged after they were born, 
and thereby obtaining the required talent from all sectors 
of society, was not central to their critique. Therefore, 
even with regard to a deeply unpopular policy, the 
government did not lose the political initiative 
completely. Nevertheless, women did not cooperate with its 
breeding policies. 
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Racism and Class 
The racist priority of the PAP-state to reproduce the 
Chinese capitalist class faced, as we have noted, the 
contradiction of an increase in the Malay and Indian birth 
rate. Since the overwhelming majority of these races are 
consigned to the working class by the education system, the 
refusal of women of these races to put up with state 
control of their mothering by cutting their reproduction 
rate, can be seen as an act of political resistance: a 
long-term attack on the capitalist class as a Chinese 
preserve. 
The linkage of education to reproduction patterns in the 
graduate mothers was detected as racist by Malays who were 
aware of their low achievement rate in the education 
system. The public emphasis on Mandarin and Confucianism 
during this period also alienated them, as it clearly 
exhibited the racial priorities of the government. 
Furthermore, the PAP exacerbated these tensions by imposing 
religious education. This added another explosive factor 
to the fraught equation between ethnicity and language 
which the government had already politicised within the 
education system. Now each student's official 
classification according to ethnicity, language and 
religion determined at least two of the subjects taken and 
also the chances of educational success. Malays were 
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forced to take Malay language as their second language and 
Islamic studies as their religious subject. Neither had 
any value in the scheme of the PAP's political economy, a 
fact made abundantly clear by the PAP's constant and almost 
exclusive emphasis on Mandarin and Confucianism. 
The combination of racism and class discrimination suffered 
by Malays ensured strong electoral opposition from this 
community. This added to the PAP's crisis of legitimacy. 
Their disloyalty did not go unnoticed by the PAP as we have 
seen from the racial quotas imposed in HOB estates soon 
after. But the PAP was not fundamentally concerned about 
this minority (or the smaller Indian community), which it 
could suppress relatively easily, provided Malays did not 
increase their numbers as a proportion of the total 
population. It would appear that the PAP realised it would 
never have legitimacy in the eyes of the Malay working 
class. It thus merely aimed to contain them within the 
lower sections of that class, including the latent reserve, 
while ensuring that a token few entered the capitalist 
class to enhance the legitimacy of the PAP's multiracial 
image. 
Regulation of foreign workers was the other focus of state 
racist practices. Employment-pass holders, overwhelmingly 
Caucasian and Chinese middle class professionals and 
business people from Malaysia and elsewhere, were able to 
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bring their families to singapore, to marry singaporeans, 
to use the education system and to join the CPF (an 
incentive to foreigners who could take out the total amount 
in cash on departure). Work permit holders, mainly 
working class production workers, construction labourers 
and domestics, from Malaysia, Thailand, Indonesia, the 
Philippines and Sri Lanka, were stringently controlled and 
routinely denied the rights accorded employment-pass 
holders. This fragmentation of the working class, 
engendered by racist policies, had advantages in cementing 
social control over the whole class. 
But, by 1985, the PAP faced a crisis arising from the 
contradictions of its own policies of encouraging 
communalism, class discrimination and patriarchal 
domination. By linking these policies within the education 
system, it had stimulated the growth of new struggles 
against itself and ensured the failure of its revolution. 
The Failure of the Revolution 
The failure of the Second Industrial Revolution became 
starkly obvious in 1985 with hardly any technological 
upgrading of the economy taking place, a 40 per cent 
decline in investment and slackening demand for its 
manufactured products. singapore suffered its worst 
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recession in twenty years, and its gross domestic product 
declined by almost two per cent (Bello and Rosenfeld 1990: 
299). The high wage policy had forced many Singaporean 
companies out of business and caused foreign investors to 
seek cheap labour elsewhere. 
unit labour costs [in Singapore] rose by 40 per cent 
in 1980-85, four times faster than in Taiwan and the 
US, while South Korea's costs stayed the same and 
Hongkong's actually fell (Asia Yearbook 1987: 236). 
with the prospect of a highly skilled labour force still 
decades away despite the refinement of the educational 
sorting mechanisms, Singapore's labour remained less 
educated and less skilled than its main competitors while 
its cost was greater (Linda Lim 1989: 179). Thus, the new 
educational practices had failed to achieve their goals. 
If the PAP-state leadership had harboured any illusions 
about its partnership with foreign capital being a 
relationship between equals, these had been dispelled. 
[I]n reality foreign capital was the undisputed senior 
partner in the alliance, as underlined by the dismal 
results of the PAP state's ambitious effort to upgrade 
Singapore's industrial structure from labour-intensive 
to high-tech manufacturing in the 1980-85 period 
(Bello and Rosenfeld 1990: 297). 
The PAP-state discovered that it could not, of its own 
volition, change its role in the partnership with foreign 
capital. It had to continue to accept a subsidiary 
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position. In particular l increased dependence on Japanese 
investment and the reluctance of this capital to upgrade 
its technological quality forced a shift in the alliance 
with imperialism that the PAP-state was not ready to deal 
with. 
The task facing the government in 1985 was to regain 
international competitiveness and to consolidate its 
position at the leading edge of NIC production. We have 
already noted in the Chapter Three how the PAP took steps 
to achieve this. But it also had to shore up its political 
legitimacy at home to overcome the struggles which had 
caused the failure of its economic strategy. 
RESTORING LEGITIMACY: PRIVATISING THE POLITICS OF EDUCATION 
After a period of reassessment I the PAP-state took a range 
of steps to restore its legitimacy. In education, this 
adjustment is not obvious from the priorities and content 
of the educational practices. The requirements of the 
alliance with foreign capital continued to be consolidated. 
However I the education system was de-linked from its 
explicit connections with the class-based state-breeding 
strategies which had previously undermined its legitimating 
405 
meritocratic ideology. Instead the PAP-state moved to 
integrate more systematically its control of women's· 
reproductive labour with immigration policy to ensure the 
long-term consolidation of the Chinese capitalist class and 
to meet its adjusted prescription for the structure of the 
working class. The PAP-state also distanced itself from 
direct political responsibility for the educational process 
of sorting class agents into their class positions. It 
began a programme of privatisation of education. At the 
same time, the PAP-state re-aligned its communalist 
education strategy to suppress current political 
resistance. Finally, it sought to achieve ideological 
hegemony through the formalisation of a state ideology and 
it gave up the attempt at using religion for this purpose. 
The above actions were the major initiatives taken to 
restore the legitimacy of the education system and of the 
PAP. They did not address the fundamental contradictions 
of PAP policy. Rather they constituted a counter-attack on 
the forms of struggle which had arisen and which were the 
political manifestations of these contradictions. After 
1985, we can observe the PAP-state counter-attacking each 
kind of political resistance, not only those which surfaced 
in education. 
For example, it also adjusted the mechanisms for the legal 
expression of dissent, this is, voting in parliamentary 
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elections. As we noted in Chapter Four, the government 
introduced the Town council scheme to prevent HOB residents 
from casting opposition votes without a cost to themselves 
in terms of services and property values. As we will see 
in the next chapter, it restructured the electoral system 
to prevent opposition votes being translated into 
opposition seats, and it criminalised opposition politics 
to discourage anyone from standing for these seats. 
In this section we will examine each initiative in turn: 
the consolidation of educational priorities in accordance 
with the political economy; the adjusted strategies for 
reproducing the capitalist class and the working class; the 
privatisation of education; the re-alignment of communalist 
policies; and the formalisation of a state ideology. 
Consolidation of Educational Priorities 
since 1985 there have been several.reports re-affirming the 
educational priorities of the Second Industrial Revolution. 
The 1986 Economic Committee report called for a more 
skilled and creative labour force. This was responding to 
the realisation that, even to keep at the leading edge of 
NIC production, something more had to be done about the 
fact that roughly half the Singapore labour force still had 
only primary-level education or less and also that National 
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University of Singapore graduates were better at following 
manuals than dealing with concepts or thinking for 
themselves (FEER 25 August 1988i STW 25 March 1989: 12). A 
1990 report Building a Firm Foundation was based on a study 
of Japan and Taiwan and recommended a more rigorous 
streaming process, single session schools, teacher 
upgrading and more moral education (STW 4 August 1990). 
The Minister of Education went on record that "there was a 
need for singapore's education system to move away from the 
British-American model - which provides a general liberal 
education for all - to one akin to the German-Swiss system 
which stresses technical and/or vocational education for 
the majority of students" (STW 28 July 1990). He later 
stated: 
It is clear, therefore, that maintaining and, indeed, 
improving levels of achievement in Mathematics and 
English must be a primary task of the Ministry of 
Education. If levels of achievement in these two 
subjects drop, we will suffer an overall decline in 
the educational performance of our children, which 
will have long term adverse economic consequences for 
Singapore (STW 17 November 1990). 
These statements and reports show no deviation from 
previous practices, only refinements and re-affirmations of 
them. In spite of popular resistance, the PAP remained 
committed to increasing social control through more 
rigorous sorting, and forcing through an educational agenda 
politicised by its links with imperialism. 
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In line with these priorities, there were steps to 
nimprove lt the education system, such as the establishment 
of a second university (STW 7 March 1990), and students at 
the National University of Singapore were awarded marks for 
speaking in tutorials as a way to promote creativity (STW 
13 October 1990: 7). More worker training schemes were 
launched, such as the Worker Improvement through Secondary 
Education (WISE) programme set up in 1987 to give the 
600,000 eligible workers, 53 per cent of the labour force 
(including the 23 per cent who had no schooling at all), 
basic competence in English and mathematics (Asia Yearbook 
1987: 236; The Economist 15 August 1987; GOS 1989a: 196). 
The main innovations in educational content reflected the 
shift in the internationalisation of capital. The growing 
importance of Japanese and European capital in a multipolar 
imperialist alliance was recognised in the opportunistic 
encouragement of French, German and Japanese language 
learning. This was the PAP's formal acknowledgement in 
educational practice of the need to attract more capital 
from the European Community and Japan (STW 1, 22, 29 
September 1990). 
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Bourgeois Women in Labour: De-Linking Education 
The PAP did not draw back at all from its determination to 
reproduce the Chinese capitalist class. Neither did it 
lessen the pressure on middle and upper class Chinese women 
to have more babies. If anything, the pressure increased 
as a major source of racial replenishment was drying up. 
Educated Malaysian Chinese now, in Lee Kuan Yew's words, 
"leap-frogged" singapore for the west (STW 26 August 1989). 
But, in 1985, the government did withdraw the graduate 
mother priority scheme in the face of sustained public 
anger. It continued to pursue the same objectives but 
without the explicit link between class and educational 
privilege that this scheme demonstrated. Instead of using 
educational qualifications to target the class of women it 
wanted to breed, and instead of using priority entry for 
their children as an incentive, the PAP-state switched to 
targetting income levels. 
In 1987, the government introduced income-related 
incentives for bourgeois women to have children. Tax 
relief for a third child was increased and a tax rebate of 
$20,000 added. That is, if your household income was 
sufficient to attract more than $20,000 in tax, then you 
received that amount back as a rebate. In 1988, tax 
reliefs for children were doubled to $1,500 and extended to 
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a fourth child. The same rebate was made available for a 
fourth child (STW 11 March 1989, 16 June 1990). In 1990, a 
tax rebate of $20,000 was offered for couples who have 
their second child early and the five year claim period for 
the $20,000 rebate for third and fourth children was 
extended to seven years (STW 22 December 1990). Although 
the child reliefs were aimed at maintaining the birth rate 
of the Chinese working class, the major incentives of tax 
rebates could only apply to those on high salaries, since 
only they paid sufficient tax to qualify for the rebates. 
This was a policy switch from targeting class reproduction 
through educational levels to targeting it directly through 
income levels. It was a variation on the previously noted 
income targeting of the poorest in the working class for 
sterilisation whereby a maximum income level established 
eligibility for sterilisation cash incentives. 
This tax strategy avoided the odium attracted by the 
graduate mothers scheme. As Lee Kuan Yew pointe~ out when 
congratulating the new generation of PAP leadership I the 
same political objective had been reached by other means: 
Giving them [graduate mothers] preference for their 
children in school became very unpopular and very 
objectionable. So do we change? All right, we 
concede. But the principle to get more educated women 
to have more children has not changed. And income tax 
reliefs have been given, which means it's all fair, in 
accordance with what you pay the government. 
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If you don't pay, then obviously you can't afford to 
be given relief. So in that.way, they [the new PAP 
leaders] have been able to get their objectives •••. We 
have given not blanket incentives, not maternity leave 
for the third child which will encourage people who 
can't afford the third child to have one. So we give 
it to those who can afford •.•• It has produced 
results. That is the joy of working for Singapore 
(STW 1 September 1990). 
Differentiation on the basis of class through income was 
ideologically acceptable to Singaporeans because it 
accorded with the ideological effect of meritocratic 
practices. A person's individual economic success was 
perceived as determined by their individual ability and 
efforts. The decision as to whether to take advantage of 
financial incentives was also seen as a personal one, not a 
discriminatory policy imposed by the state. 
Having removed the ideologically damaging link with 
education, the PAP-state then went on the offensive. In a 
speech to a university audience on 12 December 1986, Lee 
Kuan Yew expressed concern about the step before breeding: 
marriage. That is, not enough single educated women were 
getting married: 39 per cent of women with a tertiary 
education were choosing to remain single. He also produced 
charts to show the "lop-sided" birth rate with Malays more 
than reproducing themselves, Indians nearly doing so and 
Chinese far behind. He further showed that the children of 
graduate mothers and graduate fathers were consistently at 
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the top of all educational levels, ahead even of those 
whose fathers but not mothers were graduates. 
The primary, if convoluted, message to the assembled 
students was directed at male students, telling them to 
avoid marriage to non-graduate women: 
[R]emember when you get married, be prepared, as 
Bernard Shaw says to an actress, to have your daughter 
as stupid as your wife and as ugly as you instead of 
as pretty as your wife and as smart as you. Now if 
you're satisfied with that, then marry her and vice 
versa. If you are not, then think again because there 
are shared attributes. Some 250,000 genes go into one 
chromosome. They don't come from outer space. It's 
the method of biological transmission whether it's 
fruits, animals or human beings (ST 16 December 1986: 
25) . 
Lee recognised that in a patriarchal society, men can, by 
marriage, raise women of inferior class status to their own 
class level. The reverse can rarely happen. This 
mechanism for acquiring the reproductive labour of working 
class women is in conflict with the meritocratic practices 
of capitalism. It lessened the pressure on educated women 
to have their reproductive capacities appropriated by men 
of their own class. 
Furthermore, it seemed that middle and upper class men were 
showing an increasing preference for their female social 
"inferiors". Local educated men were apparently reluctant 
to marry women educated to an equal standard as themselves, 
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because these women had internalised the individualism of 
meritocracy. They were a threat to patriarchal relations 
within the family. Lee sought to close off this form of 
female escape from social control by encouraging men to 
marry within their class. 
Lee also re-affirmed that the government would not waste 
money on an equal standard of education for the working 
class: 
Do these statistics lie? Every year it can be 
repeated. The West knows this. But the Western 
liberal says let's not talk about it, then we won't 
spend money on those who need that extra help. Well, 
maybe they can lavish their resources away. We can't. 
We've got to know what are the profiles. What returns 
for what investment (ST 15 December 1986: 19). 
The above encouragement to stUdents to marry within their 
class (and therefore race) and the statement that the 
government would spend money on them rather than the poor 
were not, of course, particularly offensive to them or the 
English-educated public. 
The outcry came when Lee turned to the problem that upper 
class marriages, even if properly intra-class, yielded few 
children. He appeared to endorse an obvious solution. 
Three years ago I was talking to some journalists, 
analysing these figures for them .... And [a woman 
journalist] said to me, "But, Prime Minister, if a man 
wants to marry me for my genes, I don't want to marry 
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him." And I thought to myself, "What a silly ass of a 
girl." 
When the Japanese zaibatsu chairman says, "Find me a 
son-in-law" to the vice-minister, he is wanting to 
ensure that his grandchildren will measure up. And 
the way the old society did it was by polygamy. The 
successful .•. had more than one wife. In fact, you can 
have as many as your economic status entitles you or 
can persuade people to give their daughters up to you. 
In other words, the unsuccessful are like the weak 
lions or bucks in a herd, they were neutralised. 
So over the generations you must have the physically 
and the mentally more vibrant and vital reproduce. We 
are doing just the opposite. We introduced monogamy. 
It seems so manifestly correct. The West was 
successful, superior. Why? Because they are 
monogamous? It was wrong. It was stupid. 
When Mr Tanaka was asked in the Japanese Diet five, 
six years ago, "You've got another mistress with 
children there?" he nodded in vehement agreement. He 
said, "That's quite right." And the more Tanakas 
there are in Japan, I have no doubt the more dynamic 
will be Japanese society (ST 15 December 1986: 19). 
Four years later, in his final National Day address as 
prime minister, Lee again addressed a form of political 
struggle by women which offended his racial sensibilities 
and raised the spectre of a significant non-chinese 
presence in the capitalist class: the marriage of educated 
women within their class but to Caucasian foreigners. He 
warned: 
The Singapore woman is not stupid. She knows that 
white men marry you freely, they also divorce you 
freely. (Applause) And I believe the children will 
also be a plus because they are going to be highly 
competent and well-trained persons. Of course, you 
know there are innate prejudices. And I don't pretend 
that I don't share those prejudices. I do. If one of 
my sons had come back and said, "I've got this 
American lady whom I met in America, my first question 
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is, what colour is she? (Laughter) (STW 1 September 
1990j parentheses in STW report). 
Despite the racial pollution involved, consistency in its 
eugenics ideology demanded that the PAP-state recognise 
that the offspring of such intra-class unions would be 
highly intelligent. In order to keep the resultant high 
quality babies, permanent residence regulations were 
relaxed to enable such couples to remain in Singapore (STW 
8 september 1990). Nevertheless, Lee lamented: 
That 50 per cent of graduate girls will either marry 
down [less-educated men], marry foreigners or stay 
unmarried, it is a very unhappy position for any 
country to be in (STW 1 September 1990). 
That the other 50 per cent of graduate women were marrying 
graduate men was, however, an II improvement if over 1983 when 
only 37.6 per cent did so. The increase was partially due 
to the establishment in 1983 of the government's Social 
Development unit (SOU) which was an officially sanctioned 
and promoted dating service aimed at suppressing the two 
main forms of struggle by bourgeois Chinese women: 
remaining single and marrying foreigners. The sou provided 
an education programme in how to have normal personal 
relationships, an area of knowledge previously denied to 
many young educational achievers. Educated single women 
and men in the civil service, statutory boards and major 
companies were pressured to register with the sou and to 
attend its functions. Initially popularly lambasted as 
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standing for Single, Desperate and Ugly, the official 
pressure paid off to the extent that 240 couples were 
married through its auspices in 1988 (STW 29 April 1989). 
Thus, in its initiatives to maintain the Chinese capitalist 
class, the PAP-state used the category of educational level 
to ensure intra-class unions. But the success rate of its 
official programmes remained far from solving the problem 
perceived by the PAP leadership. This was because the 
trends towards a single life style and fewer children were 
themselves a product of economic growth and meritocracy and 
of upper class membership. The conflict between 
patriarchal and capitalist social relations remains. 
This conflict reached its most intense when the PAP-state 
arrested twenty-two middle class professionals and 
community workers in two security sweeps code-named 
Operation Spectrum on 21 May 1977 and a month later. They 
were detained without trial under the Internal Security Act 
and harshly interrogated, leading to an international human 
rights campaign for their release (Asia Watch 1989: 18). 
Twelve of the detainees were women, almost all single 
and/or childless. Politically, this act of repression can 
be seen as mainly directed at women who had risen to 
professional status in the meritocracy but had no desire to 
earn a lot of money and join the capitalist class, and who 
were not under patriarchal control through mothering. 
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Several days of continuous interrogation in underground 
cells was partly aimed at enabling the government to 
understand this political phenomenon, as well as being 
aimed at obtaining the usual forced confessions of 
complicity in a plot to overthrow the PAP. The PAP-state 
had minimal means of control over such people and resorted 
to brutal secret police tactics to suppress this form of 
struggle, which was subversive of both capitalist and 
patriarchal social relations. Furthermore, the detainees 
were involved in legal and welfare assistance to foreign 
workers and domestics, the most exploited section of the 
working class. 
Adjusted strategy for working Class Reproduction 
After 1985, the PAP-state changed the structure of the 
working class and its strategy for reproducing it to accord 
more closely with the pressures of its accumulation process 
and to. suppress dissent. 
The core of the working class would remain Chinese and 
male. Women would continue to be pressured into low-paid, 
part-time wage labour and used as a latent reserve. To 
help make up for the 120,000 Chinese babies short of 
replacement level since 1975 (Lee Kuan Yew in STW 26 August 
1989), the reproductive labour of the better-off sections 
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of the working class would also be encouraged through child 
tax relief and adjusted school times. The government 
followed up on its plans to introduce single session 
schools to release women from child care during the day 
(STW 1 September 1990). It also brought in·"full-time 
benefits" for part-time workers (STW 18 August 1990) in 
order to draw some of the 540,000 women not in wage labour 
into the labour force (STW 9 September 1989). 
The breeding efforts of working class Chinese women would 
be supplemented by encouraging the immigration of Chinese 
skilled labour from Hongkong and elsewhere. Malays would 
be consigned to the bottom of the resident working class 
and little money would be wasted on the education of this 
core of political opposition. 
Non-Chinese, temporary, foreign workers would be accepted 
as a permanent sector of the working class and, in light of 
this, would be even more rigorously controlled to prevent 
any individuals from gaining permanent residence status. 
Presumably, the denial of "full-time benefits" to this 
large sector of the working class enabled their provision 
to Singaporean Chinese women. 
The encouragement of Hongkong migrants and the acceptance 
of a permanent, rotating sector of foreign workers need to 
be understood in the context of a racist policy to 
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undermine both the strength of the resident Chinese working 
class and of the Malay community. 
importing Chinese Breeding stock 
The PAP-state took advantage of the 1997 deadline and the 
post-Tiananmien panic to offer permanent residence to 
100,000 Hongkong Chinese skilled workers (STW 15 July 
1989). There is no quota limit for professionals. This 
was an attempt to acquire pre-sorted and skilled Chinese 
"breeding stock". The success of this scheme remains open 
to question, since Singapore is not a first choice for most 
Hongkong people. A year later, of the 14,500 skilled 
workers granted permanent residence, only 1,300 were living 
in Singapore. Of them, 950 were already working in 
Singapore when they applied (STW 24 March, 28 July 1990). 
Many Hongkong Chinese see Singapore as a Chinese island in 
a Malay sea and have doubts about its long-term stability. 
In addition, a Mandarin-English speaking Chinese society is 
not especially attractive to Cantonese speakers (STW 16 
February 1991.). 
This scheme was justified as keeping singapore's racial 
"balance" (STW 29 July 1989). Guaranteeing 76 per cent 
Chinese dominance was more accurately but less often 
referred to as keeping the racial status quo, as in the 
report of Lee Kuan Yew's 1989 National Day speech when he 
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sought to reassure the populace about the Hongkong migrant 
scheme: 
"Let us just maintain the status quo. And we have to 
maintain it or there will be a shift in the economy, 
both the economic performance and the political 
backdrop which makes that economy possible." Mr Lee 
said statistics showed there will be significant 
differences in the economy of Singapore if the ratio 
were transposed. "You look at the educational levels 
of the performers. It has got to do with culture, 
nature and so many other factors. But year after 
year, this is the end result. Let's leave well alone. 
The formula has worked. Keep it." 
Disclosing that a straw poll had indicated that 
Chinese Singaporeans favoured the new policy while 
Malays and Indians were against it, he said race was a 
human instinct that would not go away (STW 26 August 
1989) . 
Lee knew the value of a racist policy in preventing working 
class solidarity. 
Temporary Workers Become Permanent sector 
By the early 1980s it was already obvious, as we have 
noted, that singapore could not survive without migrant 
workers to supplement the working class. That is, not only 
were the educated Chinese not reproducing themselves, but 
neither were the Chinese working class increasing their 
rate of reproduction to meet the demand for labour power. 
This is not surprising considering the government's family 
planning programme targeted at the working class. Labour 
shortages persisted throughout the 1970s and 1980s. By 
1991 there were an estimated 200,000 foreign workers in 
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Singapore out of a labour force of 1.3 million (FEER 21 
February 1991). 
These' workers are divided by race into two very clear 
categories: traditional source (working class Malaysian 
Chinese) and non-traditional source (Thai, Filipino, Indian 
etc.). Malaysian Chinese are permitted to work in the 
service sector, although they may not exceed ten per cent 
of the workers in that sector (STW 10, 24 March 1990). 
other races (nationalities) are restricted by government 
regulation to manufacturing, construction, shipyards and 
domestic help. To induce employers to restrict their 
reliance on foreign labour and to upgrade their 
technological level, employers must pay a levy to the state 
of $300 per month per worker (to increase to $350 per month 
from April 1991) (STW 10 March 1990; FEER 21 February 
1991). This levy is part of the surplus created by the 
foreign workers and thus can also be seen as their 
reimbursement of the daily costs of their reproduction. 
Furthermore, in order. to ensure that foreign workers do not 
acquire roots in Singapore and that the government is not 
liable for any welfare benefits for them, they are not 
permitted to join the CPF. 
These workers are controlled by draconian immigration 
legislation (STW 28 January, 4 February 1989) which was 
first used in 1989 when the government expelled 9,800 Thai 
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workers and 1,900 Indian workers (STW 20 May 1989) on pain 
of caning and imprisonment. This initial use of the 
legislation was merely to ensure that immigration 
mechanisms exerted full control over all migrant workers in 
Singapore. Many of those expelled were later permitted to 
re-enter properly documented. 
The regulations covering migrant workers ensure that they 
may not bring their families or breed in Singapore. All 
female workers, especially foreign maids, have compulsory 
AIDS tests and six-monthly pregnancy tests (STW 14 April 
1990). Men may not marry without government permission on 
pain of immediate repatriation. Thus they have no children 
to be sorted by the education system and there are no 
welfare costs to the state. 
The acceptance by the PAP-state that a significant and 
rising proportion of the population will consist of 
temporarily-resident foreigners is a major development of 
the late 1980s. The move to allow foreign workers into the 
services sector was a result of the failure of the attempt 
to upgrade the economy and the subsequent emphasis on 
services. In other words, it is an attempt to contain the 
emerging working class struggles which threatened the 
Second Industrial Revolution. The racial disadvantage, as 
perceived by the PAP, of having such a large number of non-
Chinese workers has been offset by their political function 
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in fragmenting the working class. They have no political 
rights to exercise and are only interested in saving their 
wages to take back home. They also keep down wages in the 
industrial sector, and the government pays nothing at all 
for their generational reproduction. 
This new policy also means that the education system and 
other welfare institutions no longer extend their 
regulatory mechanisms across the whole of Singapore 
society. The primary regulatory mechanisms for foreign 
workers are the immigration laws and their contracts with 
employers. This is a reversion to the practices of the 
colonial state. 
Lee Kuan Yew acknowledged this role of feeding off the 
cheap labour and misery of surrounding countries as a 
permanent f·eature of Singapore's polity. 
In another ten years, we will not get workers from 
Malaysia or Thailand. In another fifteen years, no 
more from Indonesia. We may have to go to Burma, Sri 
Lanka, because I don't think their problems are going 
to go away that easily (STW 1 September 1990). 
The PAP-state's sale of arms to Burma's military junta 
appears as some insurance of Lee's veracity (FEER 3 
November 1988). The government had also already initiated 
discussions with Burma for the purpose of finalising an 
agreement for labour supply (FEER 16 August 1990). 
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Therefore, the acceptance of 200,000 temporary foreign 
workers as a permanent low-paid sector of Singapore's 
working class meant the PAP-state no longer had to concern 
itself with the generational reproduction of this sector of 
the population or with using welfare regulatory mechanisms 
to shore up its legitimacy. But these problems remained 
with regard to the rest of the population. 
privatisinq Meritocracy 
The 1984 election results and the public anxiety created by 
the intense competition for education precipitated the 
privatisation of education. The extreme politicisation of 
the state's delivery of this type of welfare was 
undermining its legitimacy. The government could not meet 
the raised expectations of the whole population and, as its 
graduate mother priority scheme demonstrated, it had no 
intention of doing so. The period since 1985 has therefore 
seen the PAP-state drawing back from direct political 
accountability for educational practices. This process has 
strengthened, not lessened its control. At the same time 
the elitism of the school system has been systematically 
reinforced. Thus the privatisation of meritocratic 
practices has intensified them but overcome the ideological 
problem of the PAP-state appearing to decide who succeeds, 
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even though it still does. Once again, it would appear to 
be by merit alone. 
Privatisation refers not to the sale of state assets but to 
the devolution of the final individual selection decisions 
to schools which have been granted a restricted degree of 
administrative autonomy from the Ministry of Education. It 
also refers to the gradual withdrawal of state funding for 
education and the transfer of school financing to parents 
in the form of higher school fees. This accords with the 
PAP-state's policy of lowering the level of state welfare 
once sufficient educational infrastructure has been put in 
place to ensure the reproduction of a sufficiently skilled 
labour force. In 1989, the education budget was 14.6 per 
cent of total government expenditure, and the government 
wanted to reduce it (STW 25 March 1989). 
As we have seen in previous periods, the competition to 
enter the top schools is intense and therefore highly 
politicised. It is no coincidence therefore that the PAP-
state raised the idea of making the top schools 
"independent" in 1986 (Tham 1989: 492-3) and has proceeded 
to grant limited administrative autonomy to the six most 
prestigious high schools. The stated purpose was to "shift 
the focus of education innovation from the Ministry to the 
school" (Tony Tan, Minister of Education, STW 11 January 
1987). To this end, the government is assisting the top 
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schools to upgrade their already high-grade facilities. 
Perhaps as a final realisation of Lee's desire in 1965 for 
elite tiEton-style boarding schools", the government has 
funded construction of hostels at some of these schools 
(Buchanan 1972: 290j STW 8 september 1990). 
Although the Ministry of Education still controls who gets 
on the waiting list for these independent schools, the 
final decision on entrance is made by the school itself. 
Photographs of principals interviewing parents and their 
families have appeared in The straits Times (STW 22 
December 1990). The responsibility for rejecting aspirants 
to the top educational stream is now seen to lie with the 
schools, not the government. This ideological effect will 
be reinforced as more schools become "independent". 
Soon after gaining independent status, the schools raised 
their fees by between 300 and 800 per cent within two 
years. From a common base of $25 per month, fees have 
risen to as high as $200 per month (STW 2 December 1989, 15 
September 1990). These fees do not include the cost of 
books, uniforms or transport (FEER 17 January 1991). 
There has been considerable pUblicity to convince the 
public that the schools are open to all who reach the 
required educational standard regardless of income. The 
government announced subsidies for "needy" students among 
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the 4,000 combined annual intake of the independent schools 
(STW 8 September 1990). But this is a public relations 
exercise which disguises two facts. First, it avoids 
questions as to the desirability of such an elitist school 
system. Secondly, it camouflages the role of ethnicity and 
class in determining merit. 
For example, the poor cannot afford the years of private 
tuition which is now the norm for middle-class children 
from kindergarten through primary school. It is not 
unusual for a middle-class kindergarten child to be 
privately tutored three afternoons a week or for a primary 
school child to have three or four tutors in different 
subjects at a cost of $200 to $300 per month {STW 14 
September 1987}. Accordingly, the fee subsidies will go to 
a few lower middle-class children at no great expense to 
the government which at the same time reaps a huge dividend 
in terms of making the system appear equitable. 
Lowering state Welfare Costs 
The justification for the astronomical fee increases is to 
help the schools offer more educational choices and thus a 
more creative programme. But creativity will be for the 
rich; true to its word, the PAP-state is making quality 
education the preserve of the capitalist class. The fee 
hike for independent schools (which are still state-funded) 
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was the precursor to lowering state funding for all 
schools. 
This strategy for the withdrawal of state welfare took 
another step forward with the announcement of the Edusave 
scheme in December 1990. The government said it would 
establish an endowment fund of one billion dollars which 
will generate sufficient income to pay about $100 per year 
to every school child between six and sixteen years of age. 
Within a decade it is hoped the fund will grow to five 
billion dollars, and thus the annual amount remitted to 
each child's Edusave account will grow accordingly. The 
money can only be used for payment of school fees and for 
official extra-curricular activities (not private 
tutoring). The annual education budget of $1.8 billion can 
be expected to drop as Edusave takes effect (STW 25 March 
1989). 
Announcing the scheme as a personal grand gesture of 
generosity afte~his ascension to the prime ministership, 
Goh Chok Tong said: 
I have come up with the Edusave programme because I 
want to temper our meritocratic, free market system 
with compassion and more equal opportunities. 
Under the free market system, the able and talented 
are encouraged to put their talents to maximum use. 
They will do better than those less able than them. 
Naturally, their children will have advantage over 
others. 
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with Edusave, all children, rich or poor, are brought 
to the same starting line. This is the philosophy 
behind the Edusave scheme (STW 22 December 1990). 
The rhetoric of Goh's speech reveals the extent to which 
political struggles had forced the PAP to adjust its 
educational strategy. No doubt the pretence of 
humanitarian concern will have some effect in restoring PAP 
legitimacy. But, more importantly, Edusave will 
financially tie school children into a state controlled 
welfare mechanism. It gives the PAP greater power to put 
class agents in their class positions through education. 
The regulations for withdrawals from Edusave accounts will 
no doubt ensure that each student goes to that part of the 
education system that the PAP-state wants her or him be in. 
Furthermore, the amount supplied by Edusave will be 
insufficient to meet future school fees at any school. As 
Goh pointed out, Edusave does not mean the beginning of a 
welfare state or handouts. Parents will still have to 
contribute to their children's education. It can therefore 
be anticipated that fees at all schools will increase as 
Edusave becomes available and the government progressively 
withdraws its funding. This also means that income will 
determine even more the quality of education that each 
family has access to. Edusave will provide just enough 
support to enable poor parents to send their children to 
the worst schools. For the upper class parents who can 
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already afford high school fees, the Edusave scheme will be 
a useful extra, sufficient perhaps to pay for ballet 
lessons for their children. Of course, to give the 
impression of equal opportunity every child will receive 
the same amount. This is the reason the government quickly 
rejected calls to give Edusave to the poor alone (STW 29 
December 1990). But, in reality, the working class will 
retain the equal opportunity to remain unequal. 
Thus the PAP-state's objectives in launching Edusave is to 
shift the cost of education directly on to parents, to 
restore its legitimacy by retaining control of the sorting 
practices at one step removed and to entrench meritocratic 
educational practices on the basis of income now that 
society has been initially sorted. It will not be fully 
funding the schools and it will appear not to be running 
them even though it will maintain a tight grip on 
educational policy. Its political control over education 
will thereby increase without the corresponding problems of 
direct political accountability and legitimacy. 
The Edusave initiative will achieve with regard to primary 
and secondary education what the PAP-state has already 
begun to implement in tertiary education by means of fee 
increases and declining government subsidies. Similar 
control has already been extended with parents' CPF 
431 
accounts permitted to be drawn upon for tertiary fees (STW 
18, 25 March, 1 April 1989). 
Re-Aliqnment of Communalist Policies 
After 1985, part of the PAP-state's response to the rising 
level of liberal democratic dissent in the population was 
to re-assert a communalist strategy in order to break up 
the political resistance that had emerged in various forms. 
It began to use Chinese-medium education against the 
English-educated Chinese. It persisted with strident 
"Speak Mandarin" campaigns which alienated non-Chinese. It 
also launched a public offensive against Malay educational 
and political discontent. 
The increasing political activism of the English-educated 
middle class, especially women, surfaced through opposition 
parties, the Law Society, church community work and 
cultural groups. The trend towards liberal democratic 
dissent was countered with the usual means of repression: 
arrests under the Internal Security Act, forced televised 
confessions of a Marxist conspiracy, legislative 
suppression of the civil and political rights of targeted 
groups (Asia watch 1989). At the same time the PAP-state 
increased its public ruminations about the values taught 
through Chinese-medium education and took initiatives which 
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suggested Mandarin should be taught at the expense of 
English (FEER 24 January 1991: 19-20). This was an attempt 
to destabilise the English-educated middle class. 
Mandarin Against the Rest 
The small number of Special Assistance Plan (SAP) Chinese-
only primary and secondary schools were the subject of 
major debate in parliament during 1990 (STW 21 July 1990). 
SAP schools teach both English and Mandarin as first 
languages only to Chinese students. Nine Chinese schools 
were preserved by direct order of Lee Kuan Yew a decade 
previously in order to preserve a remnant of the Chinese 
education system (Seah and Seah 1983: 255, 262). These SAP 
schools were expected to transmit the values of "hard work, 
obedience, filial piety, respect for authority, moral 
rectitude, mutual support and a sense of social duty" (Tham 
1989: 484, 496). In addition, Lee's motivation may have 
been to ensure a sufficiently high standard of Mandarin was 
maintained in one part of the education system to take 
advantage of long-term commercial opportunities in China. 
In 1989, ten primary schools were chosen as "seed" SAP 
schools for teaching both Mandarin and English at first 
language levels and for transmitting Chinese values to 
Chinese students (STW 25 March 1989). Five more schools 
were added in 1991 (STW 16 February 1991). 
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In 1990 the Chinese-only SAP schools were the centre of a 
PAP-sponsored discussion in parliament about the problems 
of Western influence on the English-educated, the poor 
standard of Mandarin being achieved in the mainstream 
education system and the implications of monoracial schools 
for multiracialism (STW 17 March 1990). A statement by Goh 
Chok Tong about the possibility of introducing Mandarin-
medium primary schools because Chinese teachers "are very 
good transmitters of values" ,seemed calculated to raise 
fears that the rules were being changed again (STW 29 
September 1990). Not only were non-Chinese already 
disadvantaged by the emphasis on Mandarin and English, but 
placing Mandarin at the top of the meritocratic education 
tree would now disadvantage the Chinese middle and upper 
class who had not taken Mandarin seriously. 
One government MP, with the clear backing of his superiors, 
entered the debate to push the importance of Mandarin-
medium education, noting that non-English-educated Chinese 
"do not champion human rights and do not know much about 
their own legal rights, but they do have a strong sense of 
right and wrong, based on traditional Chinese values" (STW 
27 October 1990). The aggressive nSpeak Mandarin" Campaign 
of 1990 went beyond the encouragement of Mandarin instead 
of dialects to encouraging Mandarin to be spoken instead of 
English in the work place among Chinese (STW 6 October 
1990). These initiatives had a predictably negative effect 
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on the upper and middle class, as well as minority races 
who perceived them as Chinese chauvinism (FEER 9 February 
1989: 42; 24 January 1991: 19). But the main message was a 
warning to the upper and middle class to realise that their 
interests lay with the PAP and that they were not 
necessarily secure in their assumption of a place in the 
capitalist class. The PAP was letting them know it could 
change the rules. A regional journal pronounced: 
[T]he generally younger English-educated segment of 
the population seems to increasingly hanker after a 
more open political system •••. Some observers say the 
PAP might have now decided to play its "Chineseu card 
against the demands for a greater degree of democracy 
from the English-educated electorate (FEER 24 January 
1991: 19). 
The PAP-state was using the communalist potential of its 
existing bilingual policy rather than implementing a new 
policy_ It was lighting the fuse of the "Chinese language 
bomb" (Shotam 1989: 517) to scare those who had shown a 
tendency towards supporting the opposition. 
Ethnicity and Language: promoting communalism 
By the late 1980s, the bilingual education policy had not 
only promoted English as the de facto common language and 
the language of economic success; it had also produced 
English-Mandarin as the pre-eminent linguistic combination . 
•.. Chinese has penetrated into the magic economic (as 
opposed to cultural) circle that English has dominated 
thus far. This opportunity has been provided by the 
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official correlation accorded the language and 
economic opportunities on the Chinese mainland. 
Further, there is a growing suspicion that employers 
discriminate in favour of those who have had an 
English-Mandarin bilingual education (Shotam 1989: 
512). 
The promotion of Mandarin as the symbolic ,language of all 
Chinese, whether or not they spoke it, set up a communal 
equation of ethnicity and language which had not previously 
existed: a united Chinese population against all others, 
especially against Malay indigenous opposition. The 1985 
"speak Mandarin" campaign made this equation explicit with 
its slogan "Mandarin is chinese". The 1990 slogan offended 
even more non-Chinese and English-educated Chinese with its 
slogan "If you're Chinese, make a statement - in Mandarin" 
(STW 6 October 1990). 
Thus to enforce a neat correlation - between English-
Mandarin and ethnic Chinese, English-Malay and ethnic 
Malays, and therefore English-Tamil with ethnic South 
Indians - is inadvertently to keep the embers of 
language burning I so that the fires can easily be 
stoked up again (Shotam 1989: 517). 
However, this policy was far from "inadvertent". The PAP-
state has consciously pursued a racist policy to maximise 
communal manipulation by preventing Chinese students from 
studying Malay or Tamil as a second language and vice 
versa. The ethnic distribution of students and their 
second language options is a classified state secret, but 
the pattern is clear: language choices are officially 
predetermined according to race (Shotam 1989: 513, 517). 
436 
Under the guise of equal treatment of the major languages, 
the bilingual policy has therefore preserved and entrenched 
communalism with the second language option becoming a 
means for determining social mobility according to 
ethnicity. English-Mandarin is of first importance with 
English-Malay as a poor second and English-Tamil as a 
distant third. English-Mandarin is also, now, superior to 
English alone. 
Thus current educational initiatives can be seen as PAP-
state manipulation of communalism to ensure not only 
preservation of Chinese dominance, but the gradual 
replacement of an English-educated capitalist class with an 
Mandarin-English speaking semi-Chinese educated capitalist 
class. Minority races have put a lot of their resources 
into attaining a higher level of English proficiency. Now 
they are being faced with a Chinese-Mandarin ethnic-
linguistic bias which excludes them. In addition, the 
primarily English-educated Chinese middle-class seeking 
liberal democratic political rights have been put on the 
defensive by the call to Chinese unity under the Mandarin 
banner. Previously seen as an empty slogan, this call is 
being backed up by sUbstantive changes to educational 
practices. 
The proposal for a new three stage primary education system 
with equal emphasis on English and mother tongue learning 
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(which means Mandarin for 76 per cent of the population) 
has to be understood in the context of this communal 
strategy and of the building blocks already put in place by 
the SAP and "seed" schools (STW 17, 24 November 1990). 
Statements by Lee Kuan Yew and other ministers that English 
will continue to be the common language and that other 
races can have exclusive schools if there is a demand, do 
not preclude this communal strategy (STW 25 March 1989, 3 
November 1990). 
On the other hand, the PAP cannot go too far down this 
path. It is sacrificing a higher general standard of 
English in order to undermine middle class political 
struggles. In the long term, it must maintain the standard 
of English or change its economic policies. 
consigning Malays to the Reserve Army of Labour 
The implication of the Mandarin-English policy for Malays 
is that the inferior status of the Malay-English 
combination will be permanent. Despite the assurance that 
special schools will be established for them if they want 
them, the argument has been advanced that, since Malays 
already speak their mother tongue, such schools are not 
necessary. Hence, Mandarin-English Chinese-only schools 
will be the elite of all schools and Malays will be shut 
out on ethnic grounds. 
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This writing off of Malay education is extremely 
provocative and has been accompanied by other initiatives. 
To lower the cost to the state of Malay tertiary education 
(a paltry $1.4 million per year because few Malays make it 
that far) and to remove it from direct political 
responsibility, the PAP-state has privatised the scheme and 
introduced means-testing (STW 9 June 1990). 
Racial slurs against Malays in the education system have 
also been intensified. Malays have been told they should 
work harder on learning English and that, according to Lee 
Kuan Yew, the answer to Malay boys' under-achievement is 
more parental discipline (STW 25 August, 13 October 1990). 
Examination results have been publicly analysed according 
to racial composition by the Education Minister, who noted 
that Chinese achieve three times better than Malays in "A" 
levels. This was put down to "socio-economic factors, the 
importance placed on education by parents of various races, 
the different make-ups and aptitudes of the various racial 
groups" (STW 17 November 1990). 
The number and frequency of PAP-state direct attacks on the 
Malay minority since 1985 indicate a new twist in the 
communalist strategy. The state visit of President Herzog 
of Israel in late 1985 seemed calculated to heighten 
communal tension in the region, with objections coming from 
Malaysia, Indonesia, Brunei and Malays in singapore. 
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However, the PAP smoothed over its regional government-to-
government relationships with vague statements of regret 
while taking the opportunity to question local Malays' 
loyalty to the nation. said Lee Kuan Yew of the Singapore 
Malays' negative reaction: 
Are we sure that in a moment of crisis, when the heat 
is on, we are all together, heart to heart? I hope 
so. But we ought to have a fallback position and 
quickly fill up all the missing hearts if some go 
missing {Asia Yearbook 19BB: 222}. 
Subsequently, the sensitive question of low Malay 
involvement in the Singapore Armed Forces (e.g. no Malay 
fighter pilots), because they could not be trusted to fight 
other Malays on behalf of Chinese, was raised openly (ST 23 
February, 6 April, 1B May 19B7). After the 19BB elections, 
Goh Chok Tong and other PAP leaders attacked the Malays for 
not voting for the PAP and said that various educational 
schemes to assist Malays would need to be reconsidered (STW 
1, 22 October 19BB). 
Since then the issues of preventing racial enclaves (i.e. 
Malay concentrations) in public housing estates, the SAP 
schools, the Speak Mandarin campaigns and the recruitment 
of Chinese migrants from Hongkong have added to Malay 
grievances. The long-standing Malay resentment of PAP-co-
opted Malay leaders has also surfaced publicly (STW 9 
February 1991). Most recently Malay loyalty has again 
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been questioned by a straits Times survey showing that most 
Malays did not support the war against Iraq whereas most 
Chinese did (STW 27 January, 9 February 1991). Despite 
Malay outrage at being singled out for criticism, the PAP 
has persisted in stating that the Malays are wrong and are 
not yet thinking like Singaporeans. 
The PAP has no interest in permitting the cohesive Malay 
community to organise politically or advance educationally 
and economically, except on PAP terms, terms it has not 
accepted. Previously, the PAP-state strategy has been one 
of containment. 
If we were less skillful, [a Malay opposition party] 
would have emerged. Because there was, even today, 
even in the last election ..• I know we didn't win more 
than fifty per cent of the Malay votes; we never 
did •••• But had there been a Malay group that emerged, 
and they would have emerged easily if we had 
proportional representation and not first-past-the-
post in each constituency, you consider the 
polarisation that would take place as they expound 
Malay rights and Malay language, and the policies 
which they think should prevail seeing what goes on 
around us (Lee Kuan Yew at National University of 
Singapore, reported in ST 16 December 1986). 
Now the PAP has decided simply to consign the Malay 
community permanently to the bottom of the working class. 
However, to ensure the continuing credibility of its claims 
to multi-racialism, it has also suggested that the 
brightest top ten per cent of Malay pupils should be 
"nurtured" through the education system by special 
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subsidies (STW 9 February 1991). This modest expenditure 
will guarantee a token Malay presence in the capitalist 
class. 
The Malay minority can now be written off in this way 
because of the shift in the PAP's alliance with foreign 
capital. with the united states being unable to sustain 
its high level of military dominance in the region and the 
new importance of Japanese capital in Asia, the PAP-state 
has had to reconsider its long term security guarantees. 
It has therefore attempted an accommodation with the 
capitalist classes of Malaysia and Indonesia by ensuring 
they have an increasing interest in Singapore's economic 
growth. Hence the "growth triangle" agreement between the 
three states jointly to develop Johor state and Riau 
province (especially Batam island) as an industrial 
hinterland for Singapore to soak up cheap labour and highly 
polluting industries. 
The PAP-state also sought to minimise its past political 
conflict with the Malaysian state leadership by 
collaborating in internal security operations in 1987 to 
suppress liberal democratic and anti-communalist dissent in 
both countries, using the stigma of alleged Marxist 
conspiracies and communalism. A common interest was thus 
re-affirmed in exploiting communalist and red-scare tactics 
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to suppress legal, democratic dissent at a time that both 
governments faced a crisis of legitimacy (Committee Against 
Repression in the Pacific and Asia 1988; The European 
Committee for Human Rights in Malaysia and Singapore 1990). 
Lastly, as we noted in Chapter Three, the PAP-state began 
military exercises with the Malaysian and Indonesian armed 
forces for the first time since independence (STW 27 May 
1989) . 
The new relationship between the PAP-state and Malaysia and 
Indonesia has undermined the geopolitical potency of local 
Malay dissent. The PAP-state's communalist strategy has 
been aimed both at heightening tension in the region to 
divert attention from anti-imperialist movements and at 
suppressing domestic dissent among the Chinese working 
class. The current strategy moderates the regional thrust 
while intensifying domestic contradictions to prevent the 
emergence of inter-racial working class solidarity. 
The intensified attack on the Malays is therefore related 
to the process of breaking up the liberal democratic 
political consensus emerging among the English-educated 
Chinese and Indians which would become an powerful 
political force if linked with entrenched Malay dissent. 
The schooling of Chinese in separate schools in Mandarin 
and the even greater class separation of Malays through 
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educational deprivation is a concerted attempt to block the 
long-term development of such political solidarity. 
Thus, the re-alignment of communalist strategy together 
with the adjustment of population policy and the lowering 
of state welfare were among the changes associated with the 
shift to a multilateral alliance with foreign capitals 
which produced new demands for ideological legitimation. 
The Search for Ideological Hegemony 
As we have seen, capitalist and patriarchal systems of 
power which worked through differing and at times 
conflicting practices, had undermined each other's power 
base in the social structure. Together with communal and 
liberal democratic forms of struggle, these conflicts had 
threatened the ideology of meritocratic education and the 
legitimacy of the PAP-state. 
But the PAP-state did not comprehend the relationship 
between practices and their ideological effects. Its view 
was that ideology was a pre-packaged system of beliefs that 
people held from intellectual choice or from forced 
exposure. It was this misunderstanding of ideology that 
led to the debacle of its religious education policy and 
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which has not been corrected in its attempt to regain 
ideological hegemony. 
By 1988 the PAP-state decided that its introduction of 
religious education had been a mistake. Religious 
education had assisted in communicating to the young that 
there were higher authorities and allegiances than the 
state and had also given them, to varying degrees, an 
alternative ideological comprehension of society. The 
government realised that the values being taught somehow 
did not fit with life in a meritocratic, authoritarian 
society and were capable of being further developed in a 
manner outside its control. 
Religious institutions had been among the last community 
organisations to remain comparatively autonomous in their 
own affairs and, with cultural and political life 
suppressed at all other levels, the young had been 
attracted to them and their ideologies. The spread of 
English made Christianity more accessible to young Chinese 
and, as a religion well-adjusted to capitalism, gave it an 
image as a modern religion. The number of Christians rose 
from 10.3 per cent of the total population over ten years 
of age in 1980 to an estimated 18.7 per cent in 1988 (Kuo, 
Quah and Tong 1988: 9; Ling 1989: 693; STW 22 April 1989). 
An estimated 60 per cent of Christians are converts. More 
significantly for the PAP, it has been estimated that 40 
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per cent of National University of Singapore students are 
Christian (75 per cent of medical students), 30 to 40 per 
cent of professionals, executives and managers are 
Christian as are 40 per cent of the general population 
between 15 and 25 years of age. Four cabinet ministers, 
more than a third of members of parliament and many senior 
government officials are known to be Christian. with 35.8 
per cent of Christians being university-educated, it is the 
religion with the most highly educated following (FEER 2 
July 1987; unofficial church sources). Christians are 
overwhelmingly English-educated Chinese middle and upper 
class members. 
The rise in adherents was accompanied by the increasing 
influence both of progressive Christian social teaching in 
the Catholic church and of Protestant fundamentalist 
demands for evangelistic freedom. Both traditions were 
claiming the right publicly to judge the righteousness of 
government policies. The PAP-state realised its religious 
education policy was assisting the consolidation of 
autonomous institutional power bases which would threaten 
both its political and ideological hegemony (FEER 19 
October 1989). 
The government also had a continuing concern to contain the 
incipient Malay nationalism assisted by Muslim teaching, 
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especially in view of the Islamic resurgence in Malaysia 
and the Middle East. 
Therefore, on 6 October 1989, the government announced two 
measures to deal with the situation. First, the Education 
Minister announced that Religious Knowledge was to be 
phased out and replaced by a civics course. Also, for the 
first time, voluntary religious education would be 
forbidden within school hours. This prohibition was aimed 
at Catholic church schools. 
Secondly, in parliament on the same day, the Home Affairs 
Minister announced that legislation would be introduced to 
restrict the involvement of religious groups in politics 
(STW 7 October 1989). This was eventually passed in the 
form of the Maintenance of Religious Harmony Bill, which 
enables the government by executive decision to suppress 
almost any activity of a religious institution or leader 
(GOS, Maintenance of Religious Harmony Bill, Bill No. 1/90 
1990; FEER 18 January 1990; STW 24 February 1990). We will 
examine this provision further in the final chapter which 
deals with the criminalisation of politics. 
The government maintained it was taking these steps of 
abolishing religious education and criminalising religious 
dissent in the interests of racial and religious harmony. 
Yet ethnic minorities were the primary educational 
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casualties of the abolition of religious education and the 
government knew it. 
A study done by the Education Ministry indicates that 
had there been no religion courses, there would have 
been 13 per cent fewer Malay students, 15 per cent 
fewer Indian students and 15 per cent fewer students 
from other minorities (including Eurasians) at pre-
university institutions. The study also indicated 
that only four per cent of Chinese students used the 
religion courses to fulfil admission requirements 
(FEER 19 October 1989). 
There could be no convincing argument that the initiatives 
were not politically motivated. The PAP belatedly saw the 
potential of religion as a unifying force against the 
state. Undoubtedly the role of the Catholic Church in the 
overthrow of President Marcos had precipitated the PAP-
state's initial move against church community workers in 
1987 and led to the realisation that religious education 
was not necessarily a passive instrument for shoring up the 
legitimacy of the state. 
Unwittingly, by abolishing religious education, the PAP 
removed one of the educational practices which had 
exacerbated the conflict between meritocratic and 
patriarchal values. That it was unwitting can be seen by 
the reintroduction of this ideological tension in its newly 
formulated state ideology. 
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Ideoloqy in context 
It appears that the PAP at least partially understood the 
reasons for the failure of its religious education policy. 
It saw that the formulation of ideological principles 
needed to be more closely related to the social and 
cultural context of the practices they were designed to 
legitimate, if not to the real ideological effects of the 
practices themselves. Religious ideology was too diffuse. 
People were able to think about their actions and their 
social context in ways which did not directly support 
capitalist social relations or which even opposed them. 
Under the guise of formulating a national ideology suited 
to the religio-cultural context of Singapore, the PAP-state 
has proceeded to impose an ideology which it hopes will 
legitimate its political actions. Hence, the moves from 
october 1988 to develop a national ideology, leading to a 
Green Paper on National Ideology in 1989, a White Paper on 
Shared Values in 1991 (STW 24 June 1989, 12 January 1991) 
and numerous government~sponsored academic papers (e.g. 
Quah 1990). 
According to the White Paper, the National Ideology is 
intended to provide the ideological content of moral 
education, mother-tongue language learning and civics in 
the education system, as well as the ideological parameters 
of the mass media. The National Ideology has been 
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variously described as being composed of "key", "shared" or 
"core" values which are common to the major ethnic and 
religious groups of Singapore and which are identifiably 
Asian rather than Western in nature CST 6 January 1991). 
These shared values are: 
1. Nation before community and society above 
self. 
2. Family as the basic unit of society. 
3. Community support and respect for the 
individual. 
4. Consensus not conflict. 
5. Racial and religious harmony (ST 16 January 
1991) . 
From the above it is clear that the PAP-state has 
elaborated a set of ideological principles far more closely 
related to the legitimation of its policies than derived 
and diffuse religious dogma. The "values" have been 
carefully chosen to accord with the PAP's past and present 
political strategies to reproduce the division of labour 
amenable to its alliance with foreign capital. 
Under the first principle, wages can be lowered, individual 
human rights restricted and the grievances of minority 
communities ignored. The inevitable equation of the nation 
with the PAP-state is to ensure political loyalty. The 
interests of the local capitalist class and foreign capital 
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are identified as the national interest. As the President 
of singapore said to parliament regarding this value: 
Putting the interests of society as a whole ahead of 
individual interests has been a major factor in 
Singapore's success .... If Singaporeans had insisted on 
their individual rights and prerogatives, and refused 
to compromise these for the greater interests of the 
nation, they would have restricted the options 
available (ST 6 January 1991). 
The second value has been explained in the following terms: 
The family is the best way to provide children with a 
secure environment to grow, and to look after the 
elderly. Singaporeans must not also uncritically 
adopt the "alternative lifestyles", such as casual 
sexual relationships and single parenthood (ST 6 
January 1991). 
This value seeks to legitimate the capitalist preference 
for the nuclear family because it is the social unit which 
can supply and reproduce the most labour power at least 
cost. It also reinforces patriarchal relations and thus 
male control of women's sexuality, specifically excluding 
the life patterns which would enable women to escape 
domination through parenting. In addition, the official 
denial of HDB flats to single people or single parents can 
continue on moral grounds while encouragements to breed can 
increasingly be given the moral tone of national duty. 
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The inclusion of grandparents has become especially 
important in avoiding higher welfare costs to the state in 
terms of child care as well as pensions and health. 
TABLE 5.3: PROPORTION OF POPULATION AGED 65 AND 
OVER (%) 
1989 2025 
Philippines 3.0 7.5 
Indonesia 4.0 8.7 
Malaysia 4.0 9.1 
Thailand 4.0 9.1 
Singapore 6.0 17.0 
Japan 12.0 23.8 
Source: STW 24 November 1990. 
The third value reinforces the responsibility of the 
"community" rather than the state for the welfare of the 
poor and disadvantaged. As the White Paper states: 
[C]ommunity support for individuals will keep 
Singapore a humane society. At the same time, it 
helps us avoid the dependent mentality and severe 
social problems of a welfare state (ST 6 January 
1991) . 
The fourth value legitimates the labelling of political 
dissent or even parliamentary opposition as anti-national 
and entrenches the PAP's supremacy. It promotes a 
petitionary political process rather than a participatory 
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one. Only the PAP-state has the political reach to 
organise national consensus. 
The fifth value will be used to legitimate the PAP-state's 
communalist strategies and to suppress the grievances and 
political demands of the varying racial and religious 
groups. 
It can therefore be expected that the PAP-state will 
attempt to consolidate its ideological hegemony through 
intensive educational initiatives based on the National 
Ideology. However, the PAP-state has not differentiated 
between the actual ideological effects of its educational 
practices (and other mechanisms of social control) and 
their desired ideological effects as represented by the 
National Ideology. 
For example, common experience of meritocratic educational 
practices produces the shared ideological perception 
articulated by the Prime Ministerts political secretary: 
competition in school is the natural result of 
Singapore society becoming more and more classless. 
The son of a noodle-seller can become a top manager in 
a large company provided he works hard and earns his 
qualifications (STW 9 December 1990). 
Whether the National Ideology value of "society before 
self" will be perceived as consistent with this ideological 
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effect is dependent on the educational practices. That is, 
personal success can only be seen as a contribution to 
society as long as personal success is perceived by 
everyone as a realistic possibility for everyone. However, 
with the communalist shift in educational practices, the 
ideological effect for an increasing minority will be that 
no matter what they dOl they will not be permitted to 
succeed. The reality that people succeed by putting 
themselves first (or their race and class) will be a more 
widely shared perception in contradiction with the National 
Ideology. Similarly, the changing patterns and perceptions 
of family life will continue to be shaped by the actual 
practices of the patriarchal family and patriarchal state, 
not by imposed values. 
If the contradictions become too great, once again the 
government will undermine its own legitimacy by attempting 
to impose a set of beliefs which do not conform with 
peoplels perception of their own experience and which, 
because of possible alternative interpretations of the 
shared values, is susceptible to mobilisation against it. 
Already legal opposition parties (ST 16 January 1991) and 
the remnants of suppressed Catholic community groups have 
been criticising the National Ideology as an ideological 
weapon for PAP supremacy. 
The national ideology is nothing more than a life-line 
for a party determined not to lose its hold over the 
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electorate and fearful of the people's increasing 
demand for democracy and human rights (voices from 
singapore December 1990: 8). 
The PAP-state may then regret this official attempt at a 
systematic ideological statement of the social relations 
conducive to its alliance with foreign capital. 
Education and Social Control 
This examination of the historical phases of the PAP-
state's alliance with imperialism has shown how shifts in 
this relationship have affected the educational practices 
that contribute to the maintenance of social relations in 
Singapore. The forms of struggle in Singapore have been a 
major influence in shaping and limiting the possibilities 
for capital accumulation arising from this alliance. That 
is, the forms of regulation have been directly related to 
the forms of struggle and of accumulation during each 
phase. 
Educational practices have had the primary function of 
sorting agents into class positions for the reproduction of 
labour power. This sorting has been carried out by means 
of a meritocratic education system integrated with state 
breeding and immigration programmes. We have seen that all 
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these practices have operated in a racist and patriarchal 
manner. 
The working class has been fragmented into a labour 
hierarchy. A core of mostly Chinese, mostly male workers 
has been created above a subsidiary floating reserve of 
Singaporean women who move in and out of the latent 
reserve. Beneath them are the foreign workers who also 
move between the floating and latent reserve; when they 
float or they enter the latent reserve they do so by 
leaving the borders of singapore. 
Meritocratic educational practices have maximised the 
advantages of wealth and linguistic heritage of the upper 
class while also focussing on the reproduction of a 
skilled, obedient middle class. 
Legitimation of these practices has been achieved through 
their ideological effects and by the formalisation of these 
effects into the ideology of meritocracy by politicians and 
institutions. The struggle to lift oneself out of one's 
class through educational advancement, the dominant form of 
struggle, also legitimates educational practices rather 
than challenges them. 
However, sharp contradictions have arisen. Using English-
medium education to demolish Chinese education and destroy 
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Chinese working class political opposition has produced an 
English-educated middle class with a desire for liberal 
democracy as a potential basis of unity. The recent re-
introduction of Mandarin as a weapon against them yields . 
the irony of the English-educated middle class being a 
threat to the PAP. But it also lights the fuse of 
communalism to an extent that may prove to be beyond even 
PAP control. 
As a means to produce submission through the imposition of 
ideology, the historical saga of moving between civics, 
moral education, values education, mother tongue learning, 
religious education and latterly the National Ideology, has 
also led to contradictions. The most serious disjunction 
to emerge may be the difference between the ideological 
effect of highly individualistic, class-based and racist 
meritocratic practices, the axioms of collective loyalty to 
the state and the needs of a system of patriarchal social 
relations. 
Related to this contradiction is another: the conflict 
between tight authoritarian control and the aspiration to 
be a regional services and information centre. 
Unimaginative technicians have been the product of an 
elitist, competitive, rigid system with a high drop out 
rate. Many writers have noted that this contradiction is 
an extremely serious block to the PAP-state's aspirations 
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(e.g. Rodan 1989: 205; Tham 1989: 492; Sandhu and Wheatley 
1989: 1099; Linda Lim 1989: 181). Although government 
officials have often talked of the need for more 
creativity, the government appears to be seeking it by 
means of exacerbating the contradiction, as has resulted 
from its move towards independent schools and the 
privatisation of education. 
As we have seen, the privatisation of education is an 
attempt to restore legitimacy in the face of many forms of 
political struggle. It is also aimed at reducing 
government welfare expenditure while increasing control. 
That is, it is aimed at "shifting the electorate's 
judgement of the PAP's performance away from its ability to 
provide ongoing and expanded social welfare programmes" 
(Rodan 1989: 164). But this move may create new 
contradictions. It may again undermine the ideological 
perception that educational success is possible for all 
Singaporeans even as most Malays and the lower rungs of the 
working class realise the reality of their exclusion. 
The racism inherent in educational and population policies 
has both legitimated and undermined these practices. The 
visibility of racial classification has functioned to 
consolidate the perception of the superiority of the 
dominant race and assisted its sense of unity. But, at the 
same time, the clear exclusion of Malays and Indians from 
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social advancement on racial grounds will engender new 
contradictions which may again expose the class-sorting 
function of education. 
similarly, the PAP-state's fostering of middle-class male 
political, busineS's,professional and military leadership 
and a male core of the working class increasingly exposes 
its patriarchal nature. Its harassment of educated, 
single, middle class women with dating and breeding 
programmes has fuelled resentment and undermined its 
legitimacy. 
The education system has been required to regulate many 
forms of struggle while reproducing the class structure. 
The many contradictions which have arisen have produced new 
conflicts which continue to threaten PAP hegemony. 
Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong recently stated the necessity 
to get Singapore's politics right before the country could 
focus on the key to its future - education. He expressed 
his concern that Singaporeans might vote against the 
government in the next elections because they were unhappy 
about certain policies and were succumbing to envy when the 
"talented" get special attention. He said, "It is very 
dangerous. But it is already a trend. Can we reverse the 
trend?" He also said that minorities should not "impose 
their views on the majority" as when Malays have objected 
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to "Speak Mandarin" campaigns. He concluded, "Education is 
the key to the future. This is assuming that the politics 
are right" (STW 27 July 1991). 
Thus the PAP-state recognises its primary objective of 
social control continues to take precedence over 
educational achievement. The strength of political 
struggles has prevented Singapore's increase in educational 
levels from matching those of its regional competitors. 
These struggles are likely to continue as long as the 
nature of the education system is determined by the needs 
of international capital accumulation. 
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CHAPTER 6 
ELECTIONS, PARTIES AND PARLIAMENT: THE POLITICS OF FEAR 
Parliamentarism took on an especially significant role from 
the early 1980s when education and other welfare mechanisms 
were failing sufficiently to suppress political struggle. 
However, the system of parliamentary politics has played a 
vital role in social control since the PAP came to power by 
providing the mechanisms by which people formally assent to 
their own subjection and exploitation. It therefore 
provides legitimation for the PAP's rule and the PAP-
state's entire repressive apparatus. 
We have seen hoW public housing and education keep people 
in their physical and social places and how the ideological 
effects of these institutions serve to legitimate the 
practices which produce them. The institutions and 
practices of liberal democracy, which the PAP-state 
inherited and partially preserves, function to keep people 
in their political places while legitimating the whole 
process of government by one class. The political place of 
the working class is as a subject, powerless labour force. 
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Through elections, parties and parliament, the PAP has been 
able to claim the right to govern and to interfere in all 
aspects of people's lives in order to perpetuate this class 
hegemony. It sees this right to have been freely granted 
by many acts of individual choice at election time when 
voting, like education, further helps to transform 
submission into consent. The ostensibly democratic 
procedures of parliament then confirm the legitimacy of the 
continuing process of governance. 
This chapter examines in detail how this process works in 
Singapore. It also analyses the development of the 
political system in response to political struggles, 
concluding that liberal democracy is failing to legitimate 
PAP rule at crucial points. We will see that political 
struggles have brought contradictions between the 
legitimating and ruling functions of both the party and 
parliament. These contradictions explain why the PAP has 
found electoral opposition so threatening, and they also 
help us understand its latest political initiatives. 
Elections, parties and parliament will be examined in the 
context of the phases of Singapore's political economy to 
see how they were influenced by political struggles. But 
first it is necessary to place liberal democracy in its 
historical and theoretical context. 
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LIBERAL' DEMOCRACY AND CLASS 
western liberal democracy developed out of the liberal 
state and capitalist society. The understanding of the 
human being as an atomised, self-interested individual was 
fundamental to this society, an ideology that we earlier 
observed to have preoccupied neo-classical writers today_ 
Before the capitalist state yielded to working class 
pressure to extend the franchise, liberal principles and 
practices were already entrenched: "both the society as a 
whole and the system of government were organised on a 
principle of freedom of choice" and on the politics of 
competition and the market (Macpherson 1965: 6). In other 
words, society was already divided according to class. Some 
had the accumulated capital to employ others who had 
insufficient means to support themselves. social 
inequality thus meant some had more freedom of choice than 
others. 
Nineteenth century liberal democracy developed as: 
a logical requirement for the governance of inherently 
self-interested conflicting individuals who are 
assumed to be infinite desirers of their own private 
benefits •••• [H)is [sic] overriding motivation is to 
maximise the flow of satisfactions, or utilities, to 
himself from society, and that a national society is 
simply a collection of such individuals. Responsible 
government, even to the extent of responsibility to a 
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democratic electorate, was needed for the protection 
of individuals and the promotion of the Gross National 
Product, and for nothing more (Macpherson 1977: 43). 
Liberal democracy was a form of government adapted to a 
class-divided society from the beginning. It did not 
develop a new kind of society or inspire a vision of a new 
kind of humanity. Furthermore, it developed because the 
pressure for universalising the franchise became 
irresistible and because the ruling classes of Europe and 
America realised that it posed no threat to their property 
and thus their power. For them, democracy no longer meant 
rule by the wrong class, the working class. 
What the addition of democracy to the liberal state 
did was simply to provide constitutional channels for 
popular pressures, pressures to which governments 
would have had to yield in about the same measure 
anyway, merely to maintain public order and avoid 
revolution. By admitting the mass of the people into 
the competitive party system, the liberal state did 
not abandon its fundamental nature; it simply opened 
the competitive political system to all individuals 
who had been created by the competitive market 
society. The liberal state fulfilled its own logic. 
In so doing, it neither destroyed nor weakened itself; 
it strengthened both itself and the market society. 
It liberalised democracy while democratising 
liberalism (Macpherson 1965: 11). 
From these beginnings grew the now-familiar "pluralist, 
elitist, equilibrium model" of liberal democracy 
(Macpherson 1977: 77). Macpherson draws an entrepreneurial 
market analogy to explain its dynamics. He sees liberal 
democracy as a market mechanism, with voters as consumers 
and politicians as entrepreneurs, which maintains an 
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equilibrium between the demand and supply of political 
goods. It is elitist because groups of self-selected 
leaders take the main roles. It is pluralist because 
individuals are pulled in various directions by various 
group interests at different levels (in parliament and 
outside), and these interests compete for political power. 
It has thus become "simply a mechanism for choosing and 
authorising governments, not a kind of society nor a set of 
moral ends" (Macpherson 1977: 78). The choosing and 
authorising is done by the practice of voting under the 
universal franchise. 
Choice as Consent 
In our previous discussion of neo-classical theory, we 
noted the ideological implications of the concept of free 
and rational choice as both explanation and justification 
for human behaviour. The practice of voting in liberal 
democracies reinforces this ideology, but also goes 
further,; it converts individual choice into consent for the 
actions of others. Thus, on the basis of elections, 
governments are able to claim a mandate to govern. Voters 
can be said individually to have consented in advance to 
the decisions of the government. In this sense, voters do 
not directly decide political issues for themselves, but 
they authorise others to do the deciding. 
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On this basis, Pateman argues that liberal democratic 
voting is essentially a promise to obey. "The essence of 
liberal social contract theory is that individuals ought to 
promise to, or enter an agreement to, obey representatives, 
to whom they have alienated their right to make political 
decisions •..• liberal democratic voting is a series of 
renewals of the promise to obey" (Pateman 1979: 19-20). 
Pateman distinguishes between "self-assumed obligation as 
the free creation of a relationship, and self-assumed 
obligation as consent", rejecting the supposition that 
liberal democratic theory and practice coincide in voting 
(Pateman 1979: 21, 82). 
Pateman is right in her observation that voting fabricates 
consent while really being an act of obedience. Before 
elections in Singapore, voters are continually reminded of 
their accountability to the government. Nevertheless, the 
ideological effect of voting on voters is that they have 
consented either to the government in power or to the whole 
system of governance, or both. Furthermore, this 
ideological perception is constantly reinforced by the 
formulations of liberal democratic principles which are 
articulated by those within the parliamentary system. 
But the practical possibility that voters can replace one 
government by another is essential to the legitimating 
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power of this ideology. without this possibility, voters 
will see that their votes are meaningless even if the 
franchise includes every adult individual. As Macpherson 
puts it, "the extent of the franchise is a measure of 
democratic government only in so far as the exercise of the 
franchise can make and unmake governments" (Macpherson 
1977: 23). Liberal democratic ideology holds this effect 
of individual electoral choice to be the individual 
citizen's protection against tyranny. But it is no 
protection against the rule of one class. 
The reason that the democratic franchise did not bring 
about working class government in Western democracies was 
that the chief function of the party system 
has been to blunt the edge of apprehended or probable 
class conflict, or, if you like, to moderate and 
smooth over the conflict of class interests so as to 
save the existing property institutions and the market 
system from effective attack (Macpherson 1977: 65). 
Political parties have maintained upper class rule by 
blurring social divisions and by standing between 
governments and their direct responsibility to the 
electorate. 
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LIBERAL DEMOCRACY AND SINGAPORE 
The forms of liberal democracy bequeathed to Singapore by 
British colonialism fit well with the ideology of the 
political economy and the increasing inequality in society. 
But there is a fundamental difference between singapore and 
the western liberal democracies: under-development. The 
Singapore capitalist class does not compare in strength to 
those of the West with their centuries of accumulation and 
class rule. 
First, despite the PAP-state's attempts to build a 
capitalist class, it does not have a strong basis of class 
unity. The core of the capitalist class is not a strong 
nationalist bourgeoisie but a party organisation which 
rules for foreign capital, governing mainly through the 
state and much less through direct ownership of the means 
of production. 
This is why, even after the destruction of working class 
political organisation in the early 1960s, the PAP could 
still not afford to lose an election. If it had, at the 
very least, the uneasy accommodation between the PAP and 
the Chinese-educated bourgeoisie would have been 
threatened. With the rise of local capital under the PAP-
state and the growth of a larger bourgeoisie with vested 
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interests in the alliance with foreign capital, the 
Singapore capitalist class may now have a sufficient unity 
of interests and depth of historical control at all levels 
of society to guarantee its perpetual political hegemony. 
This means that the PAP faction no longer needs to retain 
power to secure this hegemony. 
The local capitalist class is now strong enough to field an 
alternative bourgeois party which would continue the 
alliance with imperialism, but break the PAP's supremacy. 
The possibility of a bourgeois party with a mainly Chinese-
educated leadership remains. Perhaps the current move 
towards a Mandarin- and English-speaking upper class is 
partly a move to insulate against this possibility. The 
years of suppression of Chinese education and the 
consistent priority given to foreign capital over local 
capital could be useful political weapons against the 
English-educated PAP. Such a party would have considerable 
potential for co-opting working class dissent to its 
electoral banner. 
Secondly, in order to sustain itself as a capitalist class, 
the PAP has had to rule in alliance with imperialism. 
without foreign credit and technology, production would 
rapidly decline and the political economy would collapse. 
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The PAP knows that imperialism is not particularly 
concerned over which section of the capitalist class seeks 
its partnership so long as control of the working class can 
be guaranteed. Should the PAP lose an election, foreign 
capital would cooperate with any new government that had 
the same economic priorities. If there were such an 
alternative capitalist party, imperialism would have no 
special interest in maintaining the hegemony of the 
English-educated upper class should it lose popular 
legitimacy in liberal democratic elections. 
These two reasons, both related to under-development, 
explain why the PAP has not been able to allow liberal 
democracy to function as it does in the advanced countries. 
This means that the way the PAP has governed has been 
determined by the specific class formation of Singapore. 
The PAP knows that there are real political alternatives 
within its own class but has pr~vented them from organising 
effectively and sought to coopt them into the PAP. 
However, it may yet allow another- bourgeois party to emerge 
more strongly if parliamentary struggle continues to 
intensify and the alternative is a party linked to the 
working class. 
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Singapore and Advanced capitalist Countries 
While the above factors constrain liberal democracy in 
Singapore, there are important similarities with the 
advanced capitalist countries. The convergence is in the 
"creeping authoritarianism masked by the rituals of formal 
representation" which now characterise these countries as 
they move away from Macpherson's model of modern liberal 
democracy. oppositionists in Singapore often appeal to 
Western liberal democracy as a political ideal for 
Singapore without realising the nature of political 
developments in the countries of its birth. 
Social democracy has progressively assumed those 
postures of pragmatic and creeping authoritarianism, 
which had, as one of their effects, a. gradual 
suspension of many of the traditional bases of 
democratic representation and countervailing power: 
but coupled with their formal preservation, as the 
means by which a passive popular consent is secured 
(Hall 1980: 160). 
Hall develops Poulantzas' description of the tendency to 
"authoritarian statism" in advanced capitalist countries by 
identifying "the steady and unremitting set of operations 
designed to bind or construct a popular consent into these 
new forms of statist authoritarianism", which he renames 
"authoritarian populism" (Hall 1980: 161). His description 
of the ways in which the development of popular democratic 
initiatives have been limited and a "popular" consent to 
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authoritarian regimes constructed has many similarities 
with the strategies of the PAP in Singapore. 
Thus, the similarity between Singapore and advanced liberal 
democracies lies in the extent to which these states are 
becoming like Singapore in their effort to "shift the 
previously existing disposition of social forces •.. to 
construct the movement towards a more authoritarian regime 
from a massive populist base" (Hall 1980: 182). Like 
Singapore, they use liberal democratic mechanisms to 
preserve "the inequitable social relationships of [the] 
capitalist economy" (Pateman 1979: 90). singapore differs 
in that the PAP did not have to deal with entrenched social 
democratic practices. 
But Singapore stands out in its use of the forms of liberal 
democracy because fear is present at every level in order 
to prevent people from exercising even the limited 
political rights these forms afford. 
Fear, Legitimacy and Governance 
The PAP's own fear of demise in the face of political 
struggles has come into conflict with its need to 
legitimise its rule. It has had to maintain Macpherson's 
pluralist, elitist, equilibrium model of liberal democracy 
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on the ideological level while denying it in reality. The 
PAP has no trouble with the elitist prescription, but it 
has not allowed the substance of plurality or even of 
intra-class equilibrium. 
It has not permitted a plurality of political forces to 
flourish at all levels, a dynamic that would throw up 
pressure groups as well as alternative governments. 
without a strong class base, the PAP-state could not easily 
contend with this kind of grassroots politics and prevent 
the organisation of the working class against it. 
Political pluralism has therefore been suppressed outside 
parliamentary politics. We will see in the next chapter 
how the PAP-state has criminalised all politics outside 
parliament to ensure that there is no sea for political 
fish to swim in. But, as Macpherson has noted, for 
electoral choice to be ideologically effective when the 
franchise was extended to the working class, 
There had to be freedom of association - that is, 
freedom to form political parties, and freedom to form 
the kind of associations we now know as pressure 
groups, whose purpose is to bring to bear on parties 
and on governments the combined pressure of the 
interests they represent. And there had to be freedom 
of speech and publication, for without these the 
freedom of association is of no use (Macpherson 1965: 
8) • 
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Thus, although in practical terms these freedoms are denied 
through being severely circumscribed, the PAP-state is 
constrained often to claim that they are not. The reality 
is that there are two kinds of politics in Singapore: legal 
(inside parliamentary politics) and illegal (outside). 
This division is supported to some degree by the ideology 
of consent under liberal democracy. 
contemporary consent theory is firmly in the Lockean 
tradition, offering only the alternatives of all-
embracing consent or revolution. It is argued that 
all those who make use of the electoral "method of 
consent", and all those who refrain from illegal 
political activity, are consenting .... 
contemporary consent theorists who identify consent 
and voting leave themselves no alternative but to 
treat all dissent that falls outside the "method of 
consent U as revolutionary activity. Again, this blurs 
the distinction between other existing regimes and the 
liberal democratic state with its "consentingU 
citizens, and it also means that consent theorists 
are, for example, unable to distinguish urban 
guerillas from non-violent civil disobedients because 
both engage in illegal activities (Pateman 1979: 90-
91) . 
In the hands of the PAP-state, which does not want to 
distinguish non-violent civil disobedients from urban 
guerillas (but tactically prefers to combine them in one 
category), the ideology of consent is both an ideology of 
legitimation and a method of political marginalisation. 
Those who do not specifically dissent are taken to consent. 
Those who do not follow the prescribed "method of consent" 
are enemies of the state and are therefore dealt with by 
the secret police. This is a tactic of political fear. 
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But having channelled all politics into parliamentarism, 
the PAP still has to suppress political pluralism (but not 
the illusion of it) within this system in order to deny the 
electorate the evidence of a credible alternative 
government. The PAP has structurally built in threat and 
fear at all levels of the electoral system precisely to 
ensure that individual citizens do not freely exercise 
their democratic rights. Exactly how this has been done we 
will see later in this chapter. 
This parody of liberal democracy is a political exercise 
fraught with contradictions between the tasks of governing, 
maintaining hegemony and keeping legitimacy. To understand 
these tensions, we need to identify the broad functions of 
elections and of the PAP as a political party. 
Elections and Legitimacy 
If it is not to lose legitimacy altogether and reveal its 
effective dictatorship, the PAP-state cannot take away the 
act of voting as a legal expression of political choice. 
Elections have been the primary mechanism for establishing 
the PAP's constitutional legitimacy, for claiming that 
people have consented to its rule. To ensure this 
ideological effect, it has to make sure that people do 
vote. Therefore, voting is compulsory (GOS 1989a: 56). 
Also, as pointed out above, if the legitimating ideology of 
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the franchise is not to break down, the electorate has to 
perceive that it has a real chance of changing the 
government through voting. Because the PAP, for reasons of 
self-interest, has not permitted even an intra-class change 
of government, it has had to ensure that electoral 
opposition could never unseat it while, at the same time, 
keeping the appearance that it could. 
By holding elections, Lee Kuan Yew has been able to say, 
"If I had been autocratic and authoritarian, I would not 
have won eight consecutive general elections over a period 
of thirty years" (STW 11 November 1989). While the PAP won 
these elections precisely because it had been ruthlessly 
authoritarian, the act of voting and the resulting 
electoral statistics have shored up the legitimacy of the 
regime. 
The ideological effect of Table 6.1 from the Ministry of 
Communications and Information is extremely useful to the 
PAP because it highlights the fact that there· was a 
plurality of parties contesting each election and that the 
PAP won a high proportion of votes and therefore of seats. 
Citing the 1988 result, Brigadier-General Lee Hsien Loong 
stated, "What we do is with the consent of the majority", 
an echo of PAP functionaries since 1959 (The Bulletin 21 
March 1989: 132). 
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TABLE 6.1: GENERAL ELECTIONS SINCE 1955 
Date Seats Parties Party seats % votes 
contesting Returned Won Won 
Legislative Assembly 
1955 2 Apr 25* 5+11(I) Labour 10 26.74 
Front 
1959 30 May 51 10+39(I) PAP 43 53.40 
1963 21 Sep 51 8+16(I) PAP 37 46.46 
Parliament 
1968 13 Apr 7+(51)** 2+5(I) PAP 58 84.43 
1972 2 Sep 57+(8) 6+2(I) PAP 65 69.02 
1976 23 Dec 53+(16) 7+2(I) PAP 69 72.40 
1980 23 Dec 38+(37) 8 PAP 75 75.55 
1984 22 Dec 49+(30} 9+3{I} PAP 77 62.94 
1988 3 Sep 70+(11) 8+4(I) PAP 80 61. 76 
*1955 Legislative Assembly consisted of one Speaker, 3 ex-
officio members, 25 elected and 4 nominated members. 
** Uncontested seats in brackets 
(I) = Independents 
Source: GOS 1989a: 232. 
But the table plays down the fact that, in the first four 
elections of the independent parliament, the PAP won all 
the seats. It provides no explanation for the result in 
1968, when the highest percentage vote was gained, but only 
seven seats were contested. The analysis also blurs the 
fact that, in 1988, nearly 40 per cent of the vote 
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translated into just one opposition seat. However, the 
number of seats uncontested in each election is a major 
anomaly in a liberal democracy. The inclusion of these 
statistics presumably derives from the PAP's assumption 
that readers will understand the failure to contest as a 
mark of contentment with its rule. 
But, overall, such a statistical presentation assists PAP 
legitimacy by avoiding the necessity to inform the reader 
of the most vital information of all. Just as neo-
classical political economy separates choice from socio-
economic circumstances, so do electoral statistics fail to 
take account of the circumstances in which votes are cast. 
Not only the statistics do this, but the system of voting 
ideologically represents each individual's vote as equal 
without regard to the unequal power of different classes to 
organise electoral support. 
Table 6.2, derived from the preceding table, demonstrates 
how much is left unexplained. It shows the control exerted 
by the PAP over the electoral process. The results suggest 
submission rather than consent, acquiescence rather than 
authorisation. From this perspective, voting in Singapore 
is an act which attests to the accountability of the 
individual citizen to the PAP and not of the government to 
its electors. To understand this relationship, we need to 
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TABLE 6.2: GENERAL ELECTION RESULTS 1968-88 
Date % Vote Against Oppos'n PAP Total Seats 
PAP Seats Seats 
1968 15.57* 0 58 58 
1972 30.98 0 65 65 
1976 27.6 0 69 69 
1980 24.45 0 75 75 
1984 37.06 2 77 79 
1988 38.24 1 80 81 
* opposition boycotti only 7 seats contested. 
examine the function of parties more closely, specifically 
the PAP. 
The Governing Party 
In elections, voters believe they are choosing who will 
represent them in parliament. In reality, parties make 
this choice and the voters are merely given the opportunity 
to confirm the choice of one or other of the parties. 
Singapore is different because the PAP chooses not only its 
own candidates but those of the opposition as well. We 
will see that it tried to do this first by keeping all 
opposition members out of parliament and then, when it 
failed, by using its apparatus of political repression to 
choose wh,ich opposition candidates it would let through. 
479 
The other special feature of the PAP is that it is not 
simply an electoral organisation. Its leadership also 
governs through the party, and the state apparatus is an 
adjunct to the party apparatus. 
We noted in Chapter Two how, in 1957, Lee amended the PAP's 
rules to establish a cadre system completely under the 
control of the Central Executive Committee. By this action 
he created a central ruling authority entirely under his 
control. Only cadres could attend the party conference and 
vote for the Central Executive Committee. Only the Central 
Executive Committee could choose the cadres, and the list 
was and is secret (Bellows 1970: 24). As Secretary-General 
of the PAP, Lee has retained central and undisputed 
authority over the ruling body. He oversees who is 
admitted and who is expelled as well as the entire system 
of party patronage. The operation of the PAP is largely 
secret and therefore without the open annual conferences of 
the opposition parties. There is no mass base of party 
members, since membership is by invitation only. In other 
words, the PAP is not so much an electoral party as a 
governing clique secure from any democratic challenge. As 
we have seen, this structure was necessary for the survival 
of the English-educated faction of the capitalist class, 
because it did not have a sufficient social base to 
guarantee its political survival. This mechanism is still 
necessary to prevent the PAP from factional ising and to 
480 
exclude other class interests. Thus, the Central Executive 
Committee of the PAP, not cabinet or a ruling majority in 
parliament, is the core of its power. 
As Lee has admitted during the recent debate on introducing 
an elected presidency, it is not the official titles of 
state which are fundamental to his power, but his control 
of the PAP: 
Given me and my links with so many people, all I have 
to do is stay secretary-general of the PAP. I don't 
have to be president (Asiaweek 26 August 1988: 43). 
He reiterated the point shortly afterwards but rather less 
directly: 
I belong to that exclusive club of founder members of 
new countries; first prime ministers or presidents of 
a new independent country. And even from my sick bed, 
even if you are going to lower me into the grave and I 
feel that something is going wrong, I'll get up. 
Those who believe that when I have left the government 
as prime minister, that I have gone into permanent 
retirement, really should have their heads examined 
(Asia Yearbook 1989: 212). 
In Chapter Four it was noted how the PAP extended its party 
organisation in the form of branch offices and state-
sponsored People's Associations, Community Centres, 
Residents' Committees and so on, into the housing estates. 
The entire working class and much of the middle class have 
the party-state apparatus directly imposed on them in their 
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own localities. This ruling function is common in other 
political systems, but not in liberal democratic ones . 
•.. it is crucial to recognise that the long years of 
partnership between the PAP and the civil servants 
have undoubtedly accelerated the fusion of the party 
and Government identity, a development which quite 
clearly can lead to the institutionalisation of the 
party as synonymous with state (Chan 1976: 224-225). 
The fusion of the "identity" of the party and the state is 
a euphemism for the ruling function of the party and the 
auxiliary function of the civil service. This fusion may 
have assisted the realisation of the political goals of the 
PAP but it has, at the same time, destroyed those other 
illusions of liberal democracy, the apparent neutrality of 
the state and the non-political image of the civil service. 
The electoral and ruling functions of the party have 
presented it with special problems in terms of 
legitimation. That is to say, the PAP's problems of 
legitimacy arise not only from the process of getting 
elected to govern but from the fact that it never stops 
getting elected to govern. It is a permanent governing 
party around which the state apparatus has developed. 
other governing parties in the region (e.g. in Malaysia and 
Indonesia) have been able to minimise the conflict between 
these roles and win popular support as an electoral 
movement as well as loyalty as a governing institution. 
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This is because they can, in varying degrees, claim 
historical legitimacy as the parties which led the 
nationalist struggles for independence. 
But the PAP was deprived of this mantle in 1961 when the 
working class and left-wing intellectuals deserted it to 
form the Barisan Sosialis. The PAP later also lost the 
ideological legitimacy of the nationalist struggle in 1976, 
when it withdrew from the Socialist International shortly 
before its impending expulsion (Minchin 1986: 187). 
[The PAP] did not have to its credit a long history of 
a nationalist struggle for independence and of 
personal sacrifices by many of its leaders. 
Furthermore, it was not viewed by the populace as the 
unchallenged leader of singapore nationalism .... None 
of them [the Lee faction] had a special charismatic 
appeal and a mass base (Vasil 1984: 9-10). 
Making a virtue out of necessity, the PAP has eschewed the 
popularity it could never attain in favour of justifying 
itself on its record: a party willing to take the tough 
decisions in the interests of the people even if they do 
not like it. 
I am often accused of interfering in the private lives 
of citizens. Yes, if I did not, had I not done that, 
we wouldn't be here today. And I say without the 
slightest remorse, that we wouldn't be here, we would 
not have made economic progress, if we had not 
intervened on very personal matters - who your 
neighbour is, how you live, the noise you make, how 
you spit, or what language you use. We decide what is 
right. Never mind what the people think. That's 
another problem (Lee Kuan Yew's speech at National Day 
Rally 1986, ST 20 April 1987). 
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Thus, the PAP and its academic supporters have resorted to 
extolling its material achievements and the wisdom of its 
leaders over the past thirty years as the historical basis 
for its legitimacy and its right to govern in perpetuity: 
Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew, along with his two 
advisers belonging to the first generation leadership, 
Goh Keng Swee and S. Rajaratnam, has presided over the 
government. A unique personalised system of 
government has been built up around the personalities 
of these three, Confucian, wise and dedicated rulers 
who are viewed as the repositories of the national 
will and the custodians of the nation and its 
interests. The Prime Minister is acknowledged as the 
embodiment of the party and the government and the 
person who provides and sustains the credibility of 
the government as a performer. He is the creator of 
modern Singapore. He is seen to enjoy a special, 
higher and overriding mandate from the people of 
singapore (Vasil 1984: 154). 
Slightly more soberly, Vasil notes the PAP's "spectacular 
achievements in the social and economic spheres" (Vasil 
1984: 48). Chan, in a more rigorous study, refers to this 
source of legitimacy as the "performance variable" (Chan 
1976: 14) or the successful management of "important 
political issues in the process of governance" (Chan 1976: 
165) . 
We will examine the success of these claims to legitimacy 
in the context of the historical development of Singapore's 
political system. This history focuses on the institution 
of parliament and its changing role in social control 
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during the phases of Singapore's economic development. 
There are three main phases in the history of the Singapore 
legislature: the period of transition from colonial 
assembly to independent parliament from 1955 to 1965; the 
consolidation of the party-state from 1966 to 1980; and the 
resurgence of parliamentary struggle from 1981. The first 
two periods will be referred to briefly, mainly in order to 
establish the new significance of parliament in the latter 
period. From 1981, singapore's political system has been 
transformed by renewed political opposition, creating a 
crisis of legitimacy to which the PAP has been forced to 
respond. The shaping of the electoral process and the role 
of political parties are central elements of these 
developments. 
FROM COLONIAL ASSEMBLY TO INDEPENDENT PARLIAMENT 1955-65 
We have covered the events of the decade from 1955 in some 
detail in the historical introduction and need only note 
here the major characteristics of the parliamentary system. 
It was a period of genuine political contest between 
political forces within the Legislative Assembly. The 
British established a liberal democratic system as a form 
of government congenial to their objective of consolidating 
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a local capitalist class while bringing working class 
politics into a forum they could control. They used the 
colonial legislature as a proving ground for local parties 
in order to test their support in the electorate, their 
administrative competence and, most importantly, their 
suitability as a future partner after independence. Thus, 
although conducted within the parameters of imperial rule, 
the electoral contest for power was real. There was a 
plurality of legal political forces organising outside the 
legislature as well as within, and decisions in the 
assembly, like electoral results, were by no means foregone 
conclusions. 
TABLE 6.3: LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLY ELECTIONS 
DATE NO OF SEATS 
WON 
2 Apr 1955 25* 
30 May 1959 
21 Sep 1963 
51 
51 
PARTY RETURNED NO OF SEATS 
Labour Front 10 
PAP 43 
PAP 37 
* 1955 Legislative Assembly consisted of a speaker, 3 ex-
officio, 25 elected and 4 nominated members. 
Source: GOS 1989a: 232. 
One of the continuing influences of this period is the 
tactics the British and the PAP used to prevent political 
opponents getting elected to parliament, and the use of the 
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state bureaucracy and social organisations to mobilise PAP 
votes. 
The detention of left-wing leaders in 1959 and 1963 
prevented the most popular leaders of the working class 
from even standing for election. But when the Lee faction 
had control of the electoral apparatus in 1963, this tactic 
of state terror was accompanied by a comprehensive 
subterfuge of the electoral process. 
The PAP enhanced its control of who would get elected to 
the assembly by: 
a) restricting the campaign period to the constitutional 
minimum of 9 days, a restriction which effectively applied 
to the opposition only, since Lee, as prime minister, began 
a tour of all constituencies in November 1962; 
b) ordering state festivities for the proclamation of 
Malaysia during the campaign, giving the government 
leadership maximum publicity from the festivities but 
effectively reducing the number of days for campaigning by 
the opposition to four and a half; 
c) blocking off all printing facilities with urgent 
government orders for Malaysia Day, making it impossible 
for the opposition to print in bulk in the short time 
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available after the election date was announced (the PAP 
got their printing done in Hongkong three months in 
advance); 
d) pressuring the printer of the official Barisan 
publication to cease publication; 
e) obstructing the booking of public places for opposition 
rallies and the granting of police permits for them to be 
held; 
f) freezing the bank accounts of the three largest Barisan 
unions three days before nomination day; 
g) dissolving by government order two of the Barisan's 
biggest community organisations, the Singapore Rural 
Residents' Association and the singapore Country People's 
Association; 
h) possibly starting and certainly not countering the 
rumour that a Barisan victory would bring in federal troops 
and Singapore would be ruled from Kuala Lumpur; 
i) arresting and detaining without trial under the ISA all 
the main Barisan leaders during the months before the 
election (throughout 1963 over 130 opposition organisers 
and community leaders were arrested) (George 1984: 66-68). 
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Such tactics were necessary because, after the split 
within the PAP and the loss of its mass base, the PAP could 
not be sure of winning an electoral competition with the 
Barisan. Although the Lee faction had largely defeated the 
Barisan through mass arrests and the de-registration of 
trade unions and other supporting organisations, and the 
PAP had built more right-wing support by the end of merger 
with Malaysia in 1965, it still lacked a strong electoral 
base (Minchin 1986: 138). For this reason it has continued 
such tactics until the present. 
Also, as we have seen, it developed the state bureaucracy 
to replace the grassroots party organisation. By virtue 
of its increasing power at the local level, this party-
state organisation was able to mobilise electoral support 
with increasing effect. 
Bellows claims that the 1959 elections were "the last 
general elections in Singapore in which [either of] the two 
major competing parties would have been allowed to form a 
government" (Bellows 1970: 5). However, the British 
commitment to the PAP was not necessarily unconditional in 
1963 (Minchin 1986: 115). Whatever the truth of these 
judgements, it is clear that by 1965 the PAP had been 
transformed from a mass party into an exclusive governing 
group which had yet to consolidate an organisational mass 
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base it could depend on. Electoral victory and dominance 
of the legislature was essential to its legitimacy and to 
its political power, because it still ruled through the 
Assembly. The PAP's power could still be limited by a lost 
vote in the Assembly. 
CONSOLIDATION OF THE PARTY-STATE 1966-80 
In December 1965 the thirteen opposition Barisan Sosialis 
members left parliament in protest at the obstruction and 
harassment their party was subjected to. They boycotted 
all proceedings and all but two members of parliament had 
formally resigned by October 1966 (Bellows 1973: 96-97). 
The two remained in hiding from late 1963 in fear of 
detention and were unable to present their resignations 
personally as required by law (Bellows 1973: 195). For the 
next· fifteen years, there was no opposition member in 
Sing~pore's parliament. The PAP had succeeded in acquiring 
not merely dominance but total supremacy in the 
legislature. 
It was during these years of uncontested legislative power 
that the PAP consolidated its party-state apparatus of 
control and used it, along with the criminal law and 
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political detention, to suppress all forms of organised 
dissent outside parliamentary politics. These included the 
unions, educational institutions, student movements, the 
print media and professional societies (Asia Watch 1989; 
International Mission of Jurists 1987). This is also the 
period of large-scale public housing and educational 
initiatives to reconstitute the social formation in 
consonance with the EOI accumulation strategy. 
To consolidate control in order to increase exploitation of 
the working class, the PAP-state therefore suppressed the 
pluralism of liberal democratic politics. Because it could 
not allow any growth in working class organisation, the 
legal channels for releasing popular pressures of dissent 
outside parliamentary politics were minimised. 
But, to sustain the illusion of liberal democratic 
political contest within parliamentary politics, some 
opposition parties were permitted to exist. They were 
constantly harassed to keep them fractious and weak. 
opposition parties have been badly bruised and mauled. 
The Prime Minister and Rajaratnam [PAP minister] have 
ridiculed their activists and candidates, labelling 
them "jokers" and "opportunists". They have been 
infiltrated by security and intelligence agents; they 
have been charged with receiving foreign funds and 
engaging in "black operations"; defamation suits have 
been filed or threatened by PAP ministers to avenge or 
discourage alleged excesses (Minchin 1986: 217). 
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In these circumstances, elections became a ritual 
legitimation of PAP rule with the leadership claiming them 
as ratification for their most recently announced or 
implemented policies. For example, the 1968 elections, in 
which only seven out of 58 seats were contested, were 
claimed to be an endorsement of the new draconian labour 
laws depriving workers of many rights and conditions. Over 
the next three elections (1972, 1976, 1980), which the PAP 
ensured were contested rather more vigorously, the total 
opposition vote declined from around 30 per cent to about 
25 per cent. The number of uncontested seats rose from 
eight in 1972 to 37 in 1980 (GOS 1989a: 232). 
These figures reflect the intensified control and the 
climate of fear that had been generated. Voting for the 
PAP was an act of obedience to avoid any negative 
consequences, since the party-state now directly controlled 
the housing, the schooling, the breeding habits, the local 
community organisations and the pensions of the working 
class. 
In these circumstances, parliament became merely a forum 
for making announcements about what the PAP-state had done 
or was going to do . 
... from 1966 to 1981, its legislation underwent little 
thorough scrutiny .... Sittings were kept to a minimum, 
the Prime Minister was often absent, and when he 
intervened he swamped the matter at hand. The quality 
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of a member's contribution to debate suffered from the 
lurking thought that it made no difference to the 
outcome. PAP back-benchers were encouraged, sometimes 
orchestrated, to ask questions and even to play at 
being a loyal opposition. But only a hardy soul would 
willingly risk the Prime Minister's or Dr Goh's 
[Deputy Prime Minister] wrath if he exceeded the 
bounds (Minchin 1986: 218-9). 
Parliament was necessary to prop up the legitimacy of 
democratic process. But its proceedings were no longer a 
matter of public moment. Backbench members were engaged in 
other full-time employment. Without any opposition, it was 
not the site of genuine political struggle. As an 
institution it functioned at a minimal level and faded from 
the public eye. 
When it had exclusive control of parliament, the PAP found 
it a most convenient ruling mechanism. Whatever the PAP 
decided could be implemented with a full constitutional 
imprimatur. The centre of executive power was the small 
group of senior members of the PAP's Central Executive 
Committee who were also cabinet ministers (Pang 1971, Chan 
1976). Parliament enabled the stamp of democratic 
legitimacy routinely to be given to their decisions. 
The rapid economic growth was seen by the PAP as sufficient 
justification for their extension of sqcial control 
throughout the society and their evisceration of democratic 
institutions. The material achievements did indeed enhance 
their legitimacy. But, by 1981, the sharp increase in 
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inequality had spawned new political dissent which, because 
practically all other forms of legal expression of 
grievances had been proscribed, surfaced through renewed 
support for the enfeebled Workers' Party (WP). 
The WP is a social democratic party with working class 
links and, not being a total creation of the security 
police, it had been constantly pilloried and harassed. 
Nevertheless, it had been permitted to exist, presumably 
because the PAP had a low estimate of the political 
abilities of its leader, J.B. Jeyaretnam, and of its 
political prospects. The declining opposition vote in the 
1970s was misread by the PAP as growing approval for its 
policies rather than conditional acquiescence out of fear. 
With the resurgence of political struggle in the early 
1980s in response to the Second Industrial Revolution, the 
disposition of parliamentary political forces changed 
rapidly. 
Each new example of persecution or discrimination, 
each episode of the PAP pack baying at one or two 
isolated figures, each litany of actionable offences, 
[now) draws more Singaporeans to join or sympathise 
with opposition parties (Minchin 1986: 217). 
The defeat of the PAP in the 1981 Anson by-election ushered 
in a new period in the development of Singapore's political 
system. 
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PARLIAMENTARY STRUGGLE AND THE CRISIS OF LEGITIMACY 
The PAP's general election victory in 1980 with 75 per cent 
of the vote, enough to take all the seats, proved to be 
false reassurance that all was well with the comprehensive 
system of social control they had put in place. In 1981, 
the WP's Jeyaretnam won Anson in a by-election precipitated 
by the PAP incumbent, Devan Nair, assuming the presidency. 
with 51.01 per cent of the vote in a three way contest (GOS 
1989a: 232), Jeyaretnam entered parliament much to the 
venomous displeasure of the PAP leadership (Minchin 1986: 
219). 
Behind the PAP's reaction lay its shock at having its 
governing preserve, parliament, breached. Even if only one 
opposition member is in the House, it again becomes a site 
of political struggle rather than of routine legitimation 
of PAP rule. The PAP had failed in its strategy to control 
who entered parliament. 
This opposition victory loosened the grip of fear on the 
electorate. Although the majority might be scared by the 
numbering of the ballot papers in an election (FEER 30 May 
1985: 21), an increasingly entrenched minority, loyal and 
obedient in every other respect in their outward behaviour, 
felt more and more able to risk dissenting in the one legal 
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political activity still open to them: the act of casting a 
ballot. 
This 1981 breach of PAP control marked the beginning of a 
decade when the PAP was forced by democratic dissent to 
change its pattern of governing through parliament and the 
party-state structure. It brought a conflict between its 
method of governing and its means of acquiring legitimacy. 
The 1984 and 1988 general elections conveniently demarcate 
the decade as the PAP tested various ways to overcome these 
contradictions. 
Attempting to Exo1ude opposition 1981-1984 
In early 1982, following the Jeyaretnam victory, the 
government made a confidential study of voter opinion which 
showed most singaporeans wanted to see more opposition 
members in parliament and that the government was 
"seriously out of touch with voter sentiment" (Asia 
Yearbook 1983: 239). 
The PAP's first reaction to this finding was to put off all 
pending by-elections indefinitely. Then it quickly moved 
to counter-act the growing public desire for an effective 
opposition as well as a PAP government. The PAP-state 
could not portray this objective as disloyal because the 
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aim was not to unseat the government but to make it more 
accountable. In response, ministers promulgated a new 
theory of parliamentarism: an opposition prevents good 
government. Second Deputy Prime Minister, S. Rajaratnam, 
part of Lee's "Old Guard", stated to government unionists 
in 1982: 
The theory of democracy as opposition is founded, at 
least as far as singapore is concerned, on 
intellectual dishonesty .••• No opposition enters 
parliament to help a government govern well •••• Put 
bluntly, the role of an opposition is to ensure bad 
government (Asia Yearbook 1983: 239). 
In August 1982, Rajaratnam tried to frighten people away 
from the opposition. He warned that Jeyaretnam's Workers' 
Party would provide a cover for subversive elements (Asia 
Yearbook 1983: 240). Social democratic opposition in the 
eighties became routinely tarred with the same brush of 
national disloyalty as those of the sixties, many of whom 
had spent years in detention without trial (Amnesty 
International 1980). 
The PAP-state also tried to convince the electorate that an 
opposition was not only damaging but unnecessary because of 
the quality of PAP government. This strategy had two 
thrusts, electoral and administrative. The electoral 
thrust was to claim that the PAP embodied all legitimate 
political forces in Singapore and was therefore above party 
politics. In 1982, this exclusive, cadre-based party 
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declared itself "a national movement dedicated to the 
service of Singapore arid to the advancement of the people's 
well-being" (Minchin 1986: 210). It later set about 
establishing peripheral PAP organisations without 
democratising its core structures (Chan 1989: 83). 
The second thrust was to show how the government had 
learned its lesson and would now be more responsive in its 
administration. In 1982 the government began its attempt 
to humanise the image of the party-state. Public relations 
officers were employed in ministries and concern for the 
individual was stressed in the media. Defence Minister Goh 
Chok Tong was quoted saying "We do care" (Asia Yearbook 
1983: 239). 
However, it would appear that the PAP saw Jeyaretnam's 
election as an exceptional event and not indicative of a 
trend. It therefore took only cosmetic measures to 
accommodate what it thought it was temporary phenomenon 
which could be removed by the full power of the PAP-state's 
electoral apparatus at the next election. 
By 1984, the year of election, the PAP must have concluded 
that, with the faltering economy and rising dissent, it had 
to adjust its approach. It tried to convince the public 
that, while an opposition might be desirable, actually 
voting for one was not necessary. It amended the 
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constitution to establish the position of Non-Constituency 
Member of Parliament (NCMP) (Pillai and Tan 1989: 663). In 
the event that less than three opposition MPs were elected 
at a general election, this amendment made provision for 
the appointment of up to three NCMPs to make up the 
difference. The NCMP seats would be offered by the PAP-
state to the losing opposition candidates who scored the 
highest percentage of votes. By this legislation the 
government stated that it was ensuring that there would 
always be at least three opposition MPs in the House. 
However, this new-found PAP commitment to the traditional 
theory of liberal democracy was aimed at forestalling the 
electorate from casting a protest vote in the 1984 
elections. The government's logic was that everyone could 
vote for the PAP and there would still be a parliamentary 
opposition. But an NCMP is not permitted to vote on 
fiscal, constitutional and confidence matters and is 
therefore very much a second-class MP. By this 
constitutional ruse, the PAP was not only hoping to 
maintain control of all who entered parliament, including 
opposition members, it also aimed to protect matters 
central to its governing authority and legitimacy from 
direct politic~l contestability by a credible opposition. 
In this way it could give the impression of political 
plurality that constitutional legitimacy required, without 
granting the substance of it. But, because it would be the 
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opposition members who were not popularly elected, it would 
be their legitimacy that would be in doubt, not the PAP's, 
which was generously accommodating them. 
This short period before the 1984 elections was therefore 
characterised initially by PAP-state resistance to any form 
of parliamentary opposition. Its main objective was to be 
rid of Jeyaretnam at the next polls and purify the chamber 
once again. But, at the last minute, it was forced by 
political dissent to accommodate opposition in a 
politically castrated form of NCMPs, a strategy that 
failed. 
Accommodating Plurality While Destroying It 1984-1988 
The 12.6 per cent swing against the PAP in the 1984 
elections was a major blow to the government. Although 
only two opposition members were elected as against 77 for 
the PAP, it meant that the PAP-state had not succeeded in 
keeping popularly elected oppositionists, including 
Jeyaretnam, out of parliament. Furthermore I the opposition 
spurned the offer of an NCMP seat. 
The 1984 elections finally alerted the PAP to the magnitude 
of dissent in the community. As soon as the election 
results came out, an angry Lee Kuan Yew went on television 
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and declared that the universal franchise may have to be 
reconsidered. The underlying reasons for his anger lay in 
the risk that an emerging political alternative may 
eventually threaten not only the PAP's ability to rule 
unchecked, but also its alliance with foreign capital. 
In 1985 First Deputy Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong said, ttl 
hope the day will never arrive when waiting for the general 
election result is like watching the flipping of a coin." 
He implied that a strong opposition vote would undermine 
the nation's stability and erode the confidence of foreign 
investors. The ideal he advocated for stability was a 
broad-based mainstream partYI the PAP, with a few "serious-
minded" opposition parties. "I would not apologise .•• if 
the PAP will be returned for the next 25 years, better 
still for the next 50 years. If we tell investors that, 
they can plan their future in Singapore" (FEER 15 August 
1985: 10). 
Thus, the PAP accepted that it could not avoid having an 
opposition presence in the legislature, but it was to be 
one of its choosing. The PAP modified its approach and 
began to implement a more carefully planned strategy: a 
public impression of plurality and political accountability 
while systematically blocking any opposition with a working 
class base and all future possibilities for it. In this 
way it tried to make use of the situation to enhance its 
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ability to control as well as to regain legitimacy after a 
serious recession in 1985. We will now examine this 
strategy in detail. 
Plebiscitary Politics Not Real Accountability 
After its setback in the 1984 elections, the government 
institutionalised its previous public relations campaign in 
a highly controlled process of public consultation. It 
aimed yet again to convey the ideological message that a 
parliamentary opposition was unnecessary in the light of 
the government's responsiveness to public opinion. In 
other wordS, the government attempted to divert public 
opinion away from its political accountability in 
parliament to a paternalistic process of consultation which 
it completely controlled. 
The government, stated one Singaporean academic, was moving 
towards Ita more consultative style of government, initiated 
by the younger PAP leaders after the 1984 general election" 
(Quah 1989: 1). The government Feedback Unit, headed by a 
PAP MP, was established in March 1985 ostensibly to assist 
voters to convey their views to the government. But it 
functioned as another mechanism for the PAP to gather 
political intelligence. 
On February 18, 1987 Brigadier-General Lee Hsien Loong, the 
Prime Minister's son, launched the National Agenda lito 
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enable all Singaporeans to participate in formulating the 
means of attaining the goals identified in the Government's 
Vision of 1999" (Quah 1989: 2). The rest of the year was 
taken up with a government media blitz, Feedback unit-
sponsored seminars, forums, presentations and discussions 
on "the goals which we wish to achieve together and the 
challenges which we have to overcome as a nation" (Goh Chok 
Tong in GOS 1988b: 7). 
In presenting the "Agenda for Action: Goals and Challenges" 
to parliament as a green paper on February 15, 1988, Goh 
Chok Tong stated that lithe ties between elected leaders and 
the people ... must be constantly nurtured through continual 
discussion, feedback and explanation [so that the 
Government] will have a close feel of the mood of the 
people, and the people will understand thoroughly what is 
at stake and what needs to be done" (GOS 1988b:7). 
When announcing the government's adoption of the Agenda for 
Action in parliament on February 25, 1988, Goh stated-that 
the four goals it identified (nation-building, economic 
growth and progress, human resources and education, and 
social and cultural development) could best be reached by 
the appointment of six advisory councils each headed by a 
cabinet minister. The councils were given carefully 
depoliticised areas: culture and the arts, sports and 
recreation, family and community life, youth, the 
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handicapped and the aged. Each of these advisory councils 
then began its own process of public consultation 
throughout 1988. 
In this way, the PAP tried to take the focus off its 
political accountability in the forum of parliament where 
it had to deal with real political challenges on more equal 
terms. The plethora of quasi-governmental consultative 
bodies established a plebiscitary political dynamic whereby 
the government could say it had heard public opinion and do 
anything or nothing about it. 
Also, in 1988, the government began to use the same 
technique inside parliament through its parliamentary 
select committee system which had previously been in disuse 
except for occasional political show trials (e.g. 
Parliament of Singapore 1986). It encouraged public 
submissions on a widely unpopular proposed electoral 
change. The legislation was introduced to the House on 
November 30, 1987 and read for a second time on January 11, 
1988. Of 99 written representations received by the Select 
committee, twelve representers were chosen to appear before 
the Committee for a nationally televised public hearing on 
March 7-9, 1988 (Quah 1989: 3-4; FEER 24 March 1988: 26). 
The legislation (amendments to the Constitution and to the 
Elections Act) was then passed without sUbstantive changes 
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in May 1988 with the government claiming that the voters 
had been consulted adequately. 
Thus the PAP began to use processes both outside and inside 
parliament which it completely controlled (only one, if 
any, opposition member would be on a select committee), to 
give the impression of accountability. It made a virtue of 
its controlled public consultation by portraying itself as 
seeking consensus and national unity and depicting the 
opposition as contentious and divisive (STW 14 January 
1989: 6). Consensus and unity were later formalised as an 
ideological weapon in the PAP's armoury in the National 
Values (Quah 1989: 19). 
Plurality, contest and the Media 
From March 1985, the PAP had parliament televised by its 
state-controlled media. During parliamentary sessions, 
summary excerpts were screened during a special programme 
every evening. Proceedings were extensively covered in the 
newspapers, also PAP-controlled. The PAP-state had decided 
to make the most of the opposition presence and show that 
parliament was a forum of real political contest between 
differing forces. It may have calculated that the 
uninspiring performances of the opposition members would be 
sufficient to dent public confidence in them. However, 
some observers have maintained that the televising of 
parliament "backfired on the ruling party", because it 
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increased the public perception of the two opposition 
members as besieged underdogs (FEER 11 July 1985: 34). In 
fact it did both things. It did strengthen the illusion 
that the PAP would allow real political plurality and this, 
in turn, reinforced the public desire for more opposition. 
While helping to legitimise the overall process of 
parliamentary politics, media coverage also helped to 
undermine the PAP's legitimacy as a party. We will see 
later that the PAP's use of the media for electoral 
purposes and to crush opposition members always had both 
advantages and disadvantages for it. 
The PAP Chooses the opposition 
During the 1984-88 period, the PAP-state reverted to 
traditional liberal democratic theory and accepted that an 
opposition is supposed to help governance. But it decided 
to provide that opposition from within its own ranks and 
from opposition candidates of its own choosing. 
The government brought into play nine Government 
Parliamentary committees (GPCs) in 1987 (Chan 1989: 85) 
(increased to ten in 1989), consisting of all backbench PAP 
MPs, except three who had "distanced themselves from 
current PAP policyll (FEER 26 March 1987: 23). These 
committees were encouraged to take on the role of a 
critical presence in parliament. The "chairmen" of the 
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GPCs sat alongside opposition MP Chiam See Tong on the 
front bench opposite the PAP cabinet "to counter the 
impression that the chamber is merely a rubber stamp". By 
this time, the stronger Jeyaretnam had already been 
excluded from parliament on framed-up charges in the 
courts. Only the more cooperative Chiam remained. The GPC 
chairmen stated they must not appear to "collude" with the 
government if they were to be credible and might even 
abstain on some issues. Goh said that some of the chairmen 
might become na bit of a threat" to ministers (FEER 26 
March 1987: 23). 
By 1989, it appeared the public were not very convinced by 
this pretence. Goh stated that GPCs faced the "unfortunate 
misconception ... that they were not independent because 
their members came from the ruling party" (STW 1 July 1989: 
2). The straits Times further reported his statement as 
follows: 
Asked if GPCs were meant to displace the opposition 
and render it irrelevant to· the political system, Mr 
Goh said it was his belief in the continued dominance 
of the PAP that prompted him to set up GPCs as a way 
of ensuring that Government policies would always be 
scrutinised (STW 1 July 1989: 2). 
Thus, the PAP was concentrating on supplying the forms of 
parliamentary plurality and accountability but not the 
substance. It was enhancing its ability to provide an 
acceptable opposition and to exclude members of any 
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strength and integrity if they managed to get elected. 
Thus, the persecution of Jeyaretnam continued unabated 
until he was criminalised by the courts and deprived of his 
seat (Asia watch 1989: 73). His strength derived, not 
merely from his dogged concern for the poor, which-somewhat 
overcame his lack of skill as a debater, but, more 
importantly for the PAP, from his party's base in the 
working class. Scrutiny of PAP legislation was to be 
permitted by a fabricated and tame "opposition" chosen by 
the PAP, which would never dig too deep or have a popular 
base among the working class. Political accountability 
could quickly be transformed from illusion to reality if 
connected to autonomous working class political 
organisation outside the House. The rightist, middle class 
base of Chiam's SOP and his own lack of political fire and 
clarity, rendered him an acceptable opposition member. He 
was therefore "chosen" by the PAP in the sense that the 
harassment of his party was routine and the PAP decided not 
to eject him from parliament. If political struggle forced 
the PAP to permit the rise of an alternative bourgeois 
party, it is likely the SOP would be the most acceptable of 
all existing parties. 
Lee Kuan Yew put the distinction more colourfully. In 
1986, he differentiated between Chiam, whom he likened to 
the English-educated liberals with a gentlemanly approach 
508 
to politics, and the "riff-raff ll , the "fly-by-night 
politicians" such as Jeyaretnam (Asia Yearbook 1987: 64). 
Limitinq Political contest in Parliament by Fear 
As we shall see in the next section, the PAP took steps to 
ensure greater control of the electoral process in order to 
prevent opposition members being elected. But after 1984, 
it was faced with the immediate problem of an increasingly 
effective Jeyaretnam, who now had another opposition member 
to second his parliamentary motions. The moves to 
criminalise him in the courts and remove him were taking 
time (Asia Watch 1989: 71-81) and he had to be silenced in 
the meantime. However haltingly, Jeyaretnam was beginning 
to develop a public critique of the PAP's use of the 
institutions of liberal democracy including parliament, the 
judiciary and the police. To silence him and any future 
opposition member, the PAP removed the protection of 
parliamentary privilege. As Lee said on television, "I 
think I am slowly convincing my colleagues that the only 
way to get a skunk is to skin him and nail his skin" (Time 
8 september 1986: 17). 
During the debate on the privileges amendment, Foreign 
Minister Dhanabalan stated that "the aim of the bill is not 
to stifle democracy but to enable it to work in our 
particular circumstances". Explaining this later, he said, 
"There are certain key institutions in Singapore that must 
509 
be beyond reproach - parliament, courts and so on" (FEER 8 
January 1987: 55). Lee's accusation that Jeyaretnam's 
comments about the judiciary were "totally treasonable" 
reveal the centrality of liberal democratic institutions to 
the PAP governing strategy and show that Lee recognised the 
crisis of legitimacy that was being precipitated (Asia 
Yearbook 1987: 234). 
The legislation increased the penalties that could be 
imposed by the parliamentary Privileges committee. In six 
hours on 25 August 1986, amendments to the Parliament 
(Privileges, Immunities and Powers) Act were passed through 
three readings. These changes increased the possible fine 
from $1,000 to $50,000 "if a member is found guilty of 
dishonourable conduct, abuse of privilege or contempt" and 
they gave parliament the right to imprison a member for the 
remainder of the session (FEER 4 September 1986: 12-13). 
The amendments maintained the penalties of suspension for 
the remainder of a session and of reprimand. A provision 
was added which gave parliament the right to remove a 
member's immunity from civil action for a specified period. 
Thus a member could be silenced for fear of civil 
proceedings. 
The power to deal with contempt cases summarily was 
extended from parliament as a whole to the Speaker and any 
chairman of any committee, that is, to the PAP exclusively. 
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In the same session, the government introduced 
constitutional amendments which denied the right to counsel 
for any member accused of contempt (Time 8 September 1986: 
17) and denied members the right to be brought before a 
magistrate within 48 hours of their arrest. Members could 
therefore be held incommunicado. Further, the seat of an 
expelled member would automatically fall vacant (Asia 
Yearbook 1987: 234). In short, the legislation gave the 
PAP the power to silence any member it disapproved of 
through the fear of heavy penalties and criminalisation in 
the courts and to expel them from the House at its 
convenience. 
The amendments were introduced hurriedly before a 
privileges committee hearing on Jeyaretnam's questioning of 
the independence of the jUdiciary. Noting the impending 
hearing in his introduction of the amendments, Dhanabalan 
stated that the hearing should not be allowed lito become a 
forum for another debate, an opportunity for more smears or 
a platform for histrionics ll • He continued, "By all means 
take the government to task, scrutinise its actions. But 
don't resort to defamatory statements which cannot be 
proved and which only undermine our institutions" (FEER 4 
September 1986: 12). consequently I Jeyaretnam could be 
cited for contempt if he repeated before the Privileges 
committee his original comments in the House. 
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At the end of the televised Privileges committee hearing in 
1986, during which Lee fulminated against Jeyaretnam for 
several days, the opposition MP asked whether Lee hated him 
and thought he had to be destroyed. Lee's answer: 
"Politically, yes. You have to be debunked, exposed as a 
charlatan, as basically dishonest, as immoral and utterly 
unscrupulous, that you make any allegation against anybody, 
so long as you are protected [by parliamentary privilege]. 
But the moment you bear the consequences, you flinch and 
you cringe, which is shameful" (Asia Yearbook 1987: 233-4). 
The prime minister spoke under privilege. 
Although this televised show trial may have earned sympathy 
for Jeyaretnam, it also demonstrated the limits to 
parliamentary opposition and the power of the PAP's 
continuing ability to exact revenge. Asked whether the 
government was making a political mistake in turning 
Jeyaretnam into a martyr, Dhanabalan replied, "Even if 
Jeyaretnam is made a martyr in the eyes of his supporters, 
we have still made a point to the others, and that is what 
we are interested in" (FEER 8 January 1987: 58). 
Thus the government used fear to set the limits to 
parliamentary opposition. criticism of specific pOlicies 
of the government could be countenanced, but the 
development of a political critique of the corruption of 
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the institutions of liberal democracy in singapore could 
not. 
The Washington-based human rights organisation, Asia Watch, 
a guardian of liberal democratic values, criticised these 
new measures: 
it is especially troubling because that Parliament's 
members come almost exclusively from the ruling party 
(and so control the disciplinary process); because 
there are no clear definitions of what constitutes 
behaviour that warrants disciplinary action: and 
because decisions of Parliamentary disciplinary bodies 
are not reviewable by the judiciary. Our concerns are 
only heightened by the fact that, at least in recent 
years, Parliamentary disciplinary actions seem to have 
been reserved exclusively for members of the miniscule 
opposition in Singapore (Asia Watch 1989: 79-80). 
These measures, for all practical purposes, removed 
parliamentary privilege for the opposition and meant that 
opposition MPs must be able to prove every statement they 
make in parliament according to legal standards of proof if 
they are not to make themselves liable for action under the 
privilege provisions. 
subverting opposition Members' Effectiveness 
While the PAP-state had to allow the public semblance of 
parliamentary opposition, it continued its efforts to 
undermine the performance of opposition members. Obstacles 
placed in the way of these MPs included: 
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a) Delaying the granting of office space in the 
government-administered housing estates where more than 86 
per cent of the population lives. Jeyaretnam obtained an 
office eight months after his election in 1981. Chiam was 
elected on 22 December 1984 and obtained his office on 20 
November 1985 (FEER 30 May 1985: 21; ST 30 November 1985). 
It was not possible to obtain offices prior to election as 
an MP. 
b) Ensuring that annual publication permits for party 
organs and police permits for holding rallies is usually an 
uncertain and lengthy process often resulting in rejection 
(Asia Watch 1989: 80). 
c) Bringing politically-motivated criminal charges for 
mismanagement of funds, illegal assembly and so on, or 
charges for defamation and libel against opposition leaders 
who have little hope of defending themselves successfully 
in front of a compliant jUdiciary (Asia Watch 1989: 71-81). 
These frequent prosecutions are aimed at keeping the 
opposition impoverished and criminalising the most 
effective leaders. 
d) Denying reliable information from the civil service to 
opposition MPs and parties, making it more difficult to 
criticise government policies from an informed position and 
to develop alternative policies (ST 3 March 1984). 
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e) Placing party officials under constant surveillance by 
the Internal Security Department and infiltrating the 
parties (Minchin 1986: 217). 
f) Using the government-controlled mass media to report 
minimally and negatively on opposition party affairs. 
g) Excluding opposition MPs from government-controlled 
community organisations which monopolise local affairs in 
each constituency. 
The latter exclusion is hardly surprising, since these 
government bodies, a system of community centres, 
consultative committees and residents' committees in each 
area or housing estate, are a vital governing mechanism of 
the PAP. As we noted in Chapter Four, they are all 
appointed by the Prime Minister's Office. He has been the 
chairman of the over-arching coordinating body, the 
People's Association, since its inception in 1960. PAP MPs 
head the local committees and PAP members hold the 
influential positions. Yet Lee, when faced with a 
complaint about this from Jeyaretnam, stated that these 
organisations must be insulated from "interference by 
political parties or opposition MPs" CST 30 June 1985). 
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To protect this governing structure from also becoming a 
forum of political struggle, as parliament had, the PAP-
state refused the repeated applications of both Chiam and 
Jeyaretnam to join these bodies which PAP MPs routinely sit 
on in order to have access to local community affairs (FEER 
30 May 1985: 21; ST 30 June 1985). The PAP could get away 
with this refusal because, in this'case, liberal democratic 
ideology worked in its favour: the civil service state 
apparatus was not supposed to be the place where political 
forces vied for supremacy whereas parliament was. Thus, 
the PAP was able to continue the public fiction of a 
separation of party and state in order to maintain the 
legitimacy of this governing mechanism. 
Blocking opposition votes 
The PAP's strategy of strengthening its power to select its 
own opposition while using the opposition already in 
parliament to demonstrate its commitment to democracy was 
also pursued by changing the electoral rules, heightening 
manipulation of the election campaigning and outright 
threats against voters. By these means it attempted to 
entrench its control of the legislature and prevent the 
1988 general elections bringing any more unpleasant 
surprises, as Jeyaretnam's victory had in 1981. 
The PAP-state therefore engaged in the time-honoured 
liberal democratic process of changing electoral boundaries 
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to its own advantage. But it also changed the whole voting 
system by way of amendment to the constitution. The Group 
Representation constituencies scheme (GRC scheme) (Chan 
1989: 86), passed by parliament on 18 May 1988 by 
amendments to the Constitution and the Elections Act, was 
designed to raise the threshold of votes needed by the 
opposition to get members into parliament in the first-
past-the-post electoral system. Its aim was to "dilute 
opposition votes by combining constituencies with dominant 
opposition sympathies with neighbouring constituencies 
which strongly support the PAP" (Linda Lim 1989: 184). The 
PAP was thus insulating itself from a further swing to the 
opposition. 
First mooted during the 1984 elections, the GRC scheme 
created 13 GRCs from 39 constituencies. That is, a group 
of three constituencies became a single voting block. To 
contest a GRC, a party must put forward a slate of three 
candidates all of whom become MPs if they obtain the most 
votes combined. 
When the scheme was implemented in 1988, eight of the ten' 
most marginal PAP seats from 1984 were placed in the ten 
contested GRCs along with safe PAP seats. In the boundary 
changes associated with its introduction, the solidly 
opposition Anson constituency of recently expelled MP 
Jeyaretnam was abolished even though he was still appealing 
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his case. Two other constituencies were abolished (Rochore 
and Telok Ayer) , which were the seats of increasingly 
critical PAP backbenchers and former senior ministers, Toh 
Chin Chye and Ong Pang Boon (FEER 4 August 1988: 22; 1 Sept 
1988: 20). 
The government initially justified the scheme in terms of 
its proposal to set up Town Councils (see Chapter Four), 
but the punitive implications of the proposal for the 
opposition was immediately obvious and provoked a strong 
public reaction (FEER 26 March 1987: 22). The government 
then switched its ground. It stated that the GRC scheme 
was actually to ensure minority race representation in 
parliament and that this had not been said initially for 
fear of stirring up racial tension. Each slate of 
candidates was then required to have at least one minority 
representative. The PAP government went to considerable 
lengths to convince the electorate of its sincerity in 
this. It released cabinet papers dating back to 1982. 
Using the media once again as a support for the 
government's legitimacy in the face of dissent, Lee Kuan 
Yew staged another "political TV spectacular to put his 
case over" (FEER 24 March 1988: 26). The parliamentary 
select committee hearing on the legislation was televised 
each evening from 7 to 9 March 1988. 
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However, the Malay and Indian communities were prominent in 
opposing the proposal on the grounds that they did not want 
the PAP to define either who is a Malay or to choose their 
representatives (FEER 4 August 1988: 22). In addition, as 
Jeyaretnam pointed out in 1984, all the PAP's minority race 
candidates had won .. The only two PAP candidates defeated 
were Chinese and one of them was defeated by himself, a 
member of a minority race (FEER 10 December 1987: 14). The 
voting figures from the previous three elections (1976, 
1980, 1984) showed that PAP Malay candidates polled only 
marginally fewer votes than the average for all PAP 
candidates (FEER 11 February 1988: 32-33). 
As Jeyaretnam implied, if the· PAP's concern for minority 
representation was genuine it could easily have nominated 
more minority representatives to its own safe seats. 
Furthermore, the 1988 elections with the GRCs in operation 
produced exactly the same number of minority race 
representatives in parliament as before (sixteen), and 
reduced the elected opposition members by 50 per cent, from 
two to one. In 1988, the number of Malay MPs increased 
from nine to ten, Indian MPs stayed at six and a Eurasian 
MP did not stand. 
The condition that each slate of candidates must include a 
minority representative made it harder for the opposition 
to put forward slates. Being the most exploited and 
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insecure community in Singapore, Malays are reluctant to 
enter politics for the PAP or for the opposition (FEER 4 
August 1988). 
The GRC gerrymander achieved its real goal of neutralising 
the increasing opposition vote in 1988 as a survey of the 
closeness of some results shows. without the GRC scheme, 
there would have been a sharp increase in opposition 
members. 
TABLE 6.4: MARGINAL RESULTS IN 1988 ELECTION 
Seat 
PAP VOTE BELOW 
Eunos GRC 
Paya Lebar 
Bukit Gombak 
Bedok GRC 
PAP VOTE 55-60% 
No of MPs 
55% 
3 
1 
1 
3 
Aljunied GRC 3 
Bukit Panjang 1 
Nee Soon Central 1 
Tiong Bahru GRC 3 
Fengshan 1 
Braddell Heights 1 
Hougang 1 
Chua Chu Kang 1 
Changi 1 
Whampoa 1 
punggol 1 
WP= Workers' Party 
% of valid votes 
PAP WP SDP 
50.9 
52.4 
53.5 
54.9 
56.3 
57.3 
57.6 
57.8 
57.9 
58.8 
59.0 
59.3 
59.4 
59.5 
59.9 
49.1 
45.1 
42.1 
42.1 
41.0 
40.7 
40.6 
47.6 
46.5 
43.6 
30.8 
38.4 
41.2 
40.1 
SDP= Singapore Democratic Party 
* National Solidarity Party (split from SDP) 
Source: FEER 15 September 1988:16. 
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Other 
40.5* 
The PAP secured all but one seat in parliament on the basis 
of 61.8 per cent of the total vote (GOS 1989a: 232). The 
remaining 38 per cent secured a single seat. This extreme 
distortion of the plurality system of voting meant that it 
took an average of 12,290 votes to elect a PAP candidate, 
while it took an average of 494,406 votes to elect an 
opposition candidate (election results, STW 4 September 
1988). 
Through this manipulation of the electoral process, the 
government was able to exclude most opposition candidates 
and choose one of its preference. It was able to prevent 
the strongest and working class-linked opposition party 
from winning a seat, the Workers' Party, and to permit the 
re-election of PAP-approved opposition member Chiam See 
Tong (Singapore Democratic Party). The PAP decided not to 
include his single member constituency (SMC) in a GRC. 
In addition, the PAP seats could be protected from future 
anti-government by-election swings under the GRC 
legislative provision that by-elections need not be held in 
GRCs until the entire team of MPs ceases to hold office. 
Threatening voters and potential opposition Candidates 
We noted in Chapter Four how, during the 1984-88 period, 
the PAP-state moved to tie welfare to political loyalty by 
linking housing values and services to the Town Councils 
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scheme. Since local MPs automatically head the Town 
councils, voting for the PAP candidate would be the only 
way of ensuring maintenance of the same level of services 
to one's housing estate and thus the preservation of 
property values. 
But there were more direct threats as well. The detention 
of 22 young professionals and community workers in May-June 
1987 was partly aimed at preventing the effective 
mobilisation of intellectuals and the working class behind 
the Workers' Party. Several of those detained had been 
assisting the party (International Mission of Jurists 
1987). Their detention served as a warning to opposition 
party workers as well as supporters. 
The subsequent detention without trial in 1988 of one of 
the detainees' lawyers, Mr Francis Seow, who had declared 
his interest in standing at the polls, was also aimed at 
discouraging him and other capable candidates from doing 
so. Seow was a former attorney-general who had fallen out 
with Lee. As president of the Law Society in 1986, he had 
the best of Lee in a televised select committee hearing on 
legislation designed to force his resignation from the 
Society's presidency (Parliament of Singapore 1986: B60-
B94). "My arrest and detention under the ISA [Internal 
Security Act] has frightened many potential candidates 
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away," said Seow after his release shortly before the 
elections (Asiaweek 2 September 1988: 34). 
Manipulating the Electoral campaign 
These threats and obstructions set the scene for the 1988 
election campaign. On 17 August 1988, the President 
announced the election date as 3 September, sixteen days 
hence, and nomination day as 24 August, thus allowing a 
nine-day election campaign. 
The Electoral Act forbids campaigning outside of the 
campaign period. However, again, this effectively applied 
only to the opposition. August 9 was the National Day 
celebrations. August 14 was the Prime Minister's National 
Day Rally speech in which he described, in the words of the 
straits Times headline "How the Reds can hit us a second 
time" (STW 20 August 1988: 13). Deputy Prime Minister 
Goh's National Day message included a warning about 
ensuring political stability or else "economic growth would 
take a plunge and that extra [Christmas.] bonus may 
disappear" (STW 20 August 1988: 2). August 22 was the 
Prime Minister's highly publicised address to university 
students widely seen as a pitch to the new generation of 
voters. August 27, during the campaign and one week before 
the election, was the orchard Road "Swing singapore" Party. 
Sponsored by the government and planned by the US public 
relations firm ogilvy and Mather to soften the stern image 
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of the PAP, it was a free extravaganza to which 250,000 
people turned up (FEER 8 September 1988: 16). 
On the announcement of the election, the deposit for 
candidates was raised more than 200 per cent from $1,500 to 
$4,000. During the campaign, the Workers' Party and its 
star attraction, Seow (released from 72 days detention 
under the ISA on 16 July), regularly drew crowds of 15,000 
to 18,000 at its rallies. The PAP rallies, even with the 
Prime Minister speaking, attracted crowds of only a few 
thousand. However, the straits Times and the television 
gave considerable prominence to Lee and barely mentioned 
Seow (FEER 8 September 1988: 18). On election eve, the 
media did suddenly give prominence to government 
allegations that Seow "was financially untrustworthy, had 
criminal acquaintances, and might be disqualified from 
taking his seat should he be elected" (The Economist 10 
September 1988: 30). 
with this kind of systematic crippling of opposition 
organisation, it was extremely difficult for the opposition 
to mobilise its supporters and to inform them of its 
policies. The opposition vote nevertheless increased by 
one per cent (GOS 1989a: 232). 
Two NCMP seats were offered to the two highest polling 
losers: Francis Seow and Lee Siew Choh, both from the 
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Workers' Party. They had narrowly failed to win the Eunos 
GRC where the PAP won by 50.9 per cent of the vote (STW 4 
September 1988). They accepted the seats. Dr Lee had been 
a leader of the Barisan Sosialis in the mid-1960s and his 
erratic leadership then had been a political gift to the 
PAP. He was therefore permitted to enter parliament after 
the election. However, Seow was disqualified from his seat 
before he was able to take it up, owing to tax charges 
brought against him by the PAP-state after he was released 
from political detention. Seow escaped to the United 
states before the court proceedings began (STW 24 December 
1988). The PAP recognised that, even as a second-class MP, 
a person of Seow's eloquence and skill would provide too 
serious a challenge and act as a focus for dissent. Both 
Jeyaretnam and Seow were excluded from parliament. 
Thus, from 1984 to 1988, the PAP-state moved decisively to 
protect its ability to rule through parliament. While, of 
necessity, acknowledging the place of an opposition in 
parliament, it went to considerable lengths to. undermine 
genuine opposition and to fabricate political plurality. 
It used threats and fear to prevent opposition members 
being effective in parliament and to prevent the electorate 
voting for them. If they persisted in casting an 
opposition vote, this was structurally neutralised by the 
GRC electoral gerrymander. The PAP-state ensured that no 
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member of an opposition party with a strong base and 
working class links was elected. 
separating Functions: Parliament and the presidency 
since 1988, the PAP-state has reinforced its previous 
policy of constructing an acceptable opposition in 
parliament. It has also taken steps to take the most 
important governing functions away from parliament and hand 
them to an elected president. Thus the legitimacy derived 
from the existence of the legislature will not put at risk 
the PAP's executive authority. In this way the PAP hopes 
to remove the contradiction between the two parliamentary 
functions of governing and legitimating. 
continued Fabrication of opposition 
The PAP must have calculated that a five per cent swing 
against it in the next elections may still bring into 
parliament some opposition members it regards as 
undesirable. It cannot manipulate the voting system much 
more without the electoral process losing complete 
credibility. It has therefore decided to create another 
category of MP: the non-elected MP (NMP). This plurality 
of statuses among MPs will have the effect of undermining 
the status of popularly elected opposition members. There 
will be so many categories of MPs, that the line between 
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government and opposition, between popularly elected and 
appointed, will pe blurred. 
objective. 
This, of course, must be the 
On 6 October 1989, Deputy Prime Minister Goh introduced an 
constitutional amendment to provide for the appointment of 
up to six non-elected MPs (NMPs) for two-year terms and 
with the same restricted voting rights as NCMPs. A Special 
Parliamentary Select Committee headed by the Speaker will 
choose the NMPs, who will then be appointed by the 
President. That is, the PAP will choose the NMPs. The 
first NMPs would be appointed as soon as practicable after 
the passage of the legislation (STW 14 October 1989: 8). 
NMPs were first mooted in parliament in January 1989 by 
Brigadier-General Lee Hsien Loong who termed them "non-
partisan" MPs. He put the idea forward as a way of making 
Singapore's democracy nas stable, as well supported and as 
feasible as we can contrive" (STW 28 January 1989: 6). 
NMPs could make a contribution by representing the views of 
various sectors such as community leaders, university dons, 
workers and employers, noted Lee. In May, Goh raised the 
issue again, stating that people who did not want to spend 
their whole career in politics could make a contribution 
through becoming short-term MPs (STW 20 May 1989: 2). 
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This is a reversion to nineteenth century concepts of rule 
by the "educated" rather than the "ignorant". Everyone 
should have a vote, but some should have more votes than 
others (Macpherson 1977: 57). The NMP scheme is a way of 
giving more votes to the upper class. This is an echo of 
John stuart Mill's meritocratic political theory of more 
than a century ago, which held that "those who had already 
attained superior station in life must not be made to yield 
their power to the rest" through equal voting power 
(Macpherson 1977: 60). 
The junior Lee has put forward the view that the NMPs will 
mean that singapore "will not be the same as other people's 
democracy because the circumstances are different" (STW 28 
January 1989: 6). This statement seeks to avoid the 
criticism that the government has dispensed with the 
fundamental liberal democratic principle of universal 
suffrage. However, the PAP is on firm ground domestically 
because the opposition have already agreed to this through 
their acceptance of NCMP status in the House. The NMPs can 
henceforth be used against the opposition by claiming that 
they are neither government nor opposition and thereby 
neutral and non-partisan. 
The benefit to the PAP will be considerable because the 
political effect of having yet a third category of MP in 
parliament will be to undermine the democratic concept of 
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opposition. with the Government Parliamentary Committees 
also pretending to be in opposition, there will be a 
confusion of political accountability. Deputy Prime 
Minister Goh Chok Tong was reported as stating that the 
nGPCs, together with the non-constituency MP scheme and the 
recently proposed non-elected MP scheme, will make up for 
the small number of Opposition MPs" (STW 1 July 1989: 2). 
The number of NMPs can also be increased to counter any 
increase in popularly elected opposition members. The 
number of NCMPs has recently been raised to four (STW 29 
June 1991). In addition, changes to parliamentary 
privileges and procedures (for example, cutting down 
speaking times and requiring four members to support a call 
for a division) are also designed to hobble the opposition. 
But there is also another possibility for the PAP to 
undermine genuine opposition. 
Shifting the Ground of Political Struggle 
It may also be possible at some stage to move the ground of 
political struggle from inter-party and intra-parliament to 
intra-party. That is, the controlled lIopposition" role 
allowed to the GPCs could be developed into one or more 
ostensibly opposing factions within the PAP, possibly using 
the Japanese Liberal Democratic Party or the Indian 
Congress Party as models. By focussing on these contrived 
political rivalries, the PAP government would add to the 
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illusion of political contest and of PAP responsiveness to 
popular opinion. Further, the contest would be mainly 
within the controlled environs of the party itself and 
parliament would be the showplace for exhibiting it. Such 
artificial political contest would no doubt provide a 
training programme for rising PAP leadership, as do the 
present GPCs. 
The unprecedented statement by Lee Kuan Yew that the PAP 
could possibly lose power if there was "a split in the 
leadership over policy, not a personality clash, but a real 
difference over economic or political policies" (STW 28 
October 1989: 13) may presage such a development or may 
simply be justification for an executive presidency. 
This strategy fits well with the government's view that it 
has to create an opposition in its own image which would 
wait on the sideline as a kind of emergency replacement 
team. "In terms of the thinking of the first generation 
leadership, it essentially means the creation of a PAP fA 
Team' and a PAP 'B Team /fl (Vasil 1984: 185). Because such 
an opposition "must share the ruling party1s philosophy and 
differ only in membership" (Asia Yearbook 1989: 214)1 the 
policy debates between the PAP government and the PAP 
opposition are likely to be fake. The risk for the PAP, of 
course, is that after the departure of Lee, they may not 
stay that way. 
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Whatever strategies the PAP may choose, it is clear now 
that it has created enough kinds of MPs and illusory 
opposition politics to have many options open to it as 
occasion demands. However, its main concern has been to 
protect its governing powers over the long term. 
Parliament and Presidency: separation of Functions 
'The PAP's main insurance against either an increasing 
opposition vote or a real split in its own ranks which 
would restrict its ability to govern, is its proposal for 
an elected presidency. In April 1984/ Lee Kuan Yew stated 
that the government was "seriously thinking about amending 
the constitution to introduce a blocking mechanism so that 
foreign reserves could be spent only with the assent of the 
President and a special committee" (Quah 1989: 17). This 
soon developed into a proposal for an elected presidency 
(ST 20 August 1984). 
After the December 1984 elections, it was increasingly 
suggested that the elected president should also have the 
role of safeguarding the integrity of the civil service. 
The White Paper presented to parliament on 29 July, 1988, 
spelt out the government's rationale and intentions in 
detail. 
Any government, even a temporary coalition which comes 
into power by a majority of only one seat in 
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parliament, has complete legal access to all the 
levers of power and decision-making •••. It can do 
anything ~t wishes to the financial assets and 
reserves. It can also change any appointment in the 
civil service •.•• Overnight, everything can be 
dismantled (GOS 1988c). 
The PAP could not contemplate what it has termed a "freak" 
election result (FEER 8 September 1988: 18). That is, it 
might actually lose and another party govern. As we have 
noted, the PAP cannot afford to lose its grip on executive 
power because it has an inadequate class base. It 
therefore has assigned the key decisions in controlling the 
PAP-state apparatus to an executive president over whose 
election it would have complete control. 
The White Paper proposed that the elected president would 
have a six-year tenure, with the right to veto the spending 
of the country's assets and reserves which the government 
of the day had not itself accumulated, the right to make 
appointments to all senior positions in the civil service 
(including the judiciary), the military and statutory 
boards, the right to attend and make speeches in parliament 
and the right of access to all government offices (Quah 
1989: 17i Asia Yearbook 1989: 213). 
The financial assets entrusted to the president have 
generally been alluded to as the foreign reserves. On a 
per capita basis, Singapore's reserves are the highest in 
the world. Even then they are grossly understated (US$16.9 
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billion in 1988) because Singapore is said to value its 
instruments at purchase price rather than current value 
(e.g. gold at US$35 an ounce rather than current value of 
about US$376) (FEER 25 May 1989: 68). Thus the amount to be 
guarded by the president is considerable. 
However, the implication of the White Paper was that the 
assets to be so protected include even more: 
assets.and reserves (including land and immovable 
property) of the government, the reserves and foreign 
exchange assets managed by the Government of Singapore 
Investment Corporation/the Monetary Authority of 
Singapore/the Board of commissioners of Currency, 
Singapore, the capital assets and surpluses of the 
statutory boards, the capital assets and surpluses of 
government companies and those arising from any 
extraordinary measures which involve raising loans in 
the local and international markets and pledging the 
credit of Singapore (Low and Toh 1989: 21). 
This proposal was clearly much more than "an elected 
president without executive powers to perform a custodial 
role" (Quah 1989: 17). It was a proposal "to divest 
Parliament of its powers and reinvest the powers in one 
man" (Low and Toh 1989: 25). Public reaction was very 
negative before the 1988 elections, as the proposal 
appeared tailor-made for Lee Kuan Yew. This reaction forced 
Lee to say that he would not necessarily be the first 
elected president (FEER 15 September 1988: 15). After the 
elections, Gohannounced that legislation on the propo~al 
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was a major priority but would not be rushed (Quah 1989: 
19) • 
When finally passed into law through a constitutional 
amendment (STW 5 January 1991) and the Presidential 
Elections Act (STW 6 July 1991), further provisions had 
been added. Among the powers of the president are: 
- the right to veto government expenditure bills; this 
veto can be overturned by a two-thirds parliamentary 
majority only if a majority of the president's six-
member Council of Advisers does not support the 
president; 
- the right to veto budgets of the government and key 
statutory boards and government-owned companies, and 
bills raising loans, incurring debts or providing 
guarantees on the part of the government; this and 
subsequent veto powers below may only be over-turned 
by both a two-thirds majority in parliament and in a 
referendum; 
- the right to veto any bill that changes the 
investment powers of the central Provident Fund Board; 
- the right to veto such key public service 
appointments as Supreme Court judges, the Attorney 
General, Public Service Commission members, the 
Auditor General and Accountant General, members of the 
Armed Forces Council t the Chief of Defence Force, the 
Chiefs of the Air Force, Army and Navy, the 
commissioner of Police and the Director of the corrupt 
Practices Investigation Bureaui 
- the right to refuse a recommendation from the 
government to declare a state of emergency, since this 
may enable the government to circumvent his powers; 
- the right to veto bills he considers are 
circumventing his blocking powers; 
- the final say over release of political detainees, 
the issuing of prohibition orders against religious 
leaders (under the new maintenance of religious 
harmony law) and the investigation of cabinet members 
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for corruption (GOS 1990; STW 1 September 1990: 8; 
Asia Yearbook 1991: 204). 
The presidential system is therefore entrenched because 
changes can only be made by a two-thirds majority both in 
parliament and in a referendum if the president does not 
concur. The president is bestowed with the powers of 
executive authority because he has the final say on all 
major financial and personnel matters. No government can 
rule without his cooperation or can eject from power the 
present governing fraction of the capitalist class. 
The composition of the Council of Presidential Advisers 
ensures the perpetuation of PAP rule. Of the six members, 
two will be chosen by the President (one of whom will be 
chairman), the Chairman of the Public Service commission 
{who owes his job to the president} will nominate two 
members, and the prime minister will nominate two (GOS 
1990). 
The current head of state has become the first elected 
president and his term will end in 1993. Voting for the 
presidency will be compulsory (STW 6 July 1991: 1). Only 
those persons screened by a three-member Presidential 
Elections committee and granted an eligibility certificate 
may stand for election (STW 6 July 1991). However, there 
are exceptions, most of which are appointments under the 
direct control of the executive president. 
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He [sic] is automatically qualified if he had served 
at least three years in one of the following 
positions: Minister, Chief Justice, Supreme Court 
Judge or Judicial Commissioner, Attorney-General, PSC 
[Public Service Commission] Chairman, Accountant-
General, Permanent Secretary, Chairman/CEO [Chief 
Executive Officer] of one of nine major statutory 
boards, or Chairman/CEO of a company with paid-up 
capital of at least $100 million. (STW 15 September 
1990: 9) 
The WP and SOP have objected to the legislation but mainly 
on the grounds of the stringent qualifications for 
candidacy (STW 3 August 1991: 4). The qualifications for 
candidacy ensure that only a PAP-approved member of the 
capitalist class may stand for election. 
Thus, the PAP-state has successfully transferred its core 
governing powers to a mechanism it completely controls and 
which cannot be breached by any number of opposition 
members in parliament. The president will also have the 
legitimacy of being popularly elected even though the 
circumstances of his election will be anything but 
democratic. This ideological effect is enhanced by the 
PAP's tactic of coining the title "Elected President". 
Whether or not Lee Kuan Yew takes the presidency is not of 
major significance. As he has noted, his control of the 
PAP as secretary-general is more crucial to his power 
(Asiaweek 26 August 1988: 43). Through this position, he 
can determine the membership of the Council of Presidential 
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Advisers (perhaps even becoming Council chairman himself), 
'the membership of the Presidential Elections committee and 
thus the presidential candidate. 
More importantly, the PAP has set in place a system similar 
to the British colonial administration whereby the levers 
of power remain in the hands of a democratically 
unaccountable capitalist class faction through their 
control of a "governor" and his appointed advisors. The 
legislature retains only residual powers. The similarity 
does not end in the structure. The PAP can sustain this 
rule because of its alliance with imperialism, its 
extensive control of the weak local capitalist class and 
the working class. 
However, should liberal democratic struggle continue to 
increase in strength through the demand for an opposition, 
the PAP is now in the position to concede seats in 
parliament without any immediate risk to its political 
hegemony. No future government can rule without the 
support of the PAP-selected elected president. 
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FEAR AND LIBERAL DEMOCRACY 
This examination of recent developments in singapore's 
political system has revealed its use of liberal democratic 
forms of parliamentary democracy to enable the PAP-state to 
rule with legitimacy. We have seen that Singapore's social 
formation, specifically the weakness of the capitalist 
class through under-development, has so far prevented the 
genuine liberal democratic process of intra-class 
competition. 
The PAP has held on to power by maintaining a cadre-based 
party without a mass base which rules through the party-
state apparatus. Because of the PAP-state's power to 
control parliament, legislative legitimacy became PAP 
legitimacy. Parliament was both the vehicle and the 
legitimator of PAP power. 
However, the democratic practices which ideologically 
legitimated this arrangement were thrown into crisis by 
increased political struggles in the 1980s which required 
the sUbstantive realisation of political rights. The 
PAP's response has been to intensify repressive measures 
and the fear they stimulate. It has also created the 
illusion of plurality and political contest while 
undermining the substance of it. The PAP-state has moved 
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decisively to solve the contradiction between legitimacy 
and governance by separating these functions into two 
institutions, parliament and presidency. 
This study of the political system has shown the 
functioning of the process by which people agree to their 
own subjection and exploitation. Just as public housing 
and education have put people in their physical and social 
places, the political system ensures they stay in their 
political places. But there is another institution of 
social control which supplements these. The law focuses 
the repressive power of the state on the working class to 
force its members not only to stay where they are put, but 
to cooperate with the accumulation strategy. 
539 
CHAPTER 7 
THE LAW, COERCION AND TERROR 
The ordering of society is most effectively achieved by 
consent. However, when consent is not forthcoming or the 
ordering process requires rapid break-down of existing 
social relations, then various degrees of coercion become 
necessary. 
The PAP-state's priority has been the re-ordering of 
Singapore society in consonance with the economic strategy 
of its partnership with foreign capital. This has 
involved, as we have seen, sudden reconstitution of the 
relations of production. These changes have required 
increasing state control both to initiate them and to 
secure them. with its unbroken control of the legislature, 
the PAP-state has been able to place the force of law 
behind its re-structuring of the social formation. Even 
its most violent methods of engendering terror to force 
submission and obedience have been legitimated by the law. 
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To understand how the law and its administration have 
developed in Singapore, we need first to comprehend more 
generally the relationship between the law and the state in 
a class-divided society. 
THE STATE AND THE LAW 
In a class-divided society, the relations between the 
classes need to be regulated, and the working class not 
only put in its place, but forced to cooperate with the 
mode of production. This may take the form of general 
social discipline or more extreme forms of coercion. Thus 
consent is backed up by force. 
In a system based on capitalist reproduction, labour 
has, if necessary, to be disciplined labour; .•. [I]n a 
society of "free individuals", men and women have to 
be disciplined to respect and obey the over-arching 
framework of the nation-state itself. Coercion is one 
necessary face or aspect of lithe order of the state" .. 
The law and the legal institutions are the clearest 
institutional expression of this "reserve army" of 
enforced social discipline (Hall et ale 1978: 202). 
The law functions to produce conformity to the new social 
structures that capitalism requires. It does this by 
administering the key relations of capital (private 
property and contracts), defining and upholding the public 
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order necessary for the steady reproduction of capital, 
defending the state against its enemies and raising 
"existing social norms to the level of universal norms" 
(Hall et al. 1978: 208). 
That is, the law legitimates the state's use of force in 
regulating the social relations of capitalism. This is 
achieved on one level by the state itself appearing to be 
organised in the common interest and thus independent of 
any class interest. This appearance enables the state to 
define rights and obligations which it labels universal but 
whi.ch, in fact, guarantee particular class interests. 
Thus, the relationship between the state and the law in 
liberal democracies is not that of the state openly using 
the law to impose the will of one class a~ainst the 
interests of another. Rather, the state serves the 
supremacy of the ruling class and the development of 
productive forces while maintaining the appearance of 
neutrality, of standing above politics and society in order 
to act as an impartial moderator of conflict. 
The unequal extraction of surplus value in production 
appears as a "fair day's wage for a fair day's work" 
at the level of the wage contract. So, also, the 
"reproductive" work which the capitalist state 
performs on behalf of capital, assumes the appearance 
of the class neutrality of the state - standing above 
the class struggle and moderating it - at the 
politico-juridical level (Hall et al. 1978: 198). 
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As we have seen, legitimating ideological effects are 
produced by concrete practices. In parliamentary politics, 
the appearance of control by one class is avoided by the 
separation between the state and the legislature and 
through the competition of political parties in parliament. 
The ideological effect is of a state above class politics. 
Ideology and the Law 
In the case of the law, this effect is reinforced by the 
separation of the making of law from its administration; 
that is, the separation of the executive of the state and 
the legislature from the judiciary. The state appears to 
make laws in the common interest. It has the power to 
define what is legal and illegal and what is a crime. This 
ideological power is legitimated by its apparent lack of 
class interest and its separation from the process of 
administering the law. It is the jUdiciary which imposes 
sentences and subjects people to state violence in order to 
force their compliance with the social norms set by the 
state. Thus the "independence" of the judiciary from the 
state is a crucial ideological effect which is produced by 
the actual functioning of the law and covers up the real 
relation. 
The political neutrality of the judiciary is a myth, 
one of those fictions our rulers delight in, because 
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it confuses and obscures ..•• The judiciary does not of 
course call its prejudices political or moral, or 
social. It calls them the public interest (J. 
Griffith liThe Politics of the Judiciary" New statesman 
4 February 1977). 
Furthermore, the law itself does apply to everyone, rich 
and poor alike. The fact that some members of the upper 
class are criminalised along with large numbers of the 
working class is a concrete practice which covers up the 
law's class interest and attests to the state's neutrality. 
If the law is evidently partial and unjust, then it 
will mask nothing, legitimise nothing, contribute 
nothing to any class's hegemony. The essential 
precondition for the effectiveness of law, in its 
function as ideology, is that it shall display an 
independence from gross manipulation and shall seem to 
be just (Thompson 1975: 263). 
Again, at another level, the way the administration of the 
law is organised produces this effect of equality of 
justice. The legal apparatus is divided into three main 
areas of law: administrative, civil and criminal. 
Administrative law is that law administered directly by the 
government to ensure that executive decisions are obeyed 
and to protect the direct interests of the state. The 
ideological effect of this practice is that, since every 
citizen has an interest in the smooth operation of the 
"neutral" state, these powers of regulation are normal and 
uncontroversial. 
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The civil law mainly regulates capitalist exchange. The 
distinction between civil and criminal law enables Ifnormal" 
capitalist competition to avoid being heavily criminalised, 
and simply to be regulated for the efficient operation of 
business. 
The criminal law criminalises forms of appropriation 
outside the control of the state and the capitalist class, 
along with other forms of social behaviour which threaten 
the existing social order. As the state has the power to 
define the common good and the law focuses on an 
individual's actions (taking individual circumstances into 
account only to a limited extent), the operation of the 
criminal law generates an ideological consensus that it is 
combatting social ills on behalf of society. The criminal 
law produces the ideological effect that crime is the fault 
of those who are punished for it. The particular class 
interest behind this imposition of social discipline is 
thereby obfuscated. The "illegal lt activities of the 
working class are heavily criminalised; an ideological 
sanction which legitimates the use of state violence 
against the poor. 
By operating strictly within judicial logic •.• [the 
law] constantly brackets out those aspects of class 
relations which destroy its equilibrium and 
impartiality in practice. It equalises ... things which 
cannot be equal. In the famous words of Anatole 
France: Ifin its majestic impartiality it forbids the 
rich and the poor alike to sleep under the bridges of 
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Paris". It addresses Itclass subjects" as individual 
persons (Hall et al. 1978: 208). 
Thus, these practices of the law and their ideological 
effects enable the state to criminalise the activities of a 
group or class that it wishes to control while at the same 
time disguising its class interest. 
In a class society, based on the needs of capital and 
the protection of private property, the poor and the 
propertyless are always in some sense on Itthe wrong 
side of the law", whether actually they transgress it 
or not. (Hall et al. 1978:190). 
The law thereby creates a hostile social environment for 
the working class. 
Class struggle and singapore's Legeal Inheritance 
The above analysis of the state, the law and ideology would 
appear to provide Singapore with a legal inheritance 
ideally suited to the PAP-state's political objectives. 
However, the British colonial government left behind a 
system of law and a body of statutes which contained 
contradictory influences from class struggles in England 
and in Singapore. 
In the nineteenth century, the victories of British working 
class resistance to the new set of class alliances 
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established by the transition from landed to industrial 
capital, came to be formalised in concessions within the 
legal system. The distancing of routine legal practice 
from the direct intervention of the executive did secure a 
greater measure of justice for the poor, while at the same 
time giving the law greater power to regulate on behalf of 
capital (Hall et al. 1978: 193). Real concessions were won 
in the administration of the criminal law, such as the 
right to be tried by one's peers (the jury system), the 
rules of evidence, the right not to incriminate oneself, 
the right to legal representation and restrictions on the 
powers of the police. The extension of the rule of law, 
the freedoms of speech and assembly, the right to strike 
and organise in the work-place were also gains of working 
class struggle which were raised to social norms by the 
law. More recently, the abolition of the ultimate terror 
of capital punishment and the trend towards judicial review 
of executive decisions in administrative law, reflect 
further concessions to political struggle. 
But, in Malaya and Singapore, the British colonial state 
confronted a different social formation and mode of 
production. Chapter Two alluded to colonial emergency laws 
by which the state "temporarily" negated many of the above 
legal developments in order to suppress class struggle. 
The state gave itself arbitrary powers to suppress dissent: 
it was able to act without the normal processes of judicial 
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criminalisation which were slow, individualised and 
uncertain of successful conclusion (conviction) in all 
cases. That is, the powers of the state under 
administrative law were vastly increased through granting 
itself such rights as the right to detain without trial and 
to kill on sight. Thus the extreme powers of 
administrative law were used to destroy anti-imperialist 
politics. This entailed destroying class organisation, not 
just disciplining individuals of a certain class, which is 
the function of the criminal law. 
The contradictory influences of the criminal law and the 
administrative law, each shaped by class struggle, were the 
legal inheritance of the PAP-state. This inheritance 
reflected the mix of consent, accommodation and coercion of 
two different social formations. In deciding the weight to 
give to the various influences in this combination, the 
PAP-state is right in claiming it had little choice if it 
was to follow the EOI strategy. It could not allow the 
victories of another working class to prevent the PAP-state 
exploiting its own. 
Parliamentary system, parliamentary procedures, 
sophisticated election systems, bill of rights, rights 
to counsel - do you find these in our 
histories? ... all these are alien concepts. But 
overnight, they've been put in a constitution, 
drafted, bound and given to us at the birth of our 
nation. And we're supposed to use that constitution 
and work it and run the nation without any departures 
from these Western notions. 
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But can it work? Will it always work? Will it be the 
recipe for our growth? Not necessarily. In Western 
societies, they may be able to work it, they may be 
able to harbour some of these communist, Marxist or 
other tendencies. But we have seen, as I have shown, 
our short history since independence has been replete 
with all sorts of special problems, special 
circumstances. So, in the ultimate analysis, we will 
have to devise our own solutions to deal effectively 
with our own peculiar threats and problems. (Home 
Affairs Minister Jayakumar justifying the detention 
without trial of 22 professionals and community 
workers to a PAP Youth wing Seminar, 5 July 1987, GOS 
Press Release). 
Lee Kuan Yew has made the point more concisely on many 
occasions, although sometimes more personally. 
certain liberties in a developing nation sometimes 
have to be sacrificed for the sake of economic 
development and security and to prevent communist 
oppression (The Times London 25 May 1977). 
I spent a whole life-time building this and as long as 
I am in charge nobody is going to knock it down (FEER 
26 December 1980). . 
To reconstitute the social formation and discipline the 
labour force to suit its economic policy, the PAP-state not 
only had to move in the direction of greater coercion and 
thus greater executive power, but it had also to use the 
judicial terror reminiscent of eighteenth century England. 
Tperefore, Singapore law has regressed through the removal 
of many of the gains made by the British working class 
which had been incorporated into the law. 
This study of the development of Singapore's legal system 
will focus on two areas: administrative law and criminal 
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law. This division, as pointed out earlier, is essentially 
one of function. Politically, administrative law enables 
the state to criminalise and suppress class politics. The 
individuals involved are not targeted primarily for 
individual criminal actions which could be dealt with under 
the criminal law. Many victims of executive law have not 
committed any such offence and cannot be criminalised in 
this way. The state therefore uses this kind of law 
primarily to suppress political organisation. 
criminal law enables the state to criminalise a whole class 
by criminalising individuals. This area of law essentially 
imposes social discipline by punishing individuals for 
actions which disrupt the social relations imposed by the 
state. These transgressions are overwhelmingly by the 
working class. In this sense, if administrative law is the 
criminalisation of politics, then criminal law is the 
politicisation of crime. The criminal law is aimed mainly 
at the "indiscipline" of one class. 
This distinction between administrative and criminal is not 
an absolute one, but a matter of emphasis when seen in the 
context of suppressing class struggle. We will see that 
both areas of law come into play in some cases, while both 
commonly use coercion and terror as an integral part of 
their imposition of social control. 
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This examination will not be periodised in the manner of 
earlier chapters as it will be obvious that, within in each 
area of law, there has been intensification of executive 
control and continuous removal of working class protections 
as the PAP-state required more and more control to 
implement its economic strategy. In addition, as political 
struggles resurface in the 1980s, we see that the legal 
system becomes part of the crisis of legitimacy which the 
PAP attempts to solve by even greater repression. 
Before examining the political development of 
administrative and criminal law in detail, we will set the 
context of the specific relationship between the state and 
the law in Singapore. 
Rule by Decree: The state and the Law in Singapore 
In liberal democraties, the state's constitution is held to 
entrench the fundamental liberties of the individual 
citizen and thus can be appealed to against abuses of 
executive power. Appeal is normally through judicial 
review of executive decisions. Singapore has removed even 
these modest limits to executive power and thus extended 
the reach of administrative law. 
Law and order is another basic goal for both political 
and economic transformation, and the constitution was 
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adapted to provide for the smooth passing of 
legislation which would facilitate the implementation 
of government policies. The removal of the two-thirds 
majority requirement for constitutional amendments in 
1965 was crucial in this scheme of things. The 
government needed also to expedite the passing of 
legislation without being unduly hampered by 
procedural delays by the Opposition (Pillai and Lee 
1989: 658). 
The PAP-state may aiso have been concerned that, despite 
its best efforts, the Barisan sosialis might increase its 
members at the next elections. In 1965 the PAP had only 
three more members than a two-thirds majority (57 to the 
BS' thirteen). As it happened, with the BS boycott of 
parliament, the removal of this provision proved 
unnecessary and the PAP-state has changed the constitution 
numerous times since then (Pillai and Lee 1989: 660-663). 
The existence of a constitution, even if it can be changed 
at will, has the ideological effect of appearing to provide 
an ultimate guarantee for liberal democratic rights in 
Singapore. The PAP-state is deemed to operate within the 
procedural and substantive limitations of Singapore's 
written constitution. "It is commonly assumed that in 
singapore the constitution is the supreme law and that 
Parliament ... can only enact legislation which is consistent 
with the constitution; legislation which is inconsistent 
with the constitution is liable to be struck down by the 
Courts. This view is held, as far as I know, universally" 
(Harding 1983: 351). 
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However, it has been argued by Harding that lithe accepted 
notion of constitutional supremacy as the guiding principle 
in Singapore's constitution is an illusion which rests on a 
fundamental misunderstanding of Singapore's constitutional 
history" (Harding 1983: 367). He holds that Singapore is 
an example of "legislative supremacy II and has been so since 
1965, from which date lithe Constitution could be amended 
simply by a law enacted by the legislature" (Harding 1983: 
354) • 
Therefore, the PAP-state has not been at all confined by 
entrenched provisions of the constitution because it has 
changed the constitution at will. However, it continues to 
derive legitimacy from its appearance as a constitutional 
democracy. 
In 1979, when the PAP was confident of its continuing 
legislative supremacy, the two-thirds provision was 
restored (Pillai and Lee 1989: 661). However, this did not 
mark a democratic advance, not only because of the PAP's 
overwhelming parliamentary majority, but because the PAP-
state had other reasons to be confident of the safety of 
its executive decisions from judicial review. 
While administrative actions in many states with a British 
common law tradition are becoming subject to judicial 
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review, no such trend exists in Singapore. Administrative 
law remains undeveloped in this respect in Singapore in 
comparison with other Commonwealth states, such as 
Zimbabwe, India, the United Kingdom and Australia (Goldring 
1988: 489). This is because, in Singapore, judges are kept 
directly accountable to the executive. 
The Singapore judiciary has retained most of the pomp and 
ceremony of the British colonial courts. This gives the 
impression of a powerful, independent arm of the state. 
However, whereas the jUdiciaries in other jurisdictions 
administer the law in favour of a particular class owing to 
their unity of class interest and the bias of the law 
itself, judges in Singapore have additional and less subtle 
reasons for doing so. 
The Singapore judiciary's lack of independence begins 
with its structure ..•. By granting short-term 
appointments that mayor may not be renewed at 
government discretion, Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew has 
ensured that fully half of the twelve judges on 
Singapore's Supreme Court are kept on a short leash. 
Three of these have been named so-called "judicial 
commissioners", a designation which amounts to a one-
or two-year probationary term during which the 
government can review a new judge's rulings before 
entrusting him with full tenure .... [T]he necessity 
[for this] seems to evaporate when loyalty is not at 
issue. In July, Yong Pung How, a long-time crony of 
Lee, gave up his highly successful business career to 
be appointed not a judicial commissioner but a fully 
tenured judge. The preferential treatment was not due 
to his legal prowess, since Yong has not practised law 
for eighteen years. 
The three other judges with limited tenure - including 
the chief justice - who has the all-important power to 
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select which judges hear sensitive cases - have all 
passed the retirement age of 65. They continue to 
serve as judges, and to receive full judicial salaries 
rather than their smaller pensions, solely at the 
discretion of the government, which decides whether to 
renew these appointments every three years. 
Matters only get worse at the lower-court levels, 
where judges enjoy no tenure and are routinely 
shuttled back and forth between the judiciary and 
government service (Sidney Jones, Asia watch in FEER 
21 September 1989). 
A year later, Yong was appointed chief justice (FEER 13 
September 1990), becoming the second to hold the post since 
independence. 
The independence of the judiciary became a political issue 
in 1986 when it was raised in parliament by opposition 
member Jeyaretnam. This added to the growing crisis of 
legitimacy for the PAP-state. It therefore sought to 
squash the debate by disciplining Jeyaretnam and by holding 
a commission of inquiry into the sUbject. The sole 
commissioner was a Supreme Court judge, Mr Justice 
Sinnathuray. The propriety of a judge enquiring into his 
own independence could not be a matter of public comment, 
as the alacrity with which the government serves defamation 
writs is well known. Sinnathuray was widely known as one 
of the most politically reliable on the bench. He had 
convicted student leaders of rioting on framed-up rioting 
charges in 1974 (Tan Wah piow 1987b) and had since presided 
over internal security act procedural reviews of detainees' 
cases. He concluded that Jeyaretnam's allegations were 
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"wholly unfounded and scandalous" (International Mission of 
Jurists 1987: 5). The parliamentary Privileges committee 
then convicted and fined Jeyaretnam for breach of 
privilege. This had the effect of criminalising any 
discussion of the issue. 
Thus, jUdicial review of executive decisions is unlikely 
either to be initiated or to succeed if initiated. First, 
judges are directly controlled by the PAP-state. secondly, 
in the rare event that they do allow appeals (probably in 
the knowledge of the executive's political strategy), the 
government can immediately change the constitution and the 
relevant law, retrospectively if necessary (e.g. Asia Watch 
1989: 27). Thirdly, legislation enacting administrative 
law aimed at political suppression now routinely carries 
clauses excluding judicial review (e.g. the Maintenance of 
Religious Harmony Act 1990). 
The administration of the criminal and civil law continues 
to be legitimised by the august panoply of the judiciary 
and its separation from the executive of the PAP-state. 
However, when local struggles ~orce the judiciary to 
encounter the executive directly in the area of 
administrative law, their identity of interest is revealed. 
Unlike industrialised liberal democracies, the PAP-state is 
too insecure to yield any ground in its discretionary 
powers and the ideological effect of the separation of the 
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two arms of the PAP-state breaks down. Hence the need to 
prevent any judicial review in this area of law. 
As we noted in the last chapter, the creation of the 
Elected Presidency is a recent development which takes 
increased control by the executive a stage further. The 
president's executive actions are immune from jUdicial 
review (with minor exceptions) (Constitution of the 
Republic of Singapore (Amendment N~.3) Bill 1990, Clause 
22J). His constitutional powers are entrenched. 
Therefore, the two-thirds majority provision for amending 
the constitution, originally intended to safeguard 
individual liberty and to restrain the executive, is now 
safe-guarding the executive powers of the PAP against the 
rise of democratic opposition. The latter has to get not a 
simple majority but two-thirds of the seats in the House to 
rescind those powers. 
Although the formal separation of state and judiciary 
continues to have an ideological effect in Singapore, in 
reality the PAP-state has few checks on its law-making and 
law-administering powers. In fact, the situation amounts 
to thinly disguised rule by decree. 
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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: THE CRIMINALISATION OF POLITICS 
The criminalisation of politics through the administrative 
law is an attractive option for the PAP-state since 
executive discretion is the basis for all decisions and, as 
we have noted, there is no effective legal redress for 
victims. Criminalisation through administrative law is 
primarily aimed at destroying political organisation 
through denying freedom of association. It takes place on 
two levels. The first level is that of sorting out legal 
from illegal politics and criminalising the latter. The 
second level is suppression of illegal politics by the 
imposition of state terror. The ideological effect of 
terror, f.ear, also permeates the first level as it is 
intended to do. 
Legal and Illegal Politics 
Liberal democracy usually functions in a political 
environment where there are many sectoral organisations and 
pressure groups attempting to influence public opinion. A 
citizen therefore has many ways to participate politically. 
The administration of political discipline in Singapore 
suppresses this political pluralism by declaring what is 
legal and illegal politics. It prevents the growth of any 
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autonomous political association in the community. It 
defines all non-PAP political action outside of political 
parties as illegal and subversive. It steers all political 
activity into parliamentary politics, preferably the PAP, 
or proscribes it. One of the legal mechanisms for doing 
this sorting between legal and illegal politics is the 
societies Act. 
Any group or association of ten or more persons must be 
registered under the societies Act if it is not registered 
under another law such as the Companies Act. In applying 
for registration, information must be supplied concerning 
the aims, the constitution and rules of the society and the 
names and background of office holders. The Registrar of 
societies will often request more information or require 
that aspects of the proposed constitution be amended to 
suit government criteria. 
A society will be refused registration if the Registrar is 
satisfied that "the rules of the society are insufficient 
for its proper management and control" or lIit would be 
contrary to the national interest for the society to be 
registered". Registration may be refused if "a dispute 
exists among members of the society as to the persons who 
are to be officers" or "it appears to him [the Registrar] 
that the name of the society to be registered is likely to 
mislead members of the public as to the true character or 
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purpose ... or is in [his] opinion .•. undesirable" (Section 
4, Societies Act). The Registrar is not required to give 
reasons when he rejects an application. The UK-based 
development organisation, Oxfam, had an application for the 
registration of a local section rejected without 
explanation after a two year wait (Asia Watch 1989: 39). 
If an organisation succeeds in becoming registered, it also 
requires the Registrar's permission to establish branches, 
change its name or place of business, amend any rules or 
use a flag, symbol, emblem or badge or other insignia 
(Sections 9, 11, 13, Societies Act). By this means the 
PAP-state controls the organisational strength and the 
ideological impact of the organisation. 
The Minister of Home Affairs may deregister and dissolve 
any registered society if he is satisfied that it is being 
used for unlawful purposes or purposes incompatible with 
its objects and rules, or it is a political organisation 
with IIsuch an affiliation or connection with any 
organisation outside Singapore as is considered by the 
Registrar to be contrary to the national interest". 
without written permission from the Minister, officers of a 
dissolved society may not hold office in any other society 
for three years after its dissolution (Section 24, 
Societies Act). The Registrar also has the power to 
require any society to give him any information he 
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requests, such as documents, accounts or books. The 
Minister of Home Affairs may declare someone unfit to serve 
as an officer of a society because of a criminal 
conviction. The Act provides for summoning individuals to 
give information about societies and for entering and 
searching premises. Penalties for contravention of the Act 
include large fines and imprisonment (Sections 10, 12, 26-
29, Societies Act). 
In 1988, 176 societies were registered, four 
applications for registration were rejected, 45 
societies were voluntarily dissolved and five 
societies were declared to have ceased to exist. 
There were 3,873 societies on the register a~ at 
December, 31 1988 (GOS 1989a: 185). 
The above figures do not give an accurate picture of the 
deterrent effect of the Societies Act, as they show that 
the vast majority of applications succeed. The inclusion 
of "Registration of Societies" in the Information 
Ministry's 1989 yearbook under the heading "Internal 
Security" points to the Act's real function. The 
investigation of applicants by the Internal Security 
Department is widely known (Asia Watch 1989: 38). The 
successful applications are therefore recreational, 
charitable or professional societies, not public interest 
groups. 
The conclusion which must be drawn from the government's 
registration figures is that citizens do not attempt to 
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establish organisations which in liberal democracies would 
be regarded as public interest groups or pressure groups on 
particular issues. The legislation forces any such group 
to register as a political association or to be classified 
as subversive and illegal. Those that do register as a 
political party then draw the full weight of the PAP-
state's security surveillance system onto themselves. As 
we have seen in the previous chapter, the PAP has many 
other ways to control and suppress political parties. In 
addition to these, the societies Act legally enables the 
PAP, a rival party, to know all the details of any party 
organisation and to monitor it constantly. 
The societies Act criminalises all political organisation 
which is not subject to direct government control or which 
is not criminalised by other legislation. Inherited from 
the British colonial administration, it was most used to 
sor't out and criminalis.e existing political organisations 
during the 1960s and early 1970s when the PAP was securing 
its political hegemony, and launching the EOI strategy. 
However, it continues in force as a preventive measure even 
though the sea of political pluralism was drained during 
that period. 
Criminalising New Forms of struggle 
In the 1980s, at the height of resistance to the policies 
of the Second Industrial Revolution and when Jeyaretnam was 
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beginning to undermine the PAP's legitimacy in parliament, 
political dissent surfaced through organisations which the 
government had previously seen no need to criminalise: the 
Law Society and the Catholic Church. As institutions 
already controlled by the English-educated upper class and 
with a traditional role in the ruling structure, neither of 
these bodies was susceptible to proscription under the 
societies Act. Therefore specific legislative measures 
were taken to suppress the organisation of struggle within 
these institutions without proscribing the institution 
themselves. The PAP-state imposed its own definitions of 
the legitimate and illegitimate actions and concerns of 
these bodies. It then used legislation to impose these 
definitions. By this means the boundary between 
parliamentary politics and pluralistic community politics 
was set within the organisational life of these bodies. 
Illegitimate actions and concerns could thereby be 
separated out as sUbversive t as the pursuit of 
parliamentary political objectives by clandestine means. 
[W]hat the Government will not tolerate is 
sympathizers and political activists working their way 
into professional organizations and other bona fide 
organizations, establishing themselves in positions of 
influence, concealing their sympathies and activism 
from others, and using the umbrella of the 
organization for political purposes (Home Affairs 
Minister Jayakumar, GOS 1986: B105). 
In 1986, the Law Society, the body established in law for 
the self-regulation of the legal profession, dared to offer 
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a dissenting opinion on a government legislative proposal, 
the Newspaper and Printing Presses (Amendment) Act, to 
restrict the circulation of foreign publications carrying 
critical analysis of Singapore politics. 
In response to this criticism, the government introduced 
the Legal Profession (Amendment) Bill to force a change in 
the leadership and in the disciplinary procedures of the 
Law Society. This legislation also restricted the Law 
Society to commenting on legislation only when requested by 
the government. A boundary was put in place between 
legitimate professional concerns and "politics" to prevent 
this upper class organisation becoming the vehicle for 
bourgeois dissent. 
In pursuit of this political objective, the government 
subpoenaed the entire Law Society council to appear before 
the parliamentary select committee considering the bill in 
october 1986, in order to humiliate and intimidate them. 
They were interrogated by ministers, especially the Prime· 
Minister, as if personally on trial. 
If I come to the conclusion that ... some activists, 
through the indifference of the majority of members, 
have misled the society to wilful ways unconnected 
with the profession, then I will find an answer to it. 
Because it is my job as Prime Minister in charge of 
the Government to put a stop to politicking in 
professional bodies. If you want to politick, come 
out ..•. you want to politick, you form your own party 
or join Mr Jeyaretnam. But if you stay in the Law 
Society council and politick, and at the same time you 
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consciously or sub-consciously ally these activities 
to those of the Workers' Party, then inevitably damage 
must be done •••. Because I am not taking flak from 
the lawyers without giving them as good a response as 
they would expect from me if I were a counter party in 
an action. Whether you are communist, Workers' Party 
or whatever, if you want a scrap with the Government, 
sure you will get one •... you think you can be smarter 
than the Government and outsmart it, well, if you win, 
you form the Government. If 1: win, we::'!1ave got a new 
Law society. It is as simple as that (Lee Kuan Yew, 
Parliament of Singapore 1986: B114-Bl15). 
Within two years of the heariI')g, the government established 
the Academy of Law headed by the Chief Justice to which all 
members of the judiciary, the law faculty of the university 
and members of the legal profession must belong (STW 13 
August 1988: 4). It is poised to take over the regulatory 
functions of the Law Society. 
Thus, using legislation, the government as an immediate 
priority removed the Law Society's leadership and then 
established a parallel government-controlled organisation 
to replace it. By this use of administrative law, the PAP-
state imposed political discipline on professionals seeking 
to exercise bourgeois political rights. This was a 
necessary step for the government because an active, 
independent bar would soon expose the lack of judicial 
independence in Singapore. uninvited professional comment 
was criminalised. 
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crimina1isinq Re1iqion 
The emergence of struggle through the Catholic Church was 
an altogether more threatening phenomenon, as it provided 
organisational links between upper class organisation and 
working class struggle. It further provided both a 
religious ideological rationale for political action and an 
organised group of adherents who were not interested in the 
middle class struggle to make more money and become members 
of the capitalist class. 
In 1987 the government confronted the Catholic Church and 
forced it, by threats and intimidation, to close down its 
Justice and Peace Commission and its welfare centre for 
foreign workers, alleging they were bases for a "Marxist 
conspiracy" (International Mission of Jurists 1987: 13). 
organisations within the church do not need to be 
registered under the Societies Act and the PAP-state 
threatened to change this policy if the archbishop "could 
not put his own house in order" (Lee Kuan Yew in FEER 17 
December 1987). 
To prevent religious organisations from being politically 
active in society, the PAP-state realised that the 
demarcation between legal and illegal kinds of politics 
would be insufficient, since church activities can always 
claim to be religious rather than political. The 
government therefore redefined religious activity far more 
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narrowly as the direct institutional concerns of religious 
bodies in their own organisational affairs. Religious 
activities concerned with changing Singapore society 
according to religious understandings of the nature and 
destiny of human beings were categorised as political and 
proscribed. On October 6, 1989 Home Affairs Minister 
Jayakumar announced that legislation would be introduced in 
the next sitting of parliament "to ensure that religion is 
kept out of the political arena" (STW 7 October 1989: 10). 
To blur the issue, the PAP-state entitled its legislation 
the Maintenance of Religious Harmony Act to create the 
ideological effect that it was responsibly moderating the 
relations between Singapore's religions. The provisions of 
the Act, however, focus on the relationship between 
religious bodies and the state, and give the government the 
power to suppress by executive decision almost any activity 
of a religious group or leader. 
The Minister of Home Affairs is given the power to issue a 
prohibition order against any religious office-bearer to 
prevent that person from "addressing orally or in writing 
any congregation, parish or group of worshipers or members 
of any religious group", from "printing, publishing, 
editing, distributing or contributing to any publication 
produced by that religious group" and from "holding office 
in an editorial board or a committee of a pUblication of 
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that religious group". A prohibition order may be issued 
on the basis of such catch-all provisions as "carrying out 
activities to promote a political cause", "exciting 
disaffection against the President or the Government of 
Singapore" and Itcarrying out subversive activities under 
the guise of propagating or practising any religious 
belief". The maximum penalty for contravening a 
prohibition order is a fine of $10,000 and/or two years 
imprisonment. Second or subsequent offences incur a fine 
of up to $20,000 and/or three years in prison. The 
decisions of the minister are not subject to judicial 
review (GOS, Maintenance of Religious Harmony Bill, Bill 
No. 1/90 1990; FEER 18 January 1990i STW 24 February 1990). 
This legislation was enacted on 9 November 1990 (STW 10 
November 1990). 
Thus, in the late 1980s, we see the PAP-state using 
administrative law to discipline ruling class organisations 
which seek to exercise liberal democratic rights and have 
the potential to connect with working class struggles. 
Because it could not proscribe the whole organisation, the 
PAP-state criminalisedcertain activities. The suppression 
of these organisations, as with working class organisation 
in the past, was accomplished also by the use of state 
terror which is the next level of the operation of 
administrative law. 
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Executive Terror: suppressing Illegal politics 
Under certain laws, the PAP-state may arrest and detain 
without trial anyone it chooses for as long as it chooses. 
This power has two main functions. First, it physically 
removes from society those citizens who have refused to 
conform to PAP-state social and political organisation and 
who have established, or have the potential to establish, 
alternative forms of organisation. Secondly, it has a 
profound ideological eff·ect on others who may have 
contemplated similar dissenting behaviour or have been 
actively associated with such actions. By arresting a few, 
terror can be struck into the hearts of many. 
Detention without trial at the discretion of the executive 
is possible under several laws, most of which derive from 
the colonial administration's attempt to suppress 
nationalist struggle and some forms of autonomous social 
organisation among the lower classes. 
suppressing Working Class social organisation 
In its quest for survival, the working class organises in 
ways which are classified as either legal or illegal by the 
state. Some of these forms of organisation, such as secret 
societies, are rooted in pre-capitalist traditions. Their 
present activi~ies may not be socially benign, but this 
issue must be distinguished from the fundamental reason for 
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their criminalisation. For example, the line of legality 
between right and proper exploitation, which is what 
capitalists do, and extortion, which is what gangsters do, 
is not adequately explained in terms of the social worth of 
each activity. 
section 30 of the Criminal Law (Temporary Provisions) Act 
provides that the relevant minister, if satisfied that some 
person is associated with activities of a criminal nature, 
may with the consent of the Public Prosecutor, detain the 
person for a maximum (but renewable) period of one year. 
In addition, section 33 of the Misuse of Drugs Act empowers 
the Director of the Central Narcotics Board to detain a 
person where it appears to him necessary to do so for the 
purpose of treatment or rehabilitation. There are also 
executive detention provisions in section 4(1) of the 
Emergency (Public Order and Prevention of Crime) Ordinance 
1969 (Tan Yock Lin 1987: 237-238, 243). 
This legislation is justified as necessary to suppress 
Chinese secret societies and drug trafficking, as there is 
often supposedly insufficient evidence for criminal 
convictions and prosecution witnesses sometimes refuse to 
testify because of intimidation. In other words, the power 
of the state to control through the normal operation of the 
criminal law can be partially resisted by this level of 
social organisation. Secret societies are a form of 
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autonomous social organisation which, like the state, 
enforce discipline through violence. Drug trafficking is 
one of their economic strategies to accumulate capital. 
These alternatives have to be eliminated if the PAP-state 
is to ensure the distribution of the surplus on a class 
basis and to direct social control to the needs of 
industrialisation, namely wage labour. 
By raising capitalist class social norms to the level of 
universal norms through the law, an ideological consensus 
has been generated behind the summary suppression of such 
organisations. The PAP-state has successfully 
criminalised this form of working class social 
organisation. 
As at 15 August 1989, 1,228 persons were being 
detained in prisons without trial, of whom 740 were 
said to be drug traffickers and the rest said to be 
involved in secret society and criminal 
activities, ... figures disclosed in parliament by the 
Minister for Home Affairs (Seow 1990: 7). 
Since only 73 persons were detained under this act in 1988, 
and 31 in 1987 (STW 5 August 1989: 3), it must be assumed 
that most are kept for several years. 
This category of prisoner was useful in the government's 
international public relations campaign to restore its 
legitimacy after detaining 24 middle class professionals 
under a different act (see next section) in 1987 and 1988. 
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In order to legitimate the practice of arbitrary executive 
detention, Criminal Law detainees were purposely confused 
with those who had been detained for liberal democratic 
political activities. In a speech to the Asia Society in 
Washington on 17 May 1989, the Minister of Trade and 
Industry, Brig. Gen. Lee Hsien Loong, attested to the 
beneficial effect of detention without trial: 
Lee said when Americans talked about so-called 
repressive measures in singapore, they were referring 
to "a couple of people" who had been arrested because 
of political problems. 
"You may not be aware of it, but one reason why our 
streets are safe and joggers are not subject to 
mugging [a reference to a recent violent "wilding" of 
a woman jogger in Central Park, NY] is because we have 
a sUbstantial number of people who are detained under 
criminal law provisions without trial,n he said. 
He said those detained without trial .included 
gangsters, drug traffickers, murderers and those who 
had committed heinous crimes "against whom charges 
cannot stick in court" (ST 18 May 1989). 
However, arbitrary detention of people on the basis of 
suspicion under the Criminal Law (Temporary Provisions) Act 
can be seen, in political terms, as a way of suppressing 
traditional Chinese social organisation in favour of the 
colonial institutions of capitalism inherited by the 
Chinese upper class. 
Hostage-Taking: Suppressing Political Organisation 
The Internal Security Act (ISA) is the administrative law 
targeted at political organisation which could directly 
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undermine the PAP's political hegemony. The provisions of 
the ISA include: 
section 8: 
(1) If the President is satisfied with respect to any 
person that, with a view to preventing that 
person from acting in any manner "prejudicial to 
the security of Singapore or any part thereof or 
to the maintenance of public order or essential 
services therein, it is necessary to do so, the 
Minister shall make an order 
(a) directing that such person be detained for 
any period not exceeding two years; ... 
section 74: 
(1) Any police officer may without warrant arrest and 
detain pending inquiries any person in respect of 
whom he has reason to believe 
(a) that there are grounds which would justify 
his detention under section 8; and 
(b) that he has acted or is about to act or is 
likely to act in any way prejudicial to the 
security of Singapore or part thereof. 
The definition of the security of Singapore is a matter of 
executive discretion. Once detained under these 
provisions, a person may be: 
- held up to 30 days for interrogation by the Internal 
security Department who have no obligations to inform 
family members of the detainee's whereabouts; 
- issued with a detention order for up to two years 
which is renewable ad infinitum; 
- issued with restriction orders so that even after 
release from detention, a detainee may be restricted 
to living in internal exile (an offshore island) or, 
even if permitted to reside at home, may have 
restrictions placed on their movements, employment, 
freedom of association and other civil liberties (Asia 
Watch 1989; Amnesty International 1980). 
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The terror lies in the constant threat of indefinite 
detention and the immediate threat of maltreatment, torture 
and public humiliation. The pattern of treatment of ISA 
detainees during the period immediately after their arrest 
has been systematically documented by international human 
rights organisations. It has usually involved: 
- sudden arrest in the early hours of the morning; 
- no access to legal counselor family for several 
weeks; 
- being held in solitary confinement underground; 
- being interrogated in freezing underground rooms 
under jets of refrigerated air, lightly clothed in 
prison clothes or naked; cold water may be poured over 
them at frequent intervals and they may be forced to 
drink quantities before being beaten; 
- being questioned by rotating teams of Internal 
security Department (ISO) officers for 72 hour periods 
without breaks, given a 30 minute respite, and then 
interrogated for a similar period; 
- physical beating which may be alternated with 
contrived concern for their welfare; 
- interrogators concentrating on psychological 
blackmail techniques to make detainees feel guilty for 
getting their friends into trouble, saying that their 
families will be harassed if they do not confess or 
inducing detainees to implicate their friends; 
- the threat of indefinite detention being frequently 
raised as a possibility; 
- the continuation of this routine for as many days as 
it takes for the detainee to confess to whatever the 
ISO wants (Amnesty International 1980; International 
Mission of Jurists 1987). 
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After several days of continuous physical and psychological 
abuse, many detainees have admitted to the web of lies and 
insinuations put before them for their signature. others 
have held out through punitive living conditions and 
repeated torture for many years. Lee KuanYew has 
described the interrogation process in a way which shows 
the results required: 
All interrogations must wear down resistance of 
[detainees] by sustained psychological pressure, 
including physical fatigue, to get them to give leads 
to the next links in a well-established underground 
movement (FEER 24 February 1978). 
It is not a practice, nor will I allow subversives to 
get away, by insisting that I got to prove everything 
against them in a court of law, or [obtain] evidence 
that will stand up to the strict rules of evidence in 
a court of law (ST 3 June 1987). 
When the ISD has assembled the "confessions", the PAP-state 
may announce, as it did in 1987 and many times before, that 
a Marxist conspiracy has been uncovered which was 
threatening the stability of Singapore. The "confessions" 
have then been published in the media and the detainees 
have been forced to incriminate themselves and others on 
television. After this, the ISD has usually permitted 
lawyers and families to have brief but regular access 
(under surveillance). Ultimate release is predicated on 
the willingness of a detainee to "confess" and incriminate 
others, and on the political timetable of the PAP. 
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Attempts at judicial review of detentions have consistently 
been blocked by the PAP-state. Defence lawyers who 
persisted have been imprisoned under the ISA themselves 
(Amnesty International 1980: 43; Asia Watch 1989: 51), in 
order to intimidate the legal profession as a whole. A 
foreign barrister who forced the government to amend the 
constitution in order to avoid jUdicial review was barred 
from practising in Singapore (Asia Watch 1989: 51). In 
1976, one lawyer who sought judicial review of detainees 
held under the Criminal Law (Temporary Provisions) Act was 
also detained under that act himself. Detainees who have 
taken legal action have been imprisoned for longer periods 
as retribution. 
The ISA is essentially a terror tactic of taking hostages. 
It removes from their organisational base in society those 
individuals who are a political threat and incarcerates 
them as political hostages, held against continuing 
organised dissent. 
Historical Pattern of ISA Repression 
Derived from the British colonial government's Preservation 
of Public Security Ordinance (1955), the ISA and its use 
reflect the history of political struggle in Singapore. 
The British used executive detention during the anti-
colonial struggle. 
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The PAP-state, as we have observed, used it before the 1963 
elections to eliminate the top leadership of the Barisan 
Sosialis. Since the arrest of 133 persons in that year, 
many others have been detained under the ISA. However, no 
accurate statistics are available, since the PAP-state does 
not necessarily announce all detentions. 
The PAP government has rigorously harassed all dissent 
and any potential opposition grouping in Singapore ••.. 
From 1963 to the early 1970s the number of political 
prisoners in Singapore fluctuated between a maximum of 
250 and a minimum of 70. In the years 1963-1965, 
arrests far exceeded releases, whereas in the late 
1960s this pattern was reversed. New waves of arrests 
occurred in 1970 and in the period 1974-76 (Amnesty 
International 1980: 15-16). 
This pattern of detentions accords with the PAP-stateis 
consolidation of its political hegemony as it launched the 
EOI strategy with foreign capital. A sweep of opposition 
MPs, journalists and trade unionists in 1966 cleared the 
path for the 1968 elections and the passage of anti-labour 
legislation. The last of those detained in 1966, Chia Thye 
Poh, a Barisan MP, was released into internal exile only in 
May 1989. He was kept as a constant reminder that the PAP-
state could hold a person as long as it wished. 
In 1970, more trade unionists were arrested as the final 
clean-up of independent union leaders who opposed the 
heightened exploitation of workers. In 1971, in 
preparation for the 1972 general elections, the main 
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editorial staff of the Chinese newspaper Nanyang Siang Pau 
were detained under the ISA and two other newspapers were 
closed down. This was to prevent ideological support in 
the media for Chinese education (International Mission of 
Jurists 1987: 3-7). 
A similar pattern occurred prior to the 1976, 1980 and 1988 
general elections, each sweep of arrests reflecting the 
government's attempt to suppress new forms of struggle. We 
have already noted to some extent the significance of the 
1987 ISA arrests, in terms of suppressing activism by young 
English-educated professionals within the legal profession 
and the Catholic Church. This multi-functional security 
operation was directed not only at the institutions 
involved, but at new social sectors: professional, single 
or childless women, and both professiona~ men and women who 
had no desire to join the capitalist class. As the PAP-
state statements of accusation noted: 
with major changes in our education system since the 
1970s as a result of parents opting for English-stream 
schools for their children, recruits to communism are 
no longer mainly the Chinese-educated. The younger 
generation of Singaporean Chinese are bilingual and 
bi-cultural. This has enabled the disaffected, the 
disgruntled and the misled amongst them to draw 
concepts and methods from both the Chinese-based CPM 
and West European Marxist groups (Ministry of Home 
Affairs Press Release 26 May 1987: 9). 
The charges against these detainees included references to 
forsaking "well-paid careers to take up lowly-paid jobs of 
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$300-$400 per month which would allow them to influence 
others" (MHA Press Release 26 May 1987: 9). One of the 
main reasons they were detained was their focus on the 
relationship between the PAP-state and foreign capital. 
The Marxist conspirators also targeted their attacks 
against Singapore's economic system and industrial 
policies. In their articles, they adopted familiar 
communist arguments to denounce the existing 
capitalist system as "unjust", "exploitative" and 
Itrepressive", distort the working and living 
conditions of workers, and exaggerate the disparities 
between upper- and lower-income groups. In the 15 Sep 
85 issue of the "Catholic News", Vincent Cheng [a 
detainee] alleged "wrongful beating up of workers by 
the police" and went on to suggest that the "poor are 
never born poor, they are made poor" by the existing 
system .... [other] articles attacked the role of MNCs 
[multinational corporations] in our economic 
prosperity .... No mention was made of the MNCs 
providing employment and bringing new ideas and 
technology. Instead l the articles l adopting the 
communist line, denounced MNCs for allegedly 
exploiting the people and bringing misery to the 
country. with such distortions, it is only a matter 
of time before industrial strife will resurface (MBA 
Press Release Addendum 4/ 28 May 1987: 2, 3). 
Through this exercise of executive terror, institutions had 
their autonomy restricted, liberal democratic political 
struggle emerging among young professionals was suppressed 
and public discussion of the social effects of the PAP-
state's alliance with foreign capital was proscribed. 
In addition to suppressing these new forms of struggle 
which emerged in the 1980s, there was an important shift in 
the strategy for suppressing "legal" opposition within the 
boundaries of parliamentary politics. Political leaders 
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from legally registered political parties were no longer 
detained under the ISA as they were in the 1960s. The PAP-
state's recent strategy has been to criminalise such people 
under the criminal law as professionally negligent or as . 
thieves, perjurers and bankrupts. An analysis of 
Jeyaretnam's convoluted battle against a series of trumped-
up criminal charges reveals this change of strategy. 
The criminalisation of J B Jeyaretnam: A Chronology 
1972 
1974 
1975 
1981 
1982 (Jan) 
1982 (June) 
1982 (Aug) 
1982 
1983 (Aug) 
Workers' Party (WP) sues PAP MP Tay for 
libel. 
WP loses case. 
WP loses appeal. Ordered to pay costs 
but requests for payment lapse owing to 
WP poor financial pdsition. 
Jeyaretnam (JBJ) wins by-election in 
Anson constituency. 
Tay demands full payment of costs 
within a week. Tay applies to court to 
seize WP assets but only $18.47 in 
account. 
Consequent to Tay's application, 
receiver appointed for WP. 
JBJ & Wong (WP Chairman) signed that 
materials submitted to receiver were 
fair and accurate. 
JBJ found guilty of two breaches of 
parliamentary privilege but the 
government, recognising that its 
pursuit of JBJ was generating public 
sympathy for him, waived the penalties. 
JBJ & Wong charged with making false 
statement about WP accounts and 
fraudulently transferring WP funds to 
avoid creditors. Case involved three 
donations totalling $1,600. 
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1984 (Jan) 
1984 (May) 
1984 (Dec) 
1985 (April) 
1985 (May) 
1985 (July) 
1985 (Sept) 
1986 
1986 (April) 
Senior District Judge Khoo acquits both 
of false statement charge and two 
defrauding charges. convicts them on 
one defrauding charge involving $400 . 
and fines each $1,000. 
Khoo transferred from Bench to 
Attorney-General's department seven 
months after acquittals. 
Chief Justice Wee heard state's appeal. 
JBJ re-elected in general elections. 
Wee's verdict reversed defrauding 
acquittals and imposed $1,000 fines. 
Ordered retrial on false statement 
charge. 
Application to appeal verdict to Court 
of Criminal Appeal is rejected. (This 
would have opened the way for appeal to 
the Privy Council in London.) 
JBJ fails in application to get retrial 
in High Court rather than District 
Court. (There is no appeal to the Privy 
Council from the District Court.) 
At retrial Senior District Judge 
Foenander finds both guilty and gives 
each a three month prison sentence. 
Appealed. 
During parliamentary debate on 
amendments affecting jurisdiction of 
subordinate courts (Jan) and on the 
budget, JBJ stated more measures were 
required to ensure judicial 
independence and suggested transfer of 
Judge Khoo might be seen as politically 
motivated. 
Presidential Commission of Inquiry 
appointed to investigate charges of 
executive interference in the 
judiciary. The commission consisted 
only of Justice Sinnathuray, a judge 
notorious for his pro-government 
political decisions on the bench. JBJ 
refused to appear before the 
Commission. Sinnathuray found there 
was no executive interference and that 
581 
1986 (Aug) 
1986 (Sep) 
1986 (Nov) 
1986 (Dec) 
1987 (Jan) 
the "wholly unfounded allegations of 
Jeyaretnam were scandalous statements 
that should never have been made" (FEER 
31 July 1986, 13-14). 
Just before Privileges committee sits 
to consider disciplinary action against 
JBJ for his purported allegations 
against the judiciary, amendments to 
the Parliament (Privileges, Immunities 
and Powers) Act are quickly passed 
greatly enhancing the powers of the 
committee and the penalties it may 
impose. 
For five days Prime Minister Lee 
conducted the Privileges committee 
hearing as a trial of JBJ and called 
his questions on the independence of 
the jury "totally treasonable" (Asia 
Yearbook 1987: 234). Proceedings were 
televised. 
Justice Lai upheld convictions on 
appeal but changed sentence to one 
month's imprisonment and $5,000 fine 
each/ thus disqualifying JBJ from 
parliament. A fine of more than $2,000 
disqualifies an MP from parliament for 
five years. 
JBJ serves prison sentence. 
On 9 December the Speaker announced 
that JBJ ceased to be an MP on 10 
November, the date of Lai's verdict. 
Parliamentary Privileges Committee 
announces decision to fine JBJ $1,000 
for his purported allegations about the 
judiciary. 
JBJ refused permit for opening ceremony 
of new WP offices on morning of 
ceremony. Opening proceeds. JBJ 
receives summons and is eventually 
fined $3,500 under Public Entertain-
ments Act. Fine is sUfficient to bar 
him from parliament for another five 
years. 
Soon after this JBJ was also fined 
$5,000 by parliament for each of five 
newsletters he issued criticising the 
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parliamentary disciplinary proceedings. 
Then he was again fined $1,000 on each 
of two counts for alleging in parlia-
ment in March 1986 that a person had 
been wrongfully arrested when they had 
not and for, in the same month, failing 
to declare his alleged pecuniary 
interest in a question he raised in 
parliament. 
1987 (29 July) JBJ's application to appeal his case to 
the Privy council is rejected by the 
court. 
1987 (19 Oct) JBJ disbarred after a three judge court 
chaired by the Chief Justice declare 
him unfit. 
1988 (26 Oct) Judicial Committee of Privy Council 
(UK) grants JBJ's appeal against 
disbarment. The opinion harshly 
criticised the conduct of the legal 
proceedings against JBJ and Wong, 
concluding: 
"They have been fined, imprisoned and publicly 
disgraced for offences of which they were not guilty. 
The appellant, in addition, has been deprived of his 
seat in Parliament and disqualified for a year from 
practising his profession. Their Lordships' order 
restores him to the roll of advocates and solicitors 
of the Supreme Court of Singapore, but, because of the 
course taken by the criminal proceedings, their 
Lordships have no power to right the other wrongs 
which the appellant and Wong have suffered. Their 
only prospect of redress, their Lordships understand, 
will be by way of petition for pardon to the President 
of the Republic of Singapore" (Privy Council Appeal 
No.10 of 1988: 22). 
1989 
1989 (April) 
1989 (May) 
Privy Council thereby reinstates JBJ to 
the Singapore Bar. 
Parliament amends relevant law and the 
constitution to abolish appeals to the 
Privy Council for disciplinary matters 
and for matters under the Internal 
Security Act. 
JBJ petitioned President of Singapore 
for pardon. 
President declines pardon citing reason 
that JBJ had not "expressed any sense 
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of remorse, contrition or repentance in 
respect of the offences" and that, 
according to the Attorney-General, 
"there has been no miscarriage of 
justice and no injustice has been done 
to the petitioner". 
Sources: FEER 1984-89; Asia Watch 1989; straits 
Times. 
This criminalisation is a process of de-classing middle and 
upper class politicians to the working class level of the 
"common criminal". It is a strategy which enables PAP 
leaders to claim that legal parliamentary opposition 
politics is not suppressed by obviously political laws such 
as the ISA (e.g. Jayakumar, 5 July 1987, Ministry of Home 
Affairs Press Release). It also prevents opposition 
politicians from claiming martyrdom. 
Excluding from the Nation 
Provisions for executive detention are also included in the 
Banishment Act, which enables the PAP.-state to revoke the 
citizenship of Singaporeans who are citizens by 
registration and naturalisation and to hold them "until he 
can be placed on board ship or other means of transport" 
(Section 6/4, Banishment Act). Since a large proportion of 
Singaporeans, including opposition politicians, were recent 
migrants from Malaysia, India or China, this legislation 
was used very regularly in the 1950s and 1960s to deport 
political activists. Banishment frequently rendered them 
584 
stateless. Those who refused to be banished, languished in 
jail. In 1978 Amnesty International estimated at least 
five people remained in this category, while at least 30 
had been deported since 1965. It was common for ISA 
detainees who were not citizens by birth to accept release 
on the condition of deportation. According to Singapore 
government statistics, 90 persons were "released and 
proceeded to other countries" in the years 1960-1976 
(Amnesty International 1980: 23). 
Thus, during the years that it was consolidating its rule, 
the PAP-state was also able to suppress political 
organisation by removing people completely from the nation. 
They could never be part of organised dissent in Singapore 
again. 
However, having sorted and graded the population by means 
of the education system and the immigration laws, the PAP-
state has found less need for these banishment provisions. 
Instead, it has required a means, not to expel citizens 
from Singapore, but to prevent political exiles from 
remaining politically active abroad because they have the 
possibility of coming back. It has therefore legislated to 
exclude locally-born Singaporeans from the nation. The 
constitution of the Republic of Singapore (Amendment) Act 
1985 empowers the government by executive order to deprive 
any Singaporean of their citizenship if they have stayed 
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away from the country for more than ten years. Thus, those 
who have escaped or are wanted under the ISA cannot 
contemplate participating in Singapore's political life 
ever again. Political exiles, such as 1974 student leader 
Tan Wah Piow, a charismatic political organiser and orator, 
now a London lawyer, have been deprived of their 
citizenship and cannot ever return to participate in 
Singapore political life. 
This is a summary punishment which combines the old 
penalties of transportation and excommunication. While not 
carrying the physical terror of ISA detention, the 
deprivation of citizenship forcibly takes away a citizen's 
home for ever. 
In the above ways, the PAP-state uses administrative law to 
restrict freedom of association and thus prevent or 
suppress political pluralism. The process was aptly 
described by Lee Kuan Yew in 1956 1 when speaking in the 
Legislative Assembly against the arbitrary executive 
repression of dissent by the colonial state: 
First ..• you attack only those whom your Special Branch 
can definitely say are communists. They have no proof 
except that X told Z who told Alpha who told Beta who 
told the Special Branch. Then you attack those whom 
your Special Branch say are actively sympathising with 
and helping the communists, although they are not 
communists themselves. Then you attack those whom 
your Special Branch say, although they are not 
communists or fellow travellers, yet, by their 
intransigent opposition to any collaboration with 
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colonialism, they encourage the spirit of revolt and 
weaken constituted authority and thereby, according to 
the Special Branch, they are aiding the communists. 
Then finally, since you have gone that far, you attack 
all those who oppose you .... 
All you have to do is to dissolve organisations and 
societies and banish or detain the key political 
workers in these societies. Then miraculously 
everything is tranquil and quiet on the surface. Then 
an intimidated press ... and the government-controlled 
radio together can regularly sing your praises and 
slowly and steadily the people are made to forget the 
evil things that have already been done. Or if these 
things are referred to again, they are conveniently 
distorted, and distorted with impunity, because there 
will be no opposition to contradict (George 1984: 
111) • 
Administrative law gives maximum discretion to the 
executive arm of government and is legitimated by the 
ideology of the defence of the nation. Offenders against 
the state are thereby placed ideologically outside the law 
and physically outside the society or even the nation. 
Released detainees have been disqualified from political 
participation because of the indelible taint of their 
"disloyalty". In this way, a challenge to the PAP is 
transformed into a subversive act against the nation. 
The suppression of class politics has been achieved by 
distinguishing between legal and illegal politics and by 
the selective terror of removing political organisers from 
society. This is the criminalisation of politics. But the 
disciplining of a whole class requires coercion and 
violence on a much larger scale. To exercise maximum 
control, torture has to be built in to the routine 
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operation of the law and the state has to be able to kill. 
Terror must permeate all aspects of working class iife. 
This is the function of the criminal law and it is the 
politicisation of crime. 
CRIMINAL LAW: THE POLITICISATION OF CRIME 
In the introduction to this chapter, it was noted that the 
criminal law enables the state to criminalise a whole 
class, the working class, by criminalising individuals. As 
Althusser has observed on a general level, labour must be 
tutored to lithe rules of morality, civic and professional 
conscience, which actually means rules of respect for the 
socio-technical division of labour and ultimately the rules 
of the order established by class domination" (Althusser 
184: 6). The working class must be forced to conform to a 
pattern of life which involves continuous wage labour. 
Thus, the criminal law in Singapore controls the working 
class by imposing social discipline. 
The rapid changes required in the social formation by the 
industrialisation policies of the PAP-state and foreign 
capital have meant that class struggle and the racial and 
linguistic contradictions within the working class have had 
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to be quickly suppressed. To some extent this has been 
done by other systems of social control, such as education, 
and legitimated by such PAP doctrines as meritocracy and 
racial harmony. But, to secure these rapid changes, 
judicial terror has been required as the final sanction. 
However, neither the PAP-state nor foreign capital can be 
seen directly to torture and kill on a mass scale. The 
judiciary and its separation from the state executive 
produces the necessary ideological effect of a politically 
neutral system of justice. Combined with the 
individualisation of the criminal law, the system of 
judicial administration has the ideological effect of 
ensuring that members of the working class blame themselves 
for the "crimes" they commit. This is not to suggest that 
they do not commit them, or that their "crimes" are morally 
acceptable. Rather, the aim is to point out the politics 
of the system of criminal justice: that conviction and 
punishment for individual offences legitimises, by covering 
it up, a system of social discipline·which mainly operates 
in the interests on one class and against the interests of 
another. This is why "the poor and the propertyless are 
always in some sense on 'the wrong side of the law l , 
whether they actually transgress it or not" (Hall et al. 
1978: 198). 
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Removing Legal Protections Against state Power 
The EOI policy and then the Second Industrial Revolution 
involved, as we have seen, a process of increasing 
exploitation of labour and thus of increasing control. 
This intensification has been reflected in the criminal law 
by the progressive removal of legal protections won by the 
British working class over many decades. By this means, 
the PAP-state has been able to exert more direct control 
over the outcome of criminal cases to ensure that an 
increasingly tight regime of class discipline is enforced. 
There are many examples of this process but we will examine 
some of the landmarks. 
Juries, Hearsay and Self-Incrimination 
In 1960, a year after the PAP took power, jury trial was 
restricted to capital offences only. In 1959, during the 
parliamentary debate, Lee Kuan Yew criticised jury trials 
for the premium they placed on a lawyer's "s:kill and 
agility". He held that IIJudges could make up their minds 
on facts as well as jurymen could, and the amendment would 
bring our system into line with Malaya'sll (Phang 1983: 53). 
In 1969, arguing against the jury system even for capital 
offences, Lee used the partial removal of an obstacle to 
state control as the rationale for its complete removal: 
590 
He was of the view that if judges could not decide 
questions of fact better than jurymen, then "grievous 
harm" was being done every day when single judges and 
magistrates were sitting alone deciding questions of 
fact in civil and criminal cases. Further, the jury 
seemed "overwhelmed with the responsibility of having 
to find a man guiltyll when they knew that the death 
sentence was to follow (Phang 1983: 58). 
The Minister of Law, Mr E.W.Barker (who retired from this 
position only in 1988), spoke of "the unreliability of the 
system of trial by juryll. He said the chief justice and 
other judges supported the abolition, and stated that it 
was inconceivable for the government to "stoop so low" as 
to influence the judges in the absence of a jury system. 
Ten years earlier, in 1959, Mr Barker had assured 
parliament during consideration of the restriction of the 
jury system, that it was not the government's intention 
that the jury system be abolished (Phang 1983: 57-58). In 
1970 the jury system was completely abolished. 
In 1983, in the opinion of one Singapore legal academic 
from the National University of singapore, lithe criminal 
process, slightly over a decade after the abolition of the 
jury system, appears to be functioning extremely smoothly" 
(Phang 1983: 86). The removal of the lIunreliable ll public 
from the judicial process, except as victims, increased the 
power of the PAP-state to secure convictions in criminal 
cases especially when, as we have noted previously, the 
judiciary was directly under the executive's control. This 
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increased power enabled more class agents to be 
criminalised and punished as examples to their class. 
Singapore's non-jury juridical system also may work 
against the poor. Low-income groups typically come 
before the court more frequently than do high-income 
groups, while judges themselves are governmentally 
appointed from the population's elite. Juries, which 
might include members of the lower class, have been 
discontinued (Austin 1989: 924). 
In 1977, further protections were removed: 
The traditional caution given to a person charged with 
an offence was abolished. The courts were enabled, 
with certain exceptions, to accept hearsay evidence. 
Silence on the part of the accused, either when 
charged or in court, can give rise to adverse 
inferences (Josey 1980: 57). 
In a study of lower court criminal cases in 1979 and 1980, 
it was found that defendants with legal representation who 
pleaded not guilty were acquitted in approximately 50 per 
cent of cases. Of those unrepresented, only 20 per cent 
were acquitted. Most of those who pleaded guilty to start 
with were unrepresented and received, on average, more 
severe sentences than those who were represented (Yeo 1981: 
41, 43, 48). since class generally determines the ability 
to pay for legal representation, it is likely that a higher 
proportion of working class people are not only arrested 
for criminal offences but also plead guilty and thus are 
punished most severely. 
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However, the removal of many legal protections renders 
representation a far less potent factor than otherwise 
might be the case. The PAP-state took further steps to 
ensure working class discipline by removing judicial 
discretion in sentencing, thereby enabling the PAP-state 
directly to inflict a higher level of punishment on the 
working class. 
Removing Judicial Discretion 
From 1973, the government began to restrict the 
discretionary powers of judges by legislating for 
mandatory, minimum sentences. The first major legislation 
was the Misuse of Drugs Act which provided minimum 
sentences for drug trafficking and possession. The nature 
of the offence meant that the legislation was not 
controversial. However, mandatory, minimum sentences have 
since been extended to a great number of offences from car 
theft and letting off fireworks to rape, armed robbery and 
murder. The mandatory penalties involved in the sentences 
are mainly fines, imprisonment, corporal and capital 
punishment, with increasing emphasis on the latter two. 
By removing judicial discretion in sentencing, individual 
circumstances cannot be taken into account. Individual 
cases cannot be treated individually: differences of 
background, personality, intention, intellect, and personal 
circumstances are irrelevant. 
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A young adult who, on request, passes a "joint" 
of cannabis to his host at a dinner party will 
receive the same minimum sentence of three years' 
imprisonment and caning as one who peddles small 
amounts of the drug to school children. A youth 
who steals a car hub-cap out of mischief will 
face the same minimum sentence of one year's 
imprisonment as a member of an organised 
syndicate of car thieves. A rejected lover who 
steals an involuntary kiss from his former 
girlfriend in a lift will be punished in the same 
way as a stranger performing the same act (Yeo 
1985: clxxxix-cxc). 
In arguing for mandatory minimum sentences, the Home 
Affairs Minister Jayakumar, a professor of law, stated that 
"the sentences meted out by our courts today appear neither 
to hurt the criminal nor are proportionate to the gravity 
of the offence" (Parliamentary Debates 43/1984: 1864-1865). 
The justifications of deterrence and community protection 
are routinely advanced by government spokespeople for this 
kind of legislation. Undoubtedly the effect of mandatory 
minimum sentences is to insert the power to punish more 
deeply into society. But it is increased power primarily 
to criminalise and punish the working class. While 
individual circumstances related to the offence are not 
taken into account, class circumstances are. The offences 
to which mandatory minimum sentences are applied are 
overwhelmingly "crimes" committed by the working class or, 
because of policing policy, more likely to be detected if 
committed by a working class person. 
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Examples of offences punishable by minimum terms of 
imprisonment and lashes of the cane are: 
PENAL CODE (with effect from 31.8.84) 
Robbery 
- if committed between 7 pm and 7 am 
- attempt 
Assault or using criminal force 
during snatch theft 
Theft of motor car or any part 
(including tyre, accessory or 
equipment) 
Assisting in concealing or receiving 
stolen car (or component) 
Extortion 
outraging modesty, voluntarily causing 
or attempting to cause death, hurt, 
wrongful restraint 
- in a lift or against any person 
under 14 years 
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Min.2 years, Max.10 
years; 
and min. 6 strokes. 
Min.3 years, Max.14 
years; 
and min.12 strokes. 
Min.2 years, Max.7 
years; 
and min. 6 strokes. 
Min.1 year, Max.7 
years; 
and caning 
Min.1 year, Max.7 
years; 
and fine and 
disqualified from 
driving for min. 3 
years after 
release. 
Min.6 months, Max.S 
years and fine. 
Min.2 years, Max.7 
years and caning. 
Min.2 years, Max.10 
years and caning. 
Min. 3 years,Max.10 
years and caning 
Voluntarily causing hurt or putting 
fear of death or hurt in order to 
commit rape with a woman under 14 years Min.8 years, Max.20 
years; 
Dangerous Fireworks Act (with effect 
Letting off dangerous fireworks 
- subsequent offence 
Vandalism Act 
Act (or attempt) of vandalism 
Min.12 strokes. 
from 1.5.88) 
Min.$2,000, 
Max.$10,000 
or Max.2 years or 
both. 
Max. 2 years (no 
fine) and max. 6 
strokes. 
Max.$2,OOO or max.3 
years and min.3 
strokes, max. 8. 
strokes. 
Immigration Act (with effect from 31.3.89) 
No valid entry/re-entry permit Min.3 months, max.2 
years and min. 3 
strokes. 
Over-staying more than 90 days 
Minor Offences Act (with effect from 9 
Touting for business in public place 
- subsequent offence 
As above. 
June 1989) 
Min.$l / OOO , 
max.$5,OOO or 
max.6 months or 
both. 
Min.$2,000, 
max.$10,000 or 
max.1 year or both. 
For drug trafficking and possession (e.g. possession of 
over 15 grams of heroin regardless of circumstances), 
murder (regardless of circumstances) and some firearms 
offences, the mandatory minimum sentence is death by 
hanging. 
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Mandatory sentences give far greater power to the 
prosecution and the police to extract pleas of guilty and 
confessions or to induce defendants to implicate others. 
They "provide prosecutors with too much bargaining power 
with which to influence or even coerce defendants into 
pleading guilty to other [lesser] offences", even if there 
is a good chance of acquittal on the original charge (Yeo 
1985:cxc). That is, they increase state control through 
the criminal law. 
Some lawyers recognise that lImandatory minima are 
regressive, replacing emphasis on individualisation and 
rehabilitation with punitiveness, incapacitation and 
deterrence - sentencing objectives that were common in the 
late 19th century but have proved to be ephemeral" (Yeo 
1985: cxci). But, perhaps what is not so widely 
recognised, is that the political effect (in the short term 
at least) of such legislation is entirely desirable from 
the point of view of the PAP-state. 
By the simple mechanism of passing laws setting mandatory 
minimum sentences for any offence, the PAP-state can now be 
confident that the level of legal repression of the working 
class will be instantaneously increased. Furthermore, the 
inability of judges to take individual circumstances into 
account increases the level of fear because of the 
arbitrary nature of punishment. 
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crime as Struggle 
As we have seen, the accumulation strategy of the PAP-
state's alliance with foreign capital led to intensified 
social dislocation and exploitation of the labour force. 
Non-cooperation with this strategy took many forms; crime 
was one of them. In this sense it is a form of struggle. 
The need for the added repressive capacity of the PAP-state 
to discipline workers during the Second Industrial 
Revolution is indicated by the higher incidence of this 
kind of non-cooperation, an increased crime rate, from the 
mid-1970s until 1980 (Austin 1989: 919). The limiting of 
this tendency can be attributed, not to better community 
cohesion, but to increased control (Austin 1989: 923). By 
1988, Singapore had achieved a comparatively low crime 
rate. 
TABLE 7.1: CRI*E RATE 1987-88 
Serious crimes per 100,000 people 
Japan 2.70 
South Korea 9.10 
Thailand 18.88 
Malaysia 45.26 
Australia 57.88 
Singapore 65.72 
Hongkong 139.20 
USA 225.15 
Source: Interpol figures, Asiaweek 10 August 1990: 11. 
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The removal of legal protections for defendants in criminal 
cases accompanied the process of regulating more of the 
activities of daily life in order to discipline the labour 
force. With fewer defences against conviction, it was more 
open to control . 
... the assumption that a government's use of law and 
control may benefit the middle classes and elite and 
yet be a detriment or misfortune to the lower classes, 
suggests that a conflict-theory approach may yield 
some worthwhile insights .... our findings reveal 
several features of formal justice which hint that 
singapore's law and control may be understood from 
such a perspective. For example, a number of the 
minor laws may tend to discriminate against the lower 
classes. It is true that laws against littering may 
benefit society, but the street worker, for instance, 
labouring under the equatorial sun may find it more 
difficult to avoid tossing a cigarette or spitting 
than would the white-collar worker in an air-
coriditioned office. The laws against picking fruit 
from trees in public parks may work against those 
lower-income street people who frequent parks and who 
may also suffer more from hunger than do higher-income 
groups (Austin 1989: 924). 
These minor laws or administrative requirements which, if 
not followed, result in criminal prosecutions, were 
multiplied in the 1980s in order to discipline the working 
class to "a regime of steady, regular, regulated, unbroken 
wage labour" (Hall et al. 1978: 210) and the social 
behaviour conducive thereto. 
The plethora of petty laws and regulations carrying heavy 
fines or~ other penalties has been multiplied to enforce the 
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officially approved life-style regarding such matters as 
littering, smoking, spitting, hair-length, jay-walking, 
colour of front door, keeping of pets, and type of TV 
aerial. The maximum fine for urinating in a lift was made 
$1,000. On 23 June 1988, The Straits Times reported that a 
man appeared in court for this offence. A "urine sensor" 
activated a jamming mechanism which sealed the man in the 
lift till the police arrived. A video camera in the lift 
"automatically captured the activity inside .... The 
videotape recording of the camera confirmed that [the 
accused] was the culprit." 
The same day, the newspaper announced: lIFailure to flush 
the water-closet and urinal after use is considered a 
public nuisance under the Penal Code, Chapter 224. The 
penalty for committing a public nuisance is a fine of up to 
$200." The photographs of six men, who had been booked by 
undercover environmental health officials for failing to 
flush a public toilet, appeared along with a story on their 
detection. (From 1 July, 1989 the maximum fine for repeated 
offending became $1,000.) 
The publication of photographs in the Straits Times of 
people convicted on minor morals charges became a feature 
of daily life. In June 1991, the newspaper carried the 
picture of a man who was convicted for masturbating in a 
public swimming pool (STW 15 June 1991) and of another who 
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stole women's underwear from a clothes' line (STW 22 June 
1991). Thus,' exemplary justice was extended to cover the 
most personal details of life, criminalising even those 
with psychological disabilities. 
In 1986, legislative changes gave the HOB the right to 
acquire compulsorily an apartment if any authorised 
occupant was convicted of throwing heavy objects out of 
high-rise blocks or of harbouring illegal immigrants (FEER 
14 August 1986: 18). Thus, in addition to the criminal 
penalty, a convicted person could again be penalised by 
executive order. 
On June 21, 1989 a 32 year-old woman who threw three flower 
pots over the balcony of her flat when having a fight with 
her husband, was jailed for 3 weeks. The same day a 24 
year-old man was fined $14,400 for selling fruit without a 
licence on 111 occasions in 1987 and failing to turn up in 
court on 33 occasions. If he could not pay, he would serve 
8 months in jail. Between January and May 21, 1989, 243 
persons were arrested for touting their wares on the street 
(STW 24 June 1989: 5). 
[The government] is bringing in a law under which any 
person who's caught begging twice will be produced 
before the courts, and if he's found guilty - and of 
course what defence can he have, he was begging -
he'll be fined $3,000 and, if he canlt pay that fine, 
and how do you expect a beggar whols begging on the 
road to pay a fine of $3,000, he can go to prison for 
6 months (Opposition leader and lawyer, J B Jeyaretnam 
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speaking on liThe Law Report", No.7, Radio Australia, 
21 February 1989). 
control of all aspects of daily life was thereby extended, 
and criminalisation made more likely by the parallel 
removal of defendants' protections in legal procedure. 
At the same time, the PAP-state moved to ensure that 
disobedience of administrative regulations restricting 
f~eedom of association could be dealt with as criminal 
offences along with burglary and soliciting. For example, 
1989 amendments to the Miscellaneous Offences (Public Order 
and Nuisance) Act, previously the Minor Offences Act, set 
out sUbstantial penalties for anyone who organises or 
assists in organising any assembly or procession which 
proceeds without a police permit or any person who 
participates in the same. The rules of the Act apply to 
any assembly or procession of more than five people in a 
public place intended: 
a) to demonstrate support for or opposition to the 
views of any person; 
b) to publicise a cause or campaign; or 
c) to mark or commemorate any event (Ministry of Home 
Affairs 8250/89: 887). 
If a permit for such an assembly is not obtained from the 
police, then guilt is assumed and a fine of up to $5,000 or 
imprisonment of up to three months or both is imposed. 
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This legislation covers such other npublic order and 
nuisance" matters as parliamentary election meetings 
(similar rules apply), being on private premises without 
lawful excuse, touting and prostitution. Thus increased 
control of daily life was clearly related to the 
suppression of increasing political struggle during the 
1980s as well as to non-cooperation arising from social 
alienation and dislocation. 
Judicial Terror: Torture and Death 
The above laws regulating daily social behaviour are 
additionally secured by the judicial terror of lashes with 
a cane and hanging. The terror imposed by these penalties 
(and executive detention) permeates the whole of society, 
strongly reinforcing obedience to the PAP-state and 
conformity to the discipline of wage labour. 
Torture 
The Singapore Government is not reticent about the details 
of "caning", a term which connotes schoolboy woes but is, 
in fact, a severe form of torture. In 1974, the Director 
of Prisons was interviewed in the local press. 
[He] gave a blow-by-blow account of how criminals are 
caned so that they will walk with scarred bottoms for 
the rest of their lives .... "As executors of this 
punishment, we would be failing in our duty if we did 
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not administer it in the spirit in which it was 
designed," he told a press conference (ST 13 September 
1974) . 
He recounted how warders skilled in martial arts are 
trained for the task, how the cane is prepared and wielded, 
how each stroke splits the buttocks open and they become 
covered in blood, and how the trussed, naked prisoners 
struggle in agony. 
Most of the prisoners put up a violent struggle after 
each of the first three strokes. Mr Quek said: "After 
that, their struggles lessen as they become weaker. 
At the end of the caning, those who receive more than 
three strokes will be in a state of shock. Many will 
collapse .... Many will pretend to faint [in order to 
get a temporary respite from the half-minute interval 
strokes] but they cannot fool the prison medical 
officer" (ST 13 September 1974). 
This punishment has been frequently described as an 
exemplary and appropriate treatment by a no-nonsense 
government: 
Flogging is mandatory for nearly thirty crimes. 
According to the police, caning helps to restrain the 
vicious thug from committing physical violence and 
imposes a stigma on those who have been caned. The 
law exempts women, and men over fifty. Children 
taking part in armed robbery can also be caned, up to 
ten strokes with a light rotan. For adults, the limit 
is twenty-four strokes with a rotan no more than half 
an inch thick (Josey 1980: 56). 
When legislation was passed imposing caning on foreign 
overstayers, Thai officials, concerned about Thai migrant 
workers in Singapore, said such a practice was ubarbaric" 
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and unacceptable in civilised countries (FEER 6 July 1989: 
14). A PAP backbencher, Heng chiang Meng, showing unusual 
fortitude for any PAP member, also called caning a 
"barbaric act". But Trade and Industry Minister, Brig. 
Gen. Lee Hsien Loong denounced this sentiment as "mush" 
(Time 13 March 1989). 
In 1989, an amendment was passed to the Misuse of Drugs Act 
which permitted caning as a disciplinary measure within 
drug rehabilitation centres subject to the discretion of 
the superintendent. In 1991, a man convicted of armed 
robbery stated that he had received 48 strokes of the cane 
in one session on 8 April 1988, double the legal maximum 
(STW 8 June 1991). Also in 1991, a young, working class 
man (Chinese-speaking only), who pleaded guilty to twenty 
charges relating to two cases of robbery and rape, 
requested that his sentence of twenty years jail and 24 
strokes be reduced in return for voluntary castration (STW 
13 July 1991). His request was refused. Such constant 
publicity in the media about the terror this form of 
torture induces, maintains the level of fear among the 
population, as does the extension of the penalty to more 
offences. 
A common justification for caning was to give criminals "a 
taste of the violence they have inflicted on their victims" 
(ST 13 September 1974). But since the penalty has been 
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extended to letting off fireworks, vandalism, immigration 
offences, and drug rehabilitation, this rationale fails. 
Rather, caning has been and is a form of mass torture to 
secure social discipline. 
Death 
Death is not the maximum but the mandatory penalty for 
murder (Section 302, Penal Code), trafficking in certain 
types and quantities of drugs (Misuse of Drugs Act) or 
using firearms in the commission of an offence (Section 4, 
Arms Offences Act). If a person is convicted of one of 
these offences, regardless of the circumstances, the judge 
must impose the death penalty. 
Death sentences may be imposed under other provisions of 
the above acts as well as under the Internal Security Act, 
for treason, for hurting or imprisoning the President and 
for perjury which results in the execution of another 
person. 
As with caning, the number of capital offences is 
constantly on the increase. On March 27, 1989, Home 
Affairs Minister, Professor S. Jayakumar, stated in 
parliament that the government was considering making 
cannabis trafficking a hanging offence. Trafficking 
includes "to give without any connotation of monetary 
benefit" under the Misuse of Drugs Act. In December that 
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year, death was made the mandatory penalty for possession 
of more than 30 grams of cocaine, 200 grams of hashish, 500 
grams of cannabis and 1.2 kilograms of opium. The capital 
sentence previously applied only to fifteen grams of heroin 
and 30 grams of morphine (STW 2 December 1989). 
Executions by hanging are carried out at the Changi Prison 
across the runway from Singapore International Airport. 
Hangings are routinely announced in the newspapers. 
Accurate statistics are hard to obtain as those provided by 
the government may be incomplete. However, according to 
the PAP-state, 45 people have been convicted of capital 
drugs charges since 1975, of whom 28 have already been 
hanged (STW 19 May 1990). There must be considerably more 
awaiting trial or under appeal, judging from the regular 
arrests for trafficking announced in the media. Total 
figures for executions on other capital charges, such as 
murder, have not been obtainable. 
POLITICS IS CRIME, CRIME IS POLITICS 
The pattern of the law's development in Singapore is 
closely related to the PAP-state's phases of 
industrialisation. The social alienation and political 
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struggles arising from increasing exploitation of workers 
have required intensified social control. The law has 
provided the means to impose social and political 
discipline by constantly escalating coercion and terror. 
The PAP-state now exercises direct control through both 
administrative and criminal law. In destroying political 
organisation, the administrative law has given the PAP-
state discretionary power to act according to its own 
timing and political strategy. Ideologically, it has been 
able to claim its actions are in the interest of the nation 
as a whole. 
In criminalising working class indiscipline, the removal of 
judicial discretion and of defendants' legal protections 
has enabled the government to increase the severity of 
punishments and to assert discipline more directly. The 
ideological effect of the "independence" of the judiciary 
has preserved the legitimacy of the civil law for foreign 
investors and of the state for the working class. 
Permeating the whole system of administration of the law is 
the terror of indefinite detention without trial, state 
torture and state killing. These are the final sanctions 
of the PAP-state's complex system of social control. 
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The ideological result of this process is that crime and 
politics are now almost indistinguishable. Both have 
become offences against the government. crime is not an 
offence against society but against the state. Politics is 
feared like a crime because it also attracts the penalty of 
state terror. In this context, it is possible to 
comprehend observers who label Singapore as a "city of 
fear" (Buruma 1988). 
I have never met a more political people. They are 
political with a small "p", in that everyone is 
calculating their lives and actions in accordance with 
real or imagined hierarchies of power, worrying who is 
listening and how it will reflect higher up the 
hierarchy (Ladley 1987). 
In advanced capitalist countries, there is a social space 
between ruling class social norms (regarded as civilised 
society) and the direct political interest of this class in 
social discipline. The outer limit of this space is 
demarcated by the threshold of illegality. Within this 
space, working class life styles, community politics and 
non-violent protest can exist. In Singapore, the 
boundaries of ruling class social norms, political interest 
in social control and the threshold of illegality have all 
been made to coincide in order to eliminate this social 
space and to control the working class to the maximum 
degree. This arrangement has been secured by the use of 
terror on a mass scale. 
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MILITARY FORCE: THE ULTIMATE COERCIVE GUARANTEE 
If political struggle cannot be suppressed by the law, the 
military can legally kill in the name of the state. 
Military violence is the ultimate guarantee of the PAP-
state's accumulation strategy and the final sanction of its 
system of social control. The maintenance of a standing 
military force is justified as protecting the state from 
external attack and internal subversion. 
Internally, the constant threat of overwhelming state 
violence reinforces less coercive mechanisms of social 
control, such as public housing l education and 
parliamentarism. Furthermore, in preparing for the use of 
military force externally, civilian life in Singapore can 
be militarised and workers placed under permanent military-
type discipline. 
secondly, strong armed forces linked to imperialist 
military power provide a guarantee regionally for an 
accumulation strategy also pursued through an alliance with 
imperialism. The military form of the alliance reflects 
its economic form. We will examine both the local and 
regional levels of military coercion. 
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Militarisation of Singapore society 
By being conscripted into the military, the working class 
assists in enforcing its own submission. As indicated 
already, all males must enter National Service on reaching 
the age of eighteen years for a period of two to two and a 
half years. Most are conscripted into the armed forces, 
the rest into the police, fire brigade and construction 
brigade (GOS 1989a: 172). After completion of training, 
they remain in the reserves until the age of 40 years (or 
50 years for officers) and serve in the military (or the 
police) for up to 40 days per year. 
About 80 per cent of the Singapore Armed Forces are 
reservists. They are liable for call-up at any time and 
have to keep the Ministry of Defence informed of their 
whereabouts should they go overseas. Reservists can obtain 
passports with a maximum validity of two years compared to 
the normal ten year validity, and exit permits have to be 
obtained from the Ministry if reservists intend leaving for 
longer than six months. A closer watch has been kept on 
the movements of reservists since the computerisation of 
immigration records (STW 17 March 1990). 
The active armed forces now number about 55,000 plus 
reserves of 200,000 and a People's Defence Force of 30,000. 
The civil Defence Force of 100,000 includes regulars, 
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conscripts, volunteers and 34,000 former army reservists 
(GOS 1989a: 171-6, 179, 228-9; Asia Yearbook 1989: 214). 
Between 1967 and 1985, more than a quarter of a million 
males received intensive military training (Seah 1989: 
954). Thus, most of the male population between 18 years 
and 40 years is under military discipline, and most of the 
remainder is under paramilitary discipline. 
National Service is primarily a way of disciplining the 
working class and containing local political struggle. The 
external defence capabilities of the singapore Armed Forces 
depend more on technical ability than on size. However, a 
state of overt military preparedness no doubt gives greater 
confidence to foreign investors that the PAP-state is ready 
to meet both internal and external threats while enabling 
the PAP-state to continue to generate a crisis atmosphere. 
Thus the government has opposed suggestions to shorten the 
training period for National Service. 
A shorter period of NS may erode confidence in 
Singapore and affect economic growth, Brig Gen 
(Reservist) Lee Hsien Loong has said. This is because 
the reduced security resulting from this could cause 
the manufacturing and financial sectors to shrink as 
investors turn elsewhere (STW 17 March 1990). 
The Working Class Barracks 
In Chapter Four we noted many aspects of the militarisation 
of the public housing estates, from their architecture and 
physical position to community organisation and methods of 
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surveillance within them. We noted too that housing 
estates are the barracks of worker-soldiers who live under 
military discipline, making Singapore into both a vast 
military base and a labour camp. 
In addition, there are also military or paramilitary 
activities within the estates which residents are forced to 
participate in. For example, community exercises are held 
regularly to prepare. for emergencies, from street 
demonstrations to the outbreak of war. In 1989 a civil 
defence exercise was held involving 236,000 households in 
water cuts and food rationing (STW 13 May 1989), and 
military exercises impinging on civilian life are regularly 
held for such purposes as the requisitioning of civilian 
vehicles, the immediate mobilisation of reservists or the 
use of public expressways for landing jet-fighters (Seah 
1989: 957). To maintain the atmosphere of crisis which 
justifies such a scale of military activity, large 
underground bomb shelters are routinely constructed under 
housing blocks (STW 7 July 1990) and air raid sirens are to 
be installed in all areas by 1992 (STW 21 January 1989). 
The Kilitarisation of Education and Ideology 
Secondary schools students receive military or paramilitary 
training through the National Cadet Corps or other 
uniformed services between the ages of 13 and 16 years. 
Such training may be chosen as one of three extra-
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curricular options, the others being sport and cultural 
activities (GOS 1989: 187). Military training has to be 
taken seriously. It is counted towards final marks in 
school. 
Eligibility for officer training in National Service is 
related to scholastic record and ensures that the structure 
of the armed forces reflects the class structure of society 
as a whole. The officers are from the upper and middle 
classes, and the working class co~stitutes the other ranks. 
Thus, military training reinforces the power relation that 
the working class must obey the capitalist class. 
As National Service comes between school and employment, 
the PAP-state has also instructed civilian employers to 
take into account NS performance (e.g. rank attained) in 
recruitment and evaluation (Seah 1989: 952), thereby 
further entrenching the results of the education system's 
sorting of class agents into their appropriate positions. 
The PAP-state's ideology of Total Defence is propagandised 
throughout the school system as well as in National Service 
training. It provides the formal ideological basis for the 
militarisation of civilian life and consists of five 
elements, each the responsibility of a particular ministry: 
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TOTAL DEFENCE 
Psychological Defence 
Information 
Social Defence 
Economic Defence 
civil Defence 
Military Defence 
MINISTRY 
communications and 
Community Development 
(includes social welfare, 
People's Association, 
political feedback unit). 
Trade and Industry 
Home Affairs (includes police 
and Internal Security Dept.) 
Defence 
Source: GOS 1989a: 171, 234-7. 
This ideology integrates all aspects of civilian life into 
a military strategy which politicises all behaviour as 
either for or against the PAP-state. 
The patriarchal exclusion of women from National Service, 
from the habits of unquestioning obedience and from the 
high level of exposure to Total Defence propaganda has 
occasionally been raised as a reason for their prominence 
in political struggles in the 1980s. It has also been said 
that child-bearing and rearing constitutes their National 
Service. 
The Militarisation of Governance 
In the unlikely event that parliamentary political struggle 
should threaten the political hegemony of the capitalist 
class, a final option is military rule. The systematic 
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preparation which appears to be under way for this 
eventuality may be to reassure foreign investors, or it may 
simply be that the armed forces are the best source of 
obedient technocrats. Whatever the reasons, military 
officers are being trained in civilian administration and 
politics. 
This development is presented by Vasil as a way of ensuring 
that lithe military did not feel left out" and therefore did 
not simply take over as in other Third World countries. 
This explanation is derived from Rajaratnam's statement to 
vasil in 1983: 
We definitely intend to introduce the military element 
into the Cabinet and Parliament .... The intention is to 
give them direct participation in Parliament and the 
Cabinet. If they are directly represented in the 
highest levels of decision-making, they can't blame 
the politicians for the mess. They would form part of 
the ruling class (Vasil 1984: 188). 
Vasil also relates this policy to "one of the key overall 
objectives of obtaining a dispersal of power" into a 
variety of institutions in order to protect singapore in 
the future. He further quotes Rajaratnam as saying, 
"Anybody who wants to seize power now has not only to just 
set up a political party. Jeyaretnam, after the by-
election, has been finding it out" (Vasil 1984: 188-189). 
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Brigadier-General Lee Hsien Loong, Deputy Prime Minister 
and the son of Lee Kuan Yew, is the main link between the 
PAP and the military. Observers have noted the 
militarisation of Singapore1s politics and bureaucracy as a 
consolidation of B-G Lee's political and administrative 
base. It has been noted that 
this trend could have fundamental long-term 
consequences for politics in the republic and that the 
ascendancy of [the junior] Lee - lynchpin for the 
Mindef/ex-army officer group - to the heights of power 
may be quicker than expected (FEER 20 April 1989: 33). 
By 1989, military officers or former defence officials, 
many of them contemporaries of B-G Lee, occupied posts in 
the cabinet as well as such positions as permanent 
secretary of Home Affairs (controlling the police and the 
Internal Security Dept), chief of the Central Provident 
Fund (administering the compulsory pension fund for 
employees of $32 billion), the director of the ISD and the 
chairman of the Economic Development Board. The government 
was also continuing its policy of placing military officers 
throughout the civil service for two-year assignments, of 
giving the armed forces higher pay rises than the civil 
service and almost as many scholarships as the entire civil 
service (FEER 20 April 1989: 33). 
Whether this mixing of military and civilian administration 
is to implicate the military in current government or to 
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prepare for military government or both, it remains a last 
option. If taken l this path involves no conflict between 
legitimacy and governance, since the right to rule is 
bestowed by supreme military force. However, it would be 
difficult for the military to improve on the oppressive 
system of social control already in force in Singapore. 
securing Singapore's Regional Role 
The military alliance between the PAP-state and the US has 
enabled the Singapore Armed Forces to obtain a technical 
ability in advance of its neighbours. It has upgraded its 
"poison shrimp" military strategy (i. e. swallow at your 
peril) to the "porcupine ll strategy (think twice about the 
cost of attack) with its purchase of early warning aircraft 
and the latest US combat aircraft. By the end of 1986 1 
Singapore already had more combat aircraft than Malaysia 
and Indonesia combined (Asia Yearbook 1988: 224). It is 
constantly upgrading its defence capability; for example, 
in 1990 it acquired Hawk surface-to-air missiles (STW 19 
May 1990). 
The PAP-state's defence expenditure as a percentage of GOP 
is similar to that of the other Asian NICs, with the 
exception of Hongkong which still has the direct backing of 
the British armed forces. PAP leaders state that defence 
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spending will stay at around six per cent of GDP. However, 
even one of its own backbenchers has pointed out that this 
is a nominal figure which leaves out "hidden" items (STW 17 
March 1990). Singapore's defence spending has been rising 
rapidly as a proportion of government spending. 
TABLE 7.2: COMPARATIVE DEFENCE EXPENDITURE 1990 
singapore Taiwan S Korea Hongkong 
% GDP 5.1 5.2 4.7 1.6 
% Budget 36.7 20.1 27.9 12.5 
Source: Asia Yearbook 1991: 9. 
TABLE 7.3: SINGAPORE DEFENCE EXPENDITURE 1985-90 
% GDP ~ 0 BUDGET 
1985 6.25 12.7 
1986 6.25 15.4 
1987 12.6 
1988 5.7 21. 00 
1989 4.8 27.00 
1990 5.1 36.7 
Source: Asia Yearbook 1986-91. 
Table 7.3 shows that the PAP-state began to spend much more 
on defence once the 1985 recession had been overcome and 
high growth rates returned. The reason for this lies in 
the ambiguity surrounding US strategic intentions in the 
region. singapore sought to boost its capabilities to 
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compensate for these uncertainties. Hence also its attempt 
to improve regional military relationships through 
exercises with Malaysia and Indonesia (STW 27 May 1989) and 
its more positive statements about a future role for Japan 
(STW 4 May 1991). 
If the US significantly cuts back its military forces 
in the region, this will not be a signal for Singapore 
also to reduce our forces. It will be reason for 
concern over a potentially destabilising change in the 
regional balance of power, one which may lead to other 
significant powers playing a more active role in the 
region .... No other Asean country is slashing its 
defence expenditures, demobilising its armed forces or 
acting on the assumption that it no longer faces any 
external security threats. It would be foolhardy for 
Singapore alone to do so (B-G Lee in STW 24 February 
1990). 
The PAP-state now faces another transition. It began its 
EOI accumulation strategy with British security guarantees. 
This soon moved to a reliance on US military power. Now 
the PAP-state finds the more complex situation of multi-
polar imperialism may require a multi-lateral approach to 
securing imperialist military support. Its agreement to 
have a US military presence in singapore on a regular basis 
(STW 17 November 1990) can be seen as a transitional 
measure. 
The regional political implications of this invitation to 
the US and the constant references by PAP leaders to 
threats from irrational leaders and irrational forces from 
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other countries have been well understood by Singapore's 
neighbours. 
"Many Malaysians cannot help but feel that the 
Singapore leadership may be referring to Malaysia, 
perhaps Indonesia too, and what it sees as a threat 
from the forces of Islam or Malay nationalism," the 
UMNO vice-president and former defence minister [of 
Malaysia] said. Describing Singapore as the "most 
densely defended country in the world", Datuk 
Abdullah ... said, "When you want to host US facilities 
here and when we perceive that you see us as a threat 
to your existence and your stability, then of course 
we see that the offer is directed as a deterrence 
against us. You are telling us: What you see is this 
sea of hostile Malays surrounding you and you are 
saying: 'Hey, don't meddle with us, we have the 
Americans behind us'. We feel a little hurt, a little 
suspicious of your intentions and motives, a little 
doubtful of your sense of commitment to Asean and the 
concept of the Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality 
(Zopfan) and your sense of good neighbourliness" (STW 
2 September 1989). 
Thus, the PAP-state's regional military role remains that 
of securing an accumUlation strategy pursued in alliance 
with foreign capital. As we have seen, this strategy 
involves facilitating imperialist exploitation of the 
working classes in neighbouring countries as well as its 
own. Local capital in Singapore also has interests in low-
wage production in neighbouring countries which it wants to 
secure. 
Thus, the ultimate sanction of military force functions at 
both the local and regional levels. Locally, 
militarisation is mainly a means of enforcing worker 
discipline and state violence is routinely mediated on a 
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mass scale through the law. Regionally, Singapore's arms 
build-up not only acts as a military deterrent but 
heightens communalism thereby diverting attention from the 
social consequences of Singapore's role in facilitating 
foreign capital's penetration. 
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CONCLUSION 
THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF SOCIAL CONTROL IN SINGAPORE 
This study has focused on several major institutions in 
Singapore through which the social welfare system, 
parliamentarism and state violence function to suppress 
struggles and induce the population to conform to the 
requirements of the PAP-state alliance with foreign 
capital. The main periods of capital accumulation, social 
regulation and political struggles have shown that social 
control in Singapore must be seen primarily as a response 
to people's resistance to exploitation. The outcomes of 
political struggles then place limits on future capital 
accumulation and themselves establish the context for 
future struggles. Struggle is thus the independent 
variable which has shaped the forms of regulation. 
Social relations are always regulated in many ways, but in 
Singapore different institutions have predominated at 
different times as the forms of popular resistance have 
changed. Also, some institutions have suppressed struggle 
in a variety of ways at different times. As a result of 
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this detailed study, we can now identify the nature of this 
relationship between forms of struggle and forms of 
regulation during each phase of Singapore's economic 
development. 
Anti-Imperialist struggle and Military Violence (1945-59) 
In the postwar pre-independence period, British 
imperialism's regulatory response to the strong anti-
imperialist nationalist movement in Singapore and Malaya 
was large-scale military violence and police-state tactics 
to preserve an accumulation strategy of direct colonial 
plunder. But the partnership between the anti-imperialist 
forces in Singapore and the Lee faction of the capitalist 
class, together with the general decline of British 
imperialism in the face of struggles elsewhere in the 
empire, precipitated changes in both accumulation and 
regulation strategies in order to defeat the left and to 
protect the profitability of British investment. The 
nationalist struggle had developed to the point where 
British capital and Western strategic interests could be 
preserved only by an accommodation with bourgeois political 
forces and by supporting the import sUbstitution 
industrialisation policy designed to strengthen the local 
capitalist class. Thus struggles in Singapore and in other 
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colonies undermined existing strategies and led to the 
1959-65 period of transition to a neo-colony. 
Parliamentary opposition and The Law (1960-65) 
state regulatory power was therefore transferred to the Lee 
faction which, while allied to the anti-imperialist 
movement, had manoeuvred to establish an alliance with 
British capital. After 1961, the PAP-state faced a strong 
and legal mass-based political opposition against which it 
used all the repressive legislative measures bequeathed by 
the British colonial state. Violence was mediated through 
legal coercion during this period, when the PAP-state 
consolidated its political hegemony. The law was used to 
declare legal organisations illegal and to render their 
leadership vulnerable to attack by the security police. 
Parliamentary opposition members, trade unions leaders, 
journalists and other community leaders were politically 
neutralised by means of detention without trial in order to 
secure the PAP's parliamentary dominance and thus the 
legitimacy of its grip on state power. Welfare 
institutions were also used to suppress organised political 
opposition and to destroy working class organisation in a 
violent way under the sanction of law. For example, public 
housing was implemented by forced resettlement and 
education was restructured by coercive measures against 
Chinese educational institutions. 
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The continued high level of violence and coercion was 
related to the Lee faction's lack of a reliable base in the 
weak local bourgeoisie. However, over the ensuing decades, 
as organised working class struggle was increasingly 
neutralised and local capital gained a greater interest in 
PAP hegemony, state violence was directed more towards 
disciplining workers to regular wage labour than to 
breaking up their political organisations. 
Worker Militancy and Welfare (1966-78) 
The suppression of left-wing political organisation enabled 
the PAP to monopolise control of parliament, a development 
which caused it virtually to disappear from public view for 
fifteen years because it was no longer the main site of 
political struggle. However, there remained a lower class 
with a tradition of militancy, with social cohesiveness 
stemming from linguistic and ethnic affiliations, and with 
a degree of economic independence derived from alternative 
means of sUbsistence. These gave it the ability to resist 
the export-oriented industrialisation strategy pursued by 
the PAP~state, which required cheap, obedient labourers. 
Thus during the period 1966-78, the institutions of public 
housing and education occupied centre stage. They forced a 
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new degree of social stratification by cutting away social 
roots and by ensuring that access to welfare depended on 
working for transnational corporations. Alternative means 
of livelihood to wage labour were progressively denied. It 
became increasingly difficult to find any house except an 
HDB flat, and this could only be paid for by wage labour. 
Without educational qualifications, it became more 
difficult to find a job which paid enough to buy the 
essentials of life. Access to housing and education was 
controlled by the PAP-state and depended upon selling one's 
labour power to foreign capital. 
The rapid sorting of the population into a rigid class 
system, which was achieved during this phase, helped to 
consolidate the PAP-state's alliance with foreign capital 
and to bring a period of sustained economic growth. The 
law continued to be used to crush the remnants of political 
opposition, especially in the press and educational 
institutions. 
Non-cooperation and Par1iamentarism (1978-85) 
But the many contradictions created by the fragmentation of 
the working class gave rise to new struggles when the 
Second Industrial Revolution was launched in the late 
1970s. There was a sudden increase in exploitation and, 
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despite the PAP-state's pervasive system of social control, 
people increasingly refused to cooperate. This non-
cooperation took various forms and even included elements 
of the middle class. Workers did not reach the new 
productivity goals. Women widely refused to follow the 
state-breeding policy. students did not perform to the 
required levels educationally. Malays attempted to rebuild 
their communities. People resented the control exerted by 
the HDB over their lives. This general resistance surfaced 
through increased electoral dissent and the election of 
opposition members to parliament. The new accumulation 
strategy failed and the PAP-state faced a crisis of 
legitimacy in the mid-1980s. 
The 1980s were characterised by parliament once again 
becoming an important forum for political contest. While 
strengthening its control elsewhere, the PAP-state 
attempted to domesticate and control this dissent by giving 
it vent within parliamentary politics. It tied access to 
welfare more tightly to political loyalty. To discipline 
the working class into higher productivity, the PAP-state 
raised the level of mass violence administered through the 
law, increasing the offences which drew sentences of 
official torture and execution. It built up its military 
training. 
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Bourgeois Dissent and the Privatisation of Politics 
(1985-90) 
Since 1985, with the reversion to the export-oriented 
industrialisation policy, the PAP-state has largely been 
able to re-assert its authority over the working class. 
However, the urban bourgeoisie now wants the substance as 
well as the forms of liberal democratic political rights to 
be fully tolerated. The rise of local capital and the 
growth of a middle class concentrated in the service sector 
confronts the PAP-state with a challenge from within its 
own class. 
The PAP-state faces the danger of a democratically-inclined 
fraction of the capitalist class building an electoral 
alliance with elements of a resentful working class, just 
as the Lee group did in the 1950s. The development of 
capitalism in Singapore may come into conflict with the 
rights of the individual increasingly proclaimed by the 
bourgeois meritocracy. 
To date the PAP-state has moved to counter this potential 
threat to its control and to shore up its legitimacy 
through shifting public political accountability away from 
the PAP. Partly to address this threat, an elected 
presidency has been created to take the central powers of 
governance away from parliament. The PAP's Central 
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Executive committee can now govern through the presidency, 
even in the unlikely event that it is forced to permit 
another bourgeois party to win a parliamentary majority. 
One response to the problem of entrenched working class 
disaffection has been the privatisation of education which 
is the pathway to jobs and housing. This shift removes the 
PAP-state from direct responsibility for forcing the 
working class into wage labour by failing their children at 
school. 
Multi-polar Imperialism and Militarisation (from 1985) 
The end of super-power rivalry, owing both to worldwide 
struggles and to the emergence of a new multi-polar 
imperialism, has precipitated a shift in the PAP-state's 
strategy of regional social control. Although still 
reliant on its military alliance with the US, it must now 
conclude a more complex multilateral alliance with Japan 
and the EC as well. Also, the end of the cold War has laid 
bare the main source of international conflict: the 
exploitation of neo-colonies by advanced capitalist 
countries. Singapore's role as a facilitator of this 
exploitation in its own region is in danger of being 
further exposed. Even while strengthening its military 
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capability, it has therefore sought economic and military 
accommodations with Malaysia and Indonesia. 
The Success of PAp-state Social Control 
A pattern has emerged from this periodisation of forms of 
struggle and forms of social control. It is now possible 
to identify the successes and failures of social control 
and to summarise the main ways in which it has perpetuated 
capital's dominance over labour in Singapore. PAP-state 
regulation has: 
1. Fragmented the working class and minority races in order 
to integrate them into capitalist social relations; 
2. Guaranteed working class sUbsistence on the condition of 
political loyalty; 
3. Reproduced labour power by means of education and public 
housing, state-breeding programmes and migrant workers; 
4. Made middle class social advancement conditional on 
political conformity; 
5. Extracted the semblance of popular consent, especially 
through providing social welfare and 'through 
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parliamentarismi 
6. compelled compliance by constructing a powerful 
apparatus of state violence mediated through the law and 
the military; 
7. Secured singapore's regional role by aggressive 
militarisation and manipulation of communalism. 
These are SUbstantial achievements aptly described by 
Salaff's reference to the impact of welfare. 
These many changes ... enable even hard-pressed families 
to have a more tldecenttl life as measured by services 
and consumer goods. We can readily understand why the 
poor and people of modest means believe that public 
housing, a new school system, and small families give 
them more freedom. Small wonder that they accept the 
yoke of the market economy and view the social 
services as tools that liberate rather than oppress 
them. The market and centralised services integrate 
the full range of families into a single industrial 
way of life .... [T]he market has claimed a tighter hold 
on all of them. They aim for recognisably similar 
goals and attempt to use the same means to attain 
them: the public services (Salaff 1988: 269). 
This integration of the working class into the disciplined 
routine, the economic dependence and the ideological 
framework of capitalist social relations occurred rapidly 
enough for the export-oriented industrialisation 
accumulation strategy to succeed over more than two 
decades. 
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Furthermore, the idiosyncratic leadership of Lee Kuan Yew 
must be counted as a success. The authority he wielded and 
the fear of disobedience that he generated have been widely 
recognised locally and internationally as well as by the 
man himself. Expressing his displeasure with the 1984 
election results, Lee stated: 
They [the people] know they are unlikely to make any 
dent on me. Singaporeans know by now what kind of 
person I am (Asia Yearbook 1986: 226). 
However, his personal presence has mainly ~een significant 
in how he set up a system of social control which can now 
survive without him. As a bourgeois nationalist who rode 
to power on the backs of popular forces only to take 
control of the state for his own class, Lee is 
unexceptional in the history of decolonisation. As an 
opportunist who failed to gain control of the larger 
Malaysian political stage, he can also be considered a 
failure. However, as leader of a faction which held on to 
power through its alliance with imperialism, he was the 
successful architect and builder of a comprehensive system 
of social control which will outlast him. The system he 
created has already suppressed struggle long enough for the 
PAP-state to take full advantage of the export-oriented 
industrialisation strategy. 
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Failures and Weaknesses 
The most obvious failure of the PAP-state's system of 
social control is that repression has led to new forms of 
resistance, especially when the level of exploitation is 
suddenly increased. Working class organisation in the form 
of trade unions was demolished in the 1960s, but working 
class struggle re-emerged through non-cooperation both in 
the workplace (job-hopping) and outside it (refusal to 
learn technical and linguistic skills, electoral dissent 
and crime). Chinese education was suppressed in order to 
fragment working class identity but English-medium 
education has given greater access to liberal democratic 
ideas and to the international media. other struggles have 
been only temporarily contained but not overcome. Malay 
alienation and resentment remains at a high level. 
This failure stems partly from the PAP-state's attempt to 
use particular institutions to combat a wide variety of 
struggles all at once. The education system was used to 
change the linguistic habits of the entire population, to 
alter breeding patterns, to dissipate ethnic loyalties, and 
to enforce moral discipline - all while sorting people into 
their appropriate class positions. Contradictions arose 
between these regulatory goals, and the education system 
failed to produce the skilled labour force necessary for 
the accumulation strategy of the Second Industrial 
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Revolution. PAP legitimacy was undermined in the process 
and privatisation of education was pursued to restore it. 
But even this may raise new contradictions. 
[The government's] fondness for mUlti-purpose measures 
extending over a plurality of policy sectors may 
sometimes cause privatisation in one sector to subvert 
government leverage in others (Sandhu and Wheatley 
1989: 1093). 
social control has created both new divisions and new forms 
of unity resulting from new struggles. These struggles are 
manifestations of the fundamental conflict between capital 
and labour. The increasing levels of exploitation required 
by capital continue to demand greater and different 
regulatory efforts. With singapore's highly centralised 
system of social control, each new crisis threatens to 
unravel the entire system of regulation. To decentralise 
the system is not really an alternative, since the PAP-
state would lose its ability to direct the labour force in 
ways which have given capital in Singapore its competitive 
edge. 
Overcoming Social Control 
The PAP~state has been forced to adapt to the resurgence of 
electoral dissent by permitting genuine political contest 
in parliament. But it is simultaneously strengthening its 
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control in other areas. It is keeping a firm hold on the 
provision of welfare, especially housing and education 
(despite the "privatisation" of the latter). It is 
ensuring continued Chinese racial dominance and it is 
sustaining a hierarchy in the fragmented working class 
through the importation of 200,000 foreign workers. 
Finally, through the build-up of its military capacity and 
the increasing links between the military and civilian 
administrations, the final guarantee of PAP supremacy. 
remains available. The recent unnecessary killing of 
hijackers at Changi Airport is a sign that the PAP-state 
does not hesitate to use ultimate force (STW 30 March 
1991). 
Even in the light of these trends, there are some ways that 
social control might be overcome. We have already noted 
that the removal of some powers of government from 
parliament to the elected president leaves the way open for 
another bourgeois party to gain a majority in parliament. 
The PAP can still protect its interests through the 
president. Thus, the pursuit of electoral objectives by 
bourgeois parties may now be more realistic than before. 
The PAP will not easily give way, but it may calculate that 
it is better to do so before a party with real working 
class links emerges more strongly. The current preference 
given to the Singapore Democratic Party over the Workers' 
Party already signals this priority. Therefore, the 
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capitalist class in Singapore has a possibility of securing 
enhanced liberal democratic rights for itself. 
But the working class is not likely to be permitted by any 
bourgeois government to organise autonomously, either 
within the workplace or outside it, as this would threaten 
the export-oriented industrialisation strategy in which the 
capitalist class now has a considerable investment. 
However, more concessions in terms of wage levels and 
working conditions might be granted, but this would be at 
the expense of the workers of neighbouring countries whose 
cheap labour is increasingly exploited by the PAP-state. 
Working class struggle in Singapore is unlikely to alter 
the fundamental nature of capitalist social relations until 
there is a much deeper political and economic crisis, both 
within the major imperialist countries and within the 
region, particularly Malaysia and Indonesia. Although some 
writers claim that there is already such a crisis (Bello 
and Rosenfeld 1990: 336-7), it is difficult to see it as an 
immediate threat to the PAP-state's economic policies. The 
priority for working class struggle in Singapore must be 
the long-term building of links with workers in Malaysia 
and Indonesia and the overcoming of communalism. The 
social effects of PAP collaboration with foreign capital 
may then become more widely understood, and local struggles 
can be pursued in the awareness of their contribution to 
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limiting exploitation throughout the region. However, such 
questions are beyond the scope of this thesis which has 
only set the scene for their more systematic consideration. 
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